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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
`
`BE. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`MOTOROLA MOBILITY HOLDINGS LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`Civil Action N9. 12—cv—02866 — JPM-
`TMP
`
`DEFENDANT’S AIEMORANDUM IN OPYOSITION TO
`PLAINTiFF’S EVIOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(1)
`
`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND ........................................................................................ ..I
`
`APPLICABLE LAW ........................................................................................................ ..1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Motion to Strike Under Federal Ruie of Civil Procedure 12(f) ............................ ..1
`
`The Iqbal/Twofizbiy Standard Does Not. Apply to Defenses ................................ ..3
`
`III.
`
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... ..4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`B.E’s Claim That The Iqbal/Twoinbbi Standard Appiies to Affirmative
`Defenses Shouid be Rejected ............................................................................... ..4
`
`B.E.’s Motion to Strike Motor01a’s Affixmative Defenses Shouid be
`Denied................................................................................................................... ..7
`
`1 .
`
`2
`
`3.
`
`4
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7
`
`8.
`
`Non-Infringement ..................................................................................... ..9
`
`No Injunctive Relief ............................................................................... .. 10
`
`No Contributory Infimgenaent ................................................................ ..10
`
`Waiver, Acquiescence, Equitable Esteppei, Implied License, and
`Uneiean Hands ........................................................................................ ..11
`
`Laches ..................................................................................................... ..12
`
`Invalidity................................................................................................. .. I2
`
`Limitation on Patent Damages ............................................................... ..14
`
`Failure to State a Ciaim unde1'R1.1Ie i2(b)(6) ......................................... .14
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. .. 1 5
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`

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`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`AGFA Photo USA Corp. v. Parizarn,
`No. 1:06—cv—216, 2007 WL 1655891 (13.13. Tenn, June 5, 2007) .......................................... ..7
`
`Avocent Redmona’ Corp. v. U.S.,
`No. 08-69C, 2009 WL 367499 (Ct. Fed. C1. Feb. 5, 2009) ..................................................... ..9
`
`Barry Fiala, Inc. v. Artlmr Blank & Co., Inc,
`No. 2:02—cv-2282, 2003 WL 22309442 (WI). Tenn, Feb. 19, 2003) .................................... ..2
`
`Bayer CropSc:ience AG V. Dow Ag1‘oScien.ces LL C,
`CIV. 10-1045 RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557 (D. Dei. Dec. 30, 2011) ..................................... ..5
`
`Bennett v. Sprint Nextei Corp._,
`No. 09-2122, 2011 WL 4553055 (1). Kan. Sept. 29, 2011) .................................................... ..6
`
`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States,
`201 F.2d 819 (6th Ci1'.19S3) .................................................................................................... .. 2
`
`Damron v. ATM'Cenrra1 LLC,
`No. 1:10-c.v—01210-JDB-egb, 2010 WL 6512345 (WD. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) ............. ..passim
`
`Faliey V. Friends Universizjr,
`787 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Kan. 2011) ..................................................................................... ..5
`
`Gen-Probe Inc. V. Becfon Dickinson and Co.,
`No. 09—cv-2319-BEN, 2010 WL 4442731 (8.13. Ca1.Nov. 1, 2010) ......................................11
`
`Hon Hai Precz'sz‘on Indus. Co., Ltd. V. Wi-LAN, Inc.,
`No. 12 Civ. 7900(SAS), 2013 WL 2322675 (S.D.N.Y., May 28, 2013) .............................. .. 14
`
`Hugives v. Lavender,
`No. 2:10—c.v—674, 2011 WL 2945843 (SD. Ohio, 111137 20, 2011) .......................................... .. 7
`
`KiIgore- Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A,,
`2: 1 1-cv-02601—JTF_, 2012 WL 4062663 (W1). Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) .......................... ..passim
`
`Koiwler v. Big 5 Corp,
`No. 12 Civ. 00500, 2012 WL 1511748 (CD. C31. Apr. 30, 2012) ......................................... ..6
`
`Kohler v. Islands Resist, LP,
`280 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ...............................................................................................6
`
`703918961
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`

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`McZ.em0re v. Regions Bank,
`Nos. 3:08-cv-0021; 3:08—cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092 (MD. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010),
`ajfa’, 682 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................... .. 5, 6
`
`A/Iomgamerjy v. Wyeth,
`580 F.3d 455 (6111 Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................... .. 3, 9
`
`Paducalar River Painting, Inc. v. McNationaI Inc. _,
`5:11-cv-00135—R, 2011 WL 5525938 (W3). Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) ........................................ ..13
`
