throbber
Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 1 of 100 PageID #:
`5029
`
`
`
`
`EXHIBIT M
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 1 of 99 PageID #: 4122Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 2 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5030
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`___________________________________
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`v.
`
`WAZE MOBILE LTD.,
`___________________________________
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,
`INC.
`
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`

`

` CASE NO. 2:19-CV-361-JRG

`

`

`

`

`

`

` CASE NO. 2:19-CV-359-JRG

`

`

`

`

`

`

` CASE NO. 2:19-CV-362-JRG

`

`

`

`

`
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
`
`
`
`
`Before the Court is the Opening Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 116) filed by
`
`Plaintiff AGIS Software Development LLC (“Plaintiff” or “AGIS”). Also before the Court is the
`
`Responsive Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 120) filed by Defendants Google LLC, Waze
`
`Mobile Ltd., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
`
`(“Defendants”) as well as Plaintiff’s reply (Dkt. No. 123). The Court held a hearing on
`
`October 30, 2020.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 2 of 99 PageID #: 4123Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 3 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5031
`
`Table of Contents
`
`I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 4
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 5
`III. AGREED TERMS............................................................................................................... 11
`IV. DISPUTED TERMS ............................................................................................................ 11
`A. “selected response” ............................................................................................................. 11
`B. “the response list” ............................................................................................................... 17
`C. “a response list” ................................................................................................................... 23
`D. “recipient PDA/cell phone” and “sender PDA/cell phone” ................................................ 26
`E. “A method of receiving, acknowledging and responding to a forced message alert from
`a sender PDA/cell phone to a recipient PDA/cell phone, wherein the receipt,
`acknowledgment, and response to said forced message alert is forced by a forced
`message alert software application program, said method comprising the steps of:” ........ 30
`F. “a data transmission means that facilitates the transmission of electronic files between
`said PDA/cell phones in different locations” ...................................................................... 35
`G. “means for attaching a forced message alert software packet to a voice or text message
`creating a forced message alert that is transmitted by said sender PDA/cell phone, said
`forced message alert software packet containing a list of possible required responses
`and requiring the forced message alert software on said recipient PDA/cell phone to
`transmit an automatic acknowledgement to the sender PDA/cell phone as soon as said
`forced message alert is received by the recipient PDA/cell phone” ................................... 41
`H. “means for requiring a required manual response from the response list by the recipient
`in order to clear recipient’s response list from recipient’s cell phone display” .................. 46
`I. “means for receiving and displaying a listing of which recipient PDA/cell phones have
`automatically acknowledged the forced message alert and which recipient PDA/cell
`phones have not automatically acknowledged the forced message alert” .......................... 51
`J. “means for periodically resending said forced message alert to said recipient PDA/cell
`phones that have not automatically acknowledged the forced message alert” ................... 55
`K. “means for receiving and displaying a listing of which recipient PDA/cell phones have
`transmitted a manual response to said forced message alert and details the response
`from each recipient PDA/cell phone that responded” ........................................................ 59
`L. “means for transmitting the acknowledgment of receipt to said sender PDA/cellphone
`immediately upon receiving a force message alert from the sender PDA/cellphone” ....... 62
`M. “means for controlling of the recipient PDA/cellphone upon transmitting said
`automatic acknowledgment and causing, in cases where the forced message alert is a
`text message, the text message and a response list to be shown on the display of the
`recipient PDA/cellphone or causes, in cases where the forced message alert is a voice
`message, the voice message being periodically repeated by the speakers of the
`recipient PDA/cellphone while said response list is shown on the display” ...................... 68
`
`
`
`
`2 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 3 of 99 PageID #: 4124Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 4 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5032
`
`N. “means for allowing a manual response to be manually selected from the response list
`or manually recorded and transmitting said manual response to the sender PDA/cell
`phone” ................................................................................................................................. 73
`O. “means for clearing the text message and a response list from the display of the
`recipient PDA/cell phone or stopping the repeating voice message and clearing the
`response list from the display of the recipient PDA/cell phone once the manual
`response is transmitted” ...................................................................................................... 77
`P. “spatial coordinates” ............................................................................................................ 81
`Q. “Short Message Service (SMS) messages” ......................................................................... 86
`R. “facilitating initiation of Internet Protocol (IP) based communication between the first
`device and the respective second devices” ......................................................................... 92
`S. “receiving a message from a second device” ...................................................................... 95
`V. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 99
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 4 of 99 PageID #: 4125Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 5 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5033
`
`I. BACKGROUND
`
`
`
`Plaintiff alleges infringement of United States Patents No. 8,213,970 (“the ’970 Patent”),
`
`9,408,055 (“the ’055 Patent”), 9,445,251 (“the ’251 Patent”), 9,467,838 (“the ’838 Patent”),
`
`9,749,829 (“the ’829 Patent”) & 9,820,123 (“the ’123 Patent”) (collectively, “the patents-in-
`
`suit”). (Dkt. No. 116, Exs. B–G.) Plaintiff submits that “[t]he ‘[f]ield of the [i]nvention’ is
