`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
`
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`SPARK NETWORKS, INC.
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`
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`Defendant.
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`DEFENDANT’S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
`ITS MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE TO THE
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`AND FOR EXPEDITED HEARING
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`
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`
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`Civil Action No: 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp
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`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`
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`v.
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`
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 2 of 15 PageID 332
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`I.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
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`B.E.’s Choice Of Forum Is Not Entitled To Any Weight....................................... 2
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`All Private Interests Weigh Strongly In Favor Of Transfer.................................... 4
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`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
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`Party Witnesses........................................................................................... 4
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`Non-Party Witnesses................................................................................... 6
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`Location Of Sources Of Proof .................................................................... 8
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`Costs And Expenses.................................................................................... 9
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`C.
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`Public Interest Factors Weigh Strongly In Favor Of Transfer................................ 9
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`1.
`
`2.
`
`Time To Trial Is, At Worst, Neutral ........................................................... 9
`
`The Central District Of California Has A Greater Interest In This Case
`Than Does This Judicial District............................................................... 10
`
`II.
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`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 10
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 3 of 15 PageID 333
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`
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`
`
`CASES
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Civix-DDI, LLC v. Loopnet, Inc.,
`2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123821 (E. D. Va. 2012)......................................................................3
`
`Hanning v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
`710 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ohio 1989) ...........................................................................................4
`
`Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Tech., Inc.,
`540 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................4
`
`Hunter Fan Co. v. Minka Lighting, Inc.,
`2006 WL 1627746 (W.D. Tennessee 2006) ........................................................................3, 10
`
`Imagepoint, Inc. v. Keyser Indus., Inc.,
`2005 WL 1242067 (E.D. Tenn. May 25, 2005).........................................................................4
`
`In re Link_A_Media
`Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2011)...............................................................9
`
`Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................................7
`
`Koh v. Microtek Int’l, Inc.,
`250 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D.Va. 2003) .....................................................................................5, 6
`
`Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Aspect Telecommunications Corp., 1997 WKL 476356
`(E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1997)..........................................................................................................10
`
`Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
`769 F. Supp. 2d 991 (E.D. Va. 2011) ........................................................................................3
`
`Rinks v. Hocking,
`2011 WL 691242 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2011)..........................................................................5
`
`Van Andel Inst. v. Thorne Research, Inc.,
`2012 WL 5511912 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2012).....................................................................10
`
`STATUTES
`
`38 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .........................................................................................................................1
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 4 of 15 PageID 334
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`B.E. admits that this action could have been brought in either the Central or
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`Northern Districts of California (B.E. Opp. 4).1 This admission is fatal to B.E.’s opposition to
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`transfer, because B.E. otherwise does little more than cherry pick the facts and law in an attempt
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`to create arguments against transfer where there are none.
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`B.E. does not dispute that the Central District of California is the location of
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`Spark's headquarters, the location of its relevant documents including those concerning the
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`research, design, operation, marketing and sales of its multiple accused computer systems and
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`services, the center of gravity of the activities B.E. accuses of infringement, the most convenient
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`district for Spark's party witnesses, and a district that has trial subpoena power over the 6 non-
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`party individual and corporate witnesses Spark has identified. Thus, the Central District – or
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`alternatively the contiguously located Northern District where Google (whose computers serve
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`advertisements to Spark's users) is located, and where even B.E.'s lead trial counsel is located –
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`is where this case should be. These California districts are the ones with the most compelling
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`interest in this case.
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`B.E.’s entire argument to avoid transfer is based on the fact that a single witness –
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`Mr. Hoyle, the inventor of the ‘314 patent and the CEO of B.E. – has lived here since 2006.
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`B.E., however, does not come to grips with its almost complete lack of activity here, including:
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`(1) B.E. is a non-practicing entity (“NPE”) whose business is licensing its patents, and not
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`making or selling anything here; (2) B.E.’s “principal” address here is Mr. Hoyle’s private home;
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`(3) B.E. has had offices in Michigan since at least 2001; and (4) B.E. had 74 members as of the
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`start of this lawsuit, yet only Mr. Hoyle is alleged to live in Tennessee.
