Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 14596
`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 1 of 20 PageID #: 14596
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`EXHIBIT 11
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`EXHIBIT 11
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 2 of 20 PageID #: 14597
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`SIEGEL000420
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 3 of 20 PageID #: 14598
`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JR
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`
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`Copyright © 2005 by
`The Curators of the University of Missouri
`University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 6521]
`Printed and bound in the United States of America
`
`All rights reserved
`First paperback printing, 2015
`
`Library 0t Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
`
`Elsey, George M, 1918—
`
`An unplanned lite : a memoir/ by George McKee Else-y,
`p,
`cm.
`
`Summary: "Memoir oi the author's experiences working in the White House
`during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, including inside accounts oi his
`work on classified documents, U.S.»Soviet relations, and Truman's "Whistle-Stop
`Campaign,” and his long association with the American Peel Cross"~Provided by
`publisher
`includes index.
`
`lSBN 978-0826220724 (alk. paper)
`
`Group Typefaces: Granjon and NeutraText
`
`3. Elsey, George M, 1918— 2. Political consultants-~-United States- Biography,
`3. Presidents United States—Statt-Biography, 4. Roosevelt, Franklin D. {Franklin
`Delano). 1882771945, 5. Truman, Harry 3., 1884-4972. 6. United StatesmPolitics and
`government»»»»»»19334945. 7. United States—Politics and government~~iQAS—-‘IQSQ.
`8. United States Poreign relations~Soviet Union. 9, Soviet Union—Foreign rela“
`tionswUnited States, 10. American Peel Cross~History 20th century.
`ll Title.
`E8408£45A3 2005
`973.917'092~dc22
`
`200506786
`
`This paper meets the requirements of the
`American National Standard tor Permanence oi Paper
`tor Printed Library Materiais, Z3948, 1984,
`
`Designer: Stephanie Foley
`
`SIEGEL000421
`
`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 4 of 20 PageID #: 14599
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`1
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`2/18/18 Page 4 of 20 PageID #: 14599
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`The .Vlap Qoom 19
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`Chapter Two
`
`The Map Room
`
`The first White House Map Room took shape in a cluttered
`temporary space in the West Wing of the White House. In the hectic
`days that followed the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941, the
`naval aide to the president, Captain John Beardall, took over what was
`known as the Fish Room. This windowless room directly across a cor-
`ridor from the president’s Oval Office owed its name to the trophies
`Herbert Hoover had caught on his fishing weekends at his camp on the
`Rapidan River in Virginia. Roosevelt’s much larger deep—sea catches red
`placed Hoover’s fish, and the room kept its name. (It is now known as
`the Roosevelt Room with portraits of Theodore and Franklin to main—
`tain a bipartisan aunospherc.) Beardall placed maps of battle areas on
`easels positioned around the room; brought in safes where classified
`messages from military commands and cables from Churchill, Stalin,
`and other leaders could be filed; and added desks for the young army
`and navy officers who stood watch around the clock ready to brief the
`president on war events whenever he had a break in his schedule.
`Prime Minister Winston Churchill arrived in mid-December, bring—
`ing with him his own portable map room, which he set up in a second-
`floor White House bedroom across the hall from the Queen's Bedroom,
`which he took over as though he owned the place. Roosevelt was a daily
`visitor to the prime minister’s sophisticated presentation of military
`fronts and vivid displays of allied and enemy naval fleets. Enchanted,
`Roosevelt told Beardall after Churchill’s departure, “Fix up a room for
`me like Churchill’s.”
`
`Beardall plucked Lieutenant Robert Montgomery frOm the Office of
`
`War Room, far more impressive than the traveling map room he had
`brought to Washington. The War Room was the command center for
`
`the British war eil'ort, Churchill being minister ofdefense as well as prime
`minister. impressed by what he had seen in London, Montgomery re—
`
`sponded to Beardall’s instruction to “fix up a room like Churchill's" with
`
`a grandiose proposal for an American underground war room to be dug
`under what was then known as Ickes Park, the area between the De—
`
`
`partment of the Interior and Constitution Avenue where the War and
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`Navy Departments were located. (The Pentagon was still in the early
`
`states of construction.) Montgomery proposed that top admirals and
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`generals and civilian officials gather in this war room for a once—a—day
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`presentation of the war situation. He envisioned himself as the ideal
`
`“presenter.” His proposal went nowhere. The only digging that took
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`place was a tunnel from the White House under East Executive Avenue
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`to the “gold vaults" ofthe Treasury Department, where Roosevelt could
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`he moved to safety in the event of a German attack on Washington.
`
`(This was as ridiculous as the panicky mounting of antiaircraft guns on
`
`the roofs of downtown buildings. The Germans had neither land planes
`
`capable of transatlantic flight nor any aircraft carriers.)
`Thwarted in his grandiose scheme, Montgomery came down to earth.
`He would leave the Fish Room—it was too exposed to newsmen and '
`the numerous West Wing visitors—and relocate to the White House it—
`self. He found the perfect spot in the Trophy Room, so named for the
`gifts—official and unofficial—that were sent to the president and Mrs.
`Roosevelt. The room was on the ground floor, directly across the corri-
`dor from the elevator the president used in going betWeen his living
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`..quarters on the second floor and his office in the West Wing. He could
`
`catch the overnight news first thing in the morning and stop in again at
`file end ofthe day. Security was ideal. This area was off—limits to all ex-
`cept the official family.
`Montgomery had the paneled walls covered with soft wallboard for
`Igltheir protection and so that the maps could be readily changed. Desks
`and file cabinets were placed in an island in the center of the room so
`that the president, in his wheelchair, could study the maps at close range.
`ernaps of battle areas were covered with clear plastic. Grease pencil
`firings showed the dispositions of enemy and allied troops. Charts of
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 5 of 20 PageID #: 14600
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513—JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 5 of 20 PageID #: 14600
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`20 An Unplanned Life
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`pins were of different sizes and shapes to denote the category—battle—
`ship, cruiser, destroyer, submarine, or Special troop ships such as the
`Queen Mary and the Queen Elise-shark. Pins of capital ships bore their
`names—as did a ship of whatever size on which a member of the
`Roosevelt family was embarked.
`When I arriVed in the Map Room on April 28, 1942, pursuant to a
`cryptic order from the director of Naval Intelligence to report to the
`naval aide to the president, I found there to be six watch officers, three
`army and three navy, maintaining the room twenty-four hours a day,
`seven days a week- One officer from each service was there until mid—
`evcning, with a lone officer remaining during the night. Our "boss” was
`Captain lohn McCrea, who had succeeded Beardall as naval aide. Soon
`after I arrived, the last of the West Point and Annapolis graduates dew
`parted for troop or sea duty. Watch officers were to be reserves only,
`men whose future careers would not be tarnished with too much “state—
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`side duty.” My assignment was due to Bill Mott, now assistant to McCrea.
`He was carrying out the promise he had made a few weeks earlier.
`Nominally in charge of the watch officers, Mett pretty much left us
`on our own after making sure we were properly instructed in our duties.
`As he led me into the Map Room for the first time and closed the d00r,
`he pointed to a cartoon of three monkeys posted on the inside of the
`door. Under the first monkey, whose eyes were wide open, was printed
`“sees everything.” Below, in pencil, was written “something.” Under the
`second monkey, holding a hand to an ear, was printed “heats every-
`thing.” The pcrtciled note: “a little." The third monkey, with hand over
`mouth, “tells nothing." Below, in pencil, “less." Mott said the pcnciled
`Words were written by Secretary of War Henry Stimson as dictated to
`him by Roosevelt one evening when they were conferring in the room.
`Map Room watch officers, it was obvious, were expected to be discreet
`in word and action.
`
`Several times a day officer couriers from the War and Navy Depart-
`ments brought locked leather pouches. crammed with telegrams, re-
`ports, and documents. From these the. watch officers updated the maps
`and selected the items they thought important enough for the naval aide
`to show the president. Mott explained that, however interesting the war
`news might be, the most important papers I would be handling were the
`
`The Map :loom 2l
`
`“When you get a message that is to. go to-Churchiill,” he told me, “the
`first thing to do is type it in the proper form, give it the next number in
`the Roosevelt-Churchill file, and then phone the navy code room to
`send an officer to pick it up. All outgoing messages to Churchill [and
`Stalin and Chiang too] are coded and sent by the navy. The incoming
`ones are brought to us by office:- courier from the War Department.”
`“Why is that?” I asked.
`“Simple. The president doesn’t want any place in Washington except
`the Map Room to have a complete file of these messages. This way,
`snoops in the navy might find out what he asks Churchill, but they
`won’t know the answer. Army will get an answer to an unknown ques—
`tion. Sure, people can make good guesses, but they'll never know the
`whole story.
`'
`“Navy codes all the outgoing stuff; arm-y decodes the incoming. The
`only time the Map Room might code and decode would be if the presi-
`dent were away on a long trip. If he's just at Hyde Park or some place
`close, stuff gets to him by White House pouch. We‘ve been told that if
`he’s going to be away for some time, cryptographic equipment will be
`brought here and we’ll be taught how to code and decode stuff- that is
`too hot to go by pouch. Then we’ll be handling not only Churchill and
`such but backward-forth things from the cabinet and Congress. We‘re
`likely to be damn busy then.”
`I learned that the Map Room was expected to follow up with the
`naval aide or Harry Hopkins if action was not taken in timely fashion
`on messages and papers that required action. Hopkins, the president’s
`closest adviser, had lived since before the war on the second floor of the
`White House in what today is known as the Lincoln Bedroom, a few
`doors from the president’s own quarters. Hopkins was the only presi—
`dential staff member with access to the Map Room and its files. Not
`even the president’s longtime press secretary, Steve Early; his trusted
`speechwriter, Judge Samuel Rosenman; or the director of war mobi-
`lization, former Supreme Court Justice Iamcs Byrnes {dubbed by the
`press as “assistant president”) was eligible to enter our sanctuary. Roose—
`velt was certain that the army and the navy would be reluctant to en—
`trust the Map Room with their most secret information if “politicians”
`_ were allowed to nose around.
`
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`Filed 12/18/18 Page 6 of 20 PageID #: 14601
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`AP- Unplanned Lie
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`took upstairs one nig t a message t at cause muc grle .
`mon Islands campaign in. the Southwest Pacific the Japanese had sunk
`a cruiser skippered by Captain Daniel Callaghan with heavy loss of life,
`including Callaghan’s. Callaghan, the naval aide before Beardall, was
`much beloved at the White House. On those occasions when the eve—
`ning watch officers had gone upstairs, we wrote notes for the naval aide
`to read the next morning so that he would know what “his boys” had
`been doing. With experiences such as these, my Map Room colleagues
`and I became a closerlcnit group, highly conscious of the importance of
`the information with which we were entrusted and the privilege of as—
`sociating with the president and his intimate staff.
`As I had in the Office of Naval Intelligence, I delved into the files to
`learn of events before I had arrived at the White House. One of the most
`revealing items was a letter Roosevelt had sent to Averell Harriman in
`LondOn for personal delivery to Churchill. Harriman, the Lend—Lease
`coordinator in England, had been drawn into Churchill’s inner circle.
`This was shrewd of the prime minister. It gave him a direct line to
`Roosevelt, and he knew that his opinions and wishes would not be
`warped by the American embassy or by the State Department. His dis-
`trust of both dated from before Pearl Harbor when Ioseph Kennedy,
`then U.S. ambassador, was notoriously anti-British-
`The Roosevelt letter of March 18, 1942, was remarkably revealing.
`“By the time you get this,” Roosevelt had written, “you will have been
`advised of my talk with Litvinov [a Soviet envoy Stalin had sent to
`Washington to plead for more military assistance] and I expect a reply
`from Stalin shortly. I know you will not mind my being brutally frank
`when I tell you that i think I can personally handle Stalin better than ei-
`ther your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin hates the guts
`of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will
`continue to do so.”
`
`This example of Roosevelt’s egoism—that he could “handle” Stalin—
`was a- foretaste of what I was to see for the next three years. Roosevelt
`
`iiiiiiiii
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`The Map Qoorn 25
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`Teheran in late 1943 and at Yalta in early 1945 and, in the interval be—
`tween those meetings, in various cabled exchanges. To what extent
`Roosevelt’s stance abetted Stalin’s expansion into central Europe, and
`strengthened the Soviets during the Cold War, will be endlessly de—
`bated. There is no question, however, that the written record lends some
`credence to the criticism that Roosevelt “sold out” to Stalin. in my judg—
`ment, this was not his intention in the slightest. It was unwitting, born
`of FDR’s supreme self-confidence that he could “handle” any one, any
`time, in any situation.
`As for Roosevelt’s relations with Churchill, it’s an open question as to
`who “handled” whom. Each thought he had the better of the other.
`Eager to see for ourselves how the two leaders related to each other, we
`in the Map Room awaited the prime minister’s second wartime visit in
`lune 1942 with keen anticipation.
`Churchill had grown to mythic stature in the eyes of most Amer-
`icans. His leadership of Britain during the Nazi blitz, his eloquent deli—
`ance of Hitler and Mussolini, and his inimitable rhetoric had made him
`well known and much admired, thanks to radio and newsreels. He was
`a demigod, except to a dwindling few who muttered that all he cared
`about was saving the British Empire. When he had flown to Washing-
`ton two weeks after Pearl Harbor, I was so eager to catch a glimpse of
`the great man that I waited outside my Seventeenth Street rooming
`house one Sunday morning. The presidential limousine sped by en
`route to church, too fast for any look. By June 1942, my situation was
`quite different. I was on duty in the Map Room, and Churchill was to
`be a White House guest. I was sure to see him close—up.
`Map Room officers had frequent occasion to take papers to Harry
`Hopkins’s second-floor office (which, incidentally, had been McKinley’s
`map room). One fine Iune morning, with a report for Hopkins in hand,
`l came face-to—face with Churchill as he emerged from the Queen’s
`Bedroom in a silk dressing robe with the ever-present cigar in hand. He
`came into Hopkins’s office, calling for “Harry.” Not wearing my naval
`hat, I did not salute but straightened sharply up and gave a “Good
`morning, Sir” greeting. The prime minister responded with something
`that sounded like “urn ph” and, as Hopkins was not around, turned and
`left. That was all there was to the encounter, but the thrill I felt cannot
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 240-8 Filed 12/18/18 Page 7 of 20 PageID #: 14602
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`Case 2: 17--C\/--00513- JRG Document 24 _
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`24 An Unplanned Life
`
`Back in the Map Room, I wrote: “Of course he looks like his pic-
`tures—but a bit heavier, shorter, more stooped and balder than my
`mental picture of him. He seemed in a foul mood.” Indeed, he should
`have been. The British had just been disastrously defeated at Tobruk in
`North Africa by German forces under the seemingly invincible Field
`Marshal Erwin Rommel. It looked as though all North Africa—including
`Egypt—might soon be in Nazi hands. Churchill was later to say of this
`time that he was the saddest Englishman in America since Burgoyne.
`My quick look at the RM. (as he was usually called by all at the White
`House) was the only one I had. All of us in the Map Room were disap-
`pointed that the president never brought him in and that he had not
`brought his traveling map room as he had six months earlier. We were
`intensely curious as to how we might measure against it.
`A few weeks after Churchill’s return to England, the Map Room ac—
`quired a new “customer.” Roosevelt had concluded that he needed help
`in resolving arguments between the navy and the army and its air force
`over strategy and the allocation of scarce resources He needed an offi—
`cer senior to George Marshall of the army, Ernest King of the navy, and
`“Hap” Arnold of the army air force. He recalled retired admiral Wile
`liam D. Leahy, who was serving as ambassador to what was known as
`Vichy France. Roosevelt had known Leahy since World War I, when
`FDR was assistant secretary of the navy. As president, he had appointed
`Leahy chief of naval operations, governor of Puerto Rico, and ambas-
`sador to the puppet government of France. Roosevelt gave Leahy the
`title of chief of staff to the commander in chief. Leahy was to preside
`over meetings of the Joint Chiefs (Marshall, King, and Arnold) and be
`the president’s link to them. He was installed in a spacious suite of of-
`fices in the just-completed new East Wing of the White House so that
`he would be close at hand.