`
`described generally as related to the field of map-based communication among cellphone/PDA
`
`devices, now more commonly referred to as ‘smartphones.’” (Dkt. No. 116, at 1.)
`
`
`
`The ’970 Patent is titled “Method of Utilizing Forced Alerts for Interactive Remote
`
`Communications” and issued on July 3, 2012. The Abstract of the ’970 Patent states:
`
`The system and method having a specialized software application on a personal
`computer or a PDA/cell phone that that [sic] enables a participant to force an
`automatic acknowledgement and a manual response to a text or voice message
`from other participants within the same network. Each participant’s PDA/cell
`phone includes a forced message alert software application program for both
`creating and processing these forced message alerts. The system and method
`enabled by the forced message alert software application program provides the
`ability to (a) allow an operator to create and transmit a forced message alert from
`a sender PDA/cell phone to one or more recipient PCs and PDA/cell phones
`within
`the
`communication network;
`(b)
`automatically
`transmit
`an
`acknowledgement of receipt to the sender PDA cell phone upon the receipt of the
`forced message alert; (c) periodically resend the message to the recipient PCs and
`PDA/cell phones that have not sent an acknowledgement; (d) provide an
`indication of which recipient PCs and PDA/cell phones have acknowledged the
`forced message alert; (e) provide a manual response list on the display of the
`recipient PC and PDA/cell phone’s display that can only be cleared by manually
`transmitting a response; and (f) provide an indication on the sender PDA/cell
`phone of the status and content the [sic] manual responses.
`
`The ’838 Patent is titled “Method to Provide Ad Hoc and Password Protected Digital and
`
`
`
`Voice Networks” and issued on October 11, 2016. The Abstract of the ’838 Patent states:
`
`A method and system includes the ability for individuals to set up an ad hoc
`digital and voice network easily and rapidly to allow users to coordinate their
`activities by eliminating the need for pre-entry of data into a web or identifying
`others by name, phone numbers or email. This method is especially useful for
`police, fire fighters, military, first responders or other emergency situations for
`
`4 / 99
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 5 of 99 PageID #: 4126Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 6 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5034
`
`coordinating different organizations at the scene of a disaster to elevate
`conventional communication problems either up and down the chain of command
`or cross communication between different emergency units. The method and
`system provides that the users are only required to enter a specific Server IP
`address and an ad hoc event name, a password and perhaps the name of the
`particular unit.
`
`The ’055 Patent, the ’251 Patent, and the ’829 Patent resulted from continuations of the
`
`
`
`’838 Patent. The patents-in-suit all claim priority to United States Patent Application No.
`
`10/711,490 (“the ’490 Application”), filed on September 21, 2004, which issued as United States
`
`Patent No. 7,031,728. (Dkt. No. 116, Ex. A.)1
`
`
`
`The Court previously construed disputed terms in all but one of the patents-in-suit in
`
`AGIS Software Development, LLC v. Huawei Device USA Inc., et al., No. 2:17-CV-513, Dkt.
`
`No. 205 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2018) (Gilstrap, J.) (“Huawei”).2
`
`
`
`Shortly before the start of the October 30, 2020 hearing, the Court provided the parties
`
`with preliminary constructions with the aim of focusing the parties’ arguments and facilitating
`
`discussion. Those preliminary constructions are noted below within the discussion for each
`
`term.
`
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`
`
`It is understood that “[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right
`
`which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the
`
`
`1 Plaintiff submits: “In its Preliminary Infringement Contentions, AGIS indicated that each of the
`asserted claims is entitled to the September 21, 2004 priority date. The Defendants have
`indicated, both in this litigation and in inter partes reviews that they intend to challenge the 2004
`priority date. AGIS maintains to Defendants that, in the alternative, each claim is at least entitled
`to the subsequent interim priority dates, e.g., the next application in the priority chain, U.S.
`Application No. 11/308,648, which is April 17, 2006.” (Dkt. No. 116, at 4 n.3.)
`2 Plaintiff submits: “Although the ’123 Patent was not asserted in the Huawei case, Defendants
`do not propose any terms found only in the ’123 Patent require construction. The same claim
`terms that Defendants seek construction for that appear in the ’123 Patent are also found in the
`other Asserted Patents.” (Dkt. No. 116, at 2 n.1.)
`
`5 / 99
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 6 of 99 PageID #: 4127Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 7 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5035
`
`protected invention.” Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1999). Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v.
`
`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
`
`(1996).
`
`
`
`“In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic
`
`evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background
`
`science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.” Teva
`
`Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (citation omitted). “In cases where
`
`those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to make subsidiary factual findings about
`
`that extrinsic evidence. These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings’ of claim construction that we
`
`discussed in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on
`
`appeal.” Id. (citing 517 U.S. 370).
`
`
`
`To ascertain the meaning of claims, courts look to three primary sources: the claims, the
`
`specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must
`
`contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make
`
`and use the invention. Id. A patent’s claims must be read in view of the specification, of which
`
`they are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of
`
`dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. “One
`
`purpose for examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of
`
`the claims.” Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`
`
`Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of
`
`the patentee’s invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
`
`Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own
`
`
`
`
`6 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 7 of 99 PageID #: 4128Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 8 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5036
`
`lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the
`
`specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
`
`Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
`
`embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim
`
