Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 1 of 56 PageID #: 7191
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`AGIS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`HUAWEI DEVICE USA INC., HUAWEI
`DEVICE CO., LTD. AND HUAWEI DEVICE
`(DONGGUAN) CO., LTD.,
`HTC CORPORATION,
`LG ELECTRONICS INC.,
`APPLE INC.,
`ZTE CORPORATION, ZTE (USA), INC.,
`AND ZTE (TX), INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 2:17-CV-513-JRG
`(Lead Case)
`
`Member Cases:
`Civil Action No. 2:17-CV-514-JRG
`Civil Action No. 2:17-CV-515-JRG
`Civil Action No. 2:17-CV-516-JRG
`Civil Action No. 2:17-CV-517-JRG
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSIVE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF
`
`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 2 of 56 PageID #: 7192
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................................1
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................2
`
`I.
`
`THE TEN “DEVICE” CLAIMS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED UNDER 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112(F), AND THEY ARE INVALID AS INDEFINITE BECAUSE THE
`SPECIFICATION FAILS TO DISCLOSE ADEQUATE CORRESPONDING
`STRUCTURE FOR EACH CLAIMED FUNCTION. ........................................................2
`
`A.
`
`The Ten “Device” Claims Should Be Construed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). ..........2
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“Device” Is A Nonce Word, And The Remaining Claim Language
`Likewise Lacks Recitation Of Sufficient Structure. ....................................2
`
`AGIS’s Arguments That The “Device” Claims Fall Outside The
`Scope Of § 112(f) Are Wrong. ....................................................................5
`a.
`The Claims Do Not Recite An Algorithm. ......................................5
`
`b.
`
`AGIS Cannot Rely Solely On The Conclusory Statements
`Of Its Expert To Fill In The Missing Structure................................7
`
`B.
`
`The Ten “Device” Claims Of The Ad Hoc Network Patents Are Indefinite
`Because The Specification Fails To Recite Algorithmic Structure. ........................8
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The Katz Exception Does Not Apply To The “Device” Claims. .................9
`
`The Specification Fails To Disclose Sufficient Structure. ...........................9
`
`AGIS’s Arguments Fail. ............................................................................11
`a.
`AGIS Ignores The Claim Language In An Effort To
`Improperly Apply The Katz Exception. .........................................11
`
`b.
`
`AGIS Fails To Even Argue How The Katz Exception
`Allegedly Applies To Half The Claimed Functions. .....................14
`
`II.
`
`THE ’970 PATENT MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS ...........................................15
`
`A.
`
`“means for attaching a forced message alert software packet to a voice or
`text message creating a forced message alert that is transmitted by said
`sender PDA/cell phone to the recipient PDA/cell phone, said forced
`message alert software packet containing a list of possible required
`responses” (’970 patent, claim 1) ...........................................................................15
`
`1.
`
`Defendants’ Claimed Function Is Correct. ................................................16
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 3 of 56 PageID #: 7193
`Page
`
`2.
`
`Under Either Side’s Proposed Function, The Specification Fails To
`Disclose Adequate Corresponding Structure. ............................................17
`
`“[means for. . .] requiring the forced message alert software on said
`recipient PDA/cell phone to transmit an automatic acknowledgment to the
`sender PDA/cell phone as soon as said forced message alert is received by
`the recipient PDA/cell phone” (’970 patent, claim 1) ............................................18
`
`“means for requiring a required manual response from the response list by
`the recipient in order to clear recipient’s response list from recipient’s cell
`phone display” (’970 patent, claim 1) ....................................................................19
`
`“means for periodically resending said forced message alert to said
`recipient PDA/cell phones that have not automatically acknowledged the
`forced message alert” (’970 patent, claim 1) .........................................................20
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`III.
`
`OTHER DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS ..............................................................................22
`
`A.
`
`“group” (’838 patent, claims 1, 54, 55, 84; ’251 patent, claims 1, 24; ’829
`patent, claims 1, 34, 35, 68) ...................................................................................22
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`A “Group” As Used Here Includes “More Than Two Participants.” ........22
`
`“Participants” Joining A “Group” Are “Associated Together
`Without Having To Pre-Enter Data Into A Web Or Identify Other
`Users By Name, E-Mail Addresses Or Phone Numbers.” .........................24
`
`AGIS’s Arguments Are Wrong. ................................................................26
`a.
`AGIS’s Construction Improperly Broadens “Group” To
`Encompass Only Two Participants. ...............................................26
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`AGIS’s Construction Reads Out The Entire Purpose Of The
`Alleged Invention From The Claims. ............................................27
`
`AGIS’s Attempt To Distinguish The Prosecution History
`Fails. ...............................................................................................28
`
`B.
`
`“receiving a message from a second device” (’251 patent, claims 1, 24) .............29
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`The Claims Recite A First Device That Receives A Message
`Directly From A Second Device Without The Use Of A Server. ..............29
`
`The Applicant Disclaimed The Use Of A Server During
`Prosecution. ................................................................................................30
`
`AGIS’s Arguments Fail. ............................................................................32
`
`
`
`ii
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`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 4 of 56 PageID #: 7194
`Page
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`J.
`
`“an identifier corresponding to the group” (’838 patent, claims 1, 54, 55,
`84) ..........................................................................................................................33
`
`“database of entities” (’838 patent, claim 23; ’251 patent, claim 14)....................34
`
`“Short Message Service (SMS) messages” (’055 patent, claims 1, 54) ................35
`
`“the other symbol” (’055 patent, claims 2, 42) ......................................................37
`
`“user selection of the sub-net” (’055 patent, claims 7 and 34) ..............................39
`
`“forced message alert software application” (’970 patent, claims 1 and 6) ...........40
`
`“manual response” (’970 patent, claims 1, 6) ........................................................42
`
`“the repeating voice alert” (’970 patent, claim 6) .................................................43
`
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................44
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 5 of 56 PageID #: 7195
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`
`Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................... 10, 11
`
`Advanced Mktg. Sys., LLC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
`No. 6:15-CV-134-JRG-KNM, 2016 WL 1741396 (E.D. Tex. May 3, 2016) .................... 4
`
`Apple Inc. v. AGIS Software Development, LLC,
`IPR2018-00817, Paper 001 ................................................................................................. 3
`
`Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)......................................................................................... 18
`
`Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech.,
`521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).................................................................................. passim
`
`Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc.,
`198 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999)........................................................................................... 8
`
`Augme Technologies, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc.,
`755 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014)......................................................................................... 17
`
`Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc.,
`262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001)......................................................................................... 23
`
`Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc.,
`574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)............................................................................... 8, 19, 21
`
`C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`388 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2004)..................................................................................... 25, 41
`
`Cellular Commc'ns Equip. LLC v. HTC Corp.,
`No. 6:13-CV-507, 2015 WL 10741012 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2015) ............................. 14, 43
`
`Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
`412 F.3d 1291 (Fed.Cir.2005)................................................................................. 7, 17, 20
`
`Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp,
`653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011)......................................................................................... 41
`
`Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc.,
`673 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................... 9, 12
`
`Fenner Investments, Ltd. v. Cellco P’ship,
`778 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2015)......................................................................................... 33
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 6 of 56 PageID #: 7196
`
`
`Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Gr., Inc.,
`523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)............................................................................... 6, 10, 13
`
`Forest Labs., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
`C.A. No. 14-1058-LPS, 2016 WL 54910 (D. Del. Jan. 5, 2016), aff’d, 716 F.
`App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2017)............................................................................................... 30
`
`Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc.,
`708 F.3d 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013)......................................................................................... 18
`
`Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp.,
`2012 WL 2505745 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2012) ............................................................ 5, 6, 7
`
`GoDaddy.com, LLC v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd.,
`No. CV-14-00126-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 212676 (D. Ariz. Jan 19, 2016) .......................... 5
`
`Google LLC v. AGIS Software Development, LLC,
`IPR2018-01079, Paper 002 ................................................................................................. 3
`
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc.,
`830 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2016)................................................................................... 35, 41
`
`In re Donaldson Co.,
`16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) .......................................................................... 16
`
`In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.,
`639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011)............................................................................... 9, 13, 14
`
`In re Rambus Inc.,
`694 F.3d 42 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................. 30
`
`Lochner Techs., LLC v. Lenovo (United States) Inc.,
`No. 2:10-CV-430-JRG, 2015 WL 293625 (E.D. Tex. 2015) ............................................. 5
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi–Tech Sys., Inc.,
`357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)......................................................................................... 33
`
`Mobile Telecommunications Techs., LLC v. ZTE (USA) INC.,
`No. 2:13-CV-946-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 1435603 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2016) ................... 14
`
`Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ............................................................................................ 3, 37, 43
`
`Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012)........................................................................... 7, 8, 12, 20
`
`Omega Eng'g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp.,
`334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)......................................................................................... 32
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 7 of 56 PageID #: 7197
`
`
`Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc.,
`498 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007)......................................................................................... 26
`
`Phillips. See Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..................................................................................... 3, 36
`
`Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp.,
`717 F.3d 929 (Fed. Cir. 2013)........................................................................................... 34
`
`Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On, Inc.,
`769 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................... 3
`
`SafeTCare Mfg., Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc.,
`497 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007)......................................................................................... 34
`
`Saint Lawrence Commc'ns LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 2:16-CV-82-JRG, 2017 WL 2874526 (E.D. Tex. July 5, 2017) .................................. 7
`
`Sarif Biomedical LLC v. Brainlab, Inc.,
`725 F. App'x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................... 3
`
`SCVNGR, Inc. v. DailyGobble, Inc.,
`No. 6:15-CV-493-JRG-KNM, 2017 WL 4270200 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2017) ................ 34
`
`Smith v. ORBCOMM, Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-666, 2015 WL 5302815 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2015) ........................................ 38
`
`Speedtrack, Inc. v. Endeca Techs., Inc.,
`524 Fed. App’x. 651 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 16, 2013) .................................................................. 3
`
`SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc.,
`No. 2:7-cv-497-TJW-CE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74808 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2010)......... 8
`
`Tech. Properties Ltd. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., Ltd.,
`849 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017)......................................................................................... 37
`
`Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,
`503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)......................................................................................... 25
`
`VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014)................................................................................... 34, 41
`
`Widevine Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc.,
`No. CIV.A. 2-07-CV-321, 2009 WL 3734106 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2009) .......................... 4
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................... 2, 3, 5, 8
`
`
`
`vi
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 8 of 56 PageID #: 7198
`
`
`WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech.,
`184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999)............................................................................... 8, 12, 16
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(b) ...................................................................................................................... 8, 9
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112(f) .................................................................................................................. passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311(b) .......................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2181 ............................................................................ 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
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`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 9 of 56 PageID #: 7199
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiff AGIS Software Development LLC (“AGIS”) asserts five patents. Four patents—
`
`U.S. Patent Nos. 9,467,838, 9,749,829, 9,445,251, and 9,408,055 (collectively, the “Ad Hoc
`
`Network Patents”)—share a common specification and are generally directed to software for
`
`exchanging location information among different, not-pre-known users upon joining an “ad hoc”
`
`network. Ex. 1 [’838 patent] at 2:49-3:11.1 The remaining patent—U.S. Patent No. 8,213,970
`
`(the “Forced Alert Patent”)—is generally directed to sending “forced” alerts containing a list of
`
`options from which a recipient must choose and provide a manual response. Ex. 2 [’970 patent]
`
`at 2:3-35. All five specifications state that the “heart of the invention” is software. See, e.g., ’970
`
`patent at 4:47-49; ’838 patent at 6:6-10. But many of AGIS’s software-based claims are written
`
`in computer-implemented functional language without sufficient structure for performing those
`
`functions, rendering them subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). And because the specifications lack
`
`disclosure of any algorithms for performing most of those claimed functions, those claims are
`
`indefinite. For several other terms, Defendants propose constructions consistent with their use in
`
`the intrinsic record, rather than—as AGIS seeks—divorcing them from that context.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`In view of the Court’s familiarity with the applicable law concerning claim construction,
`
`Defendants cite pertinent cases in the context of specific disputed issues.
`
`
`1 All Exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Kerri-Ann Limbeek unless otherwise specified.
`1
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 10 of 56 PageID #: 7200
`
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`The Ten “Device” Claims Should Be Construed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), And They
`Are Invalid As Indefinite Because The Specification Fails To Disclose Adequate
`Corresponding Structure For Each Claimed Function.
