Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 1 of 144 PageID #: 23681
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`CONTENTGUARD HOLDINGS, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC., et al.,
`Defendants.
`
`___________________________________
`
`CONTENTGUARD HOLDINGS, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE, INC.,
`Defendant.
`
`
` CASE NO. 2:13-CV-1112-JRG
`
` CASE NO. 2:14-CV-61-JRG
`
`
`
`
`
`§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§
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`
`
`
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`Before the Court are Plaintiff ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.’s Opening Claim
`
`
`
`Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 304),1 the response of Defendants Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”),
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`Apple Inc., DirecTV, LLC, HTC Corporation, HTC America, Inc., Huawei Technologies Co.,
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`Ltd., Huawei Device USA, Inc., Motorola Mobility LLC, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,
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`Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC
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`(collectively, “Defendants”) (Dkt. No. 331), Defendant Amazon.com, Inc.’s Separate Responsive
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`Claim Construction Brief (Dkt. No. 336), Plaintiff’s replies (Dkt. Nos. 344 & 345), and
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`Defendants’ sur-reply (Dkt. No. 353).
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`
`
`The Court held a claim construction hearing on February 6, 2015.
`
`
`
`
`1 References to docket numbers herein are to Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-1112 unless otherwise
`indicated.
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 2 of 144 PageID #: 23682
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`Table of Contents
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`
`I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 4 
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES ........................................................................................................... 4 
`III. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS ........................................................................ 9 
`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE STEFIK PATENTS ................. 10 
`A. “repository” and “trusted” ................................................................................................... 10 
`B. “physical integrity” ............................................................................................................. 16 
`C. “communications integrity” ................................................................................................ 18 
`D. “behavioral integrity” .......................................................................................................... 19 
`E. “content” and “digital content” ........................................................................................... 21 
`F. “rights,” “usage rights,” and “usage rights information” .................................................... 23 
`G. “usage rights” (‘160 Patent) ................................................................................................ 33 
`H. “digital work” ...................................................................................................................... 35 
`I. “digital document” and “document” .................................................................................... 37 
`J. “requester mode of operation” and “server mode of operation” .......................................... 40 
`K. “manner of use” .................................................................................................................. 43 
`L. “render” and “rendering” ..................................................................................................... 45 
`M. “authorization object” ........................................................................................................ 48 
`N. “identification certificate” and “digital certificate” ............................................................ 51 
`O. “nonce” and “random registration identifier” ..................................................................... 53 
`P. “distributed repository” ....................................................................................................... 56 
`Q. “document platform” .......................................................................................................... 61 
`R. “validating” ......................................................................................................................... 65 
`S. “determining, by the document platform” ........................................................................... 68 
`T. “grammar” ........................................................................................................................... 72 
`U. “description structure” ........................................................................................................ 75 
`V. “means for communicating with a master repository for obtaining an identification
`certificate for the repository” .............................................................................................. 76 
`W. “means for processing a request from the means for requesting” ...................................... 80 
`X. “means for checking whether the request is for a permitted rendering of the digital
`content in accordance with rights specified in the apparatus” ............................................ 85 
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 3 of 144 PageID #: 23683
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`Y. “means for receiving the authorization ob[j]ect when it is determined that the request
`should be granted” .............................................................................................................. 88 
`Z. “means for requesting a transfer of the digital content from an external memory to the
`storage” ............................................................................................................................... 91 
`AA. “means for processing the request to make the digital content available to the
`rendering engine for rendering when the request is for a permitted rendering of the
`digital [content],” “means for authorizing the repository for making the digital content
`available for rendering, wherein the digital content can be made available for rendering
`only by an authorized repository,” and “means for making a request for an
`authorization object required to be included within the repository for the apparatus to
`render the digital content” ................................................................................................... 95 
`V. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE NGUYEN PATENTS ................ 98 
`A. “repository” ......................................................................................................................... 99 
`B. “license” .............................................................................................................................. 99 