`language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc.,
`
`34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`
`
`This Court’s claim construction analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit’s
`
`decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips,
`
`the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In
`
`particular, the court reiterated that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the
`
`patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari
`
`Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To that end, the words used
`
`in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and
`
`customary meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date
`
`of the patent application.” Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law flows naturally from the
`
`recognition that inventors are usually persons who are skilled in the field of the invention and
`
`that patents are addressed to, and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id.
`
`
`
`Despite the importance of claim terms, Phillips made clear that “the person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
`
`which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
`
`specification.” Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of
`
`particular terms, those terms are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.” Id. at 1315
`
`
`
`
`7 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 8 of 99 PageID #: 4129Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 9 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5037
`
`(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as
`
`being the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314–17. As the Supreme Court stated
`
`long ago, “in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive
`
`portions of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and
`
`meaning of the language employed in the claims.” Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In
`
`addressing the role of the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier
`
`observations from Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1998):
`
`Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
`confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
`intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim
`language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
`will be, in the end, the correct construction.
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the
`
`specification plays in the claim construction process.
`
`
`
`The prosecution history also continues to play an important role in claim interpretation.
`
`Like the specification, the prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the
`
`United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Because
`
`the file history, however, “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the
`
`applicant,” it may lack the clarity of the specification and thus be less useful in claim
`
`construction proceedings. Id. Nevertheless, the prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that is
`
`relevant to the determination of how the inventor understood the invention and whether the
`
`inventor limited the invention during prosecution by narrowing the scope of the claims. Id.; see
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that
`
`
`
`
`8 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 9 of 99 PageID #: 4130Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 10 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5038
`
`“a patentee’s statements during prosecution, whether relied on by the examiner or not, are
`
`relevant to claim interpretation”).
`
`
`
`Phillips rejected any claim construction approach that sacrificed the intrinsic record in
`
`favor of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony. The en banc court
`
`condemned the suggestion made by Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2002), that a court should discern the ordinary meaning of the claim terms (through
`
`dictionaries or otherwise) before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes.
`
`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319–24. According to Phillips, reliance on dictionary definitions at the
`
`expense of the specification had the effect of “focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of
`
`words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.” Id. at 1321.
`
`Phillips emphasized that the patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only
`
`the invented subject matter. Id.
`
`
`
`Phillips does not preclude all uses of dictionaries in claim construction proceedings.
`
`Instead, the court assigned dictionaries a role subordinate to the intrinsic record. In doing so, the
`
`court emphasized that claim construction issues are not resolved by any magic formula. The
`
`court did not impose any particular sequence of steps for a court to follow when it considers
`
`disputed claim language. Id. at 1323–25. Rather, Phillips held that a court must attach the
`
`appropriate weight to the intrinsic sources offered in support of a proposed claim construction,
`
`bearing in mind the general rule that the claims measure the scope of the patent grant.
`
`
`
`The Supreme Court of the United States has “read [35 U.S.C.] § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a
`
`patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled
`
`in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
`
`Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 910, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). “A determination of claim
`
`
`
`
`9 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 10 of 99 PageID #: 4131Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 11 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5039
`
`indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the court’s performance of its duty as the
`
`construer of patent claims.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by
`
`Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. 2120. “Indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
`
`Sonix Tech. Co. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 844 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`
`
`
`“[P]rior orders in related cases do not bar the Court from conducting additional
`
`construction in order to refine earlier claim constructions.” TQP Dev., LLC v. Intuit Inc., No.
`
`2:12-CV-180-WCB, 2014 WL 2810016, at *6 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2014) (Bryson, J., sitting by
`
`designation).
`
`
`
`In general, however, prior claim construction proceedings involving the same patents-in-
`
`suit are “entitled to reasoned deference under the broad principals of stare decisis and the goals
`
`articulated by the Supreme Court in Markman, even though stare decisis may not be applicable
`
`per se.” Maurice Mitchell Innovations, LP v. Intel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779,
`
`at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006) (Davis, J.); see TQP, 2014 WL 2810016, at *6 (“[P]revious
`
`claim constructions in cases involving the same patent are entitled to substantial weight, and the
`
