throbber
Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 1 of 11 PageID #: 2547
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`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`PLAINTIFF AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC’S SUR-REPLY IN
`OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HTC CORPORATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(B)(2), OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
`TRANSFER VENUE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(A)
`TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (DKT. 29)
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`









`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:17-cv-514-JRG
`(Lead Case)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`HTC CORPORATION,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 2 of 11 PageID #: 2548
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`I.
`
`HTC’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER SHOULD BE DENIED
`
`AGIS Software Development, LLC (“AGIS”) has demonstrated that this Court’s exercise
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`of personal jurisdiction over HTC Corporation (“HTC”) is both proper and fair based on HTC’s
`
`conduct placing the infringing products into the stream of commerce with an expectation that
`
`they would be sold in Texas. Additionally, HTC has failed to show that transfer to the Northern
`
`District of California (“NDCal”) is clearly more convenient and warranted in the interests of
`
`justice.
`
`II.
`
`PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER HTC IS PROPER AND FAIR
`
`AGIS has established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over HTC, and HTC has
`
`failed to rebut it. Dkt. 40 at 11-17. HTC admits that (1) it manufactures products containing the
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`accused devices abroad; (2) it supplies the accused devices to its subsidiary, HTC America with
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`knowledge that HTC America imports, markets, and sells the accused devices to third party
`
`distributors and carriers in the United States; and (3) HTC’s intent and purpose is to serve the
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`United States Market. Dkt 29-2 ¶ 2; Dkt. 29 at 5, 12, 13; Dkt. 40-10 at 30, 146. HTC has not
`
`and cannot dispute that its distribution network is ongoing and continuous, and results in its
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`products being distributed and sold nationwide, including in Texas. Thus, HTC cannot deny that
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`it “knew, or reasonably could have foreseen, that a termination point of the channel was [the
`
`forum state].” Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1564. Indeed, HTC’s United States’ website
`
`identifies numerous stores in Texas that sell HTC products, including at least twenty-five (25)
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`stores in this District. See Ex. 10, HTC Corporation Store Locator. In view of these
`
`uncontroverted facts, a prima facie case of purposeful entry into the Texas stream of commerce
`
`is established as “the defendant’s products were sold into a nationwide distribution network and
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`[] the products were available in Texas.” IDQ Operating, Inc. v. Aerospace Commc’ns Holdings
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 3 of 11 PageID #: 2549
`
`Co., No. 6:15-CV-781, 2016 WL 5349488, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 10, 2016), report and
`
`recommendation adopted sub nom. Armor All/STP Prod. Co. v. Aerospace Commc’ns Holdings
`
`Co., Ltd., No. 6:15-CV-781, 2016 WL 5338715 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2016) (Gilstrap, J.). This
`
`Court has jurisdiction over HTC because HTC places the accused products into the stream of
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`commerce through a distribution channel it established with its wholly-owned subsidiary, with
`
`the knowledge and expectation that, through HTC’s distribution, the accused products would be
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`sold nationwide, including Texas. See IDQ Operating, 2016 WL 5349488, at *4 (jurisdiction
`
`proper over defendants when “the defendant’s products were sold into a nationwide distribution
`
`network and [] the products were available in Texas); MHL Tek, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co., No.
`
`2:07-cv-289 (TJW), 2008 WL 910012 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2008) (jurisdiction over foreign
`
`defendant proper where defendant placed products into established distribution channel and it
`
`knew the likely destination of its products because defendant sold its products to an entity in the
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`chain knowing that entity would distribute vehicles throughout the United States, including
`
`Texas); Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
`
`(jurisdiction proper over defendant who, as a result of selling its products through a distribution
`
`channel developed by defendant, knew or should have reasonably foreseen that the termination
`
`point of the channel was the forum state).1
`
`Accordingly, HTC’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be
`
`denied.2
`
`
`1 Guidance or control over the entities at the end of the distribution channel is not required for this Court to have
`personal jurisdiction over HTC. IDQ Operating, 2016 WL 5349488, at *4.
