`Case 2:17-cv-00517—JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 631
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`EXHIBIT A
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`EXHIBIT A
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`Case 2:17-cv-00517-JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 632
`Case 2:17-cv-00517—JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 632
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`CASE NO. 14-cv-80651-MIDDLEBROOKS
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`ADVANCED GROUND INFORMATION
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`SYSTEMS, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`LIFE360, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`/
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
`ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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`Life360 Inc. (“Life360”), the prevailing party in this patent case, has moved for award of
`attorneys’
`fees and non-taxable expenses, along with pre- and post-I judgment
`interest.
`The
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`Plaintiff, Advanced Ground Information Systems, Inc. (“AGIS”) responds that its infringement case
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`was objectively reasonable, litigated in good faith, and there is no basis for any award of attorneys’
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`fees.
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`I have reviewed the Motion, the Response, Life360’s Reply, and presided over the jury trial
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`which resulted in a finding of no infringement. The jury, however, did not invalidate the AGIS
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`patent.
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`35 U.S.C. § 285 of the Patent Act provides that a district court “in exceptional cases may
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`award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” The Supreme Court has held that “an
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`‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength
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`of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the
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`unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
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`Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). This requires a case-by-case exercise in discretion,
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`considering the totality of the circumstances.
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`Id.
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`Sanctionable conduct
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`is not a necessary
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`Case 2:17-cv-00517-JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 633
`Case 2:17-cv-00517-JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 633
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`benchmark.
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`Id. Moreover, courts maintain an inherent power to order fee-shifting “when the losing
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`party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons .
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`.
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`.
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`.” Id. (quoting
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`Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 US. 240, 258—59 (1975)).
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`This was an exceptionally weak case, especially with respect to the asserted method claims,
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`which were the only claims remaining after claim construction. Every asserted method claim
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`involved steps that could only be performed by multiple users on different cellular phones, or even
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`by third-party servers.
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`Infringement of a method claim requires a showing that a single party
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`performed each and every step of the claim, and inducement liability must be predicated on an act
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`of direct infringement (i.e. for a method claim, infringement by a single party). Limelight Networks,
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`Inc. v. Akamai Techs, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). See also, Akamai Techs, Inc v. Limelight
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`Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir. 2015), on reh ’g en banc, 797 F.3d 1020, and reh ’g en banc
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`granted, opinion vacated, 612 F. App’x 617. Users of the Life360 app could not perform the
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`asserted method claim because no user had control of other users in a circle. Moreover, neither
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`Life360 or its users controlled or maintained “a remote network server” that could transmit maps to
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`other users in the circle. Additionally, Claim I of the ‘954 Patent required accessing a website that
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`enables a user to establish both public and private networks, but any contention that the Life360 app
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`allowed users to do so was completely untenable after claim construction.
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`These Parties never competed, never lost business to each other, indeed had never heard of
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`each other before AGIS lawyers sent a demand letter to Life360, a startup company that, while
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`showing promise, had never made a profit. The letter demanded that Life360 either negotiate a
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`royalty or shut down its service. The Complaint claimed, without any basis that it was being
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`irreparably harmed by Life360, that Life 360 should be enjoined from operation. While I stop short
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`of a finding of bad faith, continued assertion of these claims seemed designed to extract settlement
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`not based upon the merits of the claim but on the high cost of litigation.
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`2
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`Case 2:17-cv-00517-JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 634
`Case 2:17-cv-00517-JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 634
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`AGIS, in arguing the case was not exceptional, points to the denial of summary judgment
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`and the fact that I submitted the case to the jury and did not grant Life360’s Motion for Judgment as
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`a Matter of Law.
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`I considered granting summary judgment in favor of Life360 but did not because
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`of an argument that the claimed method steps were performed automatically as a result of sending
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`an invitation to join a circle. While I reserved ruling on the Motion for Judgment, I did so having
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`decided that, should it prove necessary,
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`I would enter judgment
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`in favor of Life360 on the
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`infringement claim.
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`Having concluded the case was exceptional, I turn to the amount of fees that should be
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`awarded. The Complaint in the case was filed on May 15, 2014. The Supreme Court’s decision in
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`Limelight Networks, 134 S. Ct. 2111 was decided June 2, 2014. This decision confirmed the single
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`part impediment to the method claims. On November 21, 2014, I issued a Markman Order which
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`held the system claims indefinite and construed “common interest network” and “private” and
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`“public” networks. Given the Supreme Court’s decision and my Markman construction, AGIS had
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`no reasonable chance of success on its claims.
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`I therefore award fees from November 21, 2014
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`through the conclusion of trial, March 13, 2015.
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`Life360 also seeks to recover expert witness fees, pre- and post- judgment interest, and non-
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`taxable expenses. But 35 U.S.C. § 285 only authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney fees not
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`expert witness fees, Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings C0,, 23 F.3d 374, 377-79 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1994), and as noted above, I am exercising discretion solely pursuant to § 285 and not relying
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`upon any inherent power to sanction conduct. Therefore, expert witness fees are not awarded.
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`With respect to prejudgment interest, the Federal Circuit has held in a pre-Octane Fitness
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`decision that “a district court does have authority,
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`in cases of ‘bad faith or other exceptional
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`circumstances,’ to award prejudgment interest on the unliquidated sum of an award made under
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`Section 285.” Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The court went on to say,
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`3
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`Case 2:17-cv-00517-JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 635
`Case 2:17-cv-00517—JRG Document 51-6 Filed 01/19/18 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 635
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`however, “[t]hat the court has a common law authority to exercise its inherent equitable power does
`3
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`not mean it must do so.’
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`Id. Assuming but not deciding that § 285 authorizes the award of
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`prejudgment interest in the absence of a finding of bad faith, in the circumstances of this case, I do
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`not find it appropriate. Furthermore,
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`I do not find the award of non-taxable expenses to be
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`warranted.
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`While AGIS raised questions about aspects of the fees requested, the reply represents that
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`the invoices attached to its Motion are the bills that were submitted to Life3 60. The amounts of fees
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`between November 21, 2014 and March 13, 2015 total $684,190.25.1 These fees are reasonable in
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`the view of the Court and, due to the exceptional nature of the case, should be awarded.
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`Accordingly, it is hereby
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`ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (DE 190) is
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`GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
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`Judgment in the amount of $684,190.25 shall
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`be entered in favor of Life360.
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`SO ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Florida, this
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`Z
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`day of December,
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`2015.
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`/
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`/
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`[I 0" LD M. MIDDLEBROOKS
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`Copies to:
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`Counsel of Record
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`1 This total includes the sum of lead counsel fees, $602,346.25, plus local counsel fees, $81,844.
`Lead counsel fees were calculated by taking the sum of $920,045.00 (total fees incurred by lead
`counsel) see (DE 191-2 at 2), and subtracting $317,698.75 (lead counsel fees incurred before
`November 21, 2014 and after March 13, 2015), see (id. at 3—31). Local counsel fees were calculated
`in a similar manner.
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`4
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