`Court has determined that it will not depart from those constructions absent a strong reason for
`
`doing so.”); see also Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 839–40 (“prior cases will sometimes be binding because
`
`of issue preclusion and sometimes will serve as persuasive authority”) (citation omitted); Finisar
`
`Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting “the importance of
`
`uniformity in the treatment of a given patent”) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`
`517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)).
`
`
`
`
`10 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 11 of 99 PageID #: 4132Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 12 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5040
`
`III. AGREED TERMS
`
`
`
`In their July 10, 2020 Joint P.R. 4-3 Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement (Dkt.
`
`No. 109) and in their September 20, 2020 Joint Claim Construction Chart Pursuant to P.R. 4-5(d)
`
`(Dkt. No. 128), the parties submitted the following agreements:
`
`
`
`Term
`
`
`
`
`
`Agreed Construction
`“recipient-selectable response message”
`
`
`
`“a CPU, a touch screen display, and memory”
`
`“application software that allows an operator to
`create and transmit forced message alerts”
`
`than
`“more
`together”
`
`two participants
`
`associated
`
`“manual response”
`
`(’970 Pat., Cls. 1, 2)
`
`“a CPU and a touch screen display a CPU and
`memory”
`
`(’970 Pat., Cl. 1)
`
`“a forced message alert software application
`program”
`
`(’970 Pat., Cls. 1, 2, 10–12)
`
`“group”
`
`(ʼ251 Pat., Cls. 1, 24, 31;
`ʼ838 Pat., Cls. 1, 5, 19, 54;
`ʼ829 Pat., Cls. 1, 34, 35;
`ʼ123 Pat., Cls. 1, 14–17, 23, 36, 37, 45–47)
`
`
`
`IV. DISPUTED TERMS
`
`A. “selected response”
`
`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
`
`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
`
`Plain and ordinary meaning
`
`(Dkt. No. 109, Ex. B, at 1; id., Ex. C, at 1; Dkt. No. 116, at 6; Dkt. No. 120, at 2; Dkt. No. 128,
`
`“recipient selected response message”
`
`App’x A, at 37.) The parties submit that this term appears in Claim 10 of the ’970 Patent. (Dkt.
`
`No. 109, Ex. B, at 1; id., Ex. C, at 1; Dkt. No. 128, App’x A, at 37.)
`
`
`
`
`11 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 12 of 99 PageID #: 4133Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 13 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5041
`
`
`
`Shortly before the start of the October 30, 2020 hearing, the Court provided the parties
`
`with the following preliminary construction: “recipient-selectable response message.”
`
`
`
`
`
`(1) The Parties’ Positions
`
`Plaintiff argues that “Defendants’ proposed construction would conflate a ‘selected
`
`response’ with the Court’s prior construction of a ‘manual response,’” and “Defendants’
`
`construction unnecessarily complicates and adds ambiguity to the claims by adding numerous
`
`unclaimed and undefined phrases, increases confusion instead of providing clarity, and unduly
`
`limits the scope of ‘selected response.’” (Dkt. No. 116, at 7.)
`
`
`
`Defendants respond that as to whether the response is a “message” and as to whether the
`
`response is selected by a recipient, both issues were decided in favor of Defendants’ proposed
`
`construction in Huawei as to the related term “manual response.” (Dkt. No. 120, at 2.)
`
`Defendants argue that “the intrinsic record demonstrates that the ‘selected response’ is an actual
`
`content-bearing message,” including the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution
`
`history. (Id., at 2–4.) Defendants likewise argue that the claim language, the specification, and
`
`the prosecution history demonstrate that a “selected response” must be selected by the recipient.
`
`(Id., at 5–6.)
`
`
`
`Plaintiff replies that “Claim 10 mandates that ‘selected response’ is broader than a
`
`‘recipient selected response message’ because it has to be an ‘option’ that is chosen.” (Dkt.
`
`No. 123, at 2.) “Claim 1 does not mirror Claim 10,” Plaintiff argues, “and this Court should not
`
`disturb the patentee’s decision to pursue different coverage in Claim 10.” (Id.)
`
`
`
`At the October 30, 2020 hearing, Plaintiff argued that a “selected response” message
`
`need not include the full text of the selected response option but rather could include an
`
`indication of which response option was selected. Defendants argued that the Court in Huawei
`
`
`
`
`12 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 13 of 99 PageID #: 4134Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 14 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5042
`
`found that the “selected response” message must include the full “content” of the selected
`
`response option. See Huawei at 41.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`(2) Analysis
`
`Claim 10 of the ’970 Patent recites (emphasis added):
`
`10. A method of receiving, acknowledging and responding to a forced message
`alert from a sender PDA/cell phone to a recipient PDA/cell phone, wherein the
`receipt, acknowledgment, and response to said forced message alert is forced by a
`forced message alert software application program, said method comprising the
`steps of:
`
`receiving an electronically transmitted electronic message; identifying said
`electronic message as a forced message alert, wherein said forced message alert
`comprises of a voice or text message and a forced message alert application
`software packet, which triggers the activation of the forced message alert software
`application program within the recipient PDA/cell phone;
`
`transmitting an automatic acknowledgment of receipt to the sender
`PDA/cell phone, which triggers the forced message alert software application
`program to take control of the recipient PDA/cell phone and show the content of
`the text message and a required response list on the display recipient PDA/cell
`phone or to repeat audibly the content of the voice message on the speakers of the
`recipient PDA/cell phone and show the required response list on the display
`recipient PDA/cell phone; and
`
`transmitting a selected required response from the response list in order to
`allow the message required response list to be cleared from the recipient’s cell
`phone display, whether said selected response is a chosen option from the
`response list, causing the forced message alert software to release control of the
`recipient PDA/cell phone and stop showing the content of the text message and a
`response list on the display recipient PDA/cell phone and[/]or stop repeating the
`content of the voice message on the speakers of the recipient PDA/cell phone;
`
`displaying the response received from the PDA cell phone that transmitted
`the response on the sender of the forced alert PDA/cell phone; and
`
`providing a list of the recipient PDA/cell phones [that] have automatically
`acknowledged receipt of a forced alert message and their response to the forced
`alert message.
`
`As to the first dispute, a “selected response” must be selectable by the recipient. This
`
`understanding is consistent with the context in which the term is used in the claim, which recites
`
`that a selected response is chosen from a response list at a “recipient PDA/cell phone.” The
`
`
`
`
`13 / 99
`
`