`C. “meta-right” ....................................................................................................................... 102 
`D. “usage rights” .................................................................................................................... 106 
`E. “manner of use” ................................................................................................................. 108 
`F. “state variable” .................................................................................................................. 109 
`G. “the at least one state variable identifies a location where a state of rights is tracked” .... 114 
`H. “specifying, in a first license, . . . at least one usage right and at least one meta-right for
`the item, wherein the usage right and the meta-right include at least one right that is
`shared among one or more users or devices” ................................................................... 116 
`I. “means for obtaining a set of rights associated with an item” ........................................... 119 
`J. “means for determining whether the rights consumer is entitled to the right specified by
`the meta-right” .................................................................................................................. 122 
`K. “means for exercising the meta-right to create the right specified by the meta-right” ..... 125 
`L. “means for generating a license including the created right, if the rights consumer is
`entitled to the right specified by the meta-right” .............................................................. 128 
`VI. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE DUNKELD PATENT ............ 130 
`A. “detect[ing] a transfer” ...................................................................................................... 131 
`B. “instance” .......................................................................................................................... 133 
`C. “other portion” .................................................................................................................. 136 
`D. “over said network between user devices” ....................................................................... 140 
`VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 143 
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 4 of 144 PageID #: 23684
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`
`
`Plaintiff brings suit alleging infringement of United States Patents No. 6,963,859 (“the
`
`‘859 Patent”), 7,523,072 (“the ‘072 Patent”), 7,225,160 (“the ‘160 Patent”), 7,269,576 (“the ‘576
`
`Patent”), 8,370,956 (“the ‘956 Patent”), 8,393,007 (“the ‘007 Patent”) (collectively, the “Trusted
`
`Repository Patents” or “Stefik Patents”), 7,774,280 (“the ‘280 Patent”), 8,001,053 (“the ‘053
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`Patent”) (collectively, the “Meta Rights Patents,” “Nguyen/Chen Patents,” or “Nguyen Patents”),
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`and 8,583,556 (“the ‘556 Patent,” also referred to as the “Transaction Tracking Patent” or the
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`“Dunkeld Patent”) (all, collectively, “the patents-in-suit”). (Dkt. No. 304, Exs. A-I.)
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`
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`The parties have presented the patents-in-suit as three distinct groups, as set forth above,
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`and the Court addresses those three groups in turn, below.
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`
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`The Court heard oral arguments on February 6, 2015. The parties did not present oral
`
`argument as to all disputed terms. Instead, “[g]iven the large number of disputed claim terms,”
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`the parties chose to present oral arguments on terms identified in the parties’ January 23, 2015
`
`Joint Notice Regarding Markman Hearing. (Dkt. No. 365.) The parties also presented oral
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`argument regarding one additional group of terms identified by the Court, namely “nonce” and
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`“random registration identifier” in the Stefik Patents. The parties did not present oral arguments
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`regarding any other disputed terms and instead submitted those disputes on the briefing.
`
`II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
`
`
`
`It is understood that “[a] claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right
`
`which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling the
`
`protected invention.” Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1999). Claim construction is clearly an issue of law for the court to decide. Markman v.
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 5 of 144 PageID #: 23685
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`Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
`
`(1996).
`
`
`
`To ascertain the meaning of claims, courts look to three primary sources: the claims, the
`
`specification, and the prosecution history. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification must
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`contain a written description of the invention that enables one of ordinary skill in the art to make
`
`and use the invention. Id. A patent’s claims must be read in view of the specification, of which
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`they are a part. Id. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of
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`dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims. Id. “One
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`purpose for examining the specification is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of
`
`the claims.” Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
`
`
`
`Nonetheless, it is the function of the claims, not the specification, to set forth the limits of
`
`the patentee’s invention. Otherwise, there would be no need for claims. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita
`
`Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). The patentee is free to be his own
`
`lexicographer, but any special definition given to a word must be clearly set forth in the
`
`specification. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
`
`Although the specification may indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
`
`embodiments appearing in the specification will not be read into the claims when the claim
`
`language is broader than the embodiments. Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc.,
`
`34 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`
`
`This Court’s claim construction analysis is substantially guided by the Federal Circuit’s
`
`decision in Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In Phillips,
`
`the court set forth several guideposts that courts should follow when construing claims. In
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`particular, the court reiterated that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 6 of 144 PageID #: 23686
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`patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v.
