Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 6724
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`Case No. 2:15-CV-1274-JRG-RSP
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`(LEAD CASE)
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`HONDA MOTOR CO., LTD., ET AL.,
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` Defendants.
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`§
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`PLAINTIFF BLITZSAFE TEXAS LLC’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANTS VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. AND VOLKSWAGEN
`GROUP OF AMERICA CHATTANOOGA OPERATONS, LLC’S OBJECTIONS TO
`THE COURT’S CLAIM CONSTRUCTION OPINION AND ORDER (D.E. 146)
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`Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 6725
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`Pursuant to Local Rule CV-72(b), Plaintiff, Blitzsafe Texas LLC (“Blitzsafe”), submits
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`this Response in Opposition to Defendants Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. and Volkswagen
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`Group of America Chattanooga Operations, LLC’s Objections to the Court’s Claim Construction
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`Opinion and Order (D.E. 146). Blitzsafe requests that each of the objections lodged against the
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`Court’s constructions of the disputed claim terms in this case be denied.
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`I.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Term 1:
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`“Interface” Need Not Be Physically Separate from the Car Stereo
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`The Court adopted the Defendants’ proposed construction of “interface” that it must be
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`“a structurally and functionally separate component from the car stereo.” Defendants now argue
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`that the Court’s decision not to read an additional limitation into the construction of interface,
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`physical separation, was in error.
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`Defendants did not seek a construction of “interface” that requires physical separation.
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`Defendants’ argument that structural separation requires physical separation and external
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`placement of the interface is unsupported by any evidence and contradicts the position of the
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`New Jersey court on which Defendants relied so heavily during the Markman process. (Dkt.
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`101.4 at 10 (rejecting physical separation between the interface and car stereo).)
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`Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Blitzsafe did not take a position on the construction
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`of “interface” in the IPR, but merely stated that if Toyota contended that a “connector” required
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`functional and structural separation between two components, that separation should be applied
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`consistently with respect to both the first connector and the second connector. (Dkt. 133-20 at
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`16-17.) Blitzsafe never contended that “interface” should be construed to include the limitation
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`read into the claim by Defendants and the Court, and never argued that an interface must be
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`“physically separate” from the car radio. Accordingly, the Court did not err in refusing to read
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`physical separation into the construction of “interface.”
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`Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 6726
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`Term 2:
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`“Integration Subsystem” Is Not a Microprocessor
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`Defendants’ construction is incorrect because Defendants themselves admit in their brief
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`that the “integration subsystem” does not consist solely of a microcontroller as their construction
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`requires. (Dkt. 175 at 2.) Moreover, Defendants provide no argument why an integration
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`subsystem is limited to the algorithm of Figure 24 when, as the Court noted, the specification
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`states that the integration subsystem could include a microprocessor programmed in accordance
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`with the algorithm in Figure 24. (Dkt. 146 at 30.) The Court’s construction is correct.
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`Term 3:
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`Audio Generated by the Portable Device Can Be Further Decoded
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`The Court properly found that Plaintiff never argued in the Toyota IPR that the decoded
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`data generated by the portable device could not undergo further decoding. (Dkt. 146 at 35.) The
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`Court correctly concluded that the ’342 Patent merely requires that the portable device decode
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`files that contain audio data. (Id.) Defendants provide no evidence or argument that requires the
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`Court to further limit the claims to require that no further decoding of the original audio file may
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`be performed.
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`Term 4:
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`A “Continuously Transmitted” Signal Need Not be “Continuous”
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`Defendants argue that they object to the construction of “device presence signal” as
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`“continuously transmitted” because the specification states that the signal is “transmitted
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`continuously.” (Dkt. 175 at 3.) In other words, Defendants object to the Court’s construction
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`even though it is consistent with the specification.
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`The Court drew the proper distinction between a device presence signal that is
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`“continuously transmitted,” which Defendants concede the specification teaches, and one that is
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`“continuous,” or constant or uninterrupted, which the specification does not teach. (Dkt. 146 at
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`40.) Accordingly, the Court’s construction is correct and should be affirmed.
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`2
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`Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 6727
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`Term 7:
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`A “Portable Device” Must Be Capable of Being Carried by a Person
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`The Court properly limited the “portable” to devices which can be carried by a person
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`based on the intrinsic record. (Dkt. 146 at 48.) This is correct because a construction of
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`“portable” as “capable of being moved about” is improper because it broadens “portable” to
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`mean anything movable no matter how large or unwieldy, which is inconsistent with the plain
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`and ordinary meaning of “portable.” (Id.) Far from reading limitations into the claims as
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`Defendants contend, the Court avoids rendering the claim term a nullity. As such, the Court’s
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`rejection of “any argument that the scope of the claims may include anything which can be
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`moved, no matter how large or unwieldy,” (id.), should be affirmed.
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`Term 8:
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`The Court Properly Construed “Pre-Programmed” According to Its Plain
`and Ordinary Meaning
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`The Court properly declined to adopt Defendants’ construction of “pre-programmed,”
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`which was “programmed prior to its use in the normal course” because the plain and ordinary
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`meaning of “pre-programmed” is unambiguous and the intrinsic record does not support
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`inclusion of “in the normal course” in the construction. (Dkt. 146 at 49-50.) Defendants’
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`argument that O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innov’n Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2008), required this Court to construe “pre-programmed” should be rejected because its
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`plain and ordinary meaning is unambiguous, and the Court’s rejection of the term “in the normal
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`course” resolved the claim construction dispute. Defendants do not argue that the plain and
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`ordinary meaning of “pre-programmed” includes “in the normal course.” Therefore, the claim
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`construction dispute was resolved by the Court, and it is not being left to the jury to choose
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`between two or more possible plain meanings of “pre-programmed.” Accordingly, the Court’s
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`decision to give “pre-programmed” its plain and ordinary meaning should be affirmed.
