Case 2:12-cv-02830-JPM-tmp Document 46 Filed 06/07/13 Page 1 of 22 PageID 550
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
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`
`
`Civil Action No. 12-cv-02830 – JPM -
`TMP
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`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE INC.,
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`
`
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`Defendant.
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`DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`
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`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`
`
`B.
`
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 1
`APPLICABLE LAW ......................................................................................................... 2
`A.
`Motion to Strike Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) ............................. 2
`The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Does Not Apply to Defenses .................................. 3
`B.
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 4
`B.E.’s Claim That The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Applies to Affirmative
`A.
`Defenses Should be Rejected ................................................................................. 4
`B.E.’s Motion to Strike Google’s Affirmative Defenses Should be Denied ......... 8
`1.
`Non-Infringement ...................................................................................... 9
`2.
`No Injunctive Relief ................................................................................. 10
`3.
`No Contributory Infringement ................................................................. 11
`4.
`Waiver, Acquiescence, Equitable Estoppel, Implied License, and
`Unclean Hands ......................................................................................... 11
`Laches ...................................................................................................... 12
`5.
`Invalidity .................................................................................................. 12
`6.
`Limitation on Patent Damages ................................................................. 14
`7.
`Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6) ........................................... 15
`8.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 15
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`
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`
`
`CASES
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
`
`AGFA Photo USA Corp. v. Parham,
`No. 1:06-cv-216, 2007 WL 1655891 ( E.D. Tenn., June 5, 2007) ............................................7
`
`Avocent Redmond Corp. v. U.S.,
`No. 08-69C, 2009 WL 367499 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Feb. 5, 2009) .......................................................9
`
`Barry Fiala, Inc. v. Arthur Blank & Co., Inc.,
`No. 2:02-cv-2282, 2003 WL 22309442 (W.D. Tenn., Feb. 19, 2003) ......................................2
`
`Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,
`CIV. 10-1045 RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) ........................................6
`
`Bennett v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`No. 09–2122, 2011 WL 4553055 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011) ......................................................6
`
`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States,
`201 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.1953) ......................................................................................................2
`
`Damron v. ATM Central LLC,
`No. 1:10-cv-01210-JDB-egb, 2010 WL 6512345 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) .............. passim
`
`Falley v. Friends University,
`787 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Kan. 2011) ........................................................................................5
`
`Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton Dickinson and Co.,
`No. 09-cv-2319-BEN, 2010 WL 4442731 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) ......................................12
`
`Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Wi-LAN, Inc.,
`No. 12 Civ. 7900(SAS), 2013 WL 2322675 (S.D.N.Y., May 28, 2013) .................................15
`
`Hughes v. Lavender,
`No. 2:10–cv–674, 2011 WL 2945843 (S.D. Ohio, July 20, 2011) ............................................7
`
`Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
`2:11-cv-02601-JTF, 2012 WL 4062663 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) ........................... passim
`
`Kohler v. Big 5 Corp.,
`No. 12 Civ. 00500, 2012 WL 1511748 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012) ............................................6
`
`Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP,
`280 F.R.D. 560 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ...............................................................................................6
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`
`
`McLemore v. Regions Bank,
`Nos. 3:08-cv-0021; 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010),
`aff’d, 682 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................5, 6
`
`Montgomery v. Wyeth,
`580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................3, 10
`
`Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational Inc.,
`5:11-cv-00135-R, 2011 WL 5525938 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) .....................................13, 14
`
`Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc.,
`630 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Del. 2009) .........................................................................................14
`
`Trading Tech. Int'l., Inc. v. BCG Partners, Inc.,
`No. 10-cv-715, 2011 WL 3946581 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2011) ...................................................10
`
`Tyco Fire Prods LP v. Victaulic Co.,
`777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Pa. 2011) .......................................................................................13
`
`U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Educ. Loans Inc.,
`No. 11 Civ. 1445, 2011 WL 5520437 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2011) ..............................................6
`
`Unicredit Bank AG v. Bucheli,
`No. 10–2436, 2011 WL 4036466 (D. Kan. Sept. 12, 2011) ......................................................6
`
`Wistron Corp. v. Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., LLC,
`No. C–10–4458 EMC, 2011 WL 1654466 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) ......................................8
`
`STATUTES
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`35 U.S.C. § 101 ..................................................................................................................12, 13, 14
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`35 U.S.C. § 102 ..................................................................................................................12, 13, 14
