Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 28268
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`CONTENTGUARD HOLDINGS, INC.,
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
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`Case No. 2:14-CV-61-JRG
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Before the Court are the following motions filed by Plaintiff ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.
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`(“ContentGuard”) and Defendants Google, Inc., HTC America, Inc., HTC Corporation, Huawei
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`Device USA, Inc., Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Motorola Mobility LLC, Samsung
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`Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung TeleCommunications America, LLC (collectively,
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`“Defendants”): (1) ContentGuard’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law with Respect to the
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`Google-Samsung Trial or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial (Dkt. No. 4001; Dkt. No. 1038 in
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`Case No. 2:13-cv-1112); (2) Defendants’ Motion for Judgment of Invalidity as a Matter of Law
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`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and in the Alternative, Request for a New
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`Trial Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 (Dkt. No. 397; Dkt. No. 1034 in Case No.
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`2:13-cv-1112); (3) Defendants’ Conditional Motion for Bench Trial on Defendants’ Inequitable
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`Conduct Defenses (Dkt. No. 396; Dkt. No. 1032 in Case No. 2:13-cv-1112); and (4) Google’s
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`Motion for Judgment of Laches (Dkt. No. 394; Dkt. No. 1038 in Case No. 2:13-cv-1112). For
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`the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that each of these motions should be DENIED.
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`1 Unless otherwise indicated, references to the docket are for Case No. 2:14-cv-61.
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`Plaintiff,
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`GOOGLE, INC.,
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`v.
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`Defendant.
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 2 of 15 PageID #: 28269
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`The Court held a jury trial in this case and the jury returned a unanimous verdict on
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`September 23, 2015, that Defendants had not infringed United States Patents Nos. 6,963,859
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`(“the ’859 Patent”), 7,523,072 (“the ’072 Patent”), 8,370,956 (“the ’956 Patent”), and 8,393,007
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`(“the ’007 Patent”) (collectively, the “Trusted Repository Patents” or “Stefik Patents”); and
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`8,001,053 (“the ’053 Patent”) (the “Meta Rights Patent,” “Nguyen/Chen Patent,” or “Nguyen
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`Patent”) (all, collectively, “the patents-in-suit”). The jury also found that Defendants had not
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`proved that ContentGuard’s patents were invalid. ContentGuard and Defendants now uniformly
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`assert that, in the approximately 36 hours of testimony and evidence presented at trial, the jury
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`did not have sufficient evidence for its findings. The Court disagrees.
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`II. APPLICABLE LAW
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`Upon a party’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict,
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`the Court asks whether “the state of proof is such that reasonable and impartial minds could
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`reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its verdict.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); Am. Home Assur.
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`Co. v. United Space Alliance, 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2004). “The grant or denial of a
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`motion for judgment as a matter of law is a procedural issue not unique to patent law, reviewed
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`under the law of the regional circuit in which the appeal from the district court would usually
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`lie.” Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “A JMOL
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`may only be granted when, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
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`evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that
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`reasonable jurors could not arrive at any contrary conclusion.’” Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP
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`Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual
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`Automation, Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 3 of 15 PageID #: 28270
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`Under Fifth Circuit law, a court is to be “especially deferential” to a jury’s verdict, and
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`must not reverse the jury’s findings unless they are not supported by substantial evidence.
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`Baisden v. I’m Ready Productions, Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence
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`is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the
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`exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum,
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`Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied
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`“unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that
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`reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.” Baisden 393 F.3d at 498 (citation
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`omitted). However, “[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to
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`prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant.” Arismendez v. Nightingale Home
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`Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2007).
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`In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must “draw all reasonable
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`inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that
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`[the court] might regard as more reasonable.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d
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`444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing
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`of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
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`those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “[T]he
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`court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence
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`supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that
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`that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.’” Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`To prove infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, a plaintiff must show the presence of
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`every element, or its equivalent, in the accused product or service. Lemelson v. United States,
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 4 of 15 PageID #: 28271
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`752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985). First, the claim must be construed to determine its scope
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`and meaning; and second, the construed claim must be compared to the accused device or
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`service. Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 F.3d 1121, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
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`(citing Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). “A
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`determination of infringement is a question of fact that is reviewed for substantial evidence when
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`tried to a jury.” ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
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`2007).