`Szm11¢{icr'o.sjyste122s, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises), 1126.,
`630 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Del, 2009) ...................................................................................... .. 14
`
`Trading Tech. Int'l., Inc. V. BCG Partners, Inc,
`No. 10-cv-715, 2011 WL 3946581 (ND. 111. Sept. 2, 2011) ................................................. ..10
`
`Tyco Fire Prods LP v. Victaulic C0.,
`777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (ED. Pa. 2011) ..................................................................................... ..12
`
`US Bank Nat 7 Ass ’n v. Educ. Loans Inc,
`No. 11 Civ. 1445, 2011 WL 5520437 (D. Mi1m.Nov. 14, 2011) ........................................... ..6
`
`Unicrediz Bank AG v. Bucheli,
`No. 10—2436, 2011 WL 4036466 (I). Kan. Sept. 12, 2011) .................................................... ..6
`
`Wistron Corp. v. P/1.iZl7_'p M. Adams & Assocs, LLC,
`No. C—10—4458 EMC, 2011 WL 1654466 (ND. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) ................................... ..8
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ............................................................................................................
`
`....... ..12_, 13
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ..................................................................................................................... ..12_, 13
`
`35 U.S.C.§ 103 ..................................................................................................................... ..12, 13
`
`35 1.1.3.0 § 112 ..................................................................................................................... ..12, 13
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271(c) ....................................................................................................................... .. 10
`
`35 U.S.C. § 286 ........................................................................................................................... .. 14
`
`35 U.S.C.A. § 287 ....................................................................................................................... .. 14
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 31) § 1274............................................. .. 3
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ................................................................................................................... ..passz'm
`iii
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ................................................................................................................. ..passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 .......................................................................................................................... ..4
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. App. Form 30 ........................................................................................................ ..4
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 ............................................................................................................. ..1
`
`US. Patent No. 6,771,290 ............................................................................................................. ..1
`
`703918961
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`iv
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`

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`Defendant Motorola Mobility Holdings LLC (“Motorola”), by and through its
`
`undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiff B.E. Technology,
`
`L.L.C.’s (“B.E.”) Motion to Strike Pursuant. to Federal Ruie of Civil Procedure l2(t). For the
`
`reasons stated below, the Court should deny B.E.’s motion.
`
`1.
`
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND
`
`BE. accuses Motorola of infiinging US. Patent No. 6,771,290 (“the ’29(} Patent”) by
`
`allegedly “using, selling and offering to sell
`
`in the United States” various tablets and
`
`stnaitpliones. See Coinpl, Doc. No. 1.1 B.E."s Complaint does not provide any specific details
`
`as to why or how Motoroiafs products infringe the patents-in-suit. Motorola fried its Answer on
`
`December‘ 31, 2032, asserting multiple affirma.tive defenses. See Answer, Doc. No. 2l. On
`
`January 25, 2013, BE. fiied a. Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(1)
`
`and a. supporting menrorandum. See Plaintiff’ s Motion to Strike Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 1203,
`
`Doc. No. 33; see also Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike Pursuant to
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P l2(t), Doc. No. 33-1.
`
`11.
`
`APPLICABLE LAW
`
`A.
`
`Motion to Strike Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)
`
`The purpose of a motion t.o strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l2(f) is to
`
`eliminate “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter in any pleading, and {it} is
`
`’ As part of its litigation strategy, B.E. has also tiled cases relating to the alleged infringement of
`either or both of the '3 14 and ’290 Patents against Google Inc, Amazon Digital Services, Inc,
`Faceboolc, Inc, Linlcedln Corp, Groupon, Inc, Pandora Media, Inc, Twitter, Inc., Barnes &
`Noble, Sarnsnng Telecomnnlnications Anierica, LLC, Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Sony
`Computer Entertaimnent, Sony Mobile Cornmunications, Sony Electronics, Inc, Microsoft
`Corp, Apple,
`lnc., Spark Networks,
`Inc., People Media,
`Inc., and Matclrcorn L.L.C.
