Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 2627
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`THE HILLMAN GROUP, INC.
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`KEYME, LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00209
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`REDACTED VERSION
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`KEYME, LLC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
`DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
`TO TRANSFER TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`

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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 2 of 17 PageID #: 2628
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`Table of Contents
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`Page
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`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`B.
`C.
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 1
`A.
`KeyMe’s Kiosks Do Not Fall Within the Intended Meaning of Section
`1400(b) ................................................................................................................... 2
`KeyMe Has No “Physical Place” In This District ................................................. 4
`KeyMe Has No “Regular and Established Place Of Business” In This
`District.................................................................................................................... 5
`1.
`KeyMe’s Kiosks in this District are not “Regular and Established.” ........ 5
`2.
`KeyMe’s Kiosks are not “Places of Business.” ......................................... 7
`The Retail Stores Housing KeyMe’s Kiosks In This District Are Not
`“Places Of The Defendant” .................................................................................... 9
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 10
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`D.
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`-i-
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 3 of 17 PageID #: 2629
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`Table of Authorities
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`Page
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`Cases
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`Automated Packaging Sys, Inc. v. Free-Flow Packaging Int’l, Inc.,
`No. 5:14-cv-2022, 2018 WL 400326 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018) ............................................ 5, 9
`
`Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
`290 F. Supp. 3d 599 (N.D. Tex. 2017) ........................................................................................ 6
`
`Homebingo Network, Inc. v. Chayevsky,
`428 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (S.D. Ala. 2006) ..................................................................................... 10
`
`In re Cray, Inc.,
`871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................................... passim
`
`In re Google LLC,
`914 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................... 3
`
`In re ZTE (USA) Inc.,
`890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................... 1, 2
`
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp.,
`No. 2:16-cv-00980, 2017 WL 5630023 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017) ........................................... 9
`
`Lites Out, LLC v. Outdoor Link, Inc.,
`No. 4:17-cv-00192, 2017 WL 5068348 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017) ............................................. 4
`
`Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc.,
`833 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................................... 7
`
`Peerless Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC,
`No. 17-cv-1725, 2018 WL 1478047 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018) ................................................. 8
`
`Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc.,
`282 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Va. 2017) .......................................................................................... 8
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
`137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017)............................................................................................................. 1, 4
`
`Weatherford Tech. Holdings, LLC v. Tesco Corp.,
`No. 2:17-cv-00456-JRG, 2018 WL 5315206 (Oct. 26, 2018) ..................................................... 6
`
`Statutes
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`28 U.S.C. § 1694 ............................................................................................................................. 2
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`-i-
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 4 of 17 PageID #: 2630
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`Table of Authorities
`(continued)
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`Page
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`Other Authorities
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`29 Cong. Rec. 1900-1902 (1897) ............................................................................................ 2, 3, 6
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`29 Stat. 695, Ch. 395 ....................................................................................................................... 3
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`-ii-
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 5 of 17 PageID #: 2631
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`
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
`Under Hillman’s reading of the patent venue statute, KeyMe would be subject to venue in
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`every district where KeyMe placed its key duplication kiosks. This would render 28 U.S.C.
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`1400(b)’s requirement of a “regular and established place of business” meaningless. Venue would
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`be proper anywhere where KeyMe is subject to personal jurisdiction contrary to the Supreme
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`Court’s guidance in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
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`Under a proper reading of Section 1400(b), KeyMe’s thirty kiosks within the Eastern District of
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`Texas do not qualify as “regular and established” places of business and venue is not proper in this
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`District.
