Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 9092
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`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`
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`CASE NO. 2:21-cv-00040-JRG
`(Lead Case)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`CASE NO. 2:21-cv-00041-JRG
`(Member Case)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`GESTURE TECHNOLOGY
`PARTNERS, LLC,
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`Plaintiff
`
`v.
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`HUAWEI DEVICE CO., LTD.,
`HUAWEI DEVICE USA, INC.,
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`Defendants.
`
`
`GESTURE TECHNOLOGY
`PARTNERS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff
`
`v.
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`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
`AND SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS
`AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`SAMSUNG DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY UNDER § 101
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 9093
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`GTP DOES NOT RAISE ANY GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT .............. 1
`’079 PATENT .................................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`The claims are directed to an abstract idea ............................................................ 3
`B.
`The claims do not recite an inventive concept ....................................................... 5
`’949 PATENT .................................................................................................................... 6
`A.
`The claims are directed to an abstract idea ............................................................ 6
`B.
`The claims do not recite an inventive concept ....................................................... 7
`’431 PATENT .................................................................................................................... 8
`A.
`The claims are directed to an abstract idea ............................................................ 8
`B.
`The claims do not recite an inventive concept ....................................................... 8
`’924 PATENT .................................................................................................................... 9
`A.
`The claims are directed to an abstract idea ............................................................ 9
`B.
`The claims do not recite an inventive concept ..................................................... 10
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`
`
`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`
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`-i-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 9094
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Cases
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`Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) ...........................................................................................................3, 4, 6
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`Am. Axle & Mf’g, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC,
`967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..................................................................................................3
`
`Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
`881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................5
`
`ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.,
`920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019)................................................................................................3, 4
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
`838 F.3d 1307,1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016).........................................................................................5
`
`Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.,
`704 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2013)....................................................................................................1
`
`PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC,
`8 F.4th 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ..........................................................................................3, 9, 10
`
`Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States,
`850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017)......................................................................................4, 7, 8, 9
`
`In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
`823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016).......................................................................................... passim
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commn’cs, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................5
`
`Yu v. Apple Inc.,
`1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................3
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`-ii-
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 9095
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`GTP’s opposition argument makes no reference to the specification, file history, or any
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`extrinsic evidence apart from four paragraphs of conclusory expert opinion that itself cites no
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`evidentiary support. GTP has been unable to muster any evidence—apart from ipse dixit expert
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`testimony—showing the asserted claims are directed to a technological improvement or recite an
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`inventive concept because such evidence does not exist. This confirms that the asserted claims of
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`the Patents-in-Suit are directed to an abstract idea with no inventive concept.
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`I.
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`GTP DOES NOT RAISE ANY GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT
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`GTP purports to dispute only 9 of the 25 Undisputed Material Facts (UMFs) set forth in
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`Defendants’ Motion. Yet GTP does not raise a genuine dispute of material fact for even these 9
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`UMFs, as addressed below. Thus, the Motion is ripe for summary judgment.
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`UMF No. 1: GTP does not actually dispute this fact, and does not dispute its materiality to
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`claims that do not require a handheld or portable device, i.e., all asserted claims of the ’079 and
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`’949 Patents. This fact is material to all claims that require using a gesture to control a device,
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`even handheld devices. And Defendants’ expert does argue anticipation over prior art disclosing
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`handheld devices that detect gestures using a camera to control the device. Opp. Ex. A ¶ 258.
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`UMF No. 2: GTP does not dispute that the claimed computer apparatus can be a laptop,
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`and fails to specify what it disputes. See Ex. 2 at Claim 10 (reciting laptop computer).
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`UMF Nos. 3 and 4: These UMFs are material because asserted dependent claims recite
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`these limitations. Ex. 2 at Claims 2–3, 9, 14–15, 22–23, 30. GTP cites the same two conclusory
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`paragraphs of Mr. Occhiogrosso’s Validity Report to address different facts. Neither even
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`mentions light sources or using cameras and light sources fixed relative to a keypad. See Opp. Ex.