`
`Ten of the asserted claims recite either a “device” or “device programmed to perform
`
`operations”2 followed by a list of functions. See Dkt. 162-1 [Updated Joint Claim Construction
`
`and Prehearing Statement, July 23, 2018, Appx. 1], pp. 13-109 (’838 patent, claim 54; ’251 patent,
`
`claims 24, 29, 31; ’055 patent, claims 28, 32, 33, 34, 36; ’829 patent, claim 68). The parties
`
`dispute: (1) whether the “device” claims should be construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f); and (2) if
`
`so, whether there exists a sufficient recitation of structure, or if those claims are indefinite.3
`
`The Ten “Device” Claims Should Be Construed Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f).
`
`A.
`In exchange for allowing patentees to claim functionally, § 112(f) limits such claims to the
`
`particular structure disclosed in the specification for performing the claimed functions. 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 112(f).4 In Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, the Federal Circuit recognized that patentees were
`
`using generic terms—such as “device”—to avoid application of § 112(f). 792 F.3d 1339, 1350
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2015). It rejected the prior “strong presumption” that treatment of claims under § 112(f)
`
`hinged on “the presence or absence of the words ‘means,’” holding instead that § 112(f) will apply
`
`if the claim term “fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without
`
`reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. at 1348-49 (internal quotations and
`
`citation omitted).
`
`1.
`
`“Device” Is A Nonce Word, And The Remaining Claim Language
`Likewise Lacks Recitation Of Sufficient Structure.
`
`The “device” claims are functional claims subject to § 112(f). Indeed, each of the “device”
`
`claims at issue corresponds to a method claim that is identical in nearly every respect, save the
`
`recitation of “device” or “device programmed to perform operations” in the preambles. See Appx.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 11 of 56 PageID #: 7201
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`A (showing differences between method claims and “device” claims in underline). But that is not
`
`sufficient recitation of structure: this Court and the Federal Circuit have consistently held that
`
`“device” is a nonce word that acts as a mere verbal construct equivalent to the typical “means”
`
`language. See, e.g., Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (use of “device” is “tantamount to using the
`
`word ‘means’”); Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On, Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`
`(“[T]his court has found the word ‘device’ to be a non-structural ‘nonce’ word.”); Advanced Mktg.
`
`
`2 AGIS does not argue that the claims that recite a “device programmed to perform operations”
`should be treated differently than those that recite only a “device.” Adding limitations related to
`“programming” adds no structure to a nonce term. See Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int'l
`Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that “appropriate programming”
`imposed “no [structural] limitation whatever” on the claimed “standard microprocessor”); see also
`Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2181 (noting the similar phrase “configured to”
`functions identically to the traditional “for” transition.). Thus, the additional language
`“programmed to perform operations” does not transform the nonce word “device” into a non-nonce
`term, and the analysis for both sets of terms is therefore the same.
`
`3 AGIS repeatedly asserts that the “device” terms of the Ad Hoc Network Patents and the “means”
`terms of the ’970 patent are not indefinite because Defendants filed IPRs that do not allege those
`terms are indefinite. This is wrong as a matter of law. First, as AGIS should know, under current
`law the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) and district courts apply different claim
`construction standards. Whereas the PTAB applies the “broadest reasonable interpretation” to
`unexpired claims, district courts are bound by Phillips. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`1312-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005). It is therefore common—indeed, often necessary—for parties to
`propose different constructions in venues that use different standards. See, e.g., Sarif Biomedical
`LLC v. Brainlab, Inc., 725 F. App'x 996, 1000–01 (Fed. Cir. 2018); cf. Speedtrack, Inc. v. Endeca
`Techs., Inc., 524 Fed. App’x. 651 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 16, 2013) (refusing to estop defendant from
`advancing a construction in the district court that was different than a broader one presented to the
`Patent Office). AGIS also argues that Defendants’ IPR filings are “at least” evidence that the terms
`are not indefinite. But a claim is not definite merely because a party “can ascribe some meaning
`to a patent's claims.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130, 189 L. Ed.