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 ..................................................................................................................12, 13, 14
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ..................................................................................................................12, 13, 14
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`35 U.S.C. § 271(c) .........................................................................................................................11
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`35 U.S.C. § 286 ..............................................................................................................................14
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`35 U.S.C.A. § 287(a) .....................................................................................................................14
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3D § 1274 ...............................................3
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ..................................................................................................................... passim
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ................................................................................................................... passim
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ................................................................................................................. .. passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 .............................................................................................................................4
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 ........................................................................................................................... ..4
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. App. Form 30 ..........................................................................................................4
`Fed. R. Civ. P. App. Form 30 ........................................................................................................ ..4
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314................................................................................................................1
`U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 .............................................................................................................. ..1
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,771,290................................................................................................................1
`U.S. Patent No. 6,771,290 .............................................................................................................. ..1
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`Defendant Google Inc. (“Google”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby
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`submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiff B.E. Technology, L.L.C.’s (“B.E.”) Motion to
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`Strike Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). For the reasons stated below, the Court
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`should deny B.E.’s motion.
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`I.
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`RELEVANT BACKGROUND
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`B.E. accuses Google of infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 (“the ’314 Patent”) by
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`allegedly “providing demographically targeted advertising,” and U.S. Patent No. 6,771,290 (“the
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`’290 Patent”) by allegedly “offering to sell in the United States tablet computer products”
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`including “Google Nexus products.” See Compl., Doc. No. 1.1 B.E.’s Complaint does not
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`provide any specific details as to why or how Google’s products infringe the patents-in-suit.
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`Google filed its Answer on December 31, 2012, asserting multiple affirmative defenses. See
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`Answer, Doc. No. 25. On January 25, 2013, B.E. filed a Motion to Strike Pursuant to Federal
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`Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) and a supporting memorandum. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
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`Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), Doc. No. 36; Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion
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`to Strike Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(f), Doc. No. 36-1.
`
`
`1 As part of its litigation strategy, B.E. has also filed cases relating to the alleged infringement of
`either or both of the ’314 and ’290 Patents against Motorola Mobility Holdings LLC
`(“Motorola”), Amazon Digital Services, Inc., Facebook, Inc., LinkedIn Corp., Groupon, Inc.,
`Pandora Media, Inc., Twitter, Inc., Barnes & Noble, Samsung Telecommunications America,
`LLC, Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Sony Computer Entertainment, Sony Mobile
`Communications, Sony Electronics, Inc., Microsoft Corp., Apple, Inc., Spark Networks, Inc.,
`People Media, Inc., and Match.com L.L.C. (collectively, the “Defendants”). Case Nos. 12-cv-
`02830, 12-cv-02866, 12-cv-02767, 12-cv-02769, 12-cv-02772, 12-cv-02781, 12-cv-02782, 12-
`cv-02783, 2:12-cv-02823, 12-cv-02824, 12-cv-02825, 2:12-cv-02826, 12-cv-02827, 12-cv-
`02828, 12-cv-02829, 12-cv-02831, 12-cv-02832, 12-cv-02833, and 12-cv-02834, respectively
`(collectively, the “B.E. Litigations”).
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`1
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`

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`
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`II.
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`APPLICABLE LAW
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`A. Motion to Strike Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)
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`The purpose of a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is to
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`eliminate “redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter in any pleading, and [it] is
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`the primary procedure for objecting to an insufficient defense.” Barry Fiala, Inc. v. Arthur Blank
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`& Co., Inc., No. 2:02-cv-2282, 2003 WL 22309442 (W.D. Tenn., Feb. 19, 2003) (citing 5A
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`Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 (2d ed.1990)).