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`As explained in Spark's opening brief, the foregoing factors demonstrate that the
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`
`1
`References to “B.E. Opp. __” are to the indicated pages of Plaintiff’s Memorandum In Opposition To
`Defendant’s Motion To Transfer Venue Pursuant To 38 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See D.I. 26.
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`
`
`1
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 5 of 15 PageID 335
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`Central (or, alternatively, Northern) District of California is not simply an equally convenient
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`forum as here, but an overwhelmingly more convenient one.
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`I.
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`ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`B.E.’s Choice Of Forum Is Not Entitled To Any Weight
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`B.E. relies on the presence in this Judicial District of the ‘314 patent’s inventor,
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`Mr. Hoyle, for its entire argument that its chosen venue is entitled to substantial weight. (B.E.
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`Opp. 4-6) B.E.’s inflated description of its nexus to Tennessee is disingenuous.
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`First, the plaintiff here is B.E., not Mr. Doyle. And B.E. has no tangible business
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`at all in Tennessee. B.E. is a non-practicing entity (“NPE”), a company that conducts no tangible
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`business activities – no manufacturing, no marketing, no sales – other than licensing its patents.
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`B.E.’s own lead trial counsel admitted that B.E. “doesn’t make anything”: “‘This is a company
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`that was formed by the inventor,’ Freitas said, ‘and it’s a company that is enforcing patents that
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`were issued to the inventor.’” (Stroy 2nd Dec. Ex. 20)2 Not surprisingly, B.E.’s Complaint does
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`not identify any business address for its principal place of business. (D.I. 1, Complaint ¶ 2) The
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`Tennessee Department of State, however, identifies B.E.’s “principal” address in Tennessee to be
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`Mr. Hoyle’s private home on Walnut Grove Lake. (Stroy 2nd Dec. Ex. 21)
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`What’s more, B.E. has no workforce here. The only local employee or member
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`B.E. identifies is its CEO, Mr. Hoyle. Yet, the Tennessee Department of State says B.E. has 74
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`members. (D.I. 20-8) None of these people is asserted by B.E. as being in Tennessee. Instead,
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`B.E. just ignores them. Spark does not know where they all are, but does know that B.E. has for
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`years – since at least 2001 – maintained offices in Michigan. (Stroy 2nd Dec. Ex. 25, 26, 27)
`
`B.E. tries in vain to explain away its having manufactured venue in this Judicial
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`
`2
`References to “(Stroy 2nd Dec. ¶ __, Ex. __)” are to the indicated paragraph and exhibit attached to the
`Second Declaration of Brandon Stroy, submitted herewith.
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`
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`2
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 6 of 15 PageID 336
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`District by filing to do business here only the day before commencing its 19 lawsuit campaign.
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`B.E. says Mr. Hoyle “discovered” that B.E. had not filed to do business here when he was
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`preparing to bring this action/ (B.E. Opp. 6) But this isn’t a case in which a company was doing
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`business in Tennessee for years, and suddenly realized it had failed to file with the Secretary of
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`State. B.E. cannot allege that. Rather, B.E.’s litigation-eve filing to do business in Tennessee is
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`exactly what it appears to be: B.E. was not doing any business in Tennessee for all the years Mr.
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`Hoyle claims to have lived here, but instead filed to do business simply to create venue.
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`Under these circumstances, as previously explained (Spark Mem. 16-17),3 B.E.’s
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`choice of forum deserves no weight. See also Pragmatus AV, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 769 F.
`
`Supp. 2d 991, 995 (E.D. Va. 2011) (plaintiff NPE’s choice of forum given “minimal weight”
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`because it was formed in the district five months before filing suit, and had only one co-owner
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`employee in the district); and Civix-DDI, LLC v. Loopnet, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123821,
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`*11-*14 (E. D. Va. 2012) (NPE’s choice of forum “will not be given great weight” where it has
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`“no manufacturing facilities, operations, offices, or employees that are located in this district
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`besides its principal, … who owns a home in Alexandria”).