`(collectively, the “Defendants”). Case Nos. 12-cv-02830,
`l2-cv-02866, 12-cv-02767,
`l2-cv-
`02769, 12-cv—02772, l2—cv-02781, 12-cv—02’782, 12-cv-02783, 2:12-cv-02823, 12-cv—02824, I2-
`cv-0282S, 2:l2-cv-02826, l2-cv-02827, 12-cv-02828, 12-cv—G2829,
`l2—cv-02831, 12-cv-02832,
`12-cv-02833, and l2-cv-02834, respectively (collectively, the “BE. Litigations”).
`
`

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`the primary procedure for objecting to an insufficient defense.” Barry Fiala, Inc. v. Arthur Blank
`
`& Co., Inc, No. 2:02-cv-2282, 2003 WL 22309442 (WI). Tenn, Feb. 19, 2003) (citing 5A
`
`Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 (2d ed.1990)).
`
`A motion to strike must be denied unless Plaintiff has “shown that the aiiegations being
`
`challenged are so unrelated to plaintiff’ s claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as a
`
`defense and that their pleading throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving
`
`party.” Wright & Miller, § 1380, at 650; see also KiZgore- Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A., 2:11-cv-
`
`02601-.lTF, 2012 WL 4062663, at *2 (VVD. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) (“It is ‘well established that
`
`the action of striking a pleading should be sparingiy used by the courts.”’) (citing Brown &
`
`Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir.1953)) (internal citations
`
`omitted). Additionally, this Court has specifically admonished plaintiffs for moving to strike
`
`afiirrnative defenses before any discovery has occurred. See Damron 12. ATM Ccrmiral LI. C’, No.
`
`1:10-cv-01210-JDB-egh, 2010 WL 6512345, *2-3 (WI). Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) (denying motion
`
`to strike and noting it is “particularly inappropriate at this early stage, hefore any discovery has
`
`occurred”).
`
`Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit expressly discourages motions to strike, characterizing
`
`them as “a drastic remedy to he resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.”
`
`Brown v. Pfiiharnsorz Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 839, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)
`
`(citations omitted); see also Wright & Miller, § 1380, at 647-49 (“motions under Rule 12(1) are
`
`viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted”); id, § 138l, at 672 (“even when technicaliy
`
`appropriate and well-founded, they often are not granted in the absence of a showing of prejudice
`
`to the moving party”). Therefore, even if a court grants a motion to strike, “the general practice
`
`is to grant the defendant leave to amend.” Id. (citing Wright & Miller § l38l).
`
`

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`B.
`
`The Iqlml/Twombly Standard Does Not Appiy to Defenses
`
`In a ruling issued in the post-Iqbal/Twombbz era, the Sixth Circuit was clear: “{t]he
`
`Federai Rates of Civil Procedure do not require a heightened pleading standard for. . .defense[s].”
`
`Momgamery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009).
`
`In Mcmtgorziezjy, the Sixth Circuit
`
`affirined the district court.’s finding that defendants had satisfied the requirements of Ruie 8(h)(1)
`
`and preserved their statute of repose defense by stating in their Answer that “Plaintiffs causes of
`
`action are barred in Whole or in part by the applicable statues of limitations and repose,” and
`
`noting the statutory basis for their affirmative defense. Id. at 467-68. This District has foilowed
`
`suit.