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`B ¶¶ 62, 654. And neither cites any evidence. Id. An expert’s “ipse dixit statements … are not
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`sufficient to avoid summary judgment.” Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 704
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`-1-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 9096
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`F.3d 958, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Further, Dr. Pryor admitted using an LED as a light source was
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`“common” by November 1998. Ex. 15 at 429:18–24; 457:7-23.
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`UMF No. 5: GTP’s purported dispute is not genuine. The ’949 Patent states, “Today, in a
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`conventional context, one can as a photographer, choose to shoot … when you see a pose you
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`like . . . . But as one’s own photographer, this is much more difficult . . . . With the invention,
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`you may program the system to take only those poses which you think you want to get . . . the
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`gesture or pose desired, can be taught to the system . . .” Ex. 4 at 7:57–8:9.1 Thus, the patent
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`discloses that its invention is intended to replace the conventional role of a photographer.
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`UMF No. 6: GTP’s own citation confirms there were known cases in which “the camera
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`taking the picture actually determines some variable in the picture.” Ex. 4 at 7:57–8:9.
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`UMF No. 7: There is no genuine dispute. The ‘949 Patent states that in addition to the
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`“analysis after the fact of recorded images” that GTP identifies, the disclosure of U.S. Patent No.
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`5,781,650 “also alludes to a potential point and shoot capability also based on the age classification
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`of the individuals whose picture is desired.” Ex. 4 at 1:36-43.
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`UMF No. 14: There is no genuine dispute. The citation GTP relies on for both the ’431
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`and ’924 Patents expressly states that they “add functionality to the [handheld] device, without
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`complicating its base function” which implies that the inventions add functionality to an existing
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`handheld device with base functions. Ex. 11 at 11:62–67; Ex. 13 at 11:65–12:3.
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`UMF No. 17: GTP does not dispute that the ’924 Patent discloses that “known character
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`recognition techniques” could be used to perform a control function, and that transmitting data,
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`such as display control information via infrared, to another device was “known in the art.” Ex. 13
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`at 13:39–43, 26:6–10. Defendants’ Motion relies on these facts. Mot. at 27-28, 30.
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`1 All emphases added and citations omitted unless otherwise stated.
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`-2-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 9097
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`II.
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`’079 PATENT
`A.
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`The claims are directed to an abstract idea
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`GTP’s argument for the ’079 Patent rests on the misguided notion that the mere recitation
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`of allegedly “specific physical components” confers patent eligibility under § 101. Opp. at 12.
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`The Supreme Court in Alice, however, rejected this very argument, holding that reciting allegedly
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`“specific physical components” such as a “data processing system” with a “communications
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`controller” and “data storage unit” did not confer patent eligibility where those components were
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`“purely functional and generic.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 224, 226 (2014).
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`Similarly, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly found claims for physical devices that were
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`nonetheless directed to an abstract idea patent-ineligible under § 101. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC
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`Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims reciting a “telephone unit,” e.g. cellular phone,
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`with a camera for image analysis); Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (claims for
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`“improved digital camera” with dual image sensors); ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920
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`F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (claims for electric vehicle charging station); Am. Axle & Mf’g, Inc. v.
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`Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (claims for manufacturing driveline system
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`shaft assembly). GTP asks this Court to find claims reciting a “computer apparatus” with a light
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`source, camera, and processor are somehow less abstract than these claims.(cid:3)
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`GTP mischaracterizes Defendants’ Motion as “conced[ing] . . . that certain claims of the
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`’079 Patent are directed to physical devices” because the Motion states that Claim 11 “recites”
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`physical components, not that it is “directed to” a physical device. Opp. at 13 (citing Mot. at 6).
