Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: 13655
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`THE HILLMAN GROUP, INC.,
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`KEYME, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Defendant.
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`C.A. No. 2:19-cv-00209-JRG
`(LEAD CASE)
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`C.A. No. 2:20-cv-00070-JRG
`(MEMBER CASE)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`PLAINTIFF THE HILLMAN GROUP, INC.’S
`MOTIONS IN LIMINE
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: 13656
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`
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`V.
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`VI.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Reference to IPR2015-01154 ...............................................................................................1
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`Reference to the S.D. Ohio Litigation Between Hillman and Minute Key .........................2
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`Reference to Accused KeyMe Products Being Covered by KeyMe Patents .......................3
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`Reference to Pending Post-Grant Proceedings at the USPTO .............................................5
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`Reference to Other Patent Litigations or “Litigiousness” ....................................................6
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`Reference to Hillman’s Claim Construction Tutorial ..........................................................7
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`VII. Reference to Irrelevant Business Ventures of Inventors of the Patent-in-Suit ....................7
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`VIII. Reference to Opinions of Counsel to Defend Against Hillman’s Claim of Willful
`Infringement .........................................................................................................................8
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`IX.
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`X.
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`XI.
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`Any Reference to KeyMe’s Use of Jury Consultants or Jury Study Focus Groups ............9
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`Argument, Evidence, Testimony, Insinuation, Reference or Assertion that Code
`Cutting Is Outside the Scope of the Asserted Claims ..........................................................9
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`Any Comparisons Between the KeyMe Accused Instrumentalities and Hillman
`FastKey Kiosks ..................................................................................................................10
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`XII. Any Reference that Finnegan (Hillman’s Litigation Counsel) Prosecuted Any
`Patent for Hillman and/or Represented Hillman in Any Capacity Before this
`Litigation ............................................................................................................................11
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`XIII. Reference to Any Unasserted Patent Claims and Hillman’s Election of Patent
`Claims to Streamline this Litigation ..................................................................................12
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`XIV. Any Reference to Discovery Obligations, Disputes, or Deficiencies ................................12
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`XV. Derogatory, Disparaging, and/or Pejorative References to Hillman or Minute Key .........13
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`XVI. Reference to the Absence of Any Witness ........................................................................13
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`XVII. Reference to a 2013 Letter from Finnegan to Walmart…………….................................14
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`i
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: 13657
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,
`798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1986)................................................................................................14
`
`Advanced Tech. Incubator, Inc. v. Sharp Corp.,
`No. 5:09-cv-00135, 2010 WL 11451797 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010) ........................................8
`
`Ascion, LLC v. Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc.,
`No. 15-12067, 2017 WL 4572326 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2017) .................................................7
`
`Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Inc.,
`265 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001)..................................................................................................4
`
`Cardsoft, Inc. v. Verifone Sys., Inc.,
`No. 2:08-cv-00098-RSP, 2012 WL 1995302 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2012) ..............................7, 10
`
`Ceats, Inc v. TicketNetwork, Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-01470 (D.I. 254) (E.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2018) .........................................................12
`
`ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 2:13-cv-01112, 2015 WL 12915561 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2015) ..............................2, 3, 5, 6
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.,
`511 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................12
`
`DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
`No. 2:06-cv-00072-DF, 2010 WL 11468934 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2010) ....................7, 8, 10, 12
`
`DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
`No. 2:06-cv-00072-DF, 2010 WL 11538713 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2010) ................................12
`
`Elbit Sys. Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes Network Sys., LLC,
`No. 2:15-cv-00037-RWS-RSP, 2017 WL 2651618 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2017) ......................15
`
`Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd.,
`No. 2:15-cv-00011 (D.I. 377) (E.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2017) .......................................................14
`
`Evicam Int’l, Inc. v. Enforcement Video, LLC,
`No. 4:16-cv-00105 (D.I. 177) (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2017) ........................................................13