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`Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). To that end, the words
`
`used in a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Id. The ordinary and
`
`customary meaning of a claim term “is the meaning that the term would have to a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date
`
`of the patent application.” Id. at 1313. This principle of patent law flows naturally from the
`
`recognition that inventors are usually persons who are skilled in the field of the invention and
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`that patents are addressed to, and intended to be read by, others skilled in the particular art. Id.
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`
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`Despite the importance of claim terms, Phillips made clear that “the person of ordinary
`
`skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
`
`which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the
`
`specification.” Id. Although the claims themselves may provide guidance as to the meaning of
`
`particular terms, those terms are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.” Id. at 1315
`
`(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). Thus, the Phillips court emphasized the specification as
`
`being the primary basis for construing the claims. Id. at 1314-17. As the Supreme Court stated
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`long ago, “in case of doubt or ambiguity it is proper in all cases to refer back to the descriptive
`
`portions of the specification to aid in solving the doubt or in ascertaining the true intent and
`
`meaning of the language employed in the claims.” Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). In
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`addressing the role of the specification, the Phillips court quoted with approval its earlier
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`observations from Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1998):
`
`Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and
`confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
`intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 7 of 144 PageID #: 23687
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`language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention
`will be, in the end, the correct construction.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. Consequently, Phillips emphasized the important role the
`
`specification plays in the claim construction process.
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`
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`The prosecution history also continues to play an important role in claim interpretation.
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`Like the specification, the prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the
`
`United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) understood the patent. Id. at 1317. Because
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`the file history, however, “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the
`
`applicant,” it may lack the clarity of the specification and thus be less useful in claim
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`construction proceedings. Id. Nevertheless, the prosecution history is intrinsic evidence that is
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`relevant to the determination of how the inventor understood the invention and whether the
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`inventor limited the invention during prosecution by narrowing the scope of the claims. Id.; see
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`Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “a
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`patentee’s statements during prosecution, whether relied on by the examiner or not, are relevant
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`to claim interpretation”).
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`
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`Phillips rejected any claim construction approach that sacrificed the intrinsic record in
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`favor of extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony. The en banc court
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`condemned the suggestion made by Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193
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`(Fed. Cir. 2002), that a court should discern the ordinary meaning of the claim terms (through
`
`dictionaries or otherwise) before resorting to the specification for certain limited purposes.
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`Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319-24. According to Phillips, reliance on dictionary definitions at the
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`expense of the specification had the effect of “focus[ing] the inquiry on the abstract meaning of
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`words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.” Id. at 1321.
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 8 of 144 PageID #: 23688
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`Phillips emphasized that the patent system is based on the proposition that the claims cover only
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`the invented subject matter. Id.
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`
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`Phillips does not preclude all uses of dictionaries in claim construction proceedings.
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`Instead, the court assigned dictionaries a role subordinate to the intrinsic record. In doing so, the
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`court emphasized that claim construction issues are not resolved by any magic formula. The
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`court did not impose any particular sequence of steps for a court to follow when it considers
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`disputed claim language. Id. at 1323-25. Rather, Phillips held that a court must attach the
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`appropriate weight to the intrinsic sources offered in support of a proposed claim construction,
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`bearing in mind the general rule that the claims measure the scope of the patent grant.
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`
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`In general, prior claim construction proceedings involving the same patents-in-suit are
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`“entitled to reasoned deference under the broad principals of stare decisis and the goals
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`articulated by the Supreme Court in Markman, even though stare decisis may not be applicable
`
`per se.” Maurice Mitchell Innovations, LP v. Intel Corp., No. 2:04-CV-450, 2006 WL 1751779,
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`at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 21, 2006) (Davis, J.); see TQP Development, LLC v. Inuit Inc., No. 2:12-
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`CV-180, 2014 WL 2810016, at *6 (E.D. Tex. June 20, 2014) (Bryson, J.) (“[P]revious claim
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`constructions in cases involving the same patent are entitled to substantial weight, and the Court
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`has determined that it will not depart from those constructions absent a strong reason for doing
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`so.”); see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 839-40 (2015) (“prior
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`cases will sometimes be binding because of issue preclusion and sometimes will serve as
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`persuasive authority”) (citation omitted).