`
`in Damroz? V. ATM’ Central LLC, the Court uphetd the fair notice standard and denied a
`
`motion to strike, rejecting piaintiffs argument that defendant’s affirmative defenses were subject
`
`to a heightened pieading standard. Damron, 2010 WL 6512345, at *2-3. Likewise, in Kiigare-
`
`Wilson v. Home Depot U.S‘.A.,
`
`the Court rejected the application of a heightened pieading
`
`standard, and further found that, “even assuming, arguendo, that Twombiy applies to affirrriative
`
`defenses, the...{defendant’s] affirmative defenses
`
`sufficiently meet that standard... ihecause]
`
`{w}hiie [they] may tack specific factuai details, they provide Plaintiff with ‘fair notice of the
`
`defense that is being advanced’ and ‘the grounds for eatitiement to relief” Kz‘Zg0re- Wilson,
`
`2012 WL 4062663} at *3. Accordingly, the law in this Circuit is straightforward: to comport
`
`with Rules 8 and 12, a defendant need only submit “a simpie and concise statement raising the
`
`affirmative defenses.” KzTIgore- Wilson, 2012 WL 4062663, at *3 (citing jlzfonfgomery, 580 F.3d
`
`at 467-68); accord 5 Wright & Miiier, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3D § 1274 (“As
`
`numerous federal courts have heid, an affirmative defense may he pleaded in general terms and
`
`wiil be held to be sufficient, and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as iong as it gives
`
`the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.” (footnote on1itted)).
`
`

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`Additionally, the rejection of a heightened pleading standard in this context has been
`
`implicitly endorsed by the Federal Circuit, as Form 30 of the Federal Rules indicates that notice
`
`pleading suffices to plead an affirmative defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. App. Form 30 (stating that
`
`an affirinative defense is adequately pled if it. simply asserts, for example, that “{t]he coinplaint
`
`fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’’).2
`
`111.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`the Iqbal/Twombly Standard Applies to Affirmative
`B.E’s Claim That
`Defenses Should be Rejected.
`
`Ignoring that
`
`this Court has rejected applying a heightened pleading standard to
`
`affirinative defenses, B.E. manufactures arguments, without any basis, to support its position.
`
`As discussed herein, each of B.E.’s arguments fails.
`
`First, B.E. argues that cases holding that the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards do not
`
`apply to aftirniative defenses are wrong because they are based on “a misunderstanding of Rule
`
`8(c).” This misunderstanding, according to B.E., is premised on interpreting Rule 8(c), rather
`
`than Rule 8(1)), as governing the pleading requirement for defenses. According to B.E., by
`
`mandating a “simple and plain” statement of the defense, Rule 8(b) applies the same pleading
`
`standard as Rule 8(a). But as Various courts, including those in this Circuit, have reasoned, the
`
`heightened pleading standard imposed on clainis for relief should not apply to defenses because
`
`unlilce Rule 8(a), which requires a “showing” that the pleader is entitled to relief, bot}? Rule 8(b)
`
`
`
`2 Form 30 is referred to by Federal Rule 84, which provides that a pleading in accordance with the forms sufices
`under the rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the
`simplicity and brevity that these rules conternplatef’). Rule 84 was enacted to ensure that such pleadings would be
`treated favorably by the courts. See 12 Charles Alan Wright &- Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
`3162 (“Prior to 1948 an occasional case held a pleading insufficient even though it conformed to one of the Official
`Forms. To avoid such decisions the rule was amended in 1948 and now states explicitly that the forms are ‘sufficient
`under the rules.’ "‘ (internal footnotes on1itted)).
`
`

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`and Rule 8(0) require onty that the defendant “state” its defenses. See, e.g., Damron, 2010 WL
`
`6512345, at *2; McLemore V. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:O8—cv-0021; 3:08-cv—l003, 2010 WL
`
`1010092, at *l3 (MD. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (and cases cited therein), aff’d, 682 F.3d 414 (6th
`
`Cir. 20l2); see also Falley v. Frzfends University, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, £258 (D. Kan. 2011)
`
`(“Whether both Rule 8(b) and (c) apply to affirmative defenses or not is iinniaterial here. Either
`
`way, the requirement is markedly less demanding than that of Rule 8(a), where a pteading must
`
`show an entitlement to relief”) (emphasis in the original).
`
`Second, B.E.’s challenge to the rationale of “courts” that reject the applicability of
`
`Iqbal/Twombzfy to affirmative defenses based on the textual differences between Rules 8(a) and
`
`8(1)-G), discussed above, ignores the plethora of other bases these courts have provided for not
`
`applying a heightened pleading standard to a.ffinnative defenses, including:
`
`(1) a diminished concern that plaintiffs receive notice in light of their
`ability to obtain more information during discovery;
`
`(2) the absence of a concern that the defense is “unlocking the doors of
`discovery”;
`
`(3) the limited discovery costs, in reiation to the costs imposed on a
`defendant, since it. is unlikely that either side will pursue discovery
`on frivotous defenses;
`
`to the same pleading
`(4) the unfairness of holding the defendant
`standard as the plaintiff, when the defendant has only a limited
`time to respond after service of the complaint .