`2d 37 (2014) (emphasis in original). Second, the PTAB has no jurisdiction to consider
`indefiniteness arguments in IPR proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). All pending IPR petitions
`expressly reserve the right to advance this very indefiniteness position in the litigation, so AGIS’s
`complaints of inconsistency has little merit. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. AGIS Software Development,
`LLC, IPR2018-00817, Paper 001 at 12; Google LLC v. AGIS Software Development, LLC,
`IPR2018-01079, Paper 002 at 8. And IPR petitioners argue that—even though the claims are
`indefinite—the prior art discloses at least as much as the challenged patents and therefore render
`those claims invalid. (Id.)
`
` Before the America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) was codified as 35 U.S. C. § 112, ¶ 6.
`3
`
` 4
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 12 of 56 PageID #: 7202
`
`
`Sys., LLC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 6:15-CV-134-JRG-KNM, 2016 WL 1741396, at *18 (E.D.
`
`Tex. May 3, 2016) (finding that “device” did not provide “any indication of structure.”); Widevine
`
`Techs., Inc. v. Verimatrix, Inc., No. CIV.A. 2-07-CV-321, 2009 WL 3734106, at *14 (E.D. Tex.
`
`Nov. 4, 2009) (finding “first device” and “second device” to be means-plus-function terms). As
`
`explained by Defendants’ expert, Dr. Chris Bartone, a professor of Electrical Engineering and
`
`Computer Science at Ohio University, a person of ordinary skill in the art would likewise interpret
`
`the asserted claims’ use of the term “device” as a placeholder for any structure capable of
`
`performing the recited functions. Declaration of Chris Bartone, Ph.D. (“Bartone Decl.”) ¶¶ 78-79;
`
`see also Ex. 3 [The Oxford American Dictionary of Current English, 213 def.1 (1999)] (defining
`
`device as “a thing made or adapted for a particular purpose.”); Ex. 4 [Webster’s New World
`
`Dictionary of Computer Terms, 157 (8th ed. 2000)] (defining device as “Any hardware component
`
`or peripheral.”).5
`
`The surrounding claim language similarly lacks recitation of sufficient structure. In each
`
`of the “device” claims, the remaining claim language recites a list of functions performed by the
`
`device, including: (1) “receiving” or “obtaining” data; (2) “presenting” information; (3) “sending”
`
`or “transmitting” data; (4) “joining” or “participating” in a group; and/or (5) “identifying” user
`
`interactions with the device.6 Bartone Decl. ¶ 80. This Court has previously recognized that these
`
`similar terms connote functions, not structure. See Widevine Techs., 2009 WL 3734106, at *14-
`
`15 (finding (1) “receiving a packet,” (2) “examining a payload portion of the packet . . .,” (3)
`
`“communicating the selectively encrypted portions over the network in a packet”; (4) “receiving
`
`
`5 All emphasis and annotations have been added unless otherwise specified.
`
` 6
`
` As explained below, these functions require more than the short-form descriptions listed here for
`convenience. But the full limitations fail to add any structure and remain purely functional.
`
`
`
`
`4
`
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 13 of 56 PageID #: 7203
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`the communicated packet”; and (5) “parsing the received packet . . .” to be functions that lacked
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`algorithmic support).
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`2.
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`AGIS’s Arguments That The “Device” Claims Fall Outside The Scope
`Of § 112(f) Are Wrong.
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`a.
`AGIS does not argue that the term “device” provides sufficient structural support for the
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`The Claims Do Not Recite An Algorithm.
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`claims. Instead, AGIS’s sole argument is that the claims allegedly recite “steps” constituting
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`algorithms that provide structure within the claims themselves. Dkt. 165 [“AGIS Br.”] at 17-19.7
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`That argument lacks merit. Indeed, if the terms “device” and “device programmed to perform
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`operations comprising” were replaced by “means for,” there would be no question that the
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`limitations that follow are functions. AGIS cannot rebrand these functions as an algorithm merely
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`by substituting the nonce word “device.”
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`The sole case AGIS cites, Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., is distinguishable for two reasons.
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`First, that court determined that the “means for translating . . .” was not a means-plus-function
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`limitation (despite the “means for” language) because the claim itself clearly delineated the
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`function, on the one hand, from the algorithm sufficient to perform that function, on the other.