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`An issued patent is presumed valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Fox Grp., Inc. v. Cree, Inc., 700
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`F.3d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Samsung has the burden to show by clear and convincing
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`evidence that the asserted claims were anticipated by or obvious over the prior art. Microsoft
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`Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). To prevail on judgment as a matter of
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`law, moreover, Samsung must show that no reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient
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`evidentiary basis to find for the Plaintiff. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. “Generally, a party seeking to
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`invalidate a patent as obvious must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a skilled
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`artisan would have had reason to combine the teaching of the prior art references to achieve the
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`claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of
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`success from doing so.” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochoride, 676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted).
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`A.
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`Infringement of the Patents-In-Suit
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`ContentGuard argues that the Court should enter judgment of infringement as a matter of
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`law because Defendants “failed to present a meritorious non-infringement defense” and instead
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`“misled the jury to a verdict of non-infringement by repeatedly urging arguments the Court had
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`already rejected in its Markman and other pre-trial orders.” (Inf. JMOL at 1.) More specifically,
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 5 of 15 PageID #: 28272
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`ContentGuard argues that because “there is no dispute concerning the structure or operation of
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`the accused device, . . . the issue of whether the claim language reads on the device is purely one
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`of claim construction properly resolved by the Court.” See (id. at 5.) Further, ContentGuard
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`argues that because all of Defendants’ noninfringement arguments “were contrary to the Court’s
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`Markman and Daubert Orders, and thus legally incorrect,” the Court should enter judgment of
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`infringement as a matter of law. See (id. at 6.)
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`For example, ContentGuard asserts that Defendants’ argument that the content and the
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`usage rights must travel together was inconsistent with both the Court’s Markman and Daubert
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`orders rejecting the idea of “permanent” attachment. (Id. at 6–10.) Similarly, ContentGuard
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`claims that “non-infringement argument Defendants advanced based on the file-moving
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`experiments performed by Dr. Clark[, Defendants’ technical expert] should also be rejected”
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`because, “as a matter of law, copying and moving encrypted content is not the same as
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`‘access[ing]’ the content.” See (id. at 10–12.) ContentGuard also argues that Defendants’ “file-
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`moving defense” violated the Court’s Daubert order, which prohibited argument that the three
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`integrities must be maintained “at all times.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, ContentGuard argues that
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`because books and movies are data, rather than software, Defendants’ argument that movie and
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`book files are downloaded from the Google Play store without digital certificates and thus their
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`products lack “behavioral integrity” is incorrect. See (id. at 11–13.)
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`In the alternative, ContentGuard argues that new trial should be ordered because
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`“Defendants’ conduct clearly violated the Court’s Markman and Daubert orders,” Defendants
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`unfairly used the Court’s Daubert order to create alleged inconsistencies in ContentGuard’s
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`positions, and “that the Court erred when it permitted Defendants to pursue a ‘practicing the
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`prior art’ defense before the jury.” (Id. at 13–18.)
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 6 of 15 PageID #: 28273
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`Defendants respond by first arguing that “ContentGuard admits that Defendants never
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`expressly violated the Court’s claim construction and Daubert orders, but argues that Defendants
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`implicitly argued to the jury that the attachment of usage rights must be permanent.” See (Dkt.
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`No. 451, “Inf. JMOL Resp.”, at 3.) Further, Defendants argue that “Defendants never suggested
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`to the jury that attachment must be permanent,” but rather “Defendants’ evidence addressed how
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`to apply the Court’s constructions to the accused Google Play system.” (Id. at 3, 5–13)
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`Defendants also argue that “the Court already determined that the application of its ‘attached or
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`treated as attached’ construction for ‘usage rights’ was a fact question for the jury, [that]
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`ContentGuard agreed with the Court on this point,” that “ContentGuard failed to object on this
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`basis on the record at trial when the complained-of evidence was introduced,” and that the
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`Court’s construction required that “attachment” be more than mere “association.” See (id. at 3–5,
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`14–23.)
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`As to the factual issue of whether the Google Play system uses “usage rights,”
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`Defendants argue that they “presented substantial and compelling evidence to the jury.” (Id. at
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`4.) For example, Dr. Clark, Defendants’ technical expert, testified as follows regarding a test he
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`performed on the accused devices:
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`Question: And, sir, can you please describe the demonstration that you did
`with those phones in order to come to your opinions in this case?