`2 HTC does not argue in its reply that the exercise of jurisdiction over HTC would be unreasonable. See Dkt. 47 at
`1-2. Thus, HTC has failed to present a “compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction over HTC would be
`unreasonable. See Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1568 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.462, 477
`(2003).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 4 of 11 PageID #: 2550
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`III. TRANSFER TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA IS NOT
`WARRANTED
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`Despite making a bald statement that all factors weigh in favor of transfer, in its reply,
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`HTC ignores three factors (judicial economy, localized interest, and court congestion) that AGIS
`
`has shown weigh against transfer. Compare Dkt. 40 at 27-30, with Dkt. 47 2-10. HTC’s
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`arguments regarding the other three factors fail to show that transfer is “clearly more convenient”
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`for all parties, witnesses, and in the interest of justice. See Aloft Media, 2008 WL 819956, at *3.
`
`HTC’s attacks on AGIS’s ties to this District (Dkt. 47 at 10) do not discharge HTC of its burden
`
`to show that the transferee district is clearly more convenient. See In re Apple, Inc., 456 Fed.
`
`App’x 907 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (denying defendant’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking a
`
`transfer of venue noting that the district court did not give any weight to defendant’s arguments
`
`about the plaintiff's “ephemeral connections to the [initial choice of] forum”).
`
`A. Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses and Cost of Attendance for Willing
`Witnesses Weigh Against Transfer
`
`The convenience factors weigh against transfer for numerous reasons. First, HTC failed
`
`to identify a single party witness. Each of these “potential witnesses” live in Taiwan. Dkt. 29 at
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`21; Dkt. 47 at 9. This is insufficient. Mohamed v. Volvo Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D.
`
`Tex. 2000) (movant must do more than make “a general allegation that the key witnesses are
`
`inconveniently located”). Rather, HTC is required to provide evidence as to the “relevance and
`
`materiality” of the information these individuals might have and provide “evidence (e.g., a
`
`declaration from the [employees]) indicating that travel to Marshall would constitute an
`
`inordinate inconvenience or expense.” Sanger Ins. Agency, Inc. v. HUB Int’l, Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-
`
`528, 2014 WL 5389936, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2014 (Gilstrap, J.). Any witness living in
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`Taiwan will be required to travel to testify, and may consider it more convenient to travel to
`
`3
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`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 5 of 11 PageID #: 2551
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`Texas than to California. See MHL Tek, LLC v. Nissan Motor Co., No. 2:07-cv-289, 2009
`
`WL 440627, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2009).
`
`Second, HTC’s argument that NDCal is more convenient for third party witnesses, HTC
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`America, prosecuting attorney Daniel Burns, and Google, also fails. Dkt. 47 at 3-8. HTC
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`identifies two “potential witnesses” employed by HTC America (Dkt. 29 at 21; Dkt. 47 at 6);
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`however, only after AGIS argued that such a perfunctory identification is not sufficient to carry
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`HTC’s burden, HTC, for the first time in reply, sets forth the purported relevance of these
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`individuals (Dkt. 47 at 6-7). Nonetheless, these “potential witnesses” are located outside of
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`NDCal and will be required to travel to testify. See MHL Tek, 2009 WL 440627, at *4.3
`
`Similarly, HTC failed to explain the relevance and materiality of Mr. Burns in its opening brief
`
`and attempts to argue his relevance now in reply. Dkt. 29 at 6, 18; Dkt. 47 at 7.4 Prosecuting
`
`attorneys are not relevant, especially given that no party has pled an inequitable conduct defense.
`
`With regard to Google, HTC’s attempt to overcome deficiencies in its opening brief
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`regarding the identity, relevance, materiality, and purported inconvenience of Google’s witnesses
`
`in its reply (Dkt. 47 at 5) falls short. In HTC’s initial motion, HTC generally references
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`“[p]rimary” or “critical” Google witnesses and provided a vague parenthetical citation to a
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`declaration in another case, without any explanation as to why such a declaration may be
`
`relevant here, listing four employees and titles for three. Dkt. 40 at 6, 22. Even if such
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`identification is sufficient—it is not—HTC did not discuss, let alone set forth evidence of, the
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`relevance, materiality, or purported inconvenience of these individuals. Dkt. 40 at 6, 22. Now,
`
`again relying on declarations submitted in a different case, HTC lists four additional Google
`
`3 HTC’s general statement that “all of third-party HTC America’s employees with relevant information are in
`Washington” (Dkt. 47 at 7) is not sufficient for HTC to meet its burden. Sanger, 2014 WL 5389936, at *2.