`

`Case 2:19-cv-00361-JRG Document 147 Filed 12/08/20 Page 14 of 99 PageID #: 4135Case 2:21-cv-00072-JRG-RSP Document 145-14 Filed 09/07/21 Page 15 of 100 PageID #:
`
`5043
`
`Court reached substantially the same conclusion in Huawei as to the similar term “manual
`
`response” in Claim 1 of the ’970 Patent. See Huawei at 39–42.3
`
`
`
`Disclosure cited by Plaintiff is further consistent with the Court’s understanding:
`
`A required response list which will be either preinstalled in the phone application
`software or sent with the forced message alert will be presented to the user
`operator upon receipt of the forced message. When the forced text or voice alert
`is received, the user operator is presented with the required response list. In order
`to clear the forced text message alert from the user operator’s PC or PDA/cell
`phone display, the user operator is required to select a reply from this list.
`
`’970 Patent at 7:17–24 (emphasis added). This disclosure that “the user operator is required to
`
`select a reply” is consistent with interpreting the “selected response” as being selected by the
`
`recipient. And although “patent coverage is not necessarily limited to inventions that look like
`
`the ones in the figures,” MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2007), it is nonetheless noteworthy that Defendants’ proposal is consistent with Figure 4 of
`
`the ’970 Patent, which discloses that “[t]he recipient selects a response from the response list and
`
`the recipient cell phone and [sic] transmits the response to the sender[’]s cell phone.”
`
`
`
`As to whether the “selected response” must be a “message,” Defendants read the recital
`
`of “transmitting a selected required response from the response list in order to allow the message
`
`required response list to be cleared from the recipient’s cell phone display” as meaning that the
`
`“response” is a “message.” In the context of the claim as a whole, however, this recital of
`
`“message” is better read as referring to the required response list being part of the forced
`
`
`3 Huawei also considered prosecution history (see Huawei at 41), but the cited statements
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket