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Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 1 of 9 PageID #: 20044
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`HTC CORPORATION,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`LG ELECTRONICS INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`Case No. 2:17-CV-0514-JRG
`(LEAD CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:17-CV-0515-JRG
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`










`




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`
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC’S
`SUR-REPLY IN OPPOSITION TO LG ELECTRONICS INC.’S
`SEALED DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE OPINIONS OF
`MR. ALAN RATLIFF RELATING TO DAMAGES (DKT. 118)
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 2 of 9 PageID #: 20045
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`Plaintiff AGIS Software Development LLC (“Plaintiff” or “AGIS”) submits this sur-
`
`reply in opposition to the motion by Defendant LG Electronics Inc. (“Defendant” or “LG”) to
`
`exclude certain opinions of AGIS’s damages expert, Alan Ratliff, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
`
`Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For the reasons set forth below, LG’s motion should be
`
`denied.
`
`I.
`
`
`
`MR. RATLIFF’S “MARKET VALUE” IS A RELIABLE STARTING
`POINT FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL NEGOTIATION
`
`LG’s argument that Mr. Ratliff’s market value is an unreliable basis for the hypothetical
`
`negotiation rests on LG’s assumption that the Accused Apps are “free.” See Dkt. 179 at 1. LG
`
`argues that the Accused Products would sell for the same price with or without the Accused
`
`Apps. Id. However, LG’s assumption that the pre-installed software has no value leads to the
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`erroneous conclusion that LG’s Accused Products would sell for the same price without the
`
`Android operating system and pre-installed apps. The Accused Products in this case are
`
`comprised of hardware and software, and one without the other would not work. Moreover,
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`expert opinion is not needed to comprehend the reality that as more software features are
`
`included in a smartphone, the higher the cost of the phone. LG’s faulty assumption that the pre-
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`installed software is “free” is fatal to its argument.
`
`
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`The demand for the Accused Apps is necessarily factored into the price of the Accused
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`Products. As discussed, the Accused Products are comprised of both hardware and software, and
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`the phone hardware would not function without the software which includes the Accused Apps.
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`As explained in Mr. Ratliff’s report, the Accused Apps promote the purchase of additional
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`Android devices, including the LG Accused Devices. Dkt. 153-2 at ¶¶ 22-26, 33, 44, 52, 76-80.
`
`LG’s argument that Mr. Ratliff “could have measured” other things does not make Mr. Ratliff’s
`
`analysis unreliable. Dkt. 179 at 1. Mr. Ratliff’s use of the market value of comparable
`
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 3 of 9 PageID #: 20046
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`applications, while apportioning for the accused functionality within, is an accepted approach
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`recognized by the Federal Circuit. That Mr. Ratliff didn’t use the particular measurements in his
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`damages analysis that LG prefers is not a basis on which to exclude Mr. Ratliff’s testimony and
`
`LG’s criticisms are arguments best left to cross-examination at trial.
`
`
`
`In its reply, LG again tries to fit a square peg into a round hole by arguing that Exmark
`
`Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods. Group, LLC, 879 F.3d 1332, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
`
`supports its argument that Mr. Ratliff’s starting point of a market value of fee-based apps with
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`similar features to the accused features is unreliable. Dkt. 179 at 2. The portion of Exmark cited
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`by LG states that the expert had acknowledged that elements, such as durability, reliability,
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`brand position, etc., affect sales of lawnmowers, but that the expert did not conduct an analysis
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`on the impact of these elements on the market value or profitability of the mowers, making the
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`analysis unreliable. See 879 F.3d at 1350. Here, Mr. Ratliff’s starting value is the market value of
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`comparable fee-based apps having the accused features, not the LG Accused Device. Exmark
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`contains no discussion that suggests Mr. Ratliff’s starting point is unreliable.