`
`The hastily built East Wing, replacing the small one that had been
`not much more than a guest entrance, provided badly needed office
`space and covered a bomb shelter deep underground. There would be
`no need to use the long t tend to Treasury in the event of trouble. (Shortly
`
`after the war, White House Chief Usher Howell Crim told me that
`
`Roosevelt was claustrophobic. He had been taken by the Secret Service
`to inspect the new shelter and then ordered Crim to see that he was
`never taken there again. “If bombs fall, inst take me out to the South
`Lawn,” Crim told me he’d said. Crim noted that $800,000 had been
`
`i
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`The Map Qoom 25
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`spent on the unused shelterwall taken from Civil Defense funds in—
`tended for Washington. No harm doneathe city didn’t need the funds
`anyway.)
`Admiral Leahy seemed incredibly old to us youngsters, having grad—
`uated from the Naval Academy in 1897. Recalled to active duty in this
`i new position and in the uniform of a four—star admiral, he was a formi—
`, dable figure. But I took to him at once. He was quiet, friendly, and eager
`,
`to learn all that we could provide. Not everyone, however, was pleased
`at his arrival. Harry Hopkins saw Leahy as a rival for the president’s at—
`_ T,
`tention on war strategy. Hopkins had been to London and to Moscow.
`
`t e felt he knew the score as an old sailor could not possibly know it.
`i}. opkins had helped Roosevelt draft cables to Churchill and Stalin; in-
`deed, he had written some. Sensing that Leahy was an intruder on his
`_ turf, Hopkins pulled a fast one by preparing a directive for the president
`:
`: to send to Leahy: “I am anxious to get the cables to me from the Prime
`:
`lVlinster and other heads of government in various countries, and my
`, replies to them, coordinated through Harry because so much of them
`: refer to civil things.” This rationale was pure nonsense. Hopkins was
`,
`jealous!
`There were also fundamental differences of opinion between the two
`men. Hopkins shared Roosevelt’s disde in for the State Department. When
`i :l asked Hopkins once why we sent cables to Churchill through naval
`
`. channels rather than through normal diplomatic ones, he answered,
`..“
`
`'
`_'
`"ver since the Tyler Kent case, the Boss doesnt trust State.” This ref-
`erence to the theft of classified messages by a code clerkin the American
`embassy was a brushoff The fact was that Roosevelt preferred to han—
`de foreign affairs that interested him andignore the rest Leahy, by con—
`trast always thought of the diplomatic and foreign policy implications
`when strategy was considered, wanting to know‘What does State
`think?” and wanting to be sure that State was kept informed. As an ex—
`ample, at the Americaanritish landings in Morocco in November 1942,
`Leahy scribbled a note he passed to me: “State through diplomatic mis-
`sions to inform our friends and allies in .oatin America that we have
`landed to prevent an invasion of Africa by Germs and Wops.” (In lan—
`guage that in later years would be regarr ed as “politically incorrect,”
`Leahy used the epithets of his youth—Lineys, Frogs, Wops, Chinks,
`:laps, Krauts or Huns, and Russkies)
`_' The Leahy——Hopkins situation festered for months. On the eve of
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`SIEGEL000425
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513—JRG Document 24
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`"line Mao Doom 2?
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`the aide would begin their oral briefings. Any time from ten minutes to
`an hour later, Leahy would return to his East Wing office, stopping to—
`
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`leave with us the papers he had shown the president. Meticulously, he.
`initialed each with a large “P” and “WDL.” Our Map Room group was
`careful to preserve all items that Admiral Leahy had “Peed” on- Other—
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`wise, routine dispatches usually went into a “burn bag" destined for the
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`incinerator in the basement of the West Wing. (The use of shredders as
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`a means of disposing of classified papers was far in the future}
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`The president’s lessening personal interest in visiting the Map Room
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`gave rise to the phenomenon characteristic of bureaucracies large and
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`small: makeup work to keep all hands busy. Lieutenant Mott wrote
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`three pages of instructions of information he wanted the naval watch of-
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`ficers to obtain from the Navy Department. Word ofour nosing around
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`soon reached Admiral King. We found ourselves being told, “If the
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`president wants to know this, Admiral King will be glad to tell him per-
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`sonally." Despite the rebuff, the job continued to be fascinating.