`.
`.
`_;
`
`would expedite the
`(5) the low likelihood that motions to strike
`litigationgiven that leave to amend is routinely granted;
`
`(6) the risk that a defendant will waive a defense at trial by failing t.o
`plead it at the early stage of the litigation;
`
`(7) the lack of detail in Form 30, which demonstrates the appropriate
`pleading of an affinnative defense; and
`
`(8) the fact that a heightened pleading requirement would produce
`more motions to strike, which are disfavored.
`
`Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow Ag1'oSczTe1~2ces LLC, CIV. 10-1045 RMB-JS, 2011 WL 6934557,
`
`5
`
`

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`at *1—2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (collecting cases); accord Kaifler v. Big 5 Corp, No. 12 Civ.
`
`00500, 2012 WL 1511748, at *2~3 (CID. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012); Kohier V. Islands Rests, LP, 280
`
`F.R.D. 560, 565—66 (SD. Cal. 2012); US. BanicNat’1Ass’rz v. Educ. LO(If7.S‘ Inc, No. 11 Civ.
`
`1445, 2011 WL 5520437, at *5—6 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2011); Bemzett v. Sprint Nexiel Carp, No.
`
`09-2122, 2011 WL 4553055, at *1—2 (I). Kan. Sept. 29, 2011); U1-zicrediz.‘ Bank AG v. Bucizeli,
`
`No. 10—2436, 2011 WL 4036466, at *4»6 (D. Kan. Sept. 12, 2011); see also Damron, 20i0 WL
`
`6512345, at *2; McLemore, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13, affd, 682 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2012)
`
`(noting that Twombly and Iqbal focused “exclusively on the pieading. burden that appiies to
`
`piaintitfs’ coinpiaints” and did not mention affi1‘ma'tive defenses). B.E.’s faiiure to mention, iet
`
`aione persuasively address, any of these additional bases for not appiying a heightened pleading
`
`standard to affmnative defenses fuither dooins its request. that t.his Couit depart from Circuit
`
`precedent on the issue.
`
`Third, despite first arguing that Rule 8(c) contains no requirement regarding “the
`
`sufficiency of the aiiegations of an affiiniative defense” (Doc. No. 33-1 at 7), BE. urges the
`
`Court to read Rule 8(c) in the context of Rule 12(f) and (h)(2), and conclude that Rule 8(0) does,
`
`in fact, impose just such a requirement (Doc. No. 33-1 at 7-8). With respect to Rule 12(1), B.E.
`
`argues that Ruie 8(c) must require a defendant to do more than merely state his defense, because
`
`there is “Iittie else” that “insufficiency” in the context of Ruie 12(1) could mean other than
`
`“factual
`
`insuff1cieney.”3
`
`B.E., however, offers no meaningful
`
`substantiation for
`
`this
`
`asstnnption~—it cites none of the “many cases” that aliegetiiy support it, and ignores the fact that
`
`the treatise it relies onto equate “insufficiency” with “factuai insufficiency” expressly states that
`
`“[w]hat constitutes an insufficient defensemi-s impossible to reduce ...to a. siinpie or an easiiy
`
`3 it is woith noting that if this were true, a heightened pleading standard wouid have applied to affinnative defenses
`even before Iqbal/Twombly made it applicable. to claims for reiief, which is clearly not the case.
`
`6
`
`

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`applied formula,” and furtlier,
`
`that. “an irrelevant defense. . .1na.y also be challenged as an
`
`insufficient defense.” Wright & Miller § 1381.