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`
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`The Court nonetheless conducts an independent evaluation during claim construction
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`proceedings. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Linear Techs. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 2d 580,
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`589-90 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Burns, Morris & Stewart Ltd. P’ship v. Masonite Int’l Corp., 401 F.
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 9 of 144 PageID #: 23689
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`Supp. 2d 692, 697 (E.D. Tex. 2005); Negotiated Data Solutions, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:11-
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`CV-390, 2012 WL 6494240, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2012).
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`III. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREED TERMS
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`
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`The Court hereby notes the Parties’ agreed constructions:
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`Term
`
`
`“rendering engine”
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`“master device”
`
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`“master repository”
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`“session key”
`
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`“means for requesting use of the digital
`content stored in the storage”
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`
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`Stefik Patents
`
`
`Agreed Construction
`
`“a processor and associated software that renders”
`
`“A special type of device which issues
`identification certificates and distributes lists of
`repositories whose integrity has been compromised
`and which should be denied access to digital works
`(referred to as repository ‘hotlists’).”
`
`“A special type of repository which issues
`identification certificates and distributes lists of
`repositories whose integrity have been
`compromised and which should be denied access to
`digital works (referred to as repository ‘hotlists’.)”
`
`“a cryptographic key for encryption of messages
`during a single session”
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`“a user interface which is the mechanism by which
`a user interacts with a repository in order to invoke
`transactions to gain access to digital content, or
`exercise usage rights”
`
`
`Term
`
`
`Nguyen/Chen Patents
`
`Agreed Construction
`
`“The term ‘right’ in the claims of the ‘280 and ‘053
`patents means a ‘meta-right’ or a ‘usage right,’
`depending on context”
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`“rights”
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 10 of 144 PageID #: 23690
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`(Dkt. No. 292, 11/17/2014 Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, at 2; see Dkt.
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`No. 366, Ex. B, 1/23/2015 Joint Claim Construction Chart.)
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`IV. CONSTRUCTION OF DISPUTED TERMS IN THE STEFIK PATENTS
`
`
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`The earliest issued of the Stefik Patents is the ‘859 Patent. The ‘859 Patent is titled
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`“Content Rendering Repository” and issued on November 8, 2005. The Abstract states:
`
`A rendering system adapted for use in a system for managing use of content and
`operative to rendering [sic] content in accordance with usage rights associated
`with the content. The system includes a rendering device configured to render the
`content and a repository coupled to the rendering device and operative to enforce
`usage rights associated with the content and permit the rendering device to render
`the content in accordance with a manner of use specified by the usage rights.
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`Four of the six Stefik Patents have been the subject of Inter Partes Review (“IPR”)
`
`
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`proceedings at the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). (See Dkt. No. 331,
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`Exs. 1-4).
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`
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`The Stefik Patents all claim priority to an application filed on November 23, 1994.
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`Defendants submit that the specifications of the Stefik Patents are “largely identical” except that,
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`Defendants argue, “the ‘160 patent specification is critically different from the other Stefik
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`specifications,” as discussed further below. (Dkt. No. 331, at 1 n.1.)
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`
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`The present Memorandum Opinion and Order cites only the specification of the ‘859
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`Patent unless otherwise indicated.