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`Hillman’s opposition brief relies on baseless rhetoric to state that KeyMe “distorts” or
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`“willfully omits” facts bearing on the venue analysis. Contrary to Hillman’s assertions, the facts
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`remain unchanged. KeyMe does not have any offices, employees, or real estate within the Eastern
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`District of Texas. KeyMe remotely operates its kiosks from its headquarters in New York, where
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`KeyMe runs its key duplication business. KeyMe’s kiosks are not the type of permanent and
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`established places of business, the storefronts, for which Section 1400(b) was intended to confer
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`patent venue. Venue is therefore improper in this District and this case should be dismissed or
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`transferred to the Southern District of New York.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT
`As Plaintiff, Hillman bears the burden of proving venue is proper within the Eastern
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`District of Texas. In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Hillman has failed
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`to make the requisite showing here. As set forth below and in KeyMe’s Opening Brief, KeyMe’s
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`Kiosks are not “regular and established places of business” because they fail to meet the three
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`1
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`

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`prongs set forth in In re Cray, Inc.1 871 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`A.
`KeyMe’s Kiosks Do Not Fall Within the Intended Meaning of Section 1400(b)
`In enacting Section 1400(b), Congress intended to confer proper venue only where a
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`defendant resides or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a “regular
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`and established place of business.” Congress did not intend that venue would be conferred in any
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`jurisdiction where a defendant conducted business transactions or was subject to service. See In
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`re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361 (“Congress adopted the predecessor to § 1400(b) as a special venue
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`statute in patent infringement actions to eliminate the ‘abuses engendered’ by previous venue
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`provisions allowing such suits to be brought in any district in which the defendant could be
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`served.”); see also ZTE, 890 F.3d at 1014 (emphasizing that when looking at Section 1400(b), “it
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`is important not to conflate showings that may be sufficient for other purposes, e.g., personal
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`jurisdiction or the general venue statute”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, when
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`enacting the predecessor to this statute, Congress explicitly stated its intent that a “regular and
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`established place of business” be a “permanent place of business” such as a “manufactory,” an
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`“office,” or “an established place of business” where a “subpoena of the court” may be left. 29
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`Cong. Rec. 1900-1902 (1897) (statements of Reps. Lacey and Payne).
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`Furthermore, Congress has used the term “regular and established place of business” in the
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`context of service under the patent statute and indicated that it meant a physical location where
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`defendants’ “agents” were “conducting [its] business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (Notably, this statute
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`was passed on the same day, June 25, 1948, as Section 1400). In 1897, Congress passed Section
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`1 As stated in its opening brief, in In re Cray, the Federal Circuit laid out the test for determining
`whether a Defendant has a “regular and established place of business” in a judicial district: “(1)
`there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of
`business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.” In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360; see
`also Opening Br. at 6.
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`2
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`

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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 7 of 17 PageID #: 2633
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`1400(b)’s predecessor to give a court venue where a defendant’s regular and established place of
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`business exists because it is “where the witnesses are.” 29 Stat. 695, Ch. 395, 29 Cong. Rec. 1902
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`(statement of Rep Lacey); see also In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d at 1360-61. Thus, under Congress’s
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`intent for patent venue, “[i]solated cases of infringement would not confer this jurisdiction, but
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`only where a permanent agency is established” which would “limit that jurisdiction.” 29 Stat. 695,
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`Ch. 395, 29 Cong. Rec. 1900. KeyMe does not have a “permanent place of business” in this
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`District. Its offices, manufacturing and distribution centers, and employees are all located outside
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`of the state of Texas. Marsh Decl. ¶¶ 5-9. KeyMe’s witnesses with knowledge of the allegedly
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`infringing products can be found in
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`. The fact that KeyMe
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`, does not mean
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`that KeyMe has established “a permanent agency” here. KeyMe’s kiosks are not the “regular and
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`established places of business” envisioned by Congress when enacting Section 1400(b).
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`Hillman’s understanding of Section 1400(b), on the other hand, is at odds with the clear
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`legislative intent and Federal Circuit precedent. Under Hillman’s reasoning, any vending machine,
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`piece of equipment, or product display that occupies a physical space within a judicial district
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`would be subject to venue there so long as plaintiff pled that infringement occurred in that district.