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`B.E.’s authorities are not to the contrary. B.E. cites this Court’s decision in
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`Hunter Fan Co. v. Minka Lighting, Inc., 2006 WL 1627746 at *2 (W.D. Tennessee 2006) for the
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`proposition that a plaintiff’s choice of forum should be given particular weight. (B.E. Opp. 4)
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`That case, however, did not involve an NPE that established venue the day before filing 19
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`lawsuits, but rather a plaintiff having its “design, engineering, and manufacturing facilities … in
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`Memphis” and the invention of the patent in suit was “‘conceived of, produced, and marketed’ in
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`
`3
`References to “Spark Mem. __” are to the indicated page of Defendant’s Memorandum In Support of Its
`Motion To Transfer Venue To The Central District Of California And For Expedited Hearing (D.I. 20).
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`
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`3
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 7 of 15 PageID 337
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`Memphis” Id. 4 B.E. does not assert that the invention of the ‘314 patent was made in
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`Tennessee. Inventor Hoyle did not move to Tennessee until 2006, 6 years after the ‘314 patent
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`application was filed. (D.I. 20-3; Hoyle Dec. ¶ 3)
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`B.
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`All Private Interests Weigh Strongly In Favor Of Transfer
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`1.
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`Party Witnesses
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`B.E.’s One Witness. B.E.’s assertion that the convenience of party witnesses
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`favor this venue (B.E. Opp. 6-7) is meritless. Again, B.E. relies on only one witness, inventor
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`Hoyle. But just because Mr. Hoyle is the named inventor does not necessarily make his
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`testimony relevant. For instance, an inventor's testimony is not relevant to claim construction or
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`the scope of a claim (as may be important in infringement and invalidity contexts). Howmedica
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`Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (we “give
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`no deference to the testimony of the inventor about the meaning of the claims,”) (citation
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`omitted). And while B.E. unfairly criticizes Spark for not sufficiently particularizing the
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`testimony of its California witnesses (infra), B.E. says nothing at all about what Mr. Hoyle
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`might testify about as an alleged “likely … key witness” regarding any issue in the case. ( B.E.
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`Opp. 5; Hoyle Dec. passim)
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`Spark’s Multiple Witnesses. B.E. criticizes Spark for not identifying specific
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`names of its party witnesses knowledgeable about how Spark’s software and systems work, and
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`about damages and other issues, who would likely testify in this action. (B.E. Opp. 8-9) But this
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`is a patent case. The patent claims at issue concern a method for presenting “demographically-
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`targeted advertising to a computer user” and require, among other things, “providing a server that
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`is accessible via a computer network.” (D.I. 20-3, claim 11) Spark submitted declarations from
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`4
`Nor did Imagepoint, Inc. v. Keyser Indus., Inc., 2005 WL 1242067 (E.D. Tenn. May 25, 2005) or Hanning
`v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 710 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ohio 1989), also relied on by B.E. (B.E. Opp. 4), involve
`an NPE plaintiff.
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`4
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 8 of 15 PageID 338
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`its General Counsel, Joshua Kreinberg, and its Chief Information Officer, Gregory Franchina,
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`establishing that (1) Spark’s allegedly infringing computer systems and software are located at or
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`accessible from Spark’s Beverly Hills, California headquarters, and (2) Spark's employees
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`knowledgeable about how those systems work, and about Spark’s finances, are employed in
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`Beverly Hills. (Spark Mem. 4,10) The testimony of such witnesses – irrespective of who they
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`actually are – about how Spark’s systems work and Spark’s finances will plainly be relevant to
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`infringement and damages issues in this case.
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`B.E.’s own cases establish that more specificity about Spark’s California-based
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`party witnesses was not required. B.E. relies on Rinks v. Hocking, 2011 WL 691242, *3 (W.D.
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`Mich. Feb. 16, 2011), but the court there said it is only necessary to provide “‘by affidavit or
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`otherwise, sufficient details respecting the witnesses and their potential testimony to enable the
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`court to assess the materiality of evidence and the degree of inconvenience’” (citing Koh v.
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`Microtek Int’l, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 627, 637 (E.D.Va. 2003). Rinks further explained:
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`Particularized information is necessary to enable a court to ascertain how much
`weight to give a claim of inconvenience. Id. Inconvenience to a witness whose
`testimony is cumulative or tangential is not entitled to great weight. By contrast,
`greater weight must be accorded inconvenience to witnesses whose testimony is
`central to the claim or whose credibility is likely to be an important issue. …
`Consequently, the materiality and importance of the testimony of prospective
`witnesses, and not merely the number of witnesses, is crucial to this inquiry.