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`Answer: Sure. So the -- the test that I performed was that I took Device 1,
`this device (indicating), and I purchased a movie on it as a user. And then
`on this device, I rented a movie -- the same movie as a different user. And
`then I downloaded the movie files, and then I deleted the movie file from
`this file -- from the rental device and transferred the purchased movie to
`the rental device. And then when I played it on the rental device, it was
`still treated as a rental, and that told me that the usage rights from the
`purchased movie were not attached and were not transferred when I
`copied it over.
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`(9/21/2015 P.M. Trial Tr. (Clark), Dkt. No. 440, at 78:1–16.) Dr. Clark then testified as follows
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 7 of 15 PageID #: 28274
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`about the implication of the test results to an infringement analysis:
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`Question: And, sir, what did you conclude from that demonstration?
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`Answer: That the system could not be understood to be treating the license
`and the content as attached if I could move them around independently
`and have different usage conditions associated with each device in the
`same file.
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`(Id. at 84:18–23.)
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`In regard to the issue of “physical integrity,” Defendants assert that (1) “Dr. Clark
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`presented evidence of testing he performed that showed that the accused Google Play apps did
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`not exhibit physical integrity,” including manipulating purchased content on the accused devices,
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`and (2) ContentGuard did not even address Dr. Clark’s testimony that Google Play’s support of
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`“removable memory prevents the accused devices from maintaining physical security, [and thus]
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`the accused system lacked physical integrity.” (Inf. JMOL Resp. at 23–25.) Defendants further
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`assert that “Defendants never contended that physical integrity must be present at all times, and
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`ContentGuard does not point to any such evidence or argument.” (Id. at 26–28.) Defendants
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`argue that, in fact, ContentGuard’s own witnesses’ testimony confirmed that Defendants’
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`explanation of the “physical integrity” limitation was correct. (Id. at 26–29.)
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`As to “behavioral integrity,” Defendants argue that “Defendants presented both testimony
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`and documentary evidence showing that Google Play digital content (movies, TV, and books) is
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`“software” and that “much of this evidence was from the Stefik patents and Dr. Stefik himself.”
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`(Id. at 31–34.) Further, Defendants argue “[a]lthough ContentGuard suggested to the jury that the
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`explicit inclusion of digital content files in the definition of ‘software’ in language in both the
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`patents and the glossary definitions of Dr. Stefik’s article was merely ‘metaphorical,’ the jury
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`was entitled to disbelieve this argument.” (Id. at 33–34.) Finally, Defendants argue (1) that the
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`Court had previously considered and rejected ContentGuard’s argument that Google Play digital
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 8 of 15 PageID #: 28275
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`content can be “software” as used in the patents-in-suit and (2) ContentGuard failed to object
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`during trial to this evidence. (Id. at 38.)
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`As to ContentGuard’s arguments regarding the alleged “practicing the prior art” defense,
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`Defendants first argue that “ContentGuard points to no argument by Defendants that the accused
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`Google Play system did not infringe because it practiced the prior art.” (Id. at 39.) Defendants
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`argue that, in fact, they “did not claim that they practiced the prior-art Griswold system, but
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`rather that they practiced a license server system similar to the Griswold system, which Dr.
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`Stefik himself had distinguished from his trusted system with attached usage rights.” (Id.) For
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`example, Dr. Clark testified as follows regarding the “license server” approach and the Stefik
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`approach:
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`Question: Sir, what are you showing in this slide?
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`Answer: This is actually a ContentGuard presentation in which there
`appear to be -- distinguishing the trusted system, that is the system where
`the -- the user devices are trusted from what they show as a conventional
`DRM design using a license server.
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`Question: And, sir, which of these ContentGuard documents shows, in
`your view, the license server approach?
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`Answer: The one on the left that has the license server in it.
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`Question: And, sir, what does the slide on the right then show?
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`Answer: The one on the right shows that the retailer next to the publisher
`is going to attach rights and conditions, basically he’s going to package
`the digital work, the protected content with those things before it goes to
`the consumer.
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`Question: And in which of these is the license attached to the content in
`your view?
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`Answer: In the trusted system approach.
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`Question: And, sir, does one of these slides correspond to the Griswold
`license server system, in your view?