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`But see In re Google LLC, 914 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Reyna, J. dissenting) (noting this
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`type of reading is an “expansive construction of § 1400(b)”). This interpretation of “regular and
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`established place of business” would open defendants up to litigation wherever their equipment
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`was placed,2 even if there is no “permanent agency,” “manufactory,” or “office” or even if the
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`2 Under Hillman’s view, any company choosing to set-up a display of products at Best Buy or
`other big box stalls, installing a piece of machinery in a supermarket, setting up a cell tower within
`a judicial district, placing a soda vending machine in a shopping mall, or even delivering packages
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`3
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`defendant could not be served at that place of business. Hillman’s reading of Section 1400(b)
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`diverges sharply from the legislative intent and is a slippery slope to the minimum contacts and
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`personal jurisdiction requirements of the general venue statute, which the Supreme Court held does
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`not apply to patent cases in TC Heartland. See 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520-1521.
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`B.
`KeyMe Has No “Physical Place” In This District
`“A regular and established place of business must include a physical location,” for
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`example, a “retail store, warehouse, or other physical facility” and does not include remotely-
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`operated machinery. Lites Out, LLC v. Outdoor Link, Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00192, 2017 WL 5068348,
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`*4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017). In its opposition, Hillman incorrectly argues that KeyMe has
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`“stretched the facts” in arguing that KeyMe remotely operates its key duplication kiosks from New
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`York. Opp. Br. at 7. Despite this assertion, the facts remain that KeyMe employees monitor,
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`troubleshoot, and remotely operate the key duplication kiosks within this District from their
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`headquarters in New York. Marsh Decl. ¶ 18. In fact,
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`
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`” as opposed to being fixed in-person at the situs
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`of the kiosk. Ex. H, Deposition of Frank James Abbott (“Abbott Dep”) at 65:19-25 (emphasis
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`added); see also id.
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` In re Cray’s requirement of a “physical place” cannot be read
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`to apply to virtually operated kiosks or similar equipment, as this would result in an impermissible
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`expansion of Section 1400 beyond what was contemplated by the statute. Such a reading would
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`lead to a distorted result in which soda vending machine owners would be subject to venue while
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`large online retailers who use employees to deliver goods directly to a judicial district would not.
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`Hillman also argues that KeyMe’s kiosks are not analogous to packaging machines
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`to consumers would have a “regular and established place of business” there. Section 1400(b) was
`not meant to include any piece of equipment that physically takes up space within its bounds.
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`4
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`installed in customers’ homes because the kiosks are installed in retail stores and supermarkets.
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`Opp. at 8. Although the place of installation may differ, like a packaging machine, these key
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`duplication kiosks are installed in a location, owned by a third party, for use by customers, and can
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`be removed. See Opening Br. at 6-8, Exs. D, E, and F. Ultimately, these kiosks are merely pieces
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`of “equipment” and therefore cannot be considered physical places of business “for the simple
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`reason that the equipment in question is not a place.” Automated Packaging Sys, Inc. v. Free-Flow
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`Packaging Int’l, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-2022, 2018 WL 400326, *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018).
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`Moreover, to hold, as Hillman advances, that kiosks or vending machines are within the meaning
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`of a “physical place” runs afoul of the legislative history and interpretation of Section 1400(b).3
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`See part II.A, infra. Not only would this result in an overly expansive reading of In re Cray, but
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`this would also distort the meaning of Section 1400 which says nothing about mere presence in
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`the district. Hillman further argues that KeyMe’s contracts with retailers demonstrates KeyMe’s
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`“control over the space”; however, as indicated in KeyMe’s opening brief, KeyMe does not have
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`full control over its kiosks and shares responsibility with the third party retailer. Opp. Br. at 9-10;
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`Opening Br. at 12-13.
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`C.
`KeyMe Has No “Regular and Established Place Of Business” In This District
`Under the second prong of In re Cray’s three-part test, KeyMe’s kiosks are not “regular
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`and established” nor “places of business.” 871 F.3d at 1360.
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`1.
`KeyMe’s Kiosks in this District are not “Regular and Established.”