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`Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., 2012 WL 2505745, at *23 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2012). Specifically,
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`7 While not explicitly discussed in AGIS’s brief (see AGIS Br. at 17-19), AGIS’s expert argues
`that some of the claims disclose a “display” and various characteristics about the “data” that the
`alleged algorithm manipulates. Dkt. 165-1 [“Carbonell Decl.”] ¶¶ 69, 74, 80, 84. According to
`Dr. Carbonell, this additional disclosure “sets forth additional structural requirements . . . .” Id.
`But Dr. Carbonell does not—and cannot—allege that either the “display” or the “data” perform
`the recited functions. Thus, these scant references to a “display” and “data” are inapposite.
`Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (holding § 112(f) applicable where the claim “recites function
`without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function”); Lochner Techs., LLC v.
`Lenovo (United States) Inc., No. 2:10-CV-430-JRG, 2015 WL 293625, at *14 (E.D. Tex. 2015)
`(applying § 112(f) to “display element” where the claimed function went beyond pure visual
`display); see also GoDaddy.com, LLC v. RPost Commc’ns Ltd., No. CV-14-00126-PHX-JAT,
`2016 WL 212676, at *56-57 (D. Ariz. Jan 19, 2016) (finding the claimed “processor” insufficient
`structure where the function included “associating” multiple data sets).
`5
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 14 of 56 PageID #: 7204
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`the court found that the claim provided sufficient structure for the “translating” function because
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`it also recited a specific six-part algorithm. Id. The key factor was that the claim expressly
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`delineated the claimed function, on the one hand, from the algorithm (i.e., structure) for performing
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`that function, on the other hand, by using the word “by”:
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`A converter … wherein the converter comprises means for translating from the byte
`codes in the compiled form to byte codes in a format suitable for interpretation by
`the interpreter by:
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`b.1) recording all jumps and their destinations in the original byte codes;
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`b.2) performing a conversion operation selected from the group:
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`b.2.1) converting specific byte codes into equivalent generic byte codes;
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`b.2.2) modifying byte code operands from references using identifying strings to
`references using unique identifiers; and
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`b.2.3) renumbering byte codes in the compiled form to equivalent byte codes in an
`instruction set supported by an interpreter on the integrated circuit card; and
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`b.3) relinking jumps for which the destination address is affected by the conversion
`operation.
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`Id. (quoting claim and stating that “[t]he claim language signals the end of the recited function and
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`beginning of the structure of the term by the word ‘by:’”).
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`AGIS’s “device” claims do not include (and AGIS does not identify) any clear delineation
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`between the “recited function and beginning of the structure . . . .” Id. Indeed, AGIS identifies
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`the entire remainder of the claim as the purported algorithmic structure, which would make the
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`function commensurate with the purported structure. Algorithmic structure cannot be the same as,
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`or a mere restatement of, the function it allegedly performs. See Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Gr.,
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`Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). If the same claim language could embody both the
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`function to be performed and the algorithm used to perform it, the exception would swallow the
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`rule against functional claiming—every claim reciting multiple functions would be an algorithm
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`6
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`Case 2:17-cv-00513-JRG Document 175 Filed 08/14/18 Page 15 of 56 PageID #: 7205
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`sufficient to provide structure corresponding to those functions. Thus, unlike Gemalto, where the
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`claim clearly recited a function followed by a distinct, specific algorithm for performing that
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`function, AGIS’s asserted “device” claims should be construed under § 112(f).
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`Second, unlike the claim in Gemalto, AGIS does not identify any separate structure, such
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`as a “processor,” for performing the alleged algorithm. See AGIS Br. at 17-19. A claim that
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`includes structural support in the form of an algorithm must also disclose the structure—e.g., a
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`processor—on which the algorithm is performed. See Saint Lawrence Commc'ns LLC v. Apple
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`Inc., No. 2:16-CV-82-JRG, 2017 WL 2874526, at *18 (E.D. Tex. July 5, 2017) (finding that claims
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`were subject to § 112(f) because “[a]lthough the disputed term sets forth a mathematical
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`relationship, the claims do not themselves recite a processor.”). In Gemalto, the court determined
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`that the claim disclosed a processor for performing the algorithm because the claim recited a
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`“programmable environment.” Gemalto, 2012 WL 2505745, at *23 (disclosure of “programmable
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`environment” sufficient to disclose to a person of ordinary skill “a processor for executing
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`commands or instructions” corresponding to the algorithm). The “device” cl