`
`EVM Sys., LLC v. Rex Medical, L.P.,
`No. 6:13-cv-00184, 2015 WL 11089476 (E.D. Tex. June 10, 2015) ........................................4
`
`ii
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 4 of 22 PageID #: 13658
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`
`
`Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co.,
`797 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1986)..................................................................................................4
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) .............................................................................................................15
`
`Intell. Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp.,
`No. 2:16-cv-00980-JRG, 2018 WL 10638138 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2018) ...................... passim
`
`Mobile Telecommc’ns Techs., LLC v. LG Elecs. Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc.,
`No. 2:13-CV-947-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 3611559 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2016) ............................11
`
`MobileMedia Ideas, LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 2:10-cv-00112-JRG, 2013 WL 12158524 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2013) ..............................13
`
`Optimize Tech. Solns., LLC v. Staples, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-00419-JRG, 2013 WL 6170624 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2013) .................................7
`
`Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Zynga, Inc.,
`No. 2:12-cv-00068, 2013 WL 10253110 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2013) .....................................1, 5
`
`Rembrandt Wireless Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`No. 2:13-cv-00213-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 627430 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2015) ......................4, 13
`
`Saint Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. ZTE Corp.,
`No. 2:15-CV-349-JRG, 2017 WL 11517123 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2017) ..................................10
`
`SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc.,
`No. 2:08-cv-158-JRG, 2012 WL 12906091 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2012) ....................................5
`
`SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`No. 2:07-cv-00497, 2011 WL 3625036 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2011) ....................................7, 10
`
`Two-Way Media LLC v. AT&T Operations, Inc.,
`No. 5:09-cv-00476-OLG (Dkt. Nos. 426, 501) (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2013) ..............................4
`
`Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A.,
`944 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1991)....................................................................................................4
`
`Vocalife LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 2:19-cv-00123-JRG (D.I. 310) (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2020) ..................................10, 12, 14
`
`Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................11
`
`Federal Statutes
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`35 U.S.C. § 282(a) ...........................................................................................................................5
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`iii
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 5 of 22 PageID #: 13659
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`FILED UNDER SEAL PURSUANT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER
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`35 U.S.C. § 316 ................................................................................................................................5
`
`Rules
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`E.D. Tex. P. R. 3-7 ...........................................................................................................................9
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 401 ................................................................................................................... passim
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`Fed. R. Evid. 402 ................................................................................................................... passim
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`Fed. R. Evid. 403 ................................................................................................................... passim
`
`
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`Other Authorities
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`The Sedona Conference Report on the Markman Process, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 205
`(2006) .........................................................................................................................................7
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`iv
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 6 of 22 PageID #: 13660
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`Plaintiff The Hillman Group, Inc. (“Hillman”) moves for an order in limine instructing
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`counsel and all witnesses not to mention, discuss, or allude to any of the following issues at trial.
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`For the same reasons, curative instructions cannot ease the prejudicial impact of these topics.
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`I.
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`Reference to IPR2015-01154
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`Hillman respectfully requests that the Court issue an order in limine precluding KeyMe
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`from offering any argument, evidence, testimony, insinuation, reference, or assertion relating to
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`IPR2015-01154, a prior inter partes review of the ’446 patent-in-suit. This order would extend to
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`expert declarations and other filings from that proceeding. The factual circumstances of
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`IPR2015-01154 create unique risks of prejudice, jury confusion, and time wasting in violation of
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`F.R.E. 403. In IPR2015-01154, Hillman filed a petition to invalidate certain claims of the ’446
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`patent when that patent was owned by Minute Key Inc., a company that Hillman later acquired.