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`The year 1943 began with busy preparations for Roosevelt’s Ianuary
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`flight to Casablanca to discuss with Churchill the next steps following
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`the successful landings in French North Africa two months earlier.
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`_ FDR was as elated as a kid facing spring break. He would make history
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`as the first president to fly while in office. He had not been in a plane
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`since flying to Chicago in 1932 to accept the Democratic nomination.
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`(Cousin Theodore Roosevelt had boasted that he was the first president
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`to fly, But he had not flown until several years after leaving the White
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`__ House. Nothing seemed to please Roosevelt more than doing something
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`“Cousin Ted” had not.)
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`The Map Room had served in September 1942 as the communication
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`link with the president when he made a twoaweelc rail trip to inspect
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`war production plants and military installations in the West. We had
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`: fact, that Charles Berry, the Map Room officer on the presidential train,
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`had not been able to decipher many of the messages we sent. For this
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`' trip, Naval Communications came to our resaue by installing electronic
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`coding machines {ECMs in navy jargon) temporarily in the Map Room
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`and providing instructors to teach us how to use them.
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`26 An Unplanned Lile
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`Churchill’s third visit in May 1943, Leahy’s aide unburdened himself on
`me. The admiral was not seeing all the Roosevelt—Churchill-Stalin traf—
`fic. He was not faulting the Map Room. He knew we could provide
`copies only by Roosevelt’s specific directions—which he all too often
`would not give.'This put Leahy in the embarrassing position of having
`to ask Sir lohn Dill, head of the British military mission in Washington,
`for information- Churchill regularly and routinely provided Dill with
`copies of his exchanges with the president. Even more distressing to
`Leahy was Hopkins’s indifference to his need for accurate, current in—
`formation. I witnessed it one afternoon when the two were in the Map
`Room. Leahy, showing rare irritation, spoke sharply to Hopkins. “Harry,
`give me the prime minister's dispatch you have in your pocket.” Harry
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`calmly reached in his jacket and did. The two left in silence. e presr ent was espec
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`in t e convoys 5 mg aroun
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`y intereste
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`the northern tip of Norway to the Soviet port of Murmansk. Losses by
`German U—boats were horrendous, but the convoys had to keep sailing
`with tanks and weaponry if the Soviets were to stay in the war. Roosea
`velt’s'interest in our charts was at its peak as the date for the invasion of
`North Africa in November 1942 neared and our blue pins inched across
`the. Atlantic. The relatively quick campaign that followed was not
`matched in the southwest Pacific, where the struggle to wrest the Solo—
`mon Islands from the Japanese was protracted, bitter, and very costly in
`lives and ships lost.
`4 Despite anxieties about the war, FDR, always interested in anything
`pertaining to the navy, busied himself with minutiae to an extent that
`astonished me. He demanded that the name of every new frigate be sub— _
`mitted to him for approval, and he was irked to the point of writing
`sharply to Admiral King that the navy had instituted a “commendation
`ribbon” without seeking his permission.
`As l942 turned into 1943, the president began dropping in on us less
`and less frequently. Admiral Leahy and the naval aide would wait im—
`patiently in the Map Room for “three bells” to sound in the corridor—
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`_ Filed 12/18/18 Page 9 of 20 PageID #: 14604
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`lhe Map gQoom 29
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`tempt for air power and snorted at aviation enthusiasts who claimed the
`war in Europe could be won by bombing German cities. Only a massive
`invasion would end the war——and it could not be through Churchill’s
`“soft underbelly of Europe.”
`Leahy’s analysis of the German defeat at Stalingrad was blunt. “It
`shows what happens when the civilian head of a country directs strat~
`egy.” Although Hitler inspired this comment to me, it was clearly a
`_ swipe at Churchill and, equally, an expression of the conviction I had
`often heard from Leahy that Roosevelt should leave strategy to the Joint
`Chiefs of Staff.