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`A. “repository” and “trusted”
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`
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
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`“a trusted system in that it maintains physical,
`communications, and behavioral integrity in
`the support of usage rights”
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`10
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`“repository”
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`“a trusted system, which maintains physical,
`communications and behavioral integrity, and
`supports usage rights”
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 11 of 144 PageID #: 23691
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`Plaintiff’s Proposed Construction
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`“trusted”
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`Defendants’ Proposed Construction
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`“maintains physical, communications, and
`behavioral integrity in the support of usage
`rights”
`
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`(Dkt. No. 304, at 1; Dkt. No. 331, at 2.) The parties submit that “repository” appears in Claims
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`“maintains physical, communications and
`behavioral integrity”
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`1, 15, 21, 24, 58, 71, and 81 of the ‘859 Patent, Claims 1 and 18 of the ‘576 Patent, and Claims 1
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`and 10 of the ‘072 Patent. (Dkt. No. 292-1, at 7; Dkt. No. 331, at 2.) The parties submit that
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`“trusted” appears in Claims 1, 7, and 13 of the ‘956 Patent and Claims 1, 6, and 11 of the ‘007
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`Patent. (Dkt. No. 292-1, at 8; Dkt. No. 331, at 2.)
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`
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`
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`(1) The Parties’ Positions
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`Plaintiff argues that its proposed construction for “repository” “adopts th[e] language
`
`from the [specification’s] glossary verbatim while Defendants’ proposed construction introduces
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`ambiguities by replacing ‘in that it’ with ‘which’” and “by replacing ‘in the support of usage
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`rights’ with ‘and supports usage rights.’” (Dkt. No. 304, at 2.) Plaintiff submits that although
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`Defendants rely on the construction by the PTAB during an IPR, “[t]he PTAB based its
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`construction on the same glossary definition [Plaintiff] relies on, but provided no reason to
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`depart from the language from the glossary.” (Id.)
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`
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`Defendants respond that “Defendants’ proposed construction of ‘repository’ follows the
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`PTAB’s construction verbatim; and Defendants’ construction of the related term ‘trusted,’ which
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`the PTAB did not construe, mirrors this construction.” (Dkt. No. 331, at 2 (citing, id., Ex. 2,
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`at 8).) Defendants submit that Plaintiff “actually rearranged pieces of the [specification
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`glossary’s] definition to alter the meaning of ‘repository.’” (Dkt. No. 331, at 3.) Defendants
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 12 of 144 PageID #: 23692
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`explain that “[u]nder [Plaintiff’s] construction, instead of the three integrities being required at
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`all times, as taught by the Stefik patents and required by the PTAB’s construction, the three
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`integrities only need to be present when supporting usage rights.” (Id.)
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`
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`In an additional, separate responsive brief, Defendant Amazon argues that because the
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`specification defines “repository” and “trusted” in “purely functional language,” those terms are
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`indefinite. (Dkt. No. 336, at 3.) Defendant Amazon cites Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v.
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`M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which found indefinite the term “fragile gel.” (See id.,
`
`at 3-5.)
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`
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`Plaintiff replies that Defendants’ argument that a repository must “maintain the three
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`integrities at all times” “is not found in the PTAB construction and directly contradicts the Stefik
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`patents’ specification . . . .” (Dkt. No. 345, at 1.) Plaintiff concludes that “[t]here is simply no
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`basis for defining ‘repository’ as something that maintains the three integrities at all times, even
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`while conducting transactions that do not support usage rights.” (Id.)
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`
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`Plaintiff also replies, as to Amazon’s separate brief, that “Amazon’s arguments should be
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`rejected because they reflect an elementary misunderstanding of the applicable law and are not
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`supported by any evidence.” (Dkt. No. 344, at 1.) Plaintiff notes that Amazon submits no expert
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`opinions on this issue, and Plaintiff submits that “there is ample support in the specification that
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`describes the boundaries of the three integrities that define [Mr.] Stefik’s concept of ‘trust.’”
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`(Id., at 3-5 (citing 11:62-12:50).)
