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`NAVAL
`POSTGRADUATE
`SCHOOL
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`MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
`
`MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT
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`Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below-Blue Force Tracking
`(FBCB2-BFT). A Case Study in the Accelerated Acquisition of a Digital
`Command and Control System during Operations Enduring Freedom
`and Iraqi Freedom
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`
`
`
`
`Advisors:
`
`
` James L. Conatser
` Vincent E. Grizio
` December 2005
`
`Michael W. Boudreau,
`Pete Coughlan
`
`
`
`
`Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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`

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`REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
`
`Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
`Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including
`the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and
`completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any
`other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington
`headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite
`1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project
`(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
`1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)
`3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
`2. REPORT DATE
`MBA Professional Report
`December 2005
`
`4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below-
`5. FUNDING NUMBERS
`Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2-BFT). A Case Study in the Accelerated
`Acquisition of a Digital Command and Control System during Operations
`Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom
`6. AUTHOR(S)
`James L. Conatser
`Vincent E. Grizio
`7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
`Naval Postgraduate School
`Monterey, CA 93943-5000
`9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
`
`12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
`
`8. PERFORMING
`ORGANIZATION REPORT
`NUMBER
`10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
` AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
`11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official
`policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
`12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
`Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
`13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
`The purpose of this project is to provide a process for accelerated acquisition in support of contingency operations.
`The objective of the project is to recreate and document the events surrounding the fielding of FBCB2-BFT during Operations
`Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, and to produce a document that provides an analysis of actions taken, the obstacles that were
`overcome and the acquisition policy that applied to the situation in order to rapidly acquire, produce, train and field a useful
`solution to fulfill an urgent and valid operational need. In 2002, while conducting the Global War on Terror, the US Army
`determined that combat on an asymmetric battlefield, consisting of a complex operational environment as well as an increased
`geographic battlespace, required improvements to the current command and control capability available to the force. PM
`FBCB2 determined their system could fulfill the need by taking the current FBCB2 system and adjusting it to meet the new
`operational need. Given the constraints regarding time, funding, and technical feasibility PM FBCB2 diligently worked with
`multiple organizations and agencies in order to provide a useful solution for friendly forces in Operations Enduring Freedom
`and Iraqi Freedom. In the 12 months prior to 21 March 2003 (G-Day Iraqi Freedom), the Army undertook an enormous effort
`to develop, produce, provide system training, and field FBCB2-BFT. The FBCB2-BFT initiative was successful due to the
`synchronization of four interrelated and supporting components; 1) a technically mature system, 2) user representative
`acceptance, 3) senior leadership support, and 4) a funding stream.
`14. SUBJECT TERMS Situational Awareness, Situational Dominance, Situational Understanding,
`Common Relevant Operational Picture, Digitization
`
`15. NUMBER OF
`PAGES
`73
`16. PRICE CODE
`20. LIMITATION
`OF ABSTRACT
`
`
`UL
`
`17. SECURITY
`CLASSIFICATION OF
`REPORT
`Unclassified
`
`18. SECURITY
`CLASSIFICATION OF THIS
`PAGE
`
`Unclassified
`
`19. SECURITY
`CLASSIFICATION OF
`ABSTRACT
`Unclassified
`
`
`
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`APL-AGIS_00012808
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`Authors:
`
`Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited
`
`
`FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW-BLUE FORCE
`TRACKING (FBCB2-BFT). A CASE STUDY IN THE ACCELERATED
`ACQUISITION OF A DIGITAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
`DURING OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM
`
`
`James L. Conatser, Major, U.S. Army
`Vincent E. Grizio, Major, U.S. Army
`
`
`Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
`
`
`MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
`
`from the
`
`NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
`December 2005
`
`
`
`
`
`
`_____________________________________
`James L. Conatser
`
`
`_____________________________________
`Vincent E. Grizio
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Approved by:
`
`_____________________________________
`Michael W. Boudreau