`4 HTC also ignored that other prosecuting attorneys of the Patents-in-Suit are located in Florida (Dkt. 29 at 6), who,
`if called to testify, will likely find Texas more convenient than California (MHL Tek, 2009 WL 440627, at *4).
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 6 of 11 PageID #: 2552
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`employees not identified in its opening brief and, for the first time, states the purported relevance
`
`of these individuals. Compare Dkt. 40 at 6, 22, with Dkt. 47 at 5. This is improper and should
`
`be disregarded. Watson v. Astrue, 2013 WL 6662828, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2013).5
`
`HTC’s argument regarding the relevance of Google generally (Dkt. 47 at 3-5) also fails.
`
`HTC contends that “Google’s publicly available open-source code is not what is actually
`
`relevant” to this action. Id. at 3-4. This argument is entirely ignores that AGIS’s infringement
`
`contentions rely significantly on Google’s publicly available source code. Dkt. 29-33. That
`
`AGIS reserved its rights to amend its infringement contentions if additional source code is made
`
`available to it (id.) is standard protocol and further supports the fact that AGIS relied on
`
`Google’s publicly available source code. HTC argues that Google witnesses are relevant to this
`
`action because this action involves Google applications (Dkt. 47 at 3-4), but HTC ignores that its
`
`own witnesses have knowledge regarding these applications. Indeed, HTC states that HTC
`
`employees “interface with Google employees relating to the engineering of their smartphones”
`
`and that Google provides the applications to HTC whose employees then install the applications.
`
`Dkt. 29 at 5.
`
`Third, HTC does not contest that this District is most convenient for third party cellular
`
`carriers, Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint. Dkt. 47 at 8. Rather, HTC argues that AGIS failed to
`
`provide evidence of the relevance of certain third parties, including cellular carriers. Id. at 8.
`
`This burden shifting is improper. It is HTC’s burden, not AGIS’s, to come forward with
`
`evidence as to why NDCal is clearly more convenient for its witnesses. Mears Techs., Inc. v.
`
`Finisar Corp., 2014 WL 1652603, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014) (Gilstrap, J.). Sanger, 2014,
`
`5 Additionally, AGIS has accused functionality related to Google’s Android Operating System and Google
`employees located in Austin have knowledge regarding various products including Androids. Dkt. 40 at 7; Dkt. 40-
`2 ¶¶ 3-4. Thus, to the extent Google employees are relevant; Google’s Austin employees would likely find it more
`convenient to travel to this District rather than California.
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 7 of 11 PageID #: 2553
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`WL 5389936, at *2. Nonetheless, AGIS sufficiently sets forth the relevance of these cellular
`
`carriers in its opposition, including consumer market value of the features enabled by the
`
`Patents-in-Suit, consumer surveys, and marketing information regarding demand for particular
`
`applications and features. Dkt. 40 at 26-27. HTC’s argument that, because cellular carriers were
`
`not the focus of its infringement contentions, they are irrelevant (Dkt. 47 at 8) is wrong. While
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`cellular carriers may not be the focus of AGIS’s infringement contentions, they do have
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`knowledge and information relevant to numerous aspects of AGIS’s case, including damages.
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`Indeed, AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint have numerous stores in this District that sell HTC’s
`
`products. Ex. 10.
`
`Finally, this District is the most convenient for AGIS’s witnesses. HTC does not contest
`
`that this District is the most convenient for Eric Armstrong, but rather argues that AGIS did not
`
`provide an explanation as to why Mr. Armstrong is relevant. Dkt. 47 at 9. But HTC is wrong.
`
`AGIS explained that Mr. Armstrong’s “relevant knowledge and anticipated testimony includes
`
`[his] knowledge relating to contracts and licenses involving AGIS’s intellectual property and
`
`AGIS’s software development and quality assurance which relates to, inter alia, AGIS’s
`
`damages.” Dkt. 40 at 22; see also Dkt. 40-1 ¶ 16. HTC’s argument that Mr. Armstrong is
`
`irrelevant because he did not testify in a different case, involving different parties and different
`
`patents (Dkt. 47 at 9) is misguided. A party is under no obligation to use the same witness in
`
`various cases, and not using a witness in one case does not amount to an admission that that
`
`witness is not relevant in a different or subsequent litigation. HTC also does not dispute that this
`
`District is the most convenient for AGIS’s technical expert, who is located in this District (Dkt.