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`Answer: Sure. Griswold is kind of a classic license server DRM system.
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 9 of 15 PageID #: 28276
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`Question: And does one of these correspond to Dr. Stefik’s approach from
`his patent, in your view?
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`Answer: Yes. I mean, you need trusted systems and you need those
`systems to have attached usage rights that accompany the works, and those
`are enforced by the devices, which is shown on the right.
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`Question: And does -- does one of these diagrams correspond to what you
`understand Google’s Google Play and Google Play Books and Movies
`apps, what their system looks like?
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`Answer: As -- as we’ve seen, the Google Play Movies and Books use the
`license server.
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`(9/21/2015 P.M. Trial Tr. (Clark), Dkt. No. 440, at 99:15–100:22.) Defendants also argue that
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`they “never argued to the jury that the scope of the patent claims was narrower because of the
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`specification,” and “[i]nstead, Defendants argued that Google Play did not meet the Court’s
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`construction of the claim terms ‘usage rights’ and ‘trusted’ repositories.” (Inf. JMOL Resp. at
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`44–45.)
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`First, the Court agrees with Defendants that their noninfringement arguments were within
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`the scope of the Court’s prior orders. ContentGuard has already raised and the Court has
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`previously addressed the claim construction issue in regard to “usage rights.” See, e.g.,
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`(9/15/2015 A.M. Trial Tr., Dkt. No. 428, at 6:13–24, 8:19–9:3, 16:16–23.) The Court declines to
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`revisit that ruling. Further, the jury was properly instructed on the law, was free to judge the
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`credibility of witnesses, and weigh all competing evidence. After consideration of the evidence
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`presented at trial, including the tests that Dr. Clark performed on the accused devices, the jury
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`found that Defendants had not infringed the patents-in-suit. See, e.g., (9/21/2015 P.M. Trial Tr.
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`(Clark), Dkt. No. 440, at 78:1–16, 84:18–23.) The jury, acting under a preponderance of the
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`evidence standard as to this disputed factual issue, unanimously reached a reasoned and
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`supportable decision. Accordingly, the Court will not supplant the judgment of the jury. The
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`Court does not find that no reasonable jury could have found that Defendants had not infringed
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 10 of 15 PageID #: 28277
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`the patents-in-suit, and thus the Court must deny the motion for judgment as a matter of law on
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`this issue.
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`Furthermore, the issues raised by ContentGuard do not warrant a new trial. The Court
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`does not find that Defendants presented a “practicing the prior art” defense. Instead, Defendants
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`properly distinguished their system from the systems described in the patents-in-suit. Further, the
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`Court properly and specifically instructed the jury that when answering the question of
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`infringement, they were only to compare the accused products to the patent claims, and were
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`never to compare the accused products to the prior art. See (9/23/2015 P.M. Trial Tr., Dkt. No.
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`445, at 52:10–21.) The Court does not find that a new trial is warranted in this case. Accordingly,
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`ContentGuard’s motion for judgment of infringement as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new
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`trial is DENIED in all respects.
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`B.
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`Invalidity of the Patents-in-Suit
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`Defendants request that the Court overturn the jury’s verdict and enter judgment that the
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`patents-in-suit are invalid as obvious as a matter of law. (Dkt. No. 397, “Inv. JMOL,” at 3.)
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`Defendants argue that “evidence presented at trial compelled a finding that the Asserted Claims
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`of the Stefik Patents were anticipated by the DOD Orange Book, formally titled ‘Trusted
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`Computer System Evaluation.’ ” (Id.) In particular, Defendants argue that ContentGuard only
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`“disputed that two elements of the asserted Stefik Patent claims were disclosed in the DOD
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`Orange Book: a ‘repository’/‘trusted’ system and ‘usage rights’ ” and that “[i]n view of the
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`evidence presented, however, no reasonable jury could conclude that the DOD Orange Book did
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`not teach these elements.” (Id.) Further, Defendants argue that the claims were obvious in view
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`of the DOD Orange Book in combination with Harn or the CNI Proceedings Book or the Kahn
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`and Cerf References. (Id. at 12–16.) Additionally, Defendants argue that they are obvious in
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 11 of 15 PageID #: 28278
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`view of the Griswold patent publication and the CNI Proceedings. (Id. at 16–18.) Defendants
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`also assert that the Meta-Rights patent is invalid in light of the ’980 patent. (Id. at 19–23.)