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`Neither of ’446 Asserted Claims 70 and 71 in this litigation were at issue in IPR2015-
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`01154. Yet KeyMe has repeatedly tried to advance misleading arguments and elicit out-of-
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`context sound bites that will prejudice Hillman at trial. It is apparent that KeyMe now plans to
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`refer to IPR2015-01154 and related expert declarations extensively at trial. See, e.g., Ex. 1 (e.g.,
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`DX-0067, DX-0102, DX-0165, DX-0166, DX-0167, DX-0179, DX-0180, DX-0181, DX-0198,
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`DX-0200, DX-0215, DX-0251); Ex. 2 (extensive designations of Hillman fact witness Amanda
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`Kitzberger). Reference to the IPR at trial would require a complicated, confusing review of the
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`historical backstory of the parties, the ownership of the ’446 patent (and how it changed over
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`time), and procedural matters relating to IPR2015-01154 itself. The likely prejudice to Hillman
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`would not be curable by way of a simple instruction at trial. See Personalized Media Commc’ns,
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`LLC v. Zynga, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00068, 2013 WL 10253110, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2013)
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`(finding that “the danger of undue prejudice is extremely high and that danger cannot be
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`mitigated simply by the use of a limiting instruction” for an IPR on a patent-in-suit (citation
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 7 of 22 PageID #: 13661
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`omitted)). And with no reference to the Asserted Claims of this case in these IPR documents, the
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`documents are simply not relevant and should not be alluded to in front of the jury. F.R.E. 403.
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`This Court has previously excluded reference to IPR proceedings of patents-in-suit for
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`these reasons. See ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01112,
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`2015 WL 12915561, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2015) (precluding “argument, evidence, testimony,
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`insinuation, reference, or assertions” related to IPR proceedings). Hillman requests that the Court
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`preclude reference to this IPR to remove the risk that the jury will be confused or misled.
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`II.
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`Reference to the S.D. Ohio Litigation Between Hillman and Minute Key
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`KeyMe should be precluded from offering any argument, evidence, testimony,
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`insinuation, reference, or assertion relating to The Hillman Group, Inc. v. Minute Key Inc., C.A.
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`No. 1:13-cv-707, in the Southern District of Ohio (“the Ohio litigation”), including prelitigation
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`communications between the parties and with customers related to the same case. For several
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`reasons, the Ohio litigation creates unique risks of prejudice, jury confusion, and time wasting in
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`violation of F.R.E. 403. First, no patent-in-suit and no KeyMe kiosk here was at issue in Ohio.
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`The subject of the Ohio litigation was U.S. Patent No. 8,532,809, a child of the ’446 patent, but
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`with different claim language and prosecution history. Moreover, the Ohio litigation was only a
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`patent litigation for six months; the case went to trial under the federal Lanham Act and Ohio
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`state law provisions relating to unfair competition. No infringement or validity determination
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`was ever made for any claim of any patent. No claims were construed by the Ohio court.
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`Despite these differences, KeyMe appears ready to make the Ohio litigation a central part
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`of its case here. KeyMe has placed virtually the entire record of the Ohio litigation onto its
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`exhibit list, including full deposition transcripts and full trial transcripts. See, e.g., Ex. 1 (DX-
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`0552 to DX-0588). In violation of various Orders of this Court, KeyMe has not offered any
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`designations of these irrelevant, hearsay transcripts (including embedded exhibits) to be played
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`2
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 8 of 22 PageID #: 13662
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`at trial or read into the record; instead, KeyMe simply seeks to have them admitted as evidence
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`in their entireties. Given that both parties in the Ohio litigation (Hillman and Minute Key) have
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`since been combined under one corporate umbrella and as one party in this litigation, the near-
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`certain jury confusion and prejudice to Hillman would not be curable by way of a simple
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`instruction at trial. Some of the evidence KeyMe seeks to introduce is testimony from witnesses
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`that will testify live at trial in this case; other testimony is from witnesses not disclosed or
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`deposed in this case who have no association at all with the current trial. Clear issues under
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`F.R.E. 402 and 403 make this evidence prejudicial and irrelevant.
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`KeyMe’s exhibit list and expert reports suggest that hyperbole from the Ohio litigation—
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`where now combined Plaintiff Hillman / Minute Key were then fierce adversaries—stands to be
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`a substantial part of its trial presentation. E.g., Ex. 1 (DX-0064, DX-0065, DX-0327); Ex. 3 at
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`¶¶ 150-57. The Ohio litigation has no relevance to the issues before the Court and the jury in this
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`case. Under similar circumstances, this Court and others have excluded introduction of such
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`irrelevant, satellite hyperbole. See Intell. Ventures II LLC v. FedEx Corp., No. 2:16-cv-00980-
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`JRG, 2018 WL 10638138, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2018) (“FedEx”) (barring “referenc[es,] . . .
