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`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`CASE NO. 2:17-cv-514-JRG
`(Lead Case)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`CASE NO. 2:17-CV-515-JRG
`(Member Case)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`§§§§§§§§§
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`§§§§§§§§§
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`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`HTC CORPORATION, et al.
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`Defendant.
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`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, LLC
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`Plaintiff,
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`LG ELECTRONICS INC.
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`Defendant.
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`DEFENDANT LG ELECTRONICS INC.’S OPPOSITION TO AGIS’S MOTION TO
`STRIKE THE JANUARY 11, 2019 EXPERT REPORT OF EDWARD R. TITTEL
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 14652
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`AGIS WAS WELL AWARE OF LG’S RELIANCE ON GOOGLE WITNESSES
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`Under Rule 37, Mr. Tittel’s Reliance On Information Obtained From
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`THE GOOGLE SOURCE CODE IDENTIFIED BY AGIS IN ITS MOTION WAS
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`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1
`BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................2
`GOOGLE SOURCE CODE.............................................................................................2
`GOOGLE WITNESSES ..................................................................................................3
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................5
`TIMELY PRODUCED AND INSPECTED BY AGIS ....................................................5
`FROM THE OUTSET OF THIS CASE ...........................................................................8
`a.
`Third-Party Google Fact Witnesses Is “Harmless” ............................................. 10
`i.
`Important ................................................................................................ 11
`ii.
`Is Not Prejudicial And Does Not Warrant A Continuance ....................... 11
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 12
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`The Information Obtained from William Luh and Micah Mason Is
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`Any Allegedly Late Identification Of Google Witnesses By Name
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`-i-
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`I.
`II.
`A.
`B.
`III.
`A.
`B.
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`IV.
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 14653
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
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`Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`No. 2:12-CV-207-JRG, 2016 WL 7209798 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2016) ................................ 10
`
`Baltimore Aircoil Co., Inc. v. SPX Cooling Techs. Inc.,
`No. CCB-13-2053, 2016 WL 4426681 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2016), aff’d, 721 F.
`App’x 983 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ................................................................................................. 10
`
`Brown v. Chertoff,
`No. 406cv002, 2009 WL 50163 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2009) ........................................................ 9
`
`ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 2:13-CV-1112- JRG, 2015 WL 6886957 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2015) ................................. 7
`
`Finjan, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
`No. 14-cv-02998-HSG (JSC), 2018 WL 620156 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018) ............................ 7
`
`Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc.,
`786 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (E.D. Tex. 2011) ............................................................................... 10
`
`Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co.,
`382 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................... 10
`
`Smith v. Ardew Wood Prods., Ltd.,
`No. C07-5641 FDB, 2009 WL 799679 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2009) ............................. 11, 12
`
`Williams v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
`No. 4:08-cv-487, 2009 WL 305183 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009)............................................... 12
`
`Rules
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(d) ................................................................................................................... 7
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37............................................................................................ 10
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`
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`ii
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 14654
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff AGIS Software Development LLC (“AGIS”) seeks to strike portions of the
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`January 11, 2019 Expert Report of Edward R. Tittel (D.I. 110, “Motion”). The Motion is based
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`on misleading arguments and omits critical context; it should be denied in whole.
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`First,
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`Second, with respect to an alleged failure to disclose Google witnesses relevant to LG’s
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`defense in this action, AGIS again entirely misrepresents the record. From the outset of this
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`case, AGIS has been on notice that LG expected to rely on Google witnesses and evidence,
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`especially since AGIS’s allegations are directed solely to Google technology. Indeed, AGIS was
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`expressly put on notice that LG expected to rely on Google engineers for the accused Google
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`Find My Device application and the accused Google Maps application over a year before the
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`close of fact discovery. And, AGIS served a deposition subpoena to Google purporting to
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`request depositions of the Google engineers with knowledge of the accused functionality in Find
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`My Device and Google Maps. But, AGIS chose not to take any Google depositions. After
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`serving the notice on Google, AGIS never again asked Google anything with respect to
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`depositions or Google engineers. Now, having chosen not to speak to Google engineers in
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`-1-
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 14655
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`discovery, AGIS wants to penalize LG for AGIS’s own failures on an issue for which it bears the
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`burden of proof.
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`Mr. Tittel’s reliance on third-party evidence and information obtained from Google
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`personnel and source code is entirely appropriate. AGIS’s Motion should be denied.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`A. Google Source Code
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`1 “Callagy Decl.” refers to the Declaration of Sean Callagy in Support of Defendant LG
`Electronics Inc.’s Opposition to AGIS’s Motion to Strike the January 11, 2019 Expert Report of
`Edward R. Tittel.