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`Step one of the Alice test is not about mere recitation of physical components, but rather requires
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`evaluating “the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s
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`‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google
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`LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2021). GTP makes no effort to show that the recited hardware
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`-3-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 9098
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`is the inventive focus of the claims. Plainly, it is not. The patent never suggests that the computer
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`apparatus “itself is improved from a technical perspective, or that it would operate differently than
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`it otherwise could,” ChargePoint, 920 F.3d at 768, and GTP fails to point to any such evidence.
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`The claimed computer apparatus—with its generic light source (i.e., almost any source of
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`light, even a cell phone display according to GTP), camera, and processor—is merely a tool to
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`implement the abstract idea of determining a gesture, rather than the subject of the invention. The
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`Abstract describes the invention as “[a] method for determining a gesture” using a light source to
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`illuminate the gesture and a camera to observe it, making clear the focus of the claims is on
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`determining a gesture using generic components that merely perform their known and established
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`functions, not on specific hardware. GTP’s expert admits the claims are not directed to hardware,
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`instead stating “claims 1 and 21 are directed to computer-implemented methods for determining
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`gestures,” Opp. Ex. B ¶ 651, i.e., using a computer as a tool to implement the abstract idea of
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`determining a gesture, which is patent-ineligible under Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 210.
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`The claims are not focused on the routine feature of pointing a light source and camera at
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`the same space as GTP alleges, Opp. at 12, a feature that has been known for as long as flash
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`photography. This is clear from the testimony of the named inventor, Dr. Pryor, that the
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`combination of a light source and camera was known in the art. Ex. 15 at 457:7-23.
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`GTP’s attempt to analogize to Thales is unavailing. In Thales, the claims recited an
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`unconventional placement of sensors the patent said “may seem somewhat strange” to those in the
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`field and “that reduces errors.” Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1348-49
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`(Fed. Cir. 2017). By contrast, there is no unconventional hardware arrangement here, and GTP
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`points to none. Defendants, however, have demonstrated the claims as a whole recite conventional
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`and functionally defined hardware for performing the abstract idea. Mot. at 10-11.
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`-4-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 9099
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`GTP also conflates novelty with the § 101 inquiry, including citing the Supreme Court’s
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`KSR decision concerning obviousness, not § 101. Opp. at 13 (“These unique and novel processes
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`and computer apparatus are not directed to abstract subject matter.”), 15 (citing KSR). “[T]he
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`‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
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`determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
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`patentable subject matter.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307,1315
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`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981)).
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`GTP has no response to the similarities between the ’079 Patent claims and those found
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`patent-ineligible in In re TLI. That is because the claims at issue are no less abstract than those in
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`In re TLI, which were directed to image analysis on cellular camera phones.
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`B.
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`The claims do not recite an inventive concept
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`To survive at step two, the claims must recite an inventive concept. Two-Way Media Ltd.
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`v. Comcast Cable Commn’cs, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he claim—as
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`opposed to something purportedly described in the specification—is missing an inventive
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`concept.”) (emphasis in original)); Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
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`(finding claims that did not recite the inventive concept patent ineligible). GTP is unable to
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`articulate any inventive concept recited in the claims. GTP refers to an allegedly “new way of
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`implementing gesture technology,” without explaining what this “new way” is and which claim
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`limitations capture it. Opp. at 16-17. GTP also alleges Dr. Pryor created a “unique solution for
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`enabling a user to use gestures as computer inputs in portable devices,” but fails to explain what
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`this “unique solution” is and where it is recited in the claims. Id. The claims do not require a
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`“portable” device or using the determined gesture at all, let alone as a computer input.
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`GTP alleges that the claims recite “specific” components, but apart from conclusory
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`statements, GTP makes no effort to—and is unable to—rebut Defendants’ argument that these
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`-5-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 9100
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`components individually and as an ordered combination were “well understood, routine, or
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`conventional.” Opp. at 16-19; Mot. at 10-11. GTP relies on a single paragraph of its technical
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`expert’s validity report, which amounts to an ipse dixit legal conclusion that the recited elements
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`provide an inventive concept. Opp., Ex. B ¶ 653. There is no identification of what claim elements
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`provide the inventive concept and how, and no evidence in support of such a legal conclusion. Id.