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`argument[s], evidence, or testimony related to any other litigations”); ContentGuard, 2015 WL
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`12915561, at *1 (“The parties shall not introduce any argument, evidence, testimony,
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`insinuation, reference, or assertion relating to any litigations, rulings, or accusations against
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`Defendant in unrelated legal proceedings or unrelated disputed matters between Defendant and
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`any third party”). Hillman asks the Court to similarly focus the present proceedings by
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`precluding reference to the Ohio litigation and prelitigation correspondence.
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`III. Reference to Accused KeyMe Products Being Covered by KeyMe Patents
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`Hillman respectfully moves to preclude KeyMe from arguing that the Accused
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`Instrumentalities are covered by KeyMe patents. It is widely recognized that references to a
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`3
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 9 of 22 PageID #: 13663
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`defendant practicing its own patents misleads and confuses the jury, having an unduly prejudicial
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`effect. Under F.R.E. 402/403, KeyMe should not be permitted to suggest, e.g., that because the
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`accused products are protected by its patents, they must not infringe Hillman’s patents.
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`As the Federal Circuit recognized in affirming such an exclusion, “introduction of that
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`evidence would have injected frolics and detours and would have required introduction of
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`counter-evidence, all likely to create side issues that would have unduly distracted the jury form
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`the main issues.” Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see
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`also Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The
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`fact that Medtronic’s [] patent might read on [the accused device] is totally irrelevant to the
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`question of whether Medtronic willfully infringed another patent.”); Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG
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`v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 879, 879 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he existence of
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`one’s own patent does not constitute a defense to infringement of someone else’s patent.”).
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`District courts routinely preclude a defendant from arguing that the accused products are
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`covered by the defendant’s patents because it often causes the jury to infer, incorrectly, that the
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`accused products cannot practice the plaintiff’s patents. EVM Sys., LLC v. Rex Medical, L.P., No.
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`6:13-cv-00184, 2015 WL 11089476, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 10, 2015); Rembrandt Wireless
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`Techs., LP v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-00213-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 627430, at *2
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`(E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2015); Two-Way Media LLC v. AT&T Operations, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-00476-
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`OLG (Dkt. Nos. 426, 501) (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2013) (Exs. 4, 5).
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`Whether KeyMe practices its own patents is wholly irrelevant to infringement and
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`willfulness. Even if it were relevant, which it is not, KeyMe should not be permitted to insinuate
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`that it practices its own patents for the additional reason that KeyMe offered no expert opinion to
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`4
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 10 of 22 PageID #: 13664
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`that effect.1 Hillman respectfully submits that KeyMe should be precluded from emphasizing its
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`own patents and/or insinuating that it practices its own patents. Doing so would only invite the
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`jury to decide this case on an improper basis.
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`IV. Reference to Pending Post-Grant Proceedings at the USPTO
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`The Court should prevent KeyMe from referencing any pending inter partes review
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`proceeding that has not yet reached a final USPTO decision. See Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. KeyMe
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`has petitioned for IPR of the ’474 and ’830 patents-in-suit. Neither petition has been instituted by
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`the USPTO. Even discounting the appeals process, the USPTO will not issue any final decision
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`in the IPRs until months after the jury issues its verdict. See 35 U.S.C. § 316. These uninstituted
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`proceedings are irrelevant to the issues before the jury and would only serve to confuse. See
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`F.R.E. 402, 403. For example, the jury may be misled into believing that the USPTO has
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`invalidated the asserted claims or that it is likely to do so. This would significantly undercut the
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`presumption of validity that Hillman is entitled to in this case, see 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). A jury is
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`ill-equipped to understand the complicated procedural mechanisms underpinning post-grant
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`procedures, and any explanation provided by the parties or the Court to minimize this prejudice
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`would fail to cure the confusion and prejudice created by reference to these proceedings.