`
`II. MR. RATLIFF’S “USAGE APPORTIONMENT” IS RELIABLE AND
`SUPPORTED
`
`
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`LG argues that Mr. Ratliff’s “usage apportionment” is unreliable because it does not
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`compare usage of accused functionality versus non-accused functionality, and because “nowhere
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`does he assess demand or usage of the accused features themselves.” Dkt. 179 at 2-3. First,
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`Mr. Ratliff’s usage apportionment is not meant to apportion for non-infringing versus infringing
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`functionality; that apportionment comes later in the separate technical apportionment that
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`considers
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`the
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`importance of
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`infringing versus non-infringing features, and relies on
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`Mr. McAlexander Dkt. 153-2 at ¶94; Dkt. 153-3 at StoneTurn Exhibit 2. Including the
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`infringing versus non-infringing feature apportionment in the “usage apportionment” would
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 4 of 9 PageID #: 20047
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`result in a double apportionment. Second, Mr. Ratliff did assess the usage of the accused
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`features, as he considered the range of usage of the Accused Apps. See Dkt. 153-2 at ¶¶ 73-74;
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`Dkt. 153-3 at StoneTurn Exhibit 4. LG argues that Mr. Ratliff only considered “user interest in
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`non-accused features like navigation.” Dkt. 179 at 3. LG is merely using Mr. Ratliff’s
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`terminology in Stoneturn Exhibit 4 to misconstrue the analysis. Dkt. 153-3 at StoneTurn Exhibit
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`2. Two of the surveys covered “Navigation Apps” which are apps such as the Accused App
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`Google Maps. Id. The terminology “Navigation Apps” does not signify that Mr. Ratliff only
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`considered user interest in “navigation,” as LG would like the Court to believe. Dkt. 179 at 3.
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`Mr. Ratliff’s usage apportionment is tailored to the facts of the case and is based on reliable
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`information and methods, and thus should not be excluded.
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`III. MR. RATLIFF’S “TECHNICAL APPORTIONMENT” IS RELIABLE
`AND SUPPORTED
`
`
`
`Mr. Ratliff relies on Mr. McAlexander’s opinions while forming his analysis, which is
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`normal and acceptable in connection with apportionment analyses. See, e.g., Beneficial
`
`Innovations, Inc. v. Advance Publications, Inc., Case No. 2:11-cv-0029-JRG-RSP (E.D. Tex.
`
`July 9, 2014) at *5; Freeny v. Murphy Oil Corp., Case No. 2:13-cv-791-RSP, Dkt. 151, at *4
`
`(E.D. Tex. June 4, 2015). LG attempts to distinguish Chrimar Holding Company, LLC v. ALE
`
`USA Inc., 2018 WL 2120618, at *9 (Fed. Cir. 2018) by stating that the expert in Chrimar
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`provided statements describing the importance and success of the patented technology, and that
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`Mr. Ratliff did not. Dkt. 179 at 4. However, LG misreads Chrimar, where it was the technical
`
`expert who provided the statements and the damages expert relied on those statements for the
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`technical apportionment. See 2018 WL 2120618, at *9. Mr. Ratliff does the same here, basing
`
`his estimate on Mr. McAlexander’s substantial analysis and ultimate opinion that the accused
`
`features are “very significant.” See Dkt. 153-2 at ¶¶ 91-93; see also Dkt. 153-5 at §§ 9.3, 9.4.1-
`
`3
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 5 of 9 PageID #: 20048
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`9.4.4, 9.4.6, 9.5. While LG may differ with Mr. Ratliff and Mr. McAlexander’s analyses and
`
`question the ultimate result, the proper time for addressing LG’s concerns is at trial where LG
`
`will have an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Ratliff and Mr. McAlexander.
`
`A. Mr. Ratliff’s “Mobile Telephone Industry” and “Profit Split”
`Factors are Relevant
`
`
`
`LG argues that Mr. Ratliff used “irrelevant profitability data” and that his “profit split”
`
`has “no basis in fact.” Dkt. 179 at 4. LG produced inconsistent and incomplete revenue and cost
`
`data, and LG’s witnesses could not correct the deficiencies. Dkt. 153-2 at ¶¶ 39, 65-66; Dkt. 153-
`
`4, StoneTurn Second Supplemental Workpaper, at 14; Dkt. 153-7, Jang Dep., at 38:5-39:19,
`
`40:12-41:16. In light of LG’s discovery shortcomings, Mr. Ratliff performed an acceptable
`
`alternative computation specifically tied to the facts of the case as it is based on industry data for
`
`the Accused Devices. See Dkt. 153-2 at ¶¶ 68-69.
`
`
`
`Regarding Mr. Ratliff’s “profit split,” even if the analysis is not “simple or direct,”
`
`simplicity is not a prerequisite for admissibility. Dkt. 179 at 4. LG may disagree with the data
`
`points, but the proper time for addressing LG’s concerns is at trial where LG will have an
`
`opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Ratliff. Moreover, Mr. Ratliff’s “profit split” is not “fictional,”
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`but is based on arrangements between device makers, operating system providers, app providers,
`
`and wireless carriers, all of which are participants in the ecosystem discussed in his report. Dkt.