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`-2-
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: 14656
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`B. Google Witnesses
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`On November 27, 2017, LG provided AGIS with notice of its reliance on Google
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`witnesses who have knowledge regarding the accused applications in its motion to dismiss for
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`lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to the Northern District of
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`California. (Case No. 2:17-cv-513 D.I. 46 at 23 (“Because important third-party witnesses,
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`including, for instance, the majority of Google witnesses, who LGEKR expects to be key (and
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`the only) sources of evidence regarding the operation, design, and function of the Google
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`applications identified in the Complaint, reside in and around NDCA, transfer is appropriate.”).
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`In its motion, LG relied upon and cited to the Declaration of William Luh, who is the Technical
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`Lead Manager and Software Engineer at Google responsible for Find My Device. (See, e.g., 513
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`D.I. 46 at 7-8 (citing 513 D.I. 36-5); see also 513 D.I. 77 at 7 n.3 (citing 513 D.I. 74-9)). LG
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`also relied upon and cited to the Declaration of Andrew Oplinger, who stated that he had
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`knowledge related to the Google Maps application and that engineers on his Location Sharing
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`-3-
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 14657
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`Team were responsible for Google Location Sharing functionality. (See, e.g., 513 D.I. 46 at 7-8
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`(citing 513 D.I. 36-4)). Mr. Oplinger’s responsibilities subsequently changed in December 2017.
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`(See, e.g., 513 D.I. 46 at 8 (citing 513 D.I. 36-4 (stating that he has knowledge of Google Maps
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`and Location Sharing functionality); 513 D.I. 77 at 7 n.3,4 (citing 513 D.I. 74-8 ¶ 1 (“Until
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`December 2017, I was a Technical Lead Manager for Google Product Infrastructure . . . .”).)
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`Importantly, in responding to LG’s Motion to Transfer or Dismiss and LG’s assertion that
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`Google witnesses would be relevant, AGIS suggested that it had no intention of relying on
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`Google witnesses or evidence in this matter and argued that transfer should be denied on that
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`basis. (513 D.I. 68 at 2-3, 7, 19). Regardless, LG served its Initial Disclosures on AGIS on
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`December 22, 2017. (Lee Decl., Ex. A). LG’s Initial Disclosures identified “[w]itnesses from
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`Google LLC who may have knowledge related to the functionality implicated in the accused
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`applications.” (Lee Decl., Ex. A at 4). Prior to the close of fact discovery, LG served
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`supplemental Initial Disclosures on AGIS on January 17, 2018, August 31, 2018, November 14,
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`2018, December 7, 2018. (D.I. 110, Exs. K-N). In each of LG’s Supplemental Initial
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`Disclosures, LG identified “[w]itnesses from Google LLC who may have knowledge related to
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`the functionality implicated in the accused applications.” (D.I. 110, Ex. K at 4; id., Ex. L at 5; id.,
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`2 “Lee Decl.” refers to the Declaration of Nicholas H. Lee in Support of Defendant LG
`Electronics Inc.’s Opposition to AGIS’s Motion to Strike the January 11, 2019 Expert Report of
`Edward R. Tittel.
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 14658
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`Ex. M at 5; id., Ex. N at 5; see also Lee Decl., Ex. D at 5). AGIS never responded to, challenged
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`or questioned any of these disclosures.
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`On August 29, 2018, AGIS served deposition subpoenas to Google on topics related to
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`functionality of Google Maps and Find My Device. (Callagy Decl., Ex. D). On September 13,
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`2018, Google LLC provided its objections and responses to AGIS’s subpoena, in which Google
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`indicated that it was willing to meet and confer regarding the scope of the deposition topics.
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`(Callagy Decl. ¶ 15; id. Ex. F). Counsel for Google telephonically met and conferred with
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`counsel for AGIS on September 13, 2018, and had several subsequent discussions regarding
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`AGIS’s document and deposition subpoenas over the course of several months. (Callagy Decl.
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`¶¶ 16-18). However, the discussions focused on Google’s production of source code. (Callagy
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`Decl. ¶¶ 17-18; id., Ex. G). Counsel for AGIS never asked to discuss AGIS’s deposition
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`subpoena topics; never asked for a date for a deposition of any Google witness; and never asked
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`counsel for Google to identify any potential witnesses who might testify on behalf of Google
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`should a deposition proceed. (Callagy Decl. ¶ 17). As a result of AGIS’s own failure to pursue
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`its request for deposition testimony, AGIS never deposed a Google witness with respect to the
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`instant litigation. (Callagy Decl. ¶ 19).