`A “regular and established” place is one that is “permanent” or, at least, “settle[d]
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`certainly.” In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363; see also 29 Cong. Rec. 1900 (statement of Rep. Lacey).
`
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`3 Following Hillman’s reasoning, KeyMe’s thirty physical kiosks within this District would subject
`it to venue here, however, larger online retailers that deliver thousands of products into this District
`may not have a “regular and established place of business here” merely because they have no
`physical presence.
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`5
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 10 of 17 PageID #: 2636
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`When determining whether a defendant has a “regular and established” business in a particular
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`venue, Congress intended the defendant to have a “permanent agency” in that forum and a
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`“manufactory,” “office,” or other location at which “a subpoena of the court” may be left. 29
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`Cong. Rec. 1900-1902 (1897) (statements of Reps. Lacey and Payne). As discussed in the opening
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`brief, KeyMe’s kiosks are not permanent or settled and do not meet the definitions put forth in the
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`legislative history.
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`Hillman’s focus on the number of kiosks within the Eastern District of Texas
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`and the statement that
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` is
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`a red herring. See Opp. Br. at 11. The venue determination is made at the time of the filing of
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`the initial complaint—here, as of June 3, 2019. See Weatherford Tech. Holdings, LLC v. Tesco
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`Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00456-JRG, 2018 WL 5315206, *2 n.2 (Oct. 26, 2018); Galderma Labs.,
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`L.P. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 599, 612 (N.D. Tex. 2017). Thus, the number
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`of kiosks that KeyMe
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` or the number of kiosks that KeyMe will have in the
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`future is irrelevant for venue purposes.
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`As KeyMe’s contracts with retailers within the Eastern District of Texas show, KeyMe is,
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`in fact, able to remove these kiosks if and when it wants to, rendering them temporary or
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`“transient” in nature as opposed to the type of “permanent agency” suggested by Section 1400(b).
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`In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363; 29 Cong. Rec. 1902 (statement of Rep. Lacey). The fact that either
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`party may terminate the agreement and remove a kiosk
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` does not make
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`these kiosks any less removable. See, e.g., Opp. Br. Ex. D at ¶ 1; see also Abbott Dep. at 102:13-
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`15 (
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`
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`). KeyMe’s kiosks are analogous to vending machines, temporarily placed in another
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`party’s retail establishment—the “actual, physical places”—and easily moved to another location.
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`6
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 11 of 17 PageID #: 2637
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`
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`See Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that
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`a vending machine could not be considered a “sales establishment”).4 The kiosks within this
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`District are not “regular and established” under the meaning and intent of Section 1400(b).
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`2.
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`KeyMe’s Kiosks are not “Places of Business.”
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`KeyMe’s “places of business” are at its offices in New York and New Jersey—not its key
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`duplication equipment deployed in third party locations throughout the country. Marsh Decl. ¶¶
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`5-7.
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`As an initial matter, Hillman incorrectly suggests that that KeyMe “willfully omitted” that
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`it made $
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` from its kiosks in the Eastern District of Texas. See Opp. Br. at 1.
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`KeyMe omitted nothing. In its opening brief, KeyMe acknowledged the sales from the thirty
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`kiosks within this District and noted that those sales represent approximately 0.8% of KeyMe’s
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`total sales. Opening Br. at 4; Marsh Decl. ¶ 15. This fact is relevant because notwithstanding this
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`Court’s holding in Seven Networks quoted by Hillman (Opp. Br. at 12) the Federal Circuit in In re
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`Cray specifically held:
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`A further consideration for this requirement might be the nature and activity of the
`alleged place of business of the defendant in the district in comparison with that of
`other places of business of the defendant in other venues. Such a comparison
`might reveal that the alleged place of business is not really a place of business
`at all.