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`A motion to strike must be denied unless Plaintiff has “shown that the allegations being
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`challenged are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as a
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`defense and that their pleading throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving
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`party.” Wright & Miller, § 1380, at 650; see also Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A., 2:11-cv-
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`02601-JTF, 2012 WL 4062663, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) (“It is ‘well established that
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`the action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts.’”) (citing Brown &
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`Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir.1953)) (internal citations
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`omitted). Additionally, this Court has specifically admonished plaintiffs for moving to strike
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`affirmative defenses before any discovery has occurred. See Damron v. ATM Central LLC, No.
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`1:10-cv-01210-JDB-egb, 2010 WL 6512345, *2-3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) (denying motion
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`to strike and noting it is “particularly inappropriate at this early stage, before any discovery has
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`occurred”).
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`Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit expressly discourages motions to strike, characterizing
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`them as “a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.”
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`Brown v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)
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`(citations omitted); see also Wright & Miller, § 1380, at 647-49 (“motions under Rule 12(f) are
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`viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted”); id., § 1381, at 672 (“even when technically
`2
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`

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`appropriate and well-founded, they often are not granted in the absence of a showing of prejudice
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`to the moving party.”). Therefore, even if a court grants a motion to strike, “the general practice
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`is to grant the defendant leave to amend.” Id. (citing Wright & Miller § 1381).
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`B.
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`The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Does Not Apply to Defenses
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`In a ruling issued in the post-Iqbal/Twombly era, the Sixth Circuit was clear: “[t]he
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`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a heightened pleading standard for…defense[s].”
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`Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009). In Montgomery, the Sixth Circuit
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`affirmed the district court’s finding that defendants had satisfied the requirements of Rule 8(b)(1)
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`and preserved their statute of repose defense by stating in their Answer that “Plaintiff’s causes of
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`action are barred in whole or in part by the applicable statues of limitations and repose,” and
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`noting the statutory basis for their affirmative defense. Id. at 467-68. This District has followed
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`suit. In Damron v. ATM Central LLC, the Court upheld the fair notice standard and denied a
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`motion to strike, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s affirmative defenses were subject
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`to a heightened pleading standard. Damron, 2010 WL 6512345, at *2-3. Likewise, in Kilgore-
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`Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A., the Court rejected the application of a heightened pleading
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`standard, and further found that, “even assuming, arguendo, that Twombly applies to affirmative
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`defenses, the…[defendant’s] affirmative defenses sufficiently meet that standard… [because]
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`[w]hile [they] may lack specific factual details, they provide Plaintiff with ‘fair notice of the
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`defense that is being advanced’ and ‘the grounds for entitlement to relief.’” Kilgore-Wilson,
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`2012 WL 4062663, at *3. Accordingly, the law in this Circuit is straightforward: to comport
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`with Rules 8 and 12, a defendant need only submit “a simple and concise statement raising the
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`affirmative defenses.” Kilgore-Wilson, 2012 WL 4062663, at *3 (citing Montgomery, 580 F.3d
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`at 467-68); accord 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 3D § 1274 (“As
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`3
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`

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`numerous federal courts have held, an affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and
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`will be held to be sufficient, and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long as it gives
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`the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.” (footnote omitted)).
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`Additionally, the rejection of a heightened pleading standard in this context is consistent
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`with Form 30 of the Federal Rules, which indicates that notice pleading suffices to plead an
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`affirmative defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. App. Form 30 (stating that an affirmative defense is
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`adequately pled if it simply asserts, for example, that “[t]he complaint fails to state a claim upon
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`which relief can be granted.”).2
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`B.E.’s Claim That The Iqbal/Twombly Standard Applies to Affirmative
`Defenses Should be Rejected.
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`Ignoring that this Court has rejected applying a heightened pleading standard to
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`affirmative defenses, B.E. posits arguments, without any basis, to support its position. As
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`discussed herein, each of B.E.’s arguments fails.