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A. The Google Source Code Identified by AGIS In Its Motion Was Timely
`Produced And Inspected By AGIS
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`The Google source code that Mr. Tittel relies upon in his expert report was timely made
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`available to both LG and AGIS.
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: 14659
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`AGIS appears to be arguing, without any legal authority3, that source code relied upon by
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`LG’s expert must be requested by AGIS for printing before the fact discovery deadline even
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`though that same source code was produced in the case by being made available for inspection.
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`(D.I. 110 at 5). This assertion is wrong. As it relates to source code, the Protective Order
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`entered in this case only requires “the producing Party” − in this case Google − “produce
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`Source Code Material in computer searchable format on the stand-alone computer(s).”
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`(513 D.I. 119 at 12) (emphasis added). As it relates to printouts of such source code, the
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`Protective Order permits, as a matter of convenience, a receiving party to request a limited
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`number of paper copies of source code. (Id. at 14). There is no obligation, however, to provide
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`printouts of the Source Code Materials, absent a request from the receiving party. (Id.). And,
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`3 AGIS cites Dkt. 118 at 3-4 and 9 to support the proposition that LG had an obligation to print
`any source code documents received from third-party Google. (D.I. 110 at 6). The cited
`Discovery Order does not require LG to print out any source code materials produced by third-
`party Google. (See D.I. 118 at 3-4 (“produce or permit the inspection of all documents,
`electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of
`the party that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses involved in this action”); D.I. 118 at
`9 (requiring only that “[a] party receiving documents from a third party will provide copies of
`those documents to each other [ ] within 5 business days of receiving those documents”)
`(emphases added). Here, both AGIS and LG had the same access to the Google source code.
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 14660
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` Because AGIS now has in its possession printouts of the source code
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`file that is the subject of the present motion to strike, AGIS’s complaint is moot.
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`AGIS’s cited case, ContentGuard Holdings, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-
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`1112- JRG, 2015 WL 6886957 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2015), is plainly distinguishable to the facts
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`here. In that case, the court struck certain portions of an expert report under Rule 702 based on a
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`defendant’s failure to otherwise produce source code that it withheld during fact discovery. Id.
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`at *2. In contrast, unlike ContentGuard, Google is a third party that produced the challenged
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`source code file to both parties at the same time prior to the fact discovery cutoff. Stated
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`differently, all source code challenged in AGIS’s Motion was timely. (See supra §II.A). Mr.
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`Tittel’s reliance on such source code to support his rebuttal non-infringement opinions was
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`entirely appropriate.
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`AGIS further misrepresents LG’s discovery responses related to non-infringement issues
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`by arguing that LG did not identify Google source code in its discovery response to AGIS’s
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`Interrogatory Request No. 8. (D.I. 110 at 1, 6).
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` AGIS never once complained
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`about that response until the instant Motion.
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`The identified Google source was timely produced to AGIS. Mr. Tittel’s reliance on the
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`Google source code is therefore appropriate and should not be stricken. See Finjan, Inc. v.
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`Symantec Corp., No. 14-cv-02998-HSG (JSC), 2018 WL 620156, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30,
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 14661
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`2018) (declining to strike citations to source code file paths in the accused infringer’s expert
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`supplemental report because the accused infringer had produced the source code for inspection
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`during fact discovery).
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`B. AGIS Was Well Aware Of LG’s Reliance On Google Witnesses From The
`Outset Of This Case
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`AGIS cannot seriously dispute that it was aware of LG’s intent to rely on Google
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`witnesses for Google Maps and Find My Device well before the close of fact discovery. (See
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`supra §II.B). Indeed, it is hardly surprising that LG would seek to call Google third party
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`witnesses since all of the technology at issue in this case is Google technology, and not LG
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`technology. On November 27, 2017 – more than a year before the close of fact discovery – LG
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`emphasized the importance of “third-party witnesses, including, for instance, the majority of
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`Google witnesses, who LGEKR expects to be key (and the only) sources of evidence regarding
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`the operation, design, and function of the Google applications identified in the Complaint.” (513
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`D.I. 46 at 23). LG relied upon and cited to declaration testimony from William Luh, the
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`Technical Lead Manager and Software Engineer at Google responsible for Find My Device, of
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`whom AGIS now remarkably complains it was unaware. (See, e.g., 513 D.I. 46 at 7-8 (citing
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`513 D.I. 36-5); see also 513 D.I. 77 at 7 n.3 (citing 513 D.I. 74-9)). LG also relied upon and
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`cited to declaration testimony from Micah Mason’s predecessor, Andrew Oplinger, regarding
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`information related to Location Sharing on the Google Maps application. (See § II.B, supra). In
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`addition, LG served AGIS with its Initial Disclosures and Supplemental Initial Disclosures, in
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`which LG identified “[w]itnesses from Google LLC who may have knowledge related to the
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`functionality implicated in the accused applications.” (Lee Decl., Ex. A at 4; D.I. 110, Ex. K at 4;
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`id., Ex. L at 5; id., Ex. M at 5; id., Ex. N at 5). Until this Motion, AGIS never once complained
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: 14662
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`that any of LG’s disclosures were unclear. Instead, AGIS took the position that Google
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`witnesses were irrelevant. (513 D.I. 68 at 2-3, 7, 19).