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`(Emphasis added.) Plainly, the testimony of Spark’s employees about how its systems work and
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`its finances relative to those systems will neither be cumulative nor tangential but, rather, central
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`to the issues in this case. Nowhere does B.E. assert otherwise.
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`Koh v. Microtek, on which B.E. also relies ( B.R. Opp. 7), is to the same effect.
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`Koh was a patent case in which the defendant identified 3 witnesses but “failed to specifically set
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`out their potential testimony, how that testimony will be material and non-cumulative, or the
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`degree to which it will be inconvenient to access that testimony in this district.” Koh, 250
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`5
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 9 of 15 PageID 339
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`F.Supp. at 636. The court said, however (emphasis added, citations omitted):
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`there is a "tension in transfer motions between the duty to file such motions early
`in the action and the need to support that motion with affidavits identifying
`witnesses and the materiality of their testimony, information which may not be
`known until later in the case." … Furthermore, it is permissible to infer, absent
`any contrary evidence from the non-movant, that witnesses are located at or
`near the center of the allegedly infringing activities and that witnesses involved
`in the design and manufacture of the accused products are material.
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`The “tension” referred to by Koh is evident here. Spark’s ability to be more
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`specific about its witnesses was limited because B.E.’s Complaint did not identify which of
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`Sparks’ at least 27 websites (see Stroy 2nd Dec. Ex. 23, pp. 3-4) were accused of infringement
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`(D.I. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 9-11). B.E. first did so in its Infringement Contentions pursuant to LPR
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`3.1 served January 7, 2013 – 17 days after Spark’s transfer motion was filed on December 21,
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`2012 (Stroy 2nd Dec. Ex. 22, pp. 2-3) B.E. for the first time identified 5 Spark websites as
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`“accused instrumentalities” (Id., p. 3). These 5 websites implicate two different Spark computer
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`systems (Franchina 2nd Dec. ¶ 5). Based on this additional information, Spark is now able to
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`more specifically identify several employees by name in addition to Mr. Kreinberg and Mr.
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`Franchina – including software engineering manager Gustavo Sandrigo, CFO Brett Zane, and
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`CEO Greg Liberman – that will likely testify in this action concerning facts relevant to at least
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`non-infringement and damages. All of these witnesses work in Beverly Hills, and are key
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`employees of Spark whose extended absence would materially prejudice Spark’s business
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`operations. (See, Franchina 2nd Dec. ¶¶ 6-8; Kreinberg 2nd Dec. ¶¶ 5-6)
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`2.
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`Non-Party Witnesses
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`In addition to its California-based party witnesses, Spark named 5 individual
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`witnesses in California who Spark expects will testify on invalidity issues (see Spark Mem. 6).
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`Spark also identified a sixth non-party corporate witness, California-based Google and its
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`engineers as witnesses who will testify on issues relating to non-infringement, because it is
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`6
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 10 of 15 PageID 340
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`Google – not Spark – who sends ads to users of Spark’s websites via Google’s Dart For
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`Publishers service. (Spark Mem. 5) B.E.’s attempt to minimize the importance of these
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`witnesses to the issues in this case is meritless.
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`Invalidity Witnesses. B.E. says the prior art witnesses Spark identified will be
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`limited to testifying only about the actual words and content of their patents. (B.E. Opp. 10)
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`This is not true. As Spark explained at length in its opening memorandum (pp. 5-6), these
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`witnesses are expected to testify about the underlying work that led to their patents, and the sale
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`and offer for sale of systems embodying their inventions, to establish that work, and those sales,
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`as independent invalidating prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and/or 102(g). Innogenetics, N.V.
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`v. Abbott Labs, 512 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cited by B.E. (see B.E. Opp. 10), is
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`inapposite to this testimony. That case had nothing to do with establishing prior art under 35
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`U.S.C. §§ 102(b) or (g). Rather, the court restricted a prior art inventor’s testimony to the actual
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`words and content of his patent application because an expert report was required for the
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`particular type of testimony he was to give, but had not been submitted for the inventor. Id.