`Lead Advisor
`
`
`_____________________________________
`
`
`
`Pete Coughlan
`
`
`
` Support Advisor
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`_____________________________________
`
`
`
`Robert Beck, Dean
`Graduate School of Business and Public Policy
`
`
`
`iii
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 257-9 Filed 01/04/19 Page 8 of 74 PageID #: 16320
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`APL-AGIS_00012810
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`
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`FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW-BLUE FORCE
`TRACKING (FBCB2-BFT). A CASE STUDY IN THE ACCELERATED
`ACQUISITION OF A DIGITAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
`DURING OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI FREEDOM
`
`ABSTRACT
`
`The purpose of this project is to provide a process for accelerated acquisition in
`support of contingency operations. The objective of the project is to recreate and
`document the events surrounding the fielding of FBCB2-BFT during Operations
`Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, and to produce a document that provides an analysis of
`actions taken, the obstacles that were overcome and the acquisition policy that applied to
`the situation in order to rapidly acquire, produce, train and field a useful solution to fulfill
`an urgent and valid operational need. In 2002, while conducting the Global War on
`Terror, the US Army determined that combat on an asymmetric battlefield, consisting of
`a complex operational environment as well as an increased geographic battlespace,
`required improvements to the current command and control capability available to the
`force. PM FBCB2 determined their system could fulfill the need by taking the current
`FBCB2 system and adjusting it to meet the new operational need. Given the constraints
`regarding time, funding, and technical feasibility PM FBCB2 diligently worked with
`multiple organizations and agencies in order to provide a useful solution for friendly
`forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. In the 12 months prior to 21
`March 2003 (G-Day Iraqi Freedom), the Army undertook an enormous effort to develop,
`produce, provide system training, and field FBCB2-BFT. The FBCB2-BFT initiative was
`successful due to the synchronization of four interrelated and supporting components; 1)
`a technically mature system, 2) user representative acceptance, 3) senior leadership
`support, and 4) a funding stream.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`APL-AGIS_00012812
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
`A.
`PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................1
`B.
`THE PURSUIT OF INFORMATION DOMINANCE.................................2
`BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................5
`A.
`THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN TRANSITION.....................................5
`B.
`THE EVOLUTION OF FORCE XXI............................................................7
`1.
`Advanced Warfighting Experiment I ................................................7
`2.
`Task Force XXI....................................................................................8
`3.
`Army Battle Command System ..........................................................9
`a.
`Global Command and Control System-Army (GCSS-A).........9
`b.
`Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below
`(FBCB2) ....................................................................................9
`Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)..10
`c.
`Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS) ..................10
`d.
`All Source Analysis System (ASAS) .......................................10
`e.
`Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) ........10
`f.
`Combat Terrain Information System (CTIS).........................10
`g.
`Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS)........................10
`h.
`Maneuver Control System (MCS) ..........................................10
`i.
`Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS)..........................11
`j.
`Integrated System Control (ISYSCON)..................................11
`k.
`ABCS Information Server (AIS) ............................................11
`l.
`Advanced Warfighting Experiment II.............................................12
`4.
`Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment ..................................16
`5.
`Division Capstone Exercise ...............................................................19
`6.
`THE BALKAN DIGITIZATION INITIATIVE.........................................27
`C.
`III. EXPLOITING THE POTENTIAL..........................................................................33
`A.
`FBCB2-BFT....................................................................................................33
`1.
`Information Management Task Force (IMTF)...............................33
`a.
`Phase One................................................................................34
`b.
`Phase Two ...............................................................................34
`c.
`Phase Three.............................................................................35
`d.
`Mission Expansion..................................................................37
`FBCB2-EPLRS and FBCB2-BFT Differences ................................39
`2.
`RESULTS .......................................................................................................41
`B.
`THE FUTURE OF FBCB2-EPLRS AND FBCB2-BFT.............................43
`C.
