Case 2:17-cv-00676-RWS-RSP Document 127 Filed 08/17/18 Page 1 of 4 PageID #: 6882
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Case No. 2:17-cv-00676-RWS-RSP
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`GODO KAISHA IP BRIDGE 1,
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`INTEL CORPORATION,
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`INTEL CORPORATION’S RESPONSE TO IP BRIDGE’S
`SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STATEMENT
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`Defendant.
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`Intel respectfully submits this brief response to IP Bridge’s Supplemental Claim
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`Construction Statement concerning Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc. 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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`(“Praxair”). Dkt. No. 124 (“IPB Supplemental Br.”). In that case, the Federal Circuit construed
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`the claims at issue to require a “fundamental object of the invention,” holding that “[t]he claims
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`must be read in light of the specification’s consistent emphasis on this fundamental feature of the
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`invention.” See Praxair at 1323-24.
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`IP Bridge’s attempts to distinguish Praxair are unavailing. First, IP Bridge asserts that
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`there was “no allegation, agreement, or finding in Praxair that a ‘flow restrictor’ was a well-
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`understood term of art,” yet, according to IP Bridge, there is “no dispute” that “dielectric film” in
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`the ’736 patent is a term of art that is “capable of being understood under its plain and ordinary
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`meaning.” See IPB Supplemental Brief at 2; see also id. at 3 (arguing that “dielectric film” does
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`not have a disputed meaning). That is incorrect. In the district court, Praxair expressly argued that
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`“‘flow resistor’ . . . should be construed consistent with [its] plain and ordinary meaning” (see
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`Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., No. 1:03-cv-01158-SLR, D.I. 189 at 3 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2005)), and
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Case No. 2:17-cv-00676-RWS-RSP
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`GODO KAISHA IP BRIDGE 1,
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`INTEL CORPORATION,
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`INTEL CORPORATION’S RESPONSE TO IP BRIDGE’S
`SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STATEMENT
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`Defendant.
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`Intel respectfully submits this brief response to IP Bridge’s Supplemental Claim
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`Construction Statement concerning Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc. 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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`(“Praxair”). Dkt. No. 124 (“IPB Supplemental Br.”). In that case, the Federal Circuit construed
`
`the claims at issue to require a “fundamental object of the invention,” holding that “[t]he claims
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`must be read in light of the specification’s consistent emphasis on this fundamental feature of the
`
`invention.” See Praxair at 1323-24.
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`IP Bridge’s attempts to distinguish Praxair are unavailing. First, IP Bridge asserts that
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`there was “no allegation, agreement, or finding in Praxair that a ‘flow restrictor’ was a well-
`
`understood term of art,” yet, according to IP Bridge, there is “no dispute” that “dielectric film” in
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`the ’736 patent is a term of art that is “capable of being understood under its plain and ordinary
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`meaning.” See IPB Supplemental Brief at 2; see also id. at 3 (arguing that “dielectric film” does
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`not have a disputed meaning). That is incorrect. In the district court, Praxair expressly argued that
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`“‘flow resistor’ . . . should be construed consistent with [its] plain and ordinary meaning” (see
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`Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., No. 1:03-cv-01158-SLR, D.I. 189 at 3 (D. Del. Aug. 23, 2005)), and
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`Case 2:17-cv-00676-RWS-RSP Document 127 Filed 08/17/18 Page 2 of 4 PageID #: 6883
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`as reflected in the Federal Circuit’s construction, that meaning is “a structure that serves to restrict
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`the rate of flow . . . .” See Praxair at 1324. But just as here, the alleged plain meaning of the
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`disputed term in the abstract was not enough. The Federal Circuit found it necessary to construe
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`“flow restrictor” based on statements in the specification concerning a “fundamental feature of the
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`invention,”—i.e., that it “serves to restrict the rate of flow sufficiently to prevent a hazardous
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`situation.” See Praxair, 543 F.3d at 1323–24. This Court should likewise construe “dielectric
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`film” in accordance with its fundamental feature (i.e. reducing capacitance). See, e.g., ’736 patent
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`at 3:31-48, 4:16-35, 8:16-26, 20:51-62, 24:34-43.
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`Second, IP Bridge asserts that—unlike here—the disputed term in Praxair “was
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`understood to be a term of degree” such that “the question was whether the proper construction of
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`[flow restrictor] ‘include[s] a device that creates any flow restriction, no matter how minor or
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`inconsequential.” See IPB Supplemental Brief at 2. But the dispute in this case is exactly the
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`same: IP Bridge contends that any dielectric film can suffice, regardless of whether it reduces the
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`wire-to-substrate capacitance of the semiconductor device. See Dkt. No. 108 at 2.
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`Third, IP Bridge argues that while the patent in Praxair “defined [flow restrictor] based on
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`th[e] object of the invention”—through, for example, a statement about the “present invention”—
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`“the ’736 patent never attempts to define the term ‘dielectric film’ based on an ability to reduce
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`capacitance.” IPB Supplemental Br. at 2–3. This argument is highly inconsistent with the intrinsic
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`evidence. Numerous passages in the ’736 patent equate the “present invention” with the use of
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`the claimed dielectric film to reduce wire-to-substrate capacitance. See, e.g., ’736 patent at 4:16-
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`35, 24:34-43.
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`2
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`Case 2:17-cv-00676-RWS-RSP Document 127 Filed 08/17/18 Page 3 of 4 PageID #: 6884
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`Dated: August 17, 2018
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Greg Arovas with permission, by
`Michael E. Jones
`Michael E. Jones (SBN: 10929400)
`Patrick C. Clutter IV (SBN: 2403634)
`POTTER MINTON, PC
`110 North College, Suite 500
`Tyler, Texas 75702
`Tel: 903-597-8311
`Fax: 903-593-0846
`mikejones@potterminton.com
`patrickclutter@potterminton.com
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`Gregory S. Arovas (pro hac vice)
`Jon R. Carter (pro hac vice)
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`601 Lexington Ave.
`New York, NY 10022
`Tel: 212-446-4800
`Fax: 212-446-4900
`gregory.arovas@kirkland.com
`jon.carter@kirkland.com
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`Adam R. Alper (pro hac vice)
`Sarah Piepmeier (pro hac vice)
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`555 California Street
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`Tel: 415-439-1400
`Fax: 415-439-1500
`adam.alper@kirkland.com
`sarah.piepmeier@kirkland.com
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`Michael W. De Vries
`Christopher M. Lawless (pro hac vice)
`KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
`333 South Hope Street
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Tel: 213-680-8400
`Fax: 213-680-8500
`michael.devries@kirkland.com
`christopher.lawless@kirkland.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant Intel
`Corporation
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`By:
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`3
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`Case 2:17-cv-00676-RWS-RSP Document 127 Filed 08/17/18 Page 4 of 4 PageID #: 6885
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies that all counsel of record who have consented to electronic
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`service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local
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`Rule CV-5(a)(3) on this 16th day of August 2018.
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`/s/ Michael E. Jones
`Michael E. Jones
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`4
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