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`Non-Infringement Witnesses. B.E.’s position regarding the California-based
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`testimony of Google and its engineers rings just as hollow. B.E. says Spark “fails to establish
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`that its infringement arises exclusively from its use of Google’s ‘Dart For Publishers’ service, as
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`opposed to instrumentalities it designed, developed, and operates.” (B.E. Mem. 10; emphasis
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`added) This is not correct. The Franchina declaration, to which B.E. cites (id.), says the
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`opposite – that “advertising displayed to users of Spark’s websites are served by Google Inc.
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`through …. Dart For Publishers” (emphasis added). Unquestionably, Google’s testimony in
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`California about how Google is providing a service for Spark’s users that B.E. has charged with
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`infringement will be key evidence in this case. And even if Spark were serving ads to its users
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`7
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 11 of 15 PageID 341
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`also, the person most knowledgeable about that would be Spark’s software engineers based in
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`the Central District of California (supra, p. 6). Either way, B.E. loses this argument.
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`Finally, B.E. says that the third-party witnesses can be subpoenaed to produce
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`documents and testify at deposition in their home districts. (B.E. Mem 11) This is irrelevant.
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`Under this theory, the ability to subpoena for deposition would effectively eliminate the factor of
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`non-party witness location. What's important, instead, is B.E.’s concession that Spark cannot
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`compel any of the several identified third-party witnesses to testify at trial in Tennessee, but it
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`could if this case were transferred to California. (B.E. Opp. 11-12) Moreover, no case says that
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`Spark needs to show that any of these third-party witnesses is unwilling to testify in Tennessee
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`(B.E. Opp. 11). And given the brief length of time this case has been pending (Spark’s Answer
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`was filed only last month), any suggestion such proof is necessary does not merit a response.
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`3.
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`Location Of Sources Of Proof
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`Spark’s opening memorandum established that all of its documents are located at
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`or accessible from its headquarters in California. And, the Federal Circuit cases Spark marshaled
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`recognize that in patent cases like this one, the majority of documents from the parties will come
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`from the accused infringer, weighing in favor of transfer. (Spark Mem. 11)
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`B.E. says that Spark ignored B.E.’s documents, which it says are maintained here.
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`(B.E. Opp. 12) But at the time this motion was filed, Spark was not aware of any B.E.
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`documents in Tennessee. Following Spark’s motion, B.E. produced to Spark a total of only 2873
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`pages of documents with its Infringement Contentions. And of these, 708 pages were publicly
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`available copies of the patent-in-suit, patents in the other 18 lawsuits brought by B.E., and patent
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`prosecution histories. (Stroy 2nd Dec. ¶ 6) In contrast, Spark expects to produce many tens of
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`thousands of pages of source code and other documents. (Franchina 2nd Dec. ¶ 10)
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`While it is true that advances in technology is making the locations of documents
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`8
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 12 of 15 PageID 342
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`somewhat less important in the transfer analysis, as B.E. says (B.E. Opp. 13), the factor remains
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`relevant. A Federal Circuit case cited by B.E., In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d
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`1221, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2011), establishes this. Criticizing a lower court for having ignored as
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`“outdated” and “irrelevant” the locations of documents in a transfer analysis, the Federal Circuit
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`said that, “while advances in technology may alter the weight given to [location of documents], it
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`is improper to ignore [this factor] entirely.” Id.
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`4.
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`Costs And Expenses
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`B.E. asserts inventor Hoyle would be financially burdened if the case were
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`transferred to California, because he is a consultant who charges by the hour and he would lose
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`consulting opportunities and hours. (B.E. Opp. 14) But nowhere does B.E. assert that it – the
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`Plaintiff – would be financially burdened. And as a consultant, Mr. Hoyle would certainly be
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`able to work while in transit.
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`C.
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`Public Interest Factors Weigh Strongly In Favor Of Transfer
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`1.