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`871 F.3d at 1364 (italics emphasis in original, bold emphasis added). When considering the
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`activity of the kiosks within this District “in comparison with” the thousands of other kiosks
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`KeyMe has deployed across the country and KeyMe’s offices in New York and New Jersey, where
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`actual business decisions are made, customer service inquiries are handled, products are
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`4 With respect to Hillman’s argument and this Court’s discussion of Magee in Seven Networks, the
`Magee Court’s analysis of “vending machines” is instructive given the particular similarities
`between KeyMe’s kiosks being analyzed as “regular and established places of business” and
`Magee’s vending machines being analyzed as “sales establishments.”
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`7
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`developed, and the kiosks are remotely operated, it is evident that these thirty kiosks are “not really
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`[] place[s] of business at all” or at the very least not “regular and established places of business”
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`in comparison with other KeyMe venues. Id.; see also Opening Br. at 10-11.
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`
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`In its opposition brief, Hillman highlights that KeyMe is registered to conduct business in
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`Texas arguing that this is a “seemingly unnecessary move” for a company conducting its business
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`out of New York. Opp. Br. at 12. The fact that KeyMe may have registered as a foreign company
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`in Texas, however, has no “bearing on whether [KeyMe] maintains a physical place within the
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`district.” Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 931 (E.D. Va.
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`2017) (concluding that registering in the forum state and merely deriving revenue from the district
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`was insufficient to meet the requirements of Section 1400(b) and holding that patent-specific venue
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`was improper in the forum).
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`Hillman also tries to distinguish Peerless Network, arguing that the facts are inapposite.
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`Opp. Br. at 13. In Peerless, the Court held that there was no “place of business” since defendants’
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`employees were not “conducting business at the location” of the equipment, including “accept[ing]
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`orders, mak[ing] business decisions, or solicit[ing] new clients from the shelf.” Peerless Network,
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`Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-cv-1725, 2018 WL 1478047, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,
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`2018); see also Opp. Br. at 12-13. Similarly, KeyMe’s employees do not conduct business at the
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`location of the kiosks deployed within this District. Although customers may submit orders at the
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`kiosks themselves, no KeyMe employees are present at the kiosks, or elsewhere within the District,
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`to accept these orders. Marsh Decl. ¶ 18. Instead, KeyMe employees remotely operate these
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`kiosks from New York. Id.; see also Abbott Dep. at 65:19-25. KeyMe employees do not enter
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`the District to fix the machines, that work is performed by third party contractors who are not
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`involved with accepting or processing the orders themselves. See Abbott Dep. at 65:19 – 66:3.
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`8
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`Furthermore, all business decisions are made at KeyMe’s headquarters in New York, where the
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`business development and marketing teams are located. Marsh Decl. ¶ 5.
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`KeyMe’s kiosks are not “places of business;” but rather the equipment that allows KeyMe
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`to carry out its New York-based-business nationwide. KeyMe does not make business decisions
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`or develop products within this District, and no KeyMe employees are located here. Thus, KeyMe
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`does not have a place of business in the Eastern District of Texas.
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`D.
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`The Retail Stores Housing KeyMe’s Kiosks In This District Are Not “Places
`Of The Defendant”
`Hillman argues that KeyMe’s kiosks, branded with KeyMe’s logo and advertised on
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`KeyMe’s website, are “places of the defendant.” Opp. Br. at 14-15. KeyMe does not dispute that
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`it owns the kiosks, as it has already acknowledged, nor does it dispute that it places its logo on
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`these kiosks or lists the locations of these kiosks on its websites. See Opening Br. at 3, 11-13.
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`Ownership of the kiosks, however, is not enough under Section 1400(b). See Automated
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`Packaging, 2018 WL 400326 at *9 (determining that the equipment at issue was not a “place of
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`the defendant” even though defendant owned it). As Hillman states, In re Cray explained that a
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`“place of the defendant” must be “establish[ed] or ratif[ied]” by the defendant. 871 F.3d at 1364.
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`The Federal Circuit went on to say that “relevant considerations” of this third prong “include
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`whether the defendant owns or leases the place.” Id. at 1363.
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`Unlike the “places of business” in Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., cited by
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`Hillman, KeyMe’s kiosks are not “physical retail and service locations” in this District.