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`First, B.E. argues that cases holding that the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards do not
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`apply to affirmative defenses are wrong because they are based on “a misunderstanding of Rule
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`8(c).” This misunderstanding, according to B.E., is premised on interpreting Rule 8(c), rather
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`than Rule 8(b), as governing the pleading requirement for defenses. According to B.E., by
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`2 Form 30 is referred to by Federal Rule 84, which provides that a pleading in accordance with
`the forms suffices under the rules. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice
`under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”). Rule
`84 was enacted to ensure that such pleadings would be treated favorably by the courts. See 12
`Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3162 (“Prior to 1948
`an occasional case held a pleading insufficient even though it conformed to one of the Official
`Forms. To avoid such decisions the rule was amended in 1948 and now states explicitly that the
`forms are ‘sufficient under the rules.’ ” (internal footnotes omitted)).
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`4
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`
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`mandating a “simple and plain” statement of the defense, Rule 8(b) applies the same pleading
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`standard as Rule 8(a). But as various courts, including those in this Circuit, have reasoned, the
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`heightened pleading standard imposed on claims for relief should not apply to defenses because
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`unlike Rule 8(a), which requires a “showing” that the pleader is entitled to relief, both Rule 8(b)
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`and Rule 8(c) require only that the defendant “state” its defenses. See, e.g., Damron, 2010 WL
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`6512345, at *2; McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021; 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL
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`1010092, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (and cases cited therein), aff’d, 682 F.3d 414 (6th
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`Cir. 2012); see also Falley v. Friends University, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (D. Kan. 2011)
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`(“Whether both Rule 8(b) and (c) apply to affirmative defenses or not is immaterial here. Either
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`way, the requirement is markedly less demanding than that of Rule 8(a), where a pleading must
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`show an entitlement to relief.”) (emphasis in the original).
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`Second, B.E.’s challenge to the rationale of “courts” that reject the applicability of
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`Iqbal/Twombly to affirmative defenses based on the textual differences between Rules 8(a) and
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`8(b-c), discussed above, ignores the plethora of other bases these courts have provided for not
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`applying a heightened pleading standard to affirmative defenses, including:
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`(1) a diminished concern that plaintiffs receive notice in light of their
`ability to obtain more information during discovery;
`(2) the absence of a concern that the defense is “unlocking the doors of
`discovery”;
`(3) the limited discovery costs, in relation to the costs imposed on a
`defendant, since it is unlikely that either side will pursue discovery
`on frivolous defenses;
`(4) the unfairness of holding the defendant to the same pleading
`standard as the plaintiff, when the defendant has only a limited
`time to respond after service of the complaint . . . ;
`(5) the low likelihood that motions to strike … would expedite the
`litigation given that leave to amend is routinely granted;
`(6) the risk that a defendant will waive a defense at trial by failing to
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`5
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`plead it at the early stage of the litigation;
`(7) the lack of detail in Form 30, which demonstrates the appropriate
`pleading of an affirmative defense; and
`(8) the fact that a heightened pleading requirement would produce
`more motions to strike, which are disfavored.
`
`Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, CIV. 10-1045 RMB-JS, 2011 WL 6934557,
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`at *1-2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (collecting cases); accord Kohler v. Big 5 Corp., No. 12 Civ.
`
`00500, 2012 WL 1511748, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012); Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280
`
`F.R.D. 560, 565–66 (S.D. Cal. 2012); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Educ. Loans Inc., No. 11 Civ.
`
`1445, 2011 WL 5520437, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2011); Bennett v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No.
`
`09–2122, 2011 WL 4553055, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2011); Unicredit Bank AG v. Bucheli,
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`No. 10–2436, 2011 WL 4036466, at *4–6 (D. Kan. Sept. 12, 2011); see also Damron, 2010 WL
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`6512345, at *2; McLemore, 2010 WL 1010092, at *13, aff'd, 682 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2012)
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`(noting that Twombly and Iqbal focused “exclusively on the pleading burden that applies to
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`plaintiffs’ complaints” and did not mention affirmative defenses). B.E.’s failure to mention, let
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`alone persuasively address, any of these additional bases for not applying a heightened pleading
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`standard to affirmative defenses further dooms its request that this Court depart from Circuit
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`precedent on the issue.