`
`Will: respect to Rule l2{l1)(2), BE. appears to argue that “a failure to state a legal
`
`defense” in the context of this section must refer to a failure to state the facts of a. defense, rather
`
`than a mere failure to assert. the defense, because a “plaintiff would have no need to challenge a
`
`defense that was never asserted.” Unsurprisingly, B.E. fails to provide any support for this
`
`position either. Nor can it, given the fact that what Rule l2(h)(2) preserves is a. party’s right to
`
`e ol3§ect to the legal invalidity of its opponent.’s affirmative defense. See, e.g., AGFA Photo USA
`
`Corp. v. Parham, No. 1:06-cv-216, 2007 WL 1655891, *l1 (ED. Te1111._, June 5, 2007) (noting
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`that a 12(h)(2) motion would require plaintiff “to address the legal invalidity of [defendant’s]
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`affirmative defenses”); Hughes v. Lavender, No. 2:l0—cv—674, 2011 WL 2945843, *2 (SD.
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`Ohio, July 20, 2011) (citing US. v. Wang, 404 F. Supp. 2d H55, H57 (ND. Cal. 2005) (party
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`has right to challenge legal sufficiency of affirmative defense at any time, and court therefore
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`may consider merits of untimely motion to strike). Accordingly, neither Rule 12(f) nor Rule
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`l2(l1)(2) provide any reason for this Court to interpret Rule 8(c) as requiring a lieighted pleading
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`standard for affirmative defenses.
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`B.
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`B.E.’s Motion to Strike Motorola’s Affirmative Defenses Should be Denied.
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`Under the precedent of this Court, affnniative defenses should only be stricken when they
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`are so unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims that it will cause plaintiff prejudice if they remain in the
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`case. Mot.orola’s affirmative defenses are not only directly relevant to B.E.’s patent infringement
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`claims, they are in fact standard affirmative defenses to any patent. infringenient claim.
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`BE. does not argue that Motorola’s affirniative defenses are unrelated to its claims.
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`Rather, B.E. argues the affirmative defenses: (1) are largely repetitive of the defenses Motorola.
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`asserted to B.E.’s ciaiins and on that basis alone should be stricken; and (2) unfairly prejudice
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`B.E. because it can not “adequately respond, propound discovery, and prepare for trial." As for
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`B.B.’s first argument, there is no support in the Sixth Circuit that affirniative defenses repetitive
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`of defenses already asserted should be stricken on that basis alone.
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`As for B.E.’s second argument, first, BE. does not have any obligation to “respond” to
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`Motoroia’s Afilrrnative Defenses. Unlike claims or counterelainis, affirmative defenses require
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`no response. Second, this Court has specifically adrnonished plaintiffs for moving t.o strike
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`affirmative defenses before any discovery has occurred. See Damron, 2010 WL 6512345, at *2-
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`3. This is especially true in the context of a patent litigation, where, as BE. itself acknowledges
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`in its Motion, this Court’s patent mies provide a deadline, early in discovery, for Motorola to
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`detail its contentions, such as non-infringement and invalidity (Motoroia’s First and Sixth
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`Affirmative Defenses). Accordingly, dismissing Motorola’s afiirinative defenses at this stage of
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`the case would undermine this Court’s patent rules. See also Wistron Corp. v. P/iilizp M Adams
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`& Assam, LLC, No. 0-10-4458 EMC, 2011 WL 1654466, at * ll (ND. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011)
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`(“By requiring the party ciaiining invalidity to flesh out and support its invalidity contentions
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`eariy on, the Patent Local Rules fulfill the function of Twombly and Iqbai, namely, mandating
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`early notice of the factual predicate for tile suit so that the court may weed out unmeritorious
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`claims and relieve the defendant from the burden of unnecessary discovery”). Moreover, B.E. is
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`not prohibited from propounding discovery requests seeking the factual bases for Motorola’s
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`remaining affirmative defenses. Accordingly, BE. has not shown that it will be prejudiced by
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`any of Motorola’s asserted defenses.
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`In light of these considerations, and the fact
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`that each of Mot.oro1a’s defenses is
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`adequately stated under Rules 8(6) and 8(c), as set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
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`

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`should be denied. Alternatively, to the extent that the Court grants Piaintiffs Motion to Strike,
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`Defendants respectfutiy request teave to amend their affirmative defenses in accordance with the
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`Conrt’s ruling.
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`1.