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`This Court has previously excluded evidence of pending post-grant proceedings for these
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`reasons. See ContentGuard, 2015 WL 12915561, at *1 (precluding “argument, evidence,
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`testimony, insinuation, reference, or assertions” related to IPR proceedings); Personalized
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`Media, 2013 WL 10253110, at *1 (“the danger of undue prejudice is extremely high and that
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`danger cannot be mitigated simply by the use of a limiting instruction.” (citation omitted)); SSL
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`1 Hillman recognizes that
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` But KeyMe should not be permitted to offer arguments
` by, for example, providing an
`“invention story” or other elaboration from KeyMe fact witnesses regarding
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`.
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`5
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 11 of 22 PageID #: 13665
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`Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., No. 2:08-cv-158-JRG, 2012 WL 12906091, at *1 (E.D. Tex. May
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`24, 2012) (precluding evidence of ongoing reexamination proceedings). Accordingly, the Court
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`should exclude any reference to pending post-grant proceedings before the USPTO, under F.R.E.
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`402 and 403.
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`V.
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`Reference to Other Patent Litigations or “Litigiousness”
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`The Court should preclude KeyMe from offering evidence or argument or otherwise
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`referencing other legal proceedings or disputes and should preclude KeyMe from referring to
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`Hillman or Minute Key as “litigious.” See F.R.E. 402, 403. KeyMe’s exhibit list includes
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`multiple pleadings from previous litigations involving Hillman and Minute Key. But any
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`previous litigation or dispute is necessarily materially different than this case in terms of the
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`parties to the proceedings, the patents, claims, and products at issue, and/or the evidence
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`presented. As a result, such prior litigation has no bearing on the issue presented here—whether
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`KeyMe infringes any valid claim of the asserted patents. See F.R.E. 402.
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`References to prior proceedings and disputes would only serve to confuse and mislead
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`the jury. See F.R.E. 403. Hillman accordingly requests that the Court bar KeyMe from
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`referencing any prior litigation or dispute before the jury. See F.R.E. 402; 403. This Court has
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`previously barred such testimony for these reasons. See FedEx, 2018 WL 10638138, at *6
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`(barring “referenc[es,] . . . argument[s], evidence, or testimony related to any other litigations”);
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`ContentGuard, 2015 WL 12915561, at *1 (“The parties shall not introduce any argument,
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`evidence, testimony, insinuation, reference, or assertion relating to any litigations, rulings, or
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`accusations against Defendant in unrelated legal proceedings or unrelated disputed matters
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`between Defendant and any third party”). Hillman respectfully requests the Court do so here.
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`6
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 12 of 22 PageID #: 13666
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`VI. Reference to Hillman’s Claim Construction Tutorial
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`KeyMe intends to introduce Hillman’s Claim Construction Tutorial—both in its entirety
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`and in an excerpted form—as evidence in this case. See Ex. 1 (DX-0125 and DX-0135). But as
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`this Court has stated, tutorials prepared prior to claim construction are “to provide the Court with
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`background regarding the technology of the patent-in-suit.” Optimize Tech. Solns., LLC v.
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`Staples, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00419-JRG, 2013 WL 6170624, at *31 n.7 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2013).
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`“The primary goal of the tutorial is to educate the court on the technology as it relates to the
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`patents, claims, and accused products in the case.” The Sedona Conference Report on the
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`Markman Process, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 205 (2006) (Principle 4). Courts that have addressed the
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`evidentiary standing of tutorials emphasize that “the technology tutorial is not evidence; it is only
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`for the Court’s benefit so that it can understand the technology.” Ascion, LLC v. Tempur Sealy
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`Int’l, Inc., No. 15-12067, 2017 WL 4572326, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2017).
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`A party’s pre-Markman demonstrative tutorial prepared for the Court in the context of
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`specific claim construction disputes should not be introduced as evidence at a post-Markman
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`jury trial. KeyMe’s use of Hillman’s tutorial promises to be misleading, confusing, and highly
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`prejudicial, and should be precluded under F.R.E. 402 and 403. KeyMe’s effort to introduce the
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`tutorial is inconsistent with the principle that parties may “not refer to their claim construction
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`positions at trial.” SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00497, 2011 WL 3625036, at
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`*20 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2011); see also Cardsoft, Inc. v. Verifone Sys., Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00098-
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`RSP, 2012 WL 1995302, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2012); DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo &
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`Co., No. 2:06-cv-00072-DF, 2010 WL 11468934, *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2010).