`
`153-2 at ¶¶ 76-80.
`
`IV. MR. RATLIFF’S REASONABLE ROYALTY ANALYSIS IS NOT BASED
`ON THE EMVR
`
`
`
`In its reply, LG argues that Mr. Ratliff’s analysis is based on the EMVR by merely
`
`quoting AGIS’s opposition brief out of context, claiming AGIS stated the value of the Accused
`
`Apps is represented in the sales numbers for the Accused Devices. Dkt. 179 at 4. However, any
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`alleged “error” was manufactured by LG, as AGIS’s opposition clearly states that “decreased
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 6 of 9 PageID #: 20049
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`demand due to price is” represented in the sales numbers. Id. In any event, LG admits that Mr.
`
`Ratliff bases his royalty analysis on the starting price of comparable apps for which users pay.
`
`Dkt. 179 at 4. Mr. Ratliff does not base his analysis on LG’s sales revenues, but rather he further
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`apportions the price based on the comparable fee-based apps using factors such as the number of
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`activations, the contribution of the patents to the technology, and other relevant factors. See Dkt.
`
`153-3 at Exhibit 2. Further, Mr. Ratliff expressly limited this portion of his opinion to the context
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`of Georgia-Pacific factor 15, wherein a damages expert is supposed to determine a royalty that
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`would leave the infringer with a “normal profit.” Dkt. 153-2 at ¶ 117. Mr. Ratliff’s opinion
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`concerning the amount of the reasonable royalty, and its portion of LG’s estimated profits on the
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`Accused Apps, is an opinion limited to the SSPPU and not part of an EMVR analysis.
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION
`
`For all of the foregoing reasons, LG’s motion to exclude certain damages opinions of
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`Alan Ratliff should be denied in its entirety.
`
`
`Dated: February 22, 2019
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`
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`
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`BROWN RUDNICK LLP
`
` /s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
`
`
`
`Alfred R. Fabricant
`NY Bar No. 2219392
`Email: afabricant@brownrudnick.com
`Lawrence C. Drucker
`NY Bar No. 2303089
`Email: ldrucker@brownrudnick.com
`Peter Lambrianakos
`NY Bar No. 2894392
`Email: plambrianakos@brownrudnick.com
`Vincent J. Rubino, III
`NY Bar No. 4557435
`Email: vrubino@brownrudnick.com
`Alessandra C. Messing
`NY Bar No. 5040019
`Email: amessing@brownrudnick.com
`Shahar Harel
`
`5
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 7 of 9 PageID #: 20050
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`NY Bar No. 4573192
`Email: sharel@brownrudnick.com
`John A. Rubino
`NY Bar No. 5020797
`Email: jrubino@brownrudnick.com
`Enrique W. Iturralde
`NY Bar No. 5526280
`Email: eiturralde@brownrudnick.com
`Daniel J. Shea, Jr.
`NY Bar No. 5430558
`Email: dshea@brownrudnick.com
`Justine Minseon Park
`NY Bar No. 5604483
`Email: apark@brownrudnick.com
`BROWN RUDNICK LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, NY 10036
`Telephone: 212-209-4800
`Facsimile: 212-209-4801
`
`Rebecca MacDowell Lecaroz
`Massachusetts Bar No. 666860
`Email: rlecaroz@brownrudnick.com
`BROWN RUDNICK LLP
`One Financial Center
`Boston, MA 02111
`Telephone: (617) 856-8200
`Facsimile: (617) 856-8201
`
`Samuel F. Baxter
`Texas State Bar No. 01938000
`Email: sbaxter@mckoolsmith.com
`Jennifer L. Truelove
`Texas State Bar No. 24012906
`Email: jtruelove@mckoolsmith.com
`McKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`104 East Houston Street, Suite 300
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: 903-923-9000
`Facsimile: 903-923-9099
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF, AGIS
`SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC
`
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`6
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 8 of 9 PageID #: 20051
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`CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL
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`The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document is authorized to be filed under seal
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`pursuant to the Protective Order entered in this case.
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`/s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 241 Filed 02/27/19 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 20052
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that, on February 22, 2019, all counsel of record who
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`are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document
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`via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3).
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`/s/ Alfred R. Fabricant
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`Alfred R. Fabricant
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