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`By contrast, Defendants’ expert cites to numerous documents demonstrating the claims, as an
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`ordered combination (i.e., as a whole), amount to a generic computer apparatus with a camera and
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`light source, e.g., existing laptops (which is undisputed, see Opp. at 2, UMF No. 2), for performing
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`the abstract idea of determining a gesture. Ex. 5 ¶¶ 337-38. Using a computer as a tool for
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`performing the abstract idea does not pass muster at step two. Alice, 573 U.S. at 224-27.
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`Moreover, contrary to GTP’s assertion, there are no genuine disputes of material fact for
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`the reasons explained above in Section I. Summary judgment is warranted.
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`III.
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`’949 PATENT
`A.
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`The claims are directed to an abstract idea
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`GTP again relies on the claims’ recitation of physical components and alleged novelty and
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`again mischaracterizes the Motion as “conced[ing] that the asserted claims of the ’949 Patent are
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`directed to physical devices,” all of which is incorrect for the reasons set forth in Section II.A.
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`GTP does not dispute that under its infringement theory, the only hardware required by the
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`claims is a device with a camera and processor, which covers every digital camera. And the ’949
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`Patent explains that its purported invention utilizes digital cameras that were “commonplace.” Ex.
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`4 at 1:50-62. Even under the proper interpretation of the claims as requiring a separate camera
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`and sensor, e.g., two cameras, each of these components is still “commonplace,” id., and
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`functionally defined by its routine function of capturing an image or sensing light. Thus, the claims
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`do not recite a new physical device or new hardware configuration. Instead, the claims recite a
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`-6-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 9101
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`“commonplace” device as a tool to fulfill the “conventional context” role of a photographer by
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`taking a picture when the subject performs a gesture, without any technological specificity as to
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`how this is done, only abstract functional language. Id. at 7:57-8:9. GTP does not dispute that the
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`’949 Patent explicitly describes “conventional” software to perform the gesture analysis. Ex. 4 at
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`10:37-44; Mot. at 2, UMF No. 10; Opp. at 4, UMF No. 10. Thus, it is clear from the patent that
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`the focus of the claims is not on an improvement to the technology of image capture devices, but
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`rather using conventional software on a commonplace camera to perform the abstract idea of
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`capturing an image in response to a gesture, i.e., the conventional role of a photographer.
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`As with the ’079 Patent, the claims are not analogous to Thales because they do not recite
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`an unconventional hardware arrangement that results in a technological improvement. Instead,
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`they recite a commonplace digital camera used to fulfill a conventional photographer’s role, and
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`thus are more akin to In re TLI, which GTP makes no effort to distinguish.
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`B.
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`The claims do not recite an inventive concept
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`GTP cites no evidence at step two. GTP is again unable to articulate any inventive concept
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`recited in the claims. And again, GTP refers to a “unique solution” without explaining what it is
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`and what claim limitations recite it. Opp. at 21. GTP describes the inventive concept as enabling
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`a “cellular phone” to detect gestures, but the claims do not recite a cellular phone. Id.
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`GTP alleges the claims recite “specific” components, but apart from conclusory statements
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`GTP makes no effort to—and cannot—rebut Defendants’ argument that these components both
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`individually and as an ordered combination were “well understood, routine, or conventional”.
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`Opp. at 22-23; Mot. at 15-16. GTP relies on routine features, such as a camera “‘adapted to capture
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`an image’ and ha[ving] ‘a field of view,” i.e., all cameras. Opp. at 22.
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`Defendants have shown that, as an ordered combination, the claims recite a conventional
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`image capture device—such as a “commonplace” digital camera comprising a camera, sensor, and
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`-7-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 9102
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`processor—used as a tool to perform the abstract idea of capturing an image in response to a
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`gesture, thereby replacing the conventional role of a photographer. Moreover, contrary to GTP’s
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`assertion, there are no genuine disputes of material fact as explained above in Section I.