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`Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-cv-00980, 2017 WL 5630023, *6 (E.D.
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`Tex. Nov. 22, 2017) (concluding that FedEx stores and service centers constituted regular and
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`established places of business). It is undisputed that KeyMe does not own or lease the retail stores
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`9
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`and supermarkets that house its kiosks. See Opening Br. at Exs. D, E, and F. The contracts5 with
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`these third party stores indicate that KeyMe does not have sufficient “possession or control” over
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`its kiosks, to be a “place of the defendant.” See Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363; see also Opening Br. at
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`12-13, Exs. D, E, and F; Abbott Dep. at 89:10 – 90:13
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`Finally, Hillman attempts to distinguish Homebingo Network by noting that it involved
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`individual defendants and not a corporate defendant. See Opp. Br. at 15. While it is true that the
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`issue in Homebingo Network pertained to individual defendants’ ownership of the equipment, its
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`logic is not inapplicable as Hillman suggests. Id.; Homebingo Network, Inc. v. Chayevsky, 428 F.
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`Supp. 2d 1232, 1250 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (holding that the individual owners of slot machines did not
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`have regular and established places of business in the district because ownership of the equipment
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`“does not render the situs of that equipment [its] regular and established place of business for
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`venue purposes”). Although it is a corporation, KeyMe, like the individual defendants in
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`Homebingo Network, does not own the situs of its kiosks—the supermarkets and retail stores—
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`and likewise should not be found to have a regular and established place of business in this District.
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`III. CONCLUSION
`For these reasons, KeyMe respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this action for
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`improper venue, or transfer it to the Southern District of New York.
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`5 KeyMe has not “misrepresent[ed] the facts” pertaining to these contracts, as Hillman suggests.
`Opp. Br. at 15. As KeyMe noted in its opening brief, the contracts specifically state that the retailer
`“
`” and acknowledge that employees of the third party store will
`provide “
`” for a user of the kiosk, before elevating the issue to KeyMe. See
`Opening Br. at 12, Ex. E ¶ 14. If the issue cannot be resolved, it will most likely be fixed remotely
`from KeyMe’s New York office. See Abbott Dep. at 65:19-25
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`10
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 15 of 17 PageID #: 2641
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`Dated: October 2, 2019
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Stephen R. Smith
`Deron R. Dacus (Bar No. 00790553)
`The Dacus Firm, PC
`821 ESE Loop 323
`Suite 430
`Tyler, TX 75701
`Tel. 903.705.1177
`Fax 903.581.2543
`ddacus@dacusfirm.com
`
`Michael G. Rhodes
`Cooley LLP
`101 California Street, 5th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel: 415.693.2000
`Fax: 415.693.2222
`rhodesmg@cooley.com
`
`Stephen R. Smith
`Rose S. Whelan
`Elizabeth Cannon Shrieves
`Cooley LLP
`1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 700
`Washington, DC 20004
`Tel: 202.842.7800
`Fax: 202.842.7899
`stephen.smith@cooley.com
`rwhelan@cooley.com
`eshrieves@cooley.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant KeyMe, LLC
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`11
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 16 of 17 PageID #: 2642
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that all counsel of record, who are deemed to have consented to
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`electronic service are being served on this 2nd day of October, 2019, with a copy of this
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`document via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3). Any other counsel of
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`record will be served by electronic mail, facsimile transmission and/or first class mail on this
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`same date.
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`
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`/s/ Stephen R. Smith
`Stephen R. Smith
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`1
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 60 Filed 10/04/19 Page 17 of 17 PageID #: 2643
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`CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL
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`I hereby certify that this document is being filed under seal pursuant to KeyMe’s
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`Unopposed Motion For Leave to File KeyMe’s Reply In Support of Its Motion to Dismiss for
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`Improper Venue or, In the Alternative, to Transfer to the Southern District of New York Under
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`Seal and Exhibits G-H, Dkt. No. 58, filed in this matter.
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`/s/ Stephen R. Smith
`Stephen R. Smith
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`2
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