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`VII. Reference to Irrelevant Business Ventures of Inventors of the Patent-in-Suit
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`KeyMe should be precluded from referring to irrelevant business ventures of the
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`inventors of the Patents-in-Suit. The probative value of an inventor’s business ventures unrelated
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`7
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 13 of 22 PageID #: 13667
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`to key duplication machines is irrelevant to issues of patent infringement, validity, and/or
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`damages in this case. See F.R.E. 401, 402. To whatever extent such arguments or evidence may
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`be relevant, any probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice,
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`jury confusion, and waste of time. See F.R.E. 402, 403. For example,
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`. Courts routinely exclude
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`reference to prior ventures unrelated to technology or claims at issue. See Advanced Tech.
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`Incubator, Inc. v. Sharp Corp., No. 5:09-cv-00135, 2010 WL 11451797, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
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`31, 2010) (“[a]ny probative value of allegations that Japanese companies generally engaged in
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`illegal or inappropriate business conduct is irrelevant to issues of patent infringement, invalidity,
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`or damages”); DataTreasury, 2010 WL 11468934, at *9.
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`VIII. Reference to Opinions of Counsel to Defend Against Hillman’s Claim of Willful
`Infringement
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`KeyMe designated its CEO, Greg Marsh, to testify on behalf of the company pursuant to
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`Rule 30(b)(6) as to the topic “[a]ny opinion(s) of counsel KeyMe has obtained or otherwise
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`intends to rely upon related to the patents-in-suit, including the details of the opinion(s),
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`KeyMe’s reliance on the opinion(s), and the persons involved in KeyMe’s decision to rely on
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`any such opinion.” Yet, during his deposition
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` Ex. 6 at 26:22-27:10.
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` Ex. 6 at 16:8-15.2 Most
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 14 of 22 PageID #: 13668
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`importantly, KeyMe did not produce anything on the P.R. 3-7 deadline. In accordance with the
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`Rule, “[a] party…who does not comply with [P.R. 3-7] shall not be permitted to rely on an
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`opinion of counsel as part of a defense absent a stipulation of all parties or by order of the Court,
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`which shall be entered only upon a showing of good cause.” KeyMe should not be permitted to
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`suggest in any manner that it holds any good faith belief based on any opinion of counsel.
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`IX. Any Reference to Use of Jury Consultants or Jury Study Focus Groups
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`KeyMe should be precluded from raising any argument, evidence, testimony, insinuation,
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`reference, or assertion regarding the use of jury studies, jury consultants, focus group studies,
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`mock trial teams, or shadow juries. A party’s use of jury consultants or studies is not relevant to
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`any issue in this litigation and any reference to this fact should be prohibited under F.R.E. 401/
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`402/403. Hillman respectfully requests that the Court exclude any such evidence from the jury.
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`X.
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`Argument, Evidence, Testimony, Insinuation, Reference or Assertion that Code
`Cutting Is Outside the Scope of the Asserted Claims
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`KeyMe should be precluded from offering any argument, evidence, testimony,
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`insinuation, reference, or assertion that “code cutting” key duplication technology is outside the
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`scope of the Asserted Claims. In its July 2, 2020 Claim Construction Memorandum and Order,
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`the Court stated that it “expressly rejects Defendant’s proposal and arguments regarding
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`excluding code cutting. That is, Defendant fails to demonstrate that the disputed term sets forth
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`any limitation as to permissible replication techniques, such as mechanical trace cutting, optical
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`trace cutting, or code cutting.” (D.I. 159 at 16.) As the Court observed, the Asserted Claims are
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`silent on any particular technique for duplicating keys.