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`Now – over a year since LG served its first Initial Disclosure and served declarations
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`from Google witnesses regarding their relevant knowledge − AGIS argues that LG’s disclosures
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`were insufficient because the Initial Disclosure form did not identify the Google engineers by
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`name.4 But AGIS unequivocally cannot show that, if the Initial Disclosure form had the names
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`of the witnesses (like the transfer documents did), that AGIS would have done anything
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`different. AGIS served a deposition notice on Google asking for engineers with knowledge of
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`the accused Find My Device and Google Maps applications. Had AGIS followed through with
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`the notice, AGIS would have deposed Mr. Luh and Mr. Mason or Mr. Oplinger. But, after
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`serving the notice, AGIS chose not to seek any depositions of Google and never mentioned the
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`deposition notice again. (Callagy Decl. ¶¶ 16-19).
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`To recap, AGIS knew that LG was intending to rely on Google engineers; AGIS
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`specifically knew of Mr. Luh and his knowledge of Find My Device; AGIS specifically knew of
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`Mr. Oplinger and his team’s knowledge of Google Maps; AGIS took the position that Google
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`witnesses were irrelevant; AGIS served a deposition notice on Google seeking depositions of
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`engineers on Find My Device and Google Maps but chose not to take the depositions. Now,
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`AGIS is asserting that LG’s expert should not be able to talk to the Google engineers with
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`knowledge because it was never disclosed to AGIS that Google engineers might have knowledge
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`of the Google applications that are the accused technology in this matter.
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`4 Of note, AGIS engaged in the very behavior it complains of here. AGIS’s own Initial
`Disclosures to LG only identified corporations generally (e.g., “LG Electronics, Inc.,” “AT&T
`Mobility LLC,” “Verizon Wireless,” and “Sprint Corporation”). (Lee Decl., Ex. B at 18-19).
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: 14663
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`AGIS’s request to strike should be denied. See Brown v. Chertoff, No. 406cv002, 2009
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`WL 50163 at *5-6 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2009) (denying motion to strike where moving party was
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`aware of the witnesses and that the witnesses had information relevant to the defense during the
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`discovery period).
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`a. Under Rule 37, Mr. Tittel’s Reliance On Information Obtained
`From Third-Party Google Fact Witnesses Is “Harmless”
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`Even if it were true (which it is not) that AGIS received insufficient notice of LG’s
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`reliance on third party Google witnesses, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) still allows a
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`party to use information when reliance on the material at issue is “substantially justified or is
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`harmless.” The rule is intended to “prevent surprise and prejudice to the opposing party.”
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`Baltimore Aircoil Co., Inc. v. SPX Cooling Techs. Inc., No. CCB-13-2053, 2016 WL 4426681, at
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`*17 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2016), aff’d, 721 F. App’x 983 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “Courts have broad
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`discretion in determining whether to admit expert submission under Rule 37(c).” Allergan Sales,
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`LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-207-JRG, 2016 WL 7209798, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30,
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`2016). To determine whether the relied upon material is harmless, courts may look at the
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`following factors: “(1) the importance of the evidence; (2) the prejudice to the opposing party of
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`including the evidence; (3) the possibility of curing such prejudice by granting a continuance;
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`and (4) the explanation for the party’s failure to disclose.” Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am.
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`Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 563-64 (5th Cir. 2004). The prejudice inquiry focuses on whether a
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`party’s failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 “prejudiced [movant’s] ability
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`to prepare for trial.” See Norton v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1189
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`(E.D. Tex. 2011).
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`As described above, under the record in this case, AGIS is not prejudiced. LG timely
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`identified reliance on Google and its witnesses as a key source of evidence for its defense. (See
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: 14664
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`supra § II.B). AGIS’s own decision to subpoena Google confirms its awareness. And, AGIS’s
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`own decision not to depose Google also confirms that the identification of William Luh, Andrew
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`Oplinger, or Micah Mason by name as a more specific supplementation to LG’s identification of
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`“Google LLC,” after the close of fact discovery was harmless.