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`,
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`28
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`Elm Unplanned Lilo
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`“The president is curious about them,” he said. “And find a book or two
`about Morocco he can read on the way over.” This request would seem
`to have little to do with the war or the forthcoming conference, but we
`had heard of Roosevelt’s chagrin that Churchill always seemed to know
`more than be about people, places, and customs. This time, he would be
`the better informed.
`
`My friendship with Tom Shaw, my former “landlord” in the Capitol
`Hill apartment, came into play. I phoned Tom at the Library of Con-
`gress and made an appointment, saying I wanted to do a little research
`on some African questions. Tom was no dumbbell; he caught on in—
`stantly. At the library, neither Roosevelt’s name nor any travel was ever
`mentioned. I returned to the White House with books containing every—
`thing Roosevelt might want to know about his destination and more
`than I needed to write a nine-page essay about the natives, “the Berbers
`in particular.” When the presidential party returned, McCrea said they
`had read and enjoyed the paper and the books. I phoned Torn with
`warm thanks.
`
`Tom and I played this game for all of Roosevelt’s later overseas des—
`tinations—Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Malta. Since Tom checked out all
`books in his own name, there was no trace of the White House interest.
`Our security was airtight, and we had a little fun.
`As those of us on the Map Room staff readied ourselves for the Casa-
`blanca trip, we daily heard Admiral Leahy’s tart views on the French.
`In his tour as ambassador in Vichy, he had acquired an intense dislike
`for Charles de Gaulle. Whenever de Gaulle’s name came up, Leahy
`would snort something like: “Well, for Christ’s sake, if you could send
`hirrr someplace in a plane with one wing, it would be the best thing in
`the world.” Roosevelt had expected to lean heavily on Leahy for advice
`on French questions, but pneumonia forced the admiral to drop out at
`Trinidad on the first leg of the flight.
`For weeks thereafter, Leahy fretted at his absence from the Casa-
`blanca Conference. He would mutter to us in the Map Room that the
`president had swallowed hook, line, and sinker Churchill’s strategy for
`continued activity in the Mediterranean after North Africa was cleared
`of the Germans. Like General Marshall, Admiral Leahy favored the
`earliest possible assault across the English Channel against “the Huns.”
`He was astonishingly candid in his remarks to us youngsters in the Map
`Room, trusting us and letting fly his feelings. He often expressed con—
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`p
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`p
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`Churchill was expected to return to Washington for his third war-
`time visit in May 1943. “I’m all involved in this British invasion of the
`_ US, which has me nearly crazy,” Leahy confided one morning in the
`_ Map Room. Leaving as little to chance as possible, fearing both that Roose—
`_ vclt would shoot from the hip without much thought and that Church—
`_
`ill’s bombast would sweep all before him, Leahy prepped the president
`_ to seize the lead in strategic discussions. He gave Roosevelt a “talking
`_ paper” with which to open the meetings. It was a strong restatement of
`_ the position the US. Chiefs had been stressing since Pearl Harbor. Still
`_ smarting from Churchill’s success at Casablanca in persuading the pres—
`_ Ident to invade Sicily after the Germans were licked in Africa, Leahy
`_ was determined to keep FDR from being talked into further “Mediter—
`_ ranean adventures.”
`“All operations in Europe,” Leahy’s paper read, “should be judged
`_ primarily on the basis of the contribution .
`.
`. to defeating Germany at
`_ the earliest possible date.” Invading other islands or the Balkans—«as
`_ Churchill ardently wishedwwas just plain wrong, the Joint Chiefs were
`_ convinced. While we in the Map Room were well aware of the differ—
`_ ing American and British views, they were far beyond our responsibili—
`:ties. All we could do was wa:ch the ytruggle with fascination.
`We were intrigued on lea 'ning that this time the “RM.” would again
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`‘ bring his traveling Map Roo‘n. But when its director, Captain Richard
`> Film, of the Royal Naval Vol nteer Reserve, arrived and was introduced
`‘ to our shop, he at once prOjosed that he move in with us. His room
`, would be superfluous. Such information as the Admiralty and the War