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`IV.
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`’431 PATENT
`A.
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`The claims are directed to an abstract idea
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`GTP repeats the same generic arguments. Again, mere recitation of physical components
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`does not confer patent eligibility where the focus of the claimed advance is on the abstract idea.
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`GTP also again relies on novelty (“directed to a unique and novel machine,” Opp. at 24), which is
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`irrelevant for § 101. GTP alleges that functionally defined components—such as a handheld
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`device held in one hand or a sensor that senses light—for controlling the device provide the
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`requisite specificity for patent eligibility. These are merely generic components performing their
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`routine and conventional functions as part of the abstract idea.
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`The claims are nothing like those in Thales, which recited an unconventional sensor
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`arrangement that reduced errors. The ’431 Patent claims recite no such thing, just a handheld
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`device with a camera/sensor and a computer (and a control system for Claim 7 that GTP says can
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`be a computer). The patent says it seeks to add functionality to existing handheld devices, and
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`thus the hardware is not the focus of the claims. Ex. 11 at 11:62-67. Rather, the claims parallel
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`those found patent-ineligible in In re TLI, to which GTP has offered no response. Those claims
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`recited a cellular camera phone with a control unit for image analysis and control functions, like
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`the ’431 Patent claims that recite a handheld device with a camera, computer, and control system
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`for image analysis and control functions. In re TLI, 823 F.3d at 611-15.
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`B.
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`The claims do not recite an inventive concept
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`GTP again fails to identify any inventive concept or alleged “unique solution.” Opp. at 25-
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`26. The concept of controlling a device based on image analysis is the abstract idea and cannot
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`-8-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 9103
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`provide the inventive concept. PersonalWeb, 8 F.4th at 1318. Again, GTP has no answer to In re
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`TLI. The claims there parallel the ’431 Patent claims, as described above. And GTP does not
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`dispute the patent and file history admissions that the invention uses “well-known” technology,
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`Mot. at 19. As in In re TLI, “the recited physical components behave exactly as expected according
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`to their ordinary use” to carry out the abstract idea. In re TLI, 823 F.3d at 615.
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`And again, apart from conclusory statements GTP makes no effort to—and cannot—rebut
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`Defendants’ argument that the components individually and as an ordered combination were “well
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`understood, routine, or conventional.” Opp. at 25-27; Mot. at 22-23. GTP points to functional
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`language that merely describes the abstract idea as implemented by generic components in their
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`routine and ordinary use (e.g., a camera means that obtains an image, or a computer means that
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`processes the image). Defendants have shown that, as an ordered combination, the claims recite a
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`generic handheld device used as a tool to perform the abstract idea of performing a function based
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`on the position or movement of an object. Moreover, contrary to GTP’s assertion, there are no
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`genuine disputes of material fact for the reasons explained above in Section I.
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`V.
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`’924 PATENT
`A.
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`The claims are directed to an abstract idea
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`Again, mere recitation of physical components does not confer patent eligibility where the
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`focus of the claims is on the abstract idea. GTP makes no effort to show that the focus of the
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`claims is on the physical components rather than the abstract idea. Further, GTP again relies on
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`novelty (“directed to a unique and novel machine,” Opp. at 24), which is irrelevant for § 101.
