Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 257-10 Filed 01/04/19 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 16387
`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 257-10 Filed 01/04/19 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: 16387
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`EXHIBIT 10
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`EXHIBIT 10
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 257-10 Filed 01/04/19 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 16388
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`Blue Force Tracking
`The Afghanistan and Iraq Experience
`and Its Implications for the U.S. Army
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`APL-AGIS_00012877
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 257-10 Filed 01/04/19 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 16389
`Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
`Recognizing the fundamental importance of location reporting and
`recording, as well as other critical command and control tasks, the Army
`focused its “digitization” efforts in the early 1990s on leveraging the
`potential of new computer and communications technologies to auto-
`mate them. These efforts led to the development of the digital battle
`command system, Force XXI4 Battle Command Brigade and Below
`(FBCB2). Begun in 1995, it is in use today.
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`FBCB2 normally uses GPS transponders located in ground vehicles
`(typically the vehicles assigned to unit commanders at various levels) to
`report the location of the host vehicle.5 The FBCB2 equipment then
`retransmits its location to all units in the network via the Combat Net
`Radios (EPLRS and the standard Single Channel Ground and Airborne
`Radio System (SINCGARS) radio nets). Each vehicle location is dis-
`played as a blue icon on digital maps on computer screens mounted in
`the vehicles. Instead of a map covered with paper symbols, FBCB2-
`equipped commanders have computers that show their location as a
`screen icon on a digital map or overhead photograph, along with the
`icons of all FBCB2-equipped subordinate units and any other friendly
`units equipped with FBCB2 in the vicinity. This same information
`(along with enemy information input by intelligence staffs, operational
`control measures – such as unit operational boundaries – and danger
`areas) is displayed in command posts and vehicles at all levels of com-
`mand. FBCB2 also allows users to send formatted or free-text e-mail
`messages – including orders and requests for support – to any other
`FBCB2-equipped unit simply by clicking on the unit’s icon. This freed
`tactical voice radio nets for higher priority messages.
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`The network of FBCB2 vehicles communicating over Combat Net
`The network of FBCB2 vehicles communicating over Combat Net
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`Radios for situational awareness6 and command and control is known asRadios for situational awareness6 and command and control is known as
`the “tactical internet,” a self-forming network that adapts to terrain,
`the “tactical internet,” a self-forming network that adapts to terrain,
`changes in unit organization, combat conditions and transmission
`changes in unit organization, combat conditions and transmission
`channel availability. As long as vehicles are within line-of-sight, the FM
`channel availability. As long as vehicles are within line-of-sight, the FM
`radio-based tactical internet serves its users.
`radio-based tactical internet serves its users.
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`The first units to experiment with FBCB2 in 1995 found that location
`reporting and command and control improved dramatically. Compared
`to voice radios and plastic-covered maps, the new system was like going
`from grainy, black-and-white photos to full Technicolor streaming video.
`With FBCB2, soldiers at any level knew exactly where they were. In the
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 257-10 Filed 01/04/19 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 16390
`midst of a blinding sandstorm on a trackless desert, they could see their
`own vehicles’ icons moving on the digital map or overhead photograph.
`They also could see exactly where the rest of the unit and other friendly
`forces were located – without inexperienced soldiers attempting to read
`maps, lengthy voice radio messages, or exhausted sergeants posting
`information on plastic map overlays. If the intelligence staff did a good
`job of pulling enemy information from available sources and posting it
`on the FBCB2 system, soldiers and commanders also had a pretty good
`idea where the enemy was.
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`To investigate the full combat potential of FBCB2, the Army designated
`the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as the “First Digitized Division”
`to receive the new capability. Through controlled experiments and
`testing against the “opposition force”7 at the National Training Center at
`Fort Irwin, Calif., the 4th Infantry Division quickly learned that the vastly
`improved situational awareness FBCB2 provided allowed commanders
`to operate much more quickly and accurately – and much more effec-
`tively. Furthermore, the effort and resources (including time on radio
`nets) previously required for determining and recording unit locations
`and performing other command and control tasks could now be put to
`better purposes, such as precisely orchestrating an attack.