`IV. FBCB2-BFT CONTINGENCY FIELDING CONDITIONS.................................49
`A.
`TECHNICAL MATURITY ..........................................................................50
`B.
`USER ACCEPTANCE ..................................................................................51
`C. MILITARY LEADERSHIP SUPPORT......................................................52
`
`vii
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`FUNDING STREAM.....................................................................................52
`D.
`BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................55
`INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................57
`
`
`
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`APL-AGIS_00012814
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`Figure 1.
`
`Figure 2.
`
`Figure 3.
`
`Figure 4.
`Figure 5.
`
`Figure 6.
`Figure 7.
`
`Figure 8.
`
`Figure 9.
`
`Figure 10.
`
`Figure 11.
`
`Figure 12.
`
`Figure 13.
`
`Figure 14.
`
`
`
`LIST OF FIGURES
`
`in Support of
`The Principle Components of Rapid Acquisition
`Contingency Operations.....................................................................................2
`Three Distinct Domains Chart (After: Understanding Information Age
`Warfare p. 40.)...................................................................................................4
`(After:
`The
`Army
`Battle
`Command
`System
`Network
`http://peoc3t.monmouth.army.mil/Mission.html (November 3, 2005)) ..........12
`FBCB2 Program Overview..............................................................................22
`Evolution of FBCB2 Hardware (After: Artillery Symposium Briefing
`(2003))..............................................................................................................23
`Terrestrial Based FBCB2 Components............................................................24
`FBCB2 EPLRS Based Architecture (After: FBCB2 Training Support
`Material (2005))...............................................................................................25
`FBCB2 Soldier Interface (After: TSM XXI Army Knowledge Symposium
`Briefing (2003)) ...............................................................................................26
`Balkan Digitization Initiative Architecture (After: TSM XXI Army
`Knowledge Symposium (2003))......................................................................30
`Balkan Digitization Initiative Components (After: TSM XXI Army
`Knowledge Symposium (2003))......................................................................31
`FBCB2-BFT Architecture
`(After: TSM XXI Army Knowledge
`Symposium (2003)) .........................................................................................46
`FBCB2-BFT Components
`(After: TSM XXI Army Knowledge
`Symposium (2003)) .........................................................................................47
`FBCB2-BFT Installation Variants (After: TSM XXI Army Knowledge
`Symposium (2003)) .........................................................................................48
`The Principle Components of Rapid Acquisition
`in Support of
`Contingency Operations...................................................................................50
`
`
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`APL-AGIS_00012816
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`LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, SYMBOLS
`
`
`Army Acquisition Executive
`After Action Review
`Army Battle Command System
`Acquisition Category
`Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
`Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
`ABCS Information Server
`Air and Missile Defense Workstation
`Assistant Program Manager
`Army Pre-positioned Stocks
`Army Regulation 71-9 Material Requirements
`All Source Analysis System
`Advanced Technology Demonstration
`Advanced Warfighting Experiment
`
`
`
`AAE
`AAR
`ABCS
`ACAT
`ACTD
`AFATDS
`AIS
`AMDWS
`APM
`APS
`AR 71-9
`ASAS
`ATD
`AWE
`
`BCS3
`BCT
`BCTP
`BDI
`BFA
`BFT
`BOS
`
`C2
`C3
`CCS
`CENTCOM
`CFLCC
`CIB
`COA
`COTS
`CP
`CPX
`CTIS
`CTSF
`
`DAE
`DCX
`DMTC
`DoD
`DTED
`DTRACS
`
`Battle Command Sustainment Support System
`Brigade Combat Team
`Battle Command Training Program
`Balkan Digitization Initiative
`Battlefield Functional Area
`Blue Force Tracking
`Battlefield Operating System
`
`Command and Control
`Coalition Staff Operations and Training Officer
`Command Center Server
`Central Command
`Coalition Forces Land Component Command
`Controlled Image Base
`Course of Action
`Commercial off the Shelf
`Command Post
`Command Post Exercise