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`Finally, Defendants argue that new trial is warranted because of attorney misconduct during
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`closing argument. (Id. at 23–26.)
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`In addressing the challenges to Mr. Ward’s testimony on the disclosure of the “trusted,”
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`“repository,” and “usage rights” limitations in the DOD Orange Book, Defendants argue that Dr.
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`Goodrich only gave conclusory testimony that the DOD Orange Book did not disclose these
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`limitations as taught in the patents-in-suit. (Id.. at 4–12.) Similarly, Defendants argue that “Dr.
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`Goodrich’s wholly conclusory statements [about the DOD Orange Book combinations] could not
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`create a fact issue that the jury could determine against Defendants.” (Id. at 12–16.) As for
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`ContentGuard’s criticism that Griswold “did not teach usage rights because the usage rights are
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`never on the same device as the digital content,” Defendants argue that “[a] reasonable jury
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`could not rely on this testimony to find against Defendants on invalidity because the Griswold
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`references clearly disclosed that an alternative, off-line, embodiment was also possible, and that
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`off-line embodiment did not involve datagrams repeatedly checking for authorization.” (Id. at
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`16–19.) Additionally, Defendants argue that no reasonable jury could find that the Stefik ’980
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`patent did not disclose the “meta-rights” and “state variable” elements through the ’980 patent’s
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`discussion of “Next-Set-of-Rights” and “Digital Work State Information.” (Id. at 21–23) Finally,
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`Defendants argue that certain comments made by ContentGuard’s attorney during closing were
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`improper and prejudicial and thus new trial is warranted. (Id. at 23–26.)
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`ContentGuard responds by arguing that “[a]s a threshold matter, JMOL should be denied
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`because Defendants’ invalidity expert, Mr. Ward, failed to establish that the [DOD] Orange
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`Book discloses a number of elements of the asserted claims.” (Dkt. No. 450, “Inv. JMOL Resp.,”
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 12 of 15 PageID #: 28279
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`at 3–5.) Further, ContentGuard argues that “Mr. Ward failed to establish that the [DOD] Orange
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`Book discloses any of the three integrities.” (Id. at 5–9 (emphasis in original)) For example,
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`ContentGuard argues that “Mr. Ward admitted during direct-examination that the [DOD] Orange
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`Book has no explicit disclosure of a digital certificate”:
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`Question: Sir, I don’t see the words “digital certificate” anywhere on these
`pages; is that correct?
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`Answer: That’s correct.
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`(Id. at 5; 9/22/2015 A.M. Tr. (Ward), Dkt. No. 441, at 62:23–25.) ContentGuard also
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`argues that “Mr. Ward provided no testimony and pointed to no disclosure in the [DOD] Orange
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`Book that required the use of digital certificates” and that “Mr. Ward failed to establish that any
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`of the prior art references teach digital certificates as required by the Court’s claim
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`construction.” (Id. at 6–7, 10–12 (emphasis in original).) Additionally, ContentGuard argues that
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`“Dr. Goodrich explained that the Orange Book discloses that software is installed after a months-
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`long process that involves ‘hands-on’ involvement with and testing of the source code” and that
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`such a process is “completely different from the digital certificate required by the Court’s
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`construction.” (Id. at 6.) Moreover, ContentGuard argues that Mr. Ward only provided
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`conclusory testimony as to the disclosure of “communications integrity” and “physical integrity.”
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`(Id. at 7–9.)
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`In regard to the “usage rights,” ContentGuard asserts that Mr. Ward provided merely
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`conclusory testimony that “modes of access” discloses the manner of use necessary for “usage
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`rights,” while Dr. Goodrich provided specific testimony explaining why “usage rights” were not
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`taught by the DOD Orange Book. (Id. at 9–10.) For example, Dr. Goodrich testified as follows
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`regarding “usage rights”:
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`Q. And why did you include this phrase for enforcing usage rights after
`the three integrities?
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 28280
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`A. Because in -- in the Orange Book system, there isn’t usage rights the
`way the Court is construing this term. Instead, they have labels that come
`out to say, if it’s top secret, secret, and so on. And users, then -- not some
`other system where usage rights would be attached or treated as attached
`to content, but users themselves just get to say what they can do with it,
`based on the security clearance they have.