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`i. The Information Obtained from William Luh and Micah
`Mason Is Important
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`The information that Mr. Tittel obtained from William Luh and Micah Mason is
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`important to LG’s non-infringement arguments. This is precisely why AGIS seeks to strike it.
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`Mr. Luh and Mr. Mason possess knowledge regarding the relevant operation, design, and
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`functionality of the Google applications AGIS accuses of infringement, information that is
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`proprietary to Google. Hence, these third-party fact witnesses possess authoritative information
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`relevant to the truth of AGIS’s infringement allegations. Striking the portions of Mr. Tittel’s
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`expert report that are based on information obtained from those Google witnesses would
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`therefore significantly hamper LG’s ability to present its non-infringement case and make it
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`more difficult for the trier of fact to understand the technology to determine the ultimate issue of
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`infringement.
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`ii. Any Allegedly Late Identification Of Google Witnesses By
`Name Is Not Prejudicial And Does Not Warrant A
`Continuance
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`AGIS has not been prejudiced as a result of LG’s allegedly late identification of Google
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`witnesses. AGIS failed to identify exactly what information it was prevented from investigating
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`or challenging by the allegedly late identification of William Luh and Micah Mason. Indeed,
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`AGIS had adequate opportunity to depose Google witnesses but effectively abandoned its pursuit
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`of Google depositions. (Callagy Decl. ¶¶ 13-19). See Smith v. Ardew Wood Prods., Ltd., No.
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`C07-5641 FDB, 2009 WL 799679, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2009) (finding lack of prejudice
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`-11-
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 15 of 18 PageID #: 14665
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`where the movant forewent “the very discovery it now argues the supplemental . . . information
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`necessitates”).
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`AGIS’s conclusory claims of prejudice are also belied by its own assertions to the Court
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`where it expressly argued that Google witnesses would not have information relevant to its case.
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`(See, e.g., 513 D.I. 68 at 2 (“While AGIS has accused functionality related to Google’s Android
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`Operating System, much of that information is publicly available through either open source
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`code or public application programming interfaces (‘API’)”); id. at 7 (arguing that evidence or
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`testimony from Google witnesses will not be relevant to this action); id. at 19 (“Contrary to
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`LGEKR’s contention that Google’s witnesses are ‘the only[] sources of evidence regarding the
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`operation, design, and function’ of the relevant Google applications (id. at 23), AGIS’s
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`infringement contentions rely on Google’s open source code and/or application programming
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`interfaces, which are publicly available.”)).
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`Since AGIS has not suffered any prejudice, a continuance is not necessary, and Mr.
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`Tittel’s reliance upon the information obtained from conversations with William Luh and Micah
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`Mason should not be struck. See, e.g., Williams v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 4:08-cv-487, 2009
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`WL 305183, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2009) (allowing expert opinion primarily due to no
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`complaint of prejudice).
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For these reasons, LG respectfully requests that the Court deny AGIS’s Motion to Strike
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`the January 11, 2019 Expert Report of Edward R. Tittel.
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`Dated: February 11, 2019
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By:
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`/s/ Michael Berta
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`-12-
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 14666
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`J. Mark Mann (SBN: 12926150)
`G. Blake Thompson (SBN: 24042033)
`MANN TINDEL THOMPSON
`300 West Main Street
`Henderson, Texas 75652
`Tel: (903) 657-8540
`mark@themannfirm.com
`blake@themannfirm.com
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`Michael A. Berta
`ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`Three Embarcadero Center, 10th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111-4024
`Tel: (415) 471-3277
`Michael.Berta@arnoldporter.com
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`James S. Blackburn
`Nicholas H. Lee
`Justin J. Chi
`ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`777 South Figueroa Street, 44th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90017-5844
`Tel: (213) 243-4156
`James.Blackburn@arnoldporter.com
`Nicholas.Lee@arnoldporter.com
`Justin.Chi@arnoldporter.com
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`Bonnie Phan
`ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
`3000 El Camino Real
`Five Palo Alto Square, Suite 500
`Palo Alto, CA 94306-3807
`Tel: (650) 319-4500
`Bonnie.Phan@arnoldporter.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant LG Electronics Inc.
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`-13-
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 14667
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`CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION TO FILE UNDER SEAL
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`The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document is authorized to be filed under seal
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`pursuant to paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Protective Order entered in this case.
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`/s/ Michael Berta
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`Case 2:17-cv-00514-JRG Document 166 Filed 02/13/19 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 14668
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that counsel of record who are deemed to have
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`consented to electronic services are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s
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`CM/ECF system per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3) on February 11, 2019.
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`/s/ Michael Berta
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`-15-
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