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`Despite this clear direction, and the Court’s clear constructions of the implicated terms of
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`the Asserted Claims, KeyMe’s exhibit list and deposition designations indicate that KeyMe
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`intends to continue to litigate its lost claim construction position before the jury. Ex. 1 (DX-
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`0073, DX-0074); Ex. 2 (numerous designations from depositions of inventors Ari and Daniel
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 15 of 22 PageID #: 13669
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`Freeman addressing code cutting); Ex. 7 at 76:9-25 (example of designated deposition testimony
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`from Daniel Freeman). KeyMe’s proposed evidence and testimony that code cutting is somehow
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`not disclosed in the patents-in-suit and/or covered by the Asserted Claims is inconsistent with the
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`longstanding principle that parties may “not refer to their claim construction positions at trial.”
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`SynQor, 2011 WL 3625036, at *20; see also Cardsoft, 2012 WL 1995302, at *1; DataTreasury,
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`2010 WL 11468934, at *5. The risk of prejudice and jury confusion outweigh any evidentiary
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`value these arguments might have. F.R.E. 403. The Court should preclude KeyMe from making
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`arguments to the jury that the Court “expressly reject[ed]” at the Markman stage.
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`XI. Any Comparisons Between the KeyMe Accused Instrumentalities and Hillman
`FastKey Kiosks
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`Hillman respectfully moves to preclude KeyMe from comparing any of the Accused
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`Instrumentalities to any purported prior art device, patent, or system, including but not limited to
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`Hillman’s “FastKey” key duplication kiosk. KeyMe’s exhibit list, deposition designations, and
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`expert reports demonstrate its intent to rely on a key duplication kiosk formerly marketed by
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`Hillman (branded “FastKey”) as a representation and manifestation of Hillman’s purported
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`“previous views” on technical issues, claim term interpretations, and theories of the case. Ex. 1
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`(DX-0064, DX-0065, DX-0083, DX-0231, DX-0233, DX-0327); Ex. 3 at ¶¶ 150-57 (
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`). FastKey is not at issue here, and Hillman has not asserted that FastKey
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`practices any of the patents-in-suit or offered FastKey as invalidating prior art.
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`As this Court has previously held, “the only proper comparison is between the accused
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`products and the elements of the Asserted Claims.” FedEx, 2018 WL 10638138, at *3; Vocalife
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`LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00123-JRG (D.I. 310), slip op. at 9-10 (E.D. Tex. Sept.
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`30, 2020) (Ex. 8) (precluding “using any prior art to compare to the accused products”); Saint
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`Lawrence Commc’ns LLC v. ZTE Corp., No. 2:15-CV-349-JRG, 2017 WL 11517123, at *1
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`Case 2:19-cv-00209-JRG Document 263 Filed 03/03/21 Page 16 of 22 PageID #: 13670
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`(E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2017) (Defendant “may not compare an accused product to the prior art for
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`purposes of establishing non-infringement or invalidity.”); see also Mobile Telecommc’ns
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`Techs., LLC v. LG Elecs. Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-947-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL
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`3611559, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2016) (“No one shall introduce any references, evidence,
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`testimony (including expert testimony), or argument regarding, or inquire about or elicit any
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`testimony comparing any accused instrumentality to any purported prior art device, prior art
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`patent, or any other prior art.”). Similarly, the Federal Circuit has stated that “the defense of
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`noninfringement cannot be proved by comparing an accused product to the prior art.” Zenith
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`Elecs. Corp. v. PDI Commc’n Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Any such
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`presentation at trial is irrelevant and the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, and misleading
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`the jury outweighs any value that this evidence might have. F.R.E. 402, 403.
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`XII. Any Reference that Finnegan (Hillman’s Litigation Counsel) Prosecuted Any Patent
`for Hillman and/or Represented Hillman in Any Capacity Before this Litigation
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`Hillman asks the Court to preclude references to Finnegan’s past representation of
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`Hillman in any capacity other than this litigation. Hillman and Finnegan have a long-standing
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`relationship of nearly 15 years. Finnegan’s past representation of Hillman has no relevance to
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`this case. See F.R.E. 4