`Combat Terrain Information System
`Central Test Support Facility
`
`Defense Acquisition Executive
`Division Capstone Exercise
`Digital Master Trainer Course
`Department of Defense
`Digital Terrain Elevation Data
`Defense Transportation and Control System
`
`
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`xi
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`APL-AGIS_00012817
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`
`
`EECP
`EIS
`EPLRS
`EXFOR
`
`FBCB2
`FCS
`FRP
`FY
`
`G3
`G8
`GCCS-A
`GIG
`GPS
`GUI
`
`HTI
`IMETS
`IMTF
`IOT&E
`ISYSCON
`IVIS
`
`JCIDS
`
`LAN
`LRIP
`LUT
`
`MCS
`MDAP
`MILSPEC
`MNS
`MTS
`
`NTC
`
`OEF
`OIF
`ONS
`OODA
`OPFOR
`OPNET
`
`
`
`
`Early Entry Command Post
`Enhanced Information System
`Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
`Experimental Force
`
`Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
`Future Combat System
`Full Rate Production
`Fiscal Year
`
`Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training
`Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs
`Global Command and Control System-Army
`Global Information Grid
`Global Positioning System
`Graphic User Interface
`
`Horizontal Technology Insertion
`Integrated Meteorological System
`Information Management Task Force
`Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
`Integrated System Control
`Inter-vehicular Information System
`
`Joint Capability Integration and Development System
`
`Local Area Network
`Low Rate Initial Production
`Limited User Test
`
`Maneuver Control System
`Major Defense Acquisition Program
`Military Specification
`Mission Needs Statement
`Movement Tracking System
`
`National Training Center
`
`Operation Enduring Freedom
`Operation Iraqi Freedom
`Operational Needs Statement
`Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action
`Opposing Force
`Operator New Equipment Training
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`xii
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`APL-AGIS_00012818
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`
`
`PM
`PMO
`PEO C3S
`
`PEO C3T
`
`POM
`
`SA
`SATCOM
`SBCT
`SETAF
`SFOR
`SINCGARS
`
`TAIS
`TF XXI
`TI
`TOC.
`TRADOC
`TSM
`TTP
`
`ULMC
`USAREUR
`
`VPN
`
`WAN
`WRAP
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Program Manager
`Program Management Office
`Program Executive Office Command, Control, and Communications
`Systems
`Program Executive Office Command, Control, and Communications
`Tactical
`Program Objective Memorandum
`
`Situational Awareness
`Satellite Communications
`Stryker Brigade Combat Team
`Southern European Task Force
`Stabilization Forces
`Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System\
`
`Tactical Airspace Integration System
`Task Force Twenty One
`Tactical Internet
`Tactical Operations Center
`Training and Doctrine Command
`TRADOC System Manager
`Tactics Techniques and Procedures
`
`Unit Level Maintainers Course
`United States Army Europe
`
`Virtual Private Network
`
`Wide Area Network
`Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program
`
`xiii
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`APL-AGIS_00012820
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`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`A.
`
`PROBLEM STATEMENT
`The Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition process for major weapon systems
`can be characterized as extremely directive and set-piece based on the multiple activities,
`gates, documents, and review boards that must be conducted while striving to develop
`and manufacture a new materiel solution.
`
`Given this type of regimented operating environment, this case study attempts to
`identify the conditions which must be present and what methods may be utilized in order
`to accelerate the fielding of a much needed materiel requirements. The authors have
`limited the scope of the question specifically to an Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID
`program; however parallels may be drawn for lower priority requirements.
`
`Analysis of this case study reveals that four independent, yet interrelated,
`components were necessary in order to provide the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade
`and Below-Blue Force Tracking (FBCB2-BFT) capability in support of Operations
`Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. The absence of any one of these components could have
`potentially led to the inability to successfully provide this capability. Although these four
`components were revealed during this case study, the authors believe that these same
`criteria apply to any program attempting rapid acquisition in support of contingency
`operations.