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`
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`In sur-reply, Defendants argue that, “[l]ogically, [Mr.] Stefik must have intended for
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`repositories and trusted systems to require the three integrities at all times, otherwise his
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`inventions would not solve the digital piracy problem.” (Dkt. No. 353, at 1.) Defendants also
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`note that a “restoration file,” which is used to restore a back-up file, “would be held in [a]
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 13 of 144 PageID #: 23693
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`repository,” and “[i]f a repository cannot verify that it is communicating with another trusted
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`repository, then ‘the registration transaction terminates in an error.’” (Id., at 3 (citing ‘859 Patent
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`at 27:3-5 & 36:57-58).)
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`
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`At the February 6, 2015 hearing, Defendants reiterated that “in support of” is broader
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`than how the PTAB construed the term and injects ambiguity into the claims.
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`(2) Analysis
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`The parties disagree as to whether the disputed terms refer to supporting usage rights or
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`merely being “in the support of usage rights,” as well as whether the three “integrities” must be
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`present at all times.
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`On one hand, the PTAB construed “repository” to mean “a trusted system which
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`maintains physical, communications and behavioral integrity, and supports usage rights.” (Dkt.
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`No. 304, Ex. J, 6/26/2014 Final Written Decision, at 10-11.). This prior construction is entitled
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`to some deference. See Maurice Mitchell, 2006 WL 1751779, at *4; see also TQP, 2014 WL
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`2810016, at *6; Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 839-40.
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`On the other hand, the “Glossary” section of the specification explicitly states:
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`Repository:
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`Conceptually a set of functional specifications defining core functionality in the
`support of usage rights. A repository is a trusted system in that it maintains
`physical, communications and behavioral integrity.
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`‘859 Patent at 50:47-51.
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`On balance, the Court finds that by setting forth an explicit definition in a “Glossary,” the
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`patentee acted as lexicographer and expressly defined the term “repository.” See Intellicall, 952
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`F.2d at 1388; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(“[T]he inventor’s written description of the invention . . . is relevant and controlling insofar as it
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 14 of 144 PageID #: 23694
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`provides clear lexicography . . . .”); Abbott Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343,
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`1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“patentee’s lexicography must, of course, appear with reasonable clarity,
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`deliberateness, and precision”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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`This lexicography finding is supported by other disclosures in the specification, such as
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`the discussion of “Repositories”:
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`Repositories
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`Many of the powerful functions of repositories—such as their ability to “loan”
`digital works or automatically handle the commercial reuse of digital works—are
`possible because they are trusted systems. The systems are trusted because they
`are able to take responsibility for fairly and reliably carrying out the commercial
`transactions. That the systems can be responsible (“able to respond”) is
`fundamentally an issue of integrity. The integrity of repositories has three parts:
`physical integrity, communications integrity, and behavioral integrity.
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`‘859 Patent at 11:51-61; see also 6:29-31 (“the digital work genie only moves from one trusted
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`bottle (repository) to another”). The specification also discloses that a repository may
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`communicate with a non-repository and that not all communications between repositories are
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`secure. See id. at 25:37-52, 26:30-67 (“registration transaction”) & 37:12-21 (“non-repository
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`archive storage”).
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`To whatever extent Defendant Amazon maintains that Plaintiff’s construction is
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`improperly functional rather than structural, that argument is rejected. See, e.g., Hill-Rom Servs.,
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`Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“defining a particular claim term
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`by its function is not improper”); Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1366
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`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The use of comparative and functional language to construe and explain a
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`claim term is not improper. A description of what a component does may add clarity and
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`understanding to the meaning and scope of the claim.”); Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v.
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`Case 2:14-cv-00061-JRG Document 409 Filed 12/04/15 Page 15 of 144 PageID #: 23695
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`Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“claims are not necessarily
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`indefinite for using functional language”).
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`As to extrinsic evidence, Defendants have also cited an article in which named inventor
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`Mark Stefik stated that a “trusted system” “could always be counted on to follow the rules of the
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`trust,” and “[i]n the case of digital works on repositories, the requirement for trust is that the
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`repositories follow—at all times and in every instance—the rules about how digital works are
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`used.” (Dkt. No. 331, Ex. 5, Mark Stefik, Letting Loose the Light: Igniting Commerce in
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`Electronic Publication 12, 24 (1996).) This extrinsic evi