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`(9/22/2015 A.M. Trial Tr. (Goodrich), Dkt. No. 442, at 94:15–24.) Similarly, in regard to the
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`combination of Griswold and the CNI Proceedings Book, ContentGuard argues that “Mr. Ward
`
`failed to establish that the combination of the Griswold Patent Publication and Griswold’s
`
`chapter in the CNI Proceedings Book disclosed any of the three integrities in support of usage
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`rights.” (Id. at 12–13.) Further, in regard to the Stefik ’980 patent, ContentGuard argues that
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`“Mr. Ward merely asserted in conclusory fashion that the prior art disclosed a ‘meta-right’ and a
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`‘state variable’ without ever stating whether or how the claim limitations were met.” (Id. at 14.)
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`ContentGuard also notes that “the portion of Mr. Ward’s testimony cited by Defendants spans
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`less than three pages, and does not even purport to cover the limitations recited in the asserted
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`Meta-Rights Patent claim.” (Id.) Finally, in regard to the issue of attorney misconduct,
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`ContentGuard argues that the comments made during closing were proper characterizations of
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`the witness’s testimony and that the other alleged misconduct, to the extent it even occurred,
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`related to infringement rather than invalidity. (Id. at 16–18.)
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`After consideration of the evidence presented, including testimony from Mr. Ward
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`admitting that the DOD Orange Book did not use the term “digital certificates,” the jury found
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`that Defendants had not proved the patents-in-suit were invalid. See (9/22/2015 A.M. Tr. (Ward),
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`Dkt. No. 441, at 62:23–25.) The jury reached a reasoned and supportable decision, and the Court
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`does not find that no reasonable jury could have found that the patents-in-suit are valid. Further,
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`the Court does not find that a new trial is warranted in this case. During oral argument on post-
`
`trial motions, Defendants did not deny that any attorney misconduct that may have occurred was
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` 
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`‐ 13 -
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`

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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 14 of 15 PageID #: 28281
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`substantially directed toward infringement, an issue on which Defendants prevailed, as opposed
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`to invalidity. Thus, Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a
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`new trial as to the validity of the patents-in-suit is DENIED.
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`C. Motion for Judgment as to Laches and Motion for Bench Trial on
`Defendants’ Inequitable Conduct Defenses
`
`
`Defendants conditionally request a bench trial on their inequitable conduct defenses.
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`(Dkt. No. 396 at 1.) Additionally, Google requests judgment that ContentGuard’s damages are
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`limited due to laches. (Dkt. No. 394 at 1.) Both requests are predicated upon a finding of
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`infringement. However, the jury in this case did not find infringement and awarded no damages.
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`As explained above, the Court declines to overturn the jury’s verdict of non-infringement.
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`Resultantly, the Court finds that both of these motions (Dkt. Nos. 396 and 394) should be and
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`hereby are DENIED AS MOOT.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the jury’s verdict of both
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`noninfringement and validity should stand. The jury’s verdict as a whole is supported by
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`adequate evidence presented at trial, and it should not be disturbed.
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` Accordingly,
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`ContentGuard’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law with Respect to the Google-Samsung
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`Trial or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial (Dkt. No. 400; Dkt. No. 1038 in Case No. 2:13-cv-
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`1112) and Defendants’ Motion for Judgment of Invalidity as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Federal
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`Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and in the Alternative, Request for a New Trial Pursuant to
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 (Dkt. No. 397; Dkt. No. 1034 in Case No. 2:13-cv-1112) are
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`DENIED. Further, after reviewing the motions and the arguments contained within, the Court
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`finds that Defendants’ Conditional Motion for Bench Trial on Defendants’ Inequitable Conduct
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`Defenses (Dkt. No. 396; Dkt. No. 1032 in Case No. 2:13-cv-1112); and Google’s Motion for
`
` 
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`‐ 14 -
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`

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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 486 Filed 07/08/16 Page 15 of 15 PageID #: 28282
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`Judgment of Laches (Dkt. No. 394) are MOOT and they should be and are hereby DENIED as
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`such.
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`
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` 
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`‐ 15 -
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`____________________________________
`RODNEY GILSTRAP
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`SIGNED this 19th day of December, 2011.
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`So ORDERED and SIGNED this 8th day of July, 2016.