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`Blue Force Tracking
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`FBCB2’s capabilities were evident in the flat terrain of the NationalFBCB2’s capabilities were evident in the flat terrain of the National
`Training Center, where dense numbers of FBCB2-equipped vehicles
`Training Center, where dense numbers of FBCB2-equipped vehicles
`were able to maintain the tactical internet through line-of-sight FM
`were able to maintain the tactical internet through line-of-sight FM
`communications. When the Army deployed to the Balkans, however, it
`communications. When the Army deployed to the Balkans, however, it
`discovered that the mountainous terrain and relatively thinly deployed
`discovered that the mountainous terrain and relatively thinly deployed
`patrol vehicles in Bosnia and Kosovo imposed significant limitations on
`patrol vehicles in Bosnia and Kosovo imposed significant limitations on
`a tactical internet using ground-based line-of-sight radios. To overcome
`a tactical internet using ground-based line-of-sight radios. To overcome
`this, FBCB2 was adapted to communicate over commercial satellites
`this, FBCB2 was adapted to communicate over commercial satellites
`using transceivers bolted to the tops of vehicles. In this “hub and spoke”
`using transceivers bolted to the tops of vehicles. In this “hub and spoke”
`configuration, each vehicle communicates with a satellite ground station
`configuration, each vehicle communicates with a satellite ground station
`that aggregates the blue force picture and transmits it to each FBCB2-
`that aggregates the blue force picture and transmits it to each FBCB2-
`equipped vehicle by satellite.
`equipped vehicle by satellite.
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`The flexibility and effectiveness of this additional communications
`The flexibility and effectiveness of this additional communications
`option was key to future deployments of the FBCB2 system, enabling
`option was key to future deployments of the FBCB2 system, enabling
`the Army to consider deployment options involving EPLRS-equipped
`the Army to consider deployment options involving EPLRS-equipped
`and satcom-equipped FBCB2 units. Although both communications
`and satcom-equipped FBCB2 units. Although both communications
`options employ the same FBCB2 applications software, the satcom
`options employ the same FBCB2 applications software, the satcom
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`APL-AGIS_00012883
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 257-10 Filed 01/04/19 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 16391
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`configuration came to be known as “FBCB2-Blue Force Tracking” orconfiguration came to be known as “FBCB2-Blue Force Tracking” or
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`“FBCB2-BFT” (commonly called “BFT” 8) to distinguish it from the“FBCB2-BFT” (commonly called “BFT” 8) to distinguish it from the
`original FBCB2.
`original FBCB2.
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`When Army forces began operating in Afghanistan during Operation
`Enduring Freedom and preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the value
`of FBCB2 to combat units was readily apparent. Army leaders decided
`that as many of the units committed to combat operations as possible
`should be equipped with an FBCB2-like capability.9
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`Of the units considered for deployment, however, only two brigades of
`the 4th Infantry Division were equipped with the ground digital radio
`systems (EPLRS) required for the FBCB2 system. Moreover, as experi-
`ences in the Balkans proved, ground-based digital FM radios could not
`provide the range required to support Army units operating over the vast
`distances of Afghanistan or anticipated in Iraq. Consequently, the Army
`decided to launch a crash project to field a BFT variant based on satellite
`communications (satcom).10
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`Because the 4th Infantry Division was the only digitized force readily
`available for deployment to the Iraqi theater, other non-digitized units
`slated for Iraq – such as the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne
`Division (Air Assault) and the 82nd Airborne Division – needed BFT
`quickly. The U.S. Marine Corps and British combat units in the theater
`also wanted the system so they could see the Army units and Army units
`could see them.
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`Intensive planning for “thin” BFT fielding (down to company level) took
`place at the Pentagon during the spring and summer of 2002. Actual
`deployment of BFT to land forces in Southwest Asia started in late 2002
`and continued until the Iraq campaign began. Over a three-month period
`before the Iraq War, the Army and its contractor team installed the
`available equipment on combat vehicles and helicopters and trained
`commanders and soldiers to use the system.
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`APL-AGIS_00012884
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