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`Non-Infringement
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`Motorota’s First Defense provides that Motoroia has not directiy or indirectiy infringed
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`any of the patents-in-suit, “either iiteraiiy or under the doctrine of equivaients, directly or
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`indirectiy, wiiifniiy or otherwise.” Doc. No. 21 at 3. This statement of Motoroia’s defense is all
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`that is required to survive a motion to strike. See Avocem‘ Redmond Corp. v. 27.5., No. 08-69C,
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`2009 WL 367499, at *1 (Ct. Fed. Ci. Feb. 5, 2009) (finding affirmative defense of non-
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`infringement sufficient to survive a motion to strike where it stated that “[n]either the accused
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`products nor Rose have infringed or infringe any of the asserted claims of the pateiits—in-suit,
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`either directly, iiidirectiy, literally, or under the doctrine of equivaients”).
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`B.E.’s argunieiits to the contrary are without merit. First, BE. contends that Motoroia’s
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`First Defense “does not even constitute an affirmative defense” as Motoroia did not “provide any
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`facts sufficient to show that they even ‘plausibie,’ let atone possible...” Doc. No. 33-1 at 9.
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`The Sixth Circuit, however, has expressly “deciine[d} to adopt the heightened pleading standard
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`of Twombiy and Iqbal for the pleading of defenses.” Montgomerjy v. W_')2efh, 580 F .3d 455, 467——
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`68 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defense of repose, pied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1) does not
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`require a heightened pleading standard and that defendant’s pleading was sufficient even though
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`it alieged oniy that “Plaintiffs causes of action are barred in whole or in part by the appiicabie
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`statute of limitations and repose”). Motoro1a’s pleading cleariy satisfies the standard appiied in
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`Montgonzery.
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`Second, BE. asserts that Motoi'o1a’s non-infringement defense should be stricken
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`

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`because “Motorola denied that it infringed B.E.’s patents, and “{t}here is no need for a redundant.
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`affirmative defense.” Doc. No. 33-1 at 9. Under the express language of the Patent Act,
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`however, Motorola is required to plead non-infringeinent as a defense. See Trading Tech. Int’l.,
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`Inc. v. BCG Par-1729715‘, 1220., No. 10-cv-715, 2011 WL 3946581, at *5 (ND. Ill. Sept. 2, 2011)
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`(denying pa.tentee’s motion to strike accused infringefs non-infringement defense and
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`explaining that “the Patent Act requires that defendants piead non-infringement and invalidity as
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`defenses”). BE. cites no case law that would suggest otherwise. Nor does B.E. cite to any Sixth
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`Circuit authority that would support. striking an affirmative defense merely because it
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`is
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`dupiicative. Accordingiy, BE. ’s Motion to Strike l\/iotoroia’s First Defense should be denied.
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`2.
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`No Injunctive Relief
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`Motoroia’s Second Defense asserts that “B13. is not entitled to injunctive reiief because
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`Motorola has not infiinged and is not infringing any valid claim of the asserted patents, and any
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`purported injury to BB. is not immediate or irreparable.” Doc. No. 21 at 3-4. Motoroia further
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`asserts, BE. “would have an adequate remedy at law” and “the public interest and balance of
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`liardships clisfavor an injunction under the circurnstances of this case.” Id. B.E. contends that
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`this affirmative defense is duplicative of defenses already plead by Motorola. However, because
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`B.E. cites no applicabie support for its contention that a. defense may be stricken merely because
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`it is duplicative, B.E.’s Motion to Strike Motorola.’s Second Defense should be denied.
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`3.
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`No Contributory Infringement
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`Motoroia’s Third Defense states that “[t]o the extent B.E. purports to accuse any
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`Motoroia product, B.E.’s claims for contributory infringement are barred in whole or in part
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`under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) in View of the substantiai non-infringing uses of such allegedly
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`infringing product.” Doc. No. 21 at 4. BE. argues that this defense should be stricken as
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`l0
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`

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`irreievant, because “BE. did not raise a ciairn for indirect infringement in its complaint.”
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`Consistent with the ienient requirenrrents for the pieading of patent infringernent ciaims, B.E.’s
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`Complaint provides very little information regarding those ciaiins. Given this lack of guidance
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`and the nature of the products and services at issue, Motoroia. presunied that BE. intended to
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`piead contributory infringement.
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`Of course, Motoroia’s defense of “no contributory
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`infringement” is oniy necessary to the extent that B.E. int