`
`47 at 9) and whose convenience is, contrary to HTC’s contention, relevant to the transfer
`
`analysis. Aloft Media, 2008 WL 819956, at *5 (“[A] patent trial often revolves around the
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 8 of 11 PageID #: 2554
`
`strength of expert testimony.”). HTC also does not contest that this District is the most
`
`convenient for five additional AGIS witnesses: David Sietsema, Rebecca Clark, Malcom Beyer,
`
`Jr., Sandel Blackwell, and Christopher Rice. Dkt. 47 at 9-10; see Dkt. 40 at 21-23.
`
`B. Access to Sources of Proof Weighs Against Transfer
`
`In reply, HTC does not contest that it can produce its documents, located in Taiwan, in
`
`this District. Nor does HTC contest that this District contains relevant AGIS documents,
`
`including the documents of Mr. Armstrong, and that NDCal does not contain any sources of
`
`proof of AGIS. See Dkt. 40 at 26-27. Rather, HTC argues only that Google’s technical
`
`documents and source code are maintained in NDCal and that the source code cannot be
`
`electronically transferred. Dkt. 47 at 7-8. HTC does not argue that Google’s technical
`
`documents, if relevant, cannot be produced electronically. Id.; see Aloft Media, 2008 WL
`
`819956, at *4. Moreover, as discussed in AGIS’s opposition and herein, AGIS’s infringement
`
`contentions rely on Google’s open source code and/or application programing interfaces, which
`
`are publicly available. Dkt. 40-2 ¶ 12.
`
`C. Compulsory Process Weighs Against Transfer
`
`Contrary to HTC’s argument, this factor weighs against transfer because HTC is required
`
`to identify witnesses that are unwilling to testify for which compulsory process is not available in
`
`this Court. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. OOCL (USA), Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 703, 711 (N.D. Tex. 2009);
`
`J2 Glob. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Protus IP Sols., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-211, 2008 WL 5378010, at *3
`
`(E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2008). HTC’s argument that, because it does not control the witnesses it
`
`cannot possibly know if they are unwilling witnesses (Dkt. 47 at 7), is disingenuous. HTC has
`
`identified potential witnesses and, therefore, could have ascertained whether they would be
`
`willing witnesses if called to testify at trial.
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 9 of 11 PageID #: 2555
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, AGIS respectfully requests that the Court deny HTC’s Motion.
`
`Dated: March 7, 2018
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BROWN RUDNICK LLP
`
`
`
`/s/ Vincent J. Rubino, III
`Alfred R. Fabricant
`NY Bar No. 2219392
`Email: afabricant@brownrudnick.com
`Lawrence C. Drucker
`NY Bar No. 2303089
`Email: ldrucker@brownrudnick.com
`Peter Lambrianakos
`NY Bar No. 2894392
`Email: plambrianakos@brownrudnick.com
`Vincent J. Rubino, III
`NY Bar No. 4557435
`Email: vrubino@brownrudnick.com
`Alessandra C. Messing
`NY Bar No. 5040019
`Email: amessing@brownrudnick.com
`John A. Rubino
`NY Bar No. 5020797
`Email: jrubino@brownrudnick.com
`Enrique William Iturralde
`NY Bar No. 5526280
`Email: eiturralde@brownrudnick.com
`BROWN RUDNICK LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, NY 10036
`Telephone: 212-209-4800
`Facsimile: 212-209-4801
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 10 of 11 PageID #: 2556
`
`Samuel F. Baxter
`Texas State Bar No. 01938000
`sbaxter@mckoolsmith.com
`Jennifer L. Truelove
`Texas State Bar No. 24012906
`jtruelove@mckoolsmith.com
`McKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`104 East Houston Street, Suite 300
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: 903-923-9000
`Facsimile: 903-923-9099
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF, AGIS
`SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 49 Filed 03/07/18 Page 11 of 11 PageID #: 2557
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that, on March 7, 2018, all counsel of record who are
`
`deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via
`
`the Court's CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3).
`
`/s/ Vincent J. Rubino, III
` Vincent J. Rubino, III
`
`
`
`
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`

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