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`Time To Trial Is, At Worst, Neutral
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`B.E. focuses on docket congestion as between this Court and Spark’s proposed
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`transferee courts, saying that transfer to the Northern District of California would “likely delay
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`trial of this case by at least one year.” (B.E. Opp. 14-15) However, Spark seeks transfer to the
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`Central District of California, and B.E. concedes that the times to trial as between the Central
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`District and this District are insubstantially different. (B.E. Opp. 14-15)
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`As for the Northern District of California, to which Spark would consent in view
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`of the other defendants' motions seeking to transfer there, B.E. neglects that the average docket
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`of pending case per judge was actually higher in this District. Plus, the previous year's statistics
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`do not provide an accurate snapshot of court congestion. In 2010, the District had a longer
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`median time to trial than California's Northern District. Thus, transfer to the alternative Northern
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`9
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 13 of 15 PageID 343
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`District cannot be said to adversely impact time to trial. See Van Andel Inst. v. Thorne Research,
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`Inc., 2012 WL 5511912, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2012) (median time slightly in favor of
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`plaintiff but, taken as a whole, the public interest factors appeared neutral).
`
`2.
`
`The Central District Of California Has A Greater
`Interest In This Case Than Does This Judicial District
`
`Compared with Spark’s substantial presence in California, B.E.’s presence here is
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`at best minimal (supra, pp. 2-4). California is the center of gravity of this case. (Spark Mem. 4-
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`5) B.E.’s attempt to diminish this fact, and the weight that it should be accorded, fails.
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`B.E. relies on Hunter Fan, 2006 WL 1627746, at *3, for the assertion that the
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`center of gravity in a patent case is given little weight when a plaintiff brings suit in its home
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`forum. But that is not this case. This is not B.E.’s “home forum” in any real sense of the phrase.
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`B.E. is incorporated in Delaware, has had since 2001 a place of business in Saginaw, Michigan
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`for “The development, sale, and licensing of information technology products and services,”
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`since 2006 another place of business in Bay City, Michigan, and only first applied “for a
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`certificate of authority to transact business in the State of Tennessee” on the day before filing its
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`first lawsuit charging patent infringement against the 19 defendants. (D.I. 20-8; Stroy 2nd Dec.
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`Ex. 24) Unlike the case in Hunter Fan, 2006 WL 1627746, at *3, B.E. does not have “a
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`substantial connection to this forum.”
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`Nor does Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Aspect Telecommunications Corp., 1997
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`WKL 476356 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1997), support B.E.’s position (B.E. Opp. 16). Lucent
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`recognizes that the center of gravity test is one factor to consider, and is given substantial weight
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`when the plaintiff is caught forum shopping. Lucent, thus, also supports transferring this case.
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`II.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For all the foregoing reasons, Spark's motion to transfer should be granted.
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`10
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 14 of 15 PageID 344
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
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`s/Glen G. Reid, Jr.
`Glen G. Reid, Jr. (#8184)
`WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
`1715 Aaron Brenner Drive, Suite 800
`Memphis, TN 38120-4367
`Phone: 901.537.1000
`Facsimile: 901.537.1010
`greid@wyattfirm.com
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`s/Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr.
`Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr. (#06389)
`WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
`1715 Aaron Brenner Drive, Suite 800
`Memphis, TN 38120-4367
`Phone: 901.537.1000
`Facsimile: 901.537.1010
`mvorder-bruegge@wyattfirm.com
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`Attorneys for Defendant
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`11
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`Case 2:12-cv-02832-JPM-tmp Document 32 Filed 01/29/13 Page 15 of 15 PageID 345
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`OF COUNSEL:
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`Laurence S. Rogers (admission pending)
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`1211 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10036
`Phone: 212.596.9033
`Facsimile: 212-596-9090
`Laurence.Rogers@ropesgray.com
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`Brandon H. Stroy (admission pending)
`ROPES & GRAY LLP
`1900 University Avenue
`East Palo Alto, CA 94303
`Phone: 650.617.4028
`Facsimile: 650.617.4090
`Brandon.Stroy@ropesgray.com
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The foregoing document was filed under the Court’s CM/ECF system, automatically
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`effecting service on counsel of record for all other parties who have appeared in this action on
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`the date of such service.
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`
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`60317970.1
`1/29/2013 2:01 pm
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`s/Glen G. Reid, Jr.
`Glen G. Reid, Jr.
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`12