`
`•
`
`Figure 1 portrays the four components required to conduct acquisition and
`fielding in support of contingency operations and include the following:
`•
`The presence of a relatively mature technical solution to solve an
`identified capability gap.
`The presence of a User Representative that is a willing to accept a
`temporary solution in the short term while the Program Management
`Office (PMO) continues to mature the system to the desired endstate as
`outlined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) or the
`Capabilities Development Document (CDD).
`The presence of supportive military leadership, which includes not only
`the individual Service Chief but also the Combatant Commander.
`
`•
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`The presence of a funding stream that is sufficient to provide the initial
`capability in the short term and if necessary the ability to request and
`receive supplemental funding in order to sustain the effort.
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`FUNDING STREAM
`FUNDING STREAM
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`TECHNICAL MATURITYTECHNICAL MATURITY
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`ACQUISITIONACQUISITION
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`AND FIELDING AND FIELDING
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`IN SUPPORT OFIN SUPPORT OF
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`CONTINGENCY CONTINGENCY
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`OPERATIONSOPERATIONS
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`USER ACCEPTANCEUSER ACCEPTANCE
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`MILITARY LEADERSHIP SUPPORT
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`B.
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`Figure 1. The Principle Components of Rapid Acquisition in Support of
`Contingency Operations
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`THE PURSUIT OF INFORMATION DOMINANCE
`Know the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never
`know peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself your
`chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and
`yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.
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`—From Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
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`The general unreliability of all information presents a special problem: all
`action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight,…like fog. War is the
`realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is
`based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty…The
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`commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see, which his
`best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and which, because of
`constant changes, he can rarely be familiar.
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`—From Carl von Clausewitz’s On War
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`Throughout history, military leaders have recognized the key role of information
`as a contributor to victory on the battlefield. In order to understand how information
`affects one’s ability to perform military operations it is necessary to think in terms of
`three distinct domains; the physical domain consisting of the natural environment in
`which the senses are dominant, the information domain consisting of data, information
`systems, and documented knowledge, and the cognitive domain which consists of
`situational awareness, assessment and understanding.1 As such, the pursuit of information
`superiority and information dominance has long been an objective of the world’s armies.
`Over time, technological advances have provided the capability to reduce the “fog of
`war”. Figure 2, Three Distinct Domains, depicts how technological innovation
`introduced over time has provided the ability to transition from one domain to the next.
`The US Army’s digitization initiative has provided the vehicle to enter into the cognitive
`domain and help reduce the fog of war on the modern battlefield.
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`1 Alberts, David S., Garstka, John J., Hayes, Richard E., Signori, David A., Understanding
`Information Age Warfare. Command and Control Research Program Publication Series, August 2001, p.
`10.
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`THE THREE DOMAINS
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`CAPABILITY TOCAPABILITY TO
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`“SEE” AND TO“SEE” AND TO
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`COMMUNICATECOMMUNICATE
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`COGNITIVE COGNITIVE
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`DOMAINDOMAIN
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`INFORMATION INFORMATION
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`DOMAINDOMAIN
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`500 BC500 BC
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`SUN TZUSUN TZU
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`1700 1800 1900 TODAY1700 1800 1900 TODAY
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`CLAUSEWITZCLAUSEWITZ
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`PHYSICALPHYSICAL
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`DOMAINDOMAIN
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`Figure 2. Three Distinct Domains Chart (After: Understanding Information Age
`Warfare p. 40.)
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN TRANSITION
`The late 1980’s and 1990’s comprised a period of unprecedented rapid and
`fundamental change. The computer industry experienced dramatic leaps forward in the
`areas of computing power, processing speed, and Random Access Memory development
`while simultaneously reducing both physical size and cost. Concurrently, the information
`technology (IT) industry and the Army were developing processes and software
`applications to capitalize on these advancements.