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`3
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`Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 6728
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`Term 9:
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`The Court Properly Construed “Car Audio/Video System” According to Its
`Plain and Ordinary Meaning
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`The Court properly declined to adopt Defendants’ construction of “car audio/video
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`system” because it is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning and the patentee did not
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`act as its own lexicographer to redefine the term. (Dkt. 146 at 55.) Defendants provide no basis
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`for their argument that the rejection of their proposed construction does not resolve the parties’
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`dispute, or that the plain and ordinary meaning of “car audio/video system” is ambiguous.
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`Accordingly, the Court properly declined to construe “car audio/video system” under O2 Micro,
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`521 F.3d at 1361-62.
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`Term 10:
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`The Court Properly Construed “Format Incompatible With . . .” According
`to Its Plain and Ordinary Meaning
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`The Court properly declined to adopt either of Defendants’ constructions of “format
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`incompatible with . . .” because each is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning and the
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`intrinsic record. (Dkt. 146 at 57-59.) Defendants’ conclusory statement that the Court’s decision
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`not to construe the term “is not consistent with the ruling in the Order that the term
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`‘incompatible’ has a specific meaning to a person of skill in the art” is unsupported. The Court
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`noted that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “incompatible” means “not
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`defined to work with another system or device,” and rejected Defendants’ attempts to deviate
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`from that meaning by injecting additional limitations to effectively “redraft the claims.” (Dkt.
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`146 at 58.) Accordingly, the Court properly resolved the claim construction dispute by rejecting
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`Defendants’ proposed constructions in favor of the unambiguous meaning of the term. See O2
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`Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361-62.
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`Term 11:
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`The Court Properly Construed “Video Information” as “Visual Images”
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`The parties agreed that “video information” included “visual images”; the sole claim
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`construction dispute was whether the “visual images” were limited to “moving” images as
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`4
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`Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 6729
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`Defendants contended. (Dkt. 146 at 59.) The Court properly determined that the term “video
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`information” contains no such limitation. (Id. at 61.)
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`Defendants argue that the Court’s construction of “video information” is too broad
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`because it includes “visual images which are not video,” (Dkt. 175 at 5), but even assuming this
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`is a flaw, Defendants’ construction, “moving visual images,” contains the same flaw. (Dkt. 146
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`at 59.) Defendants suggest that the Court’s construction is inconsistent with the term’s plain and
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`ordinary meaning, but they do not argue that their proposed construction is consistent with the
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`plain and ordinary meaning. In short, Defendants provide no reasoned basis to reject the Court’s
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`construction and adopt Defendants’ construction.
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` Term 12:
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`The Court Properly Construed the “Connector” and “Connectable” Terms
`According to Their Plain and Ordinary Meaning
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`The Court properly declined to adopt Defendants’ construction of the “connector” and
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`“connectable” terms because it found that the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms, as
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`reflected in the intrinsic record, does not require “a connector that is able to be disconnected.”
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`(Dkt. 146 at 64.) This construction does not leave any claim construction dispute unresolved,
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`and avoids adopting a construction proposed by Defendants which is circular and confusing
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`because it attempts to construe a “connector” in terms of itself. Accordingly, the Court was not
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`required to construe these claim terms under O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361-62, nor did it err in
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`construing the terms according to their plain and ordinary meaning.
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`5
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`Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 6730
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`II.
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`CONCLUSON
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`For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Objections to the Court’s Claim Construction
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`Opinion and Order (D.E. 146) should be denied.
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`Dated: October 17, 2016
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`BROWN RUDNICK LLP
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` /s/Peter Lambrianakos
`Alfred R. Fabricant
`Texas Bar No. 2219392
`Email: afabricant@brownrudnick.com
`Lawrence C. Drucker
`Email: ldrucker@brownrudnick.com
`Texas Bar No. 2303089
`Peter Lambrianakos
`Texas Bar No. 2894392
`Email: plambrianakos@brownrudnick.com
`Alessandra Carcaterra Messing
`Texas Bar No. 5040019
`Email: amessing@brownrudnick.com
`BROWN RUDNICK LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, NY 10036
`Telephone: (212) 209-4800
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`Samuel F. Baxter
`Texas State Bar No. 01938000
`sbaxter@mckoolsmith.com
`Jennifer L. Truelove
`Texas State Bar No. 24012906
`jtruelove@mckoolsmith.com
`MCKOOL SMITH, P.C.
`104 E. Houston Street, Suite 300
`Marshall, Texas 75670
`Telephone: (903) 923-9000
`Facsimile: (903) 923-9099
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`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF,
`BLITZSAFE TEXAS, LLC
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`Case 2:15-cv-01274-JRG-RSP Document 190 Filed 10/17/16 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 6731
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned certifies that all counsel of record who have consented to electronic
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`service are being served with a copy of this document via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Local
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`Rule CV-5(a)(3) on this 17th day of October, 2016.
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`Peter Lambrianakos
`/s/
` Peter Lambrianakos
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