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`The ‘924 Patent claims are nothing like those in Thales, which recited an unconventional
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`sensor arrangement that reduced errors. The ’924 Patent claims recite no unconventional hardware
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`configuration. GTP admits “handheld devices with two cameras having non-overlapping fields of
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`view—one oriented to view a user and the other oriented to view an object other than the user—
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`-9-
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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 9104
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`were known.” Opp. at 5 (UMF No. 18). Indeed, the patent says it seeks to add functionality to
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`existing handheld devices. Ex. 13 at 11:65-12:3. And, GTP’s expert testified that the patent
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`provides no detail as to how to implement a two-camera handheld device. Ex. 3 at 78:12-18. Thus,
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`the hardware is not the focus of the claims. Rather, the claims parallel those found patent-ineligible
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`in In re TLI, to which GTP has no response. Those claims recited a cellular camera phone with a
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`control unit for performing image analysis and control functions, similar to the ’924 Patent claims
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`that recite a handheld device with two cameras and a computer for performing image analysis and
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`control functions. In re TLI, 823 F.3d at 611-15.
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`B.
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`The claims do not recite an inventive concept
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`GTP again fails to identify the inventive concept or alleged “unique solution.” Opp. at 29.
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`The concept of performing a control function of a handheld device is part of the abstract idea and
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`cannot provide the inventive concept. PersonalWeb, 8 F.4th at 1318. Again, GTP has no answer
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`to In re TLI. The claims there parallel the ’924 Patent claims, as described above. And GTP does
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`not dispute the patent and file history admissions that the invention uses “well-known” technology.
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`Mot. at 26-27. As in In re TLI, “the recited physical components behave exactly as expected
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`according to their ordinary use” to carry out the abstract idea. In re TLI, 823 F.3d at 615.
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`Once again, apart from conclusory statements GTP makes no effort to—and cannot—rebut
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`Defendants’ argument that the components individually and as an ordered combination were “well
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`understood, routine, or conventional.” Opp. at 29-30; Mot. at 29-30. GTP only points to a camera
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`setup it admits was known. Opp. at 5 (UMF No. 18). Defendants have shown that, as an ordered
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`combination, the claims recite a generic handheld device used as a tool to perform the abstract idea
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`of performing a function based on image analysis. Moreover, contrary to GTP’s assertion, there
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`are no genuine disputes of material fact for the reasons explained above in Section I.
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`
`-10-
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`

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`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 9105
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`DATED: December 28, 2021
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`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`By: /s/ Christopher W. Kennerly
`Christopher W. Kennerly (TX Bar No. 00795077)
`chriskennerly@paulhastings.com
`Radhesh Devendran (pro hac vice)
`radheshdevendran@paulhastings.com
`Boris S. Lubarsky (pro hac vice)
`borislubarsky@paulhastings.com
`David M. Fox (pro hac vice)
`davidfox@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`1117 S. California Avenue
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Telephone: (650) 320-1800
`Facsimile: (650) 320-1900
`
`Allan M. Soobert
`allansoobert@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`2050 M Street NW
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`Telephone: 202-551-1700
`Facsimile: 202-551-1705
`
`Elizabeth L. Brann
`elizabethbrann@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`4747 Executive Drive, 12th Floor
`San Diego, CA 92121
`Telephone: (858) 458-3000
`Facsimile: (858) 458-3005
`
`Robert Laurenzi
`robertlaurenzi@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`Telephone: (212) 318-6000
`Facsimile: (212) 319-4090
`
`Melissa R. Smith (TX Bar No. 24001351)
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 S. Washington Ave.
`Marshall, TX 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`
`-11-
`
`

`

`Case 2:21-cv-00040-JRG Document 179 Filed 12/30/21 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 9106
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`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Samsung Electronics
`Co., Ltd and Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed
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`
`
`
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`electronically in compliance with Local Rule CV-5 on December 28, 2021. As of this date, all
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`counsel of record had consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy of this
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`document through the Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a)(3)(A) and by email.
`
` /s/ Christopher W. Kennerly
`Christopher W. Kennerly
`
`
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`CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO SEAL
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`I hereby certify that under Local Rule CV-5(a)(7), the foregoing document is filed under
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`
`
`
`
`
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`seal pursuant to the Court’s Protective Order entered in this matter.
`
` /s/ Christopher W. Kennerly
`Christopher W. Kennerly
`
`
`
`-12-
`
`