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`The implosion of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold War in July 1990,
`and the United States found it increasingly difficult to justify a large standing army with
`substantial forces forward deployed and postured to fight a conflict whose time had
`passed. The political environment within the United States called for the downsizing of
`the military as a whole and the repositioning of a substantial amount of forces to the
`continental United States.2
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`US Army leadership believed that employment of emerging technological
`advances in the areas of information technology could serve as a force multiplier and
`would somewhat compensate for the reduction in Army force structure brought on by the
`end of the Cold War. The Army digitization plan capitalizes on the acquisition of current
`and emerging technologies in order to create an environment where friendly forces can
`dominate. Army digitization initiatives would soon develop new systems and improve
`existing systems within each Battlefield Functional Area (BFA). The overall goal would
`be to aggregate them into an interoperable network-centric force. The vision of this
`initiative was to improve the situational dominance of the US Army on the modern
`battlefield for the foreseeable future.
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`Situational dominance can be defined as applying lethal and non-lethal effects
`with unprecedented precision across the spectrum of military operations. Situational
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`2 Gargan, John J. To Defend A Nation: An Overview of Downsizing and the U.S. Military.
`M@n@gement, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1999, pp. 225-226.
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`dominance is attained through the ability to collect, analyze, distribute and act on
`information pertaining to the battlefield. Situational dominance facilitates increased
`operational tempo, dispersed operations, synchronization of forces, accelerated orders
`dissemination, application of massed and precision effects, automated logistics, reduction
`in fratricide, and the ability to operate within the enemy’s decision making cycle.
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`Before significant restructuring activities and digitization implementation could
`take place in the Army, the nation of Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait on August 2,
`1990. Following a prolonged six-month deployment and build up of forces in the Middle
`East by the United States and coalition partners, the Iraqi army was forcibly removed
`from Kuwait in February 1991. At the conclusion of hostilities the United States Army
`conducted a detailed analysis of its performance, which set the stage to launch its future
`Force XXI initiative.
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`One of the most powerful tools available to the United States military is the
`effective use of the After Action Review (AAR). The AAR is the mechanism through
`which detailed information pertaining to a specific event can be gathered and analyzed.
`The purpose of the AAR is to capture what happened, why it happened, how to sustain
`exposed strengths and improve on identified weaknesses. 3 Following Desert Storm,
`AARs confirmed that weapon systems such as the M1 Abrams Tank, M2 Bradley
`Fighting Vehicle, M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, AH64 Apache Helicopter, and
`the Patriot Missile System, which had been developed and fielded for a potential conflict
`in Europe against the Soviet Union, received high marks for their survivability, mobility,
`and lethality. However, the AARs determined that effective Command and Control
`systems were still lacking. It was apparent that to improve our warfighting capability a
`rapid and reliable information networks was necessary to enable the Army to better
`project the force, protect the force, gain information dominance, shape the battlespace,
`conduct decisive operations and sustain the force.
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`The resulting product of this introspection was the Army’s roadmap for future
`digital transformation. The Army began its process of transformation with a detailed
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`3 US Department of the Army. Training Circular 25-20 A Leader’s Guide to the After Action Review.
`September 1993, p. 1.
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`three-pronged vision and process called Force XXI. This plan detailed the method by
`which it would convert from a Cold War army into a force projection army. The three
`prongs consisted of 1) redesigning the operational Army, 2) redesigning the institutional
`Army and 3) integrating information age technologies into the force.4 Of particular
`interest to the Army leadership was how to leverage current and future technologies to
`solve the information problem. Over the next several years multiple studies and
`experiments were conducted to demonstrate the potential that insertions of information
`technology could have on the nature of warfare. Each BFA pursued the development of a
`system that would solve their individual problems.
`B.
`THE EVOLUTION OF FORCE XXI
`Much preparat