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`Third, despite first arguing that Rule 8(c) contains no requirement regarding “the
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`sufficiency of the allegations of an affirmative defense” (Doc. No. 36-1 at 7), B.E. urges the
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`Court to read Rule 8(c) in the context of Rule 12(f) and (h)(2), and conclude that Rule 8(c) does,
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`in fact, impose just such a requirement (Doc. No. 36-1 at 7-8). With respect to Rule 12(f), B.E.
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`argues that Rule 8(c) must require a defendant to do more than merely state his defense, because
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`there is “little else” that “insufficiency” in the context of Rule 12(f) could mean other than
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`6
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`“factual insufficiency.”3
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` B.E., however, offers no meaningful substantiation for this
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`assumption—it cites none of the “many cases” that allegedly support it, and ignores the fact that
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`the treatise it relies on to equate “insufficiency” with “factual insufficiency” expressly states that
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`“[w]hat constitutes an insufficient defense...is impossible to reduce …to a simple or an easily
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`applied formula,” and further, that “an irrelevant defense…may also be challenged as an
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`insufficient defense.” Wright & Miller § 1381.
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`With respect to Rule 12(h)(2), B.E. appears to argue that “a failure to state a legal
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`defense” in the context of this section must refer to a failure to state the facts of a defense, rather
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`than a mere failure to assert the defense, because a “plaintiff would have no need to challenge a
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`defense that was never asserted.” Unsurprisingly, B.E. fails to provide any support for this
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`position either. Nor can it, given the fact that what Rule 12(h)(2) preserves is a party’s right to
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`object to the legal invalidity of its opponent’s affirmative defense. See, e.g., AGFA Photo USA
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`Corp. v. Parham, No. 1:06-cv-216, 2007 WL 1655891, *11 (E.D. Tenn., June 5, 2007) (noting
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`that a 12(h)(2) motion would require plaintiff “to address the legal invalidity of [defendant’s]
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`affirmative defenses”); Hughes v. Lavender, No. 2:10–cv–674, 2011 WL 2945843, *2 (S.D.
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`Ohio, July 20, 2011) (citing U.S. v. Wang, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (party
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`has right to challenge legal sufficiency of affirmative defense at any time, and court therefore
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`may consider merits of untimely motion to strike). Accordingly, neither Rule 12(f) nor Rule
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`12(h)(2) provide any reason for this Court to interpret Rule 8(c) as requiring a heighted pleading
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`standard for affirmative defenses.
`
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`3 It is worth noting that if this were true, a heightened pleading standard would have applied to
`affirmative defenses even before Iqbal/Twombly made it applicable to claims for relief, which is
`clearly not the case.
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`7
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`B.
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`B.E.’s Motion to Strike Google’s Affirmative Defenses Should be Denied.
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`Under the precedent of this Court, affirmative defenses should only be stricken when they
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`are so unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims that it will cause plaintiff prejudice if they remain in the
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`case. Google’s affirmative defenses are not only directly relevant to B.E.’s patent infringement
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`claims, they are in fact standard affirmative defenses to any patent infringement claim.
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`B.E. does not argue that Google’s affirmative defenses are unrelated to its claims.
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`Rather, B.E. argues the affirmative defenses: (1) are largely repetitive of the defenses Google
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`asserted to B.E.’s claims and on that basis alone should be stricken; and (2) unfairly prejudice
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`B.E. because it can not “adequately respond, propound discovery, and prepare for trial.” As for
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`B.E.’s first argument, there is no support in the Sixth Circuit that affirmative defenses repetitive
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`of defenses already asserted should be stricken on that basis alone.
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`As for B.E.’s second argument, first, B.E. does not have any obligation to “respond” to
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`Google’s Affirmative Defenses. Unlike claims or counterclaims, affirmative defenses require no
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`response. Second, this Court has specifically admonished plaintiffs for moving to strike
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`affirmative defenses before any discovery has occurred. See Damron, 2010 WL 6512345, at *2-
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`3. This is especially true in the context of a patent litigation, where, as B.E. itself acknowledges
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`in its Motion, this Court’s patent rules provide a deadline, early in discovery, for Google to detail
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`its contentions, such as non-infringement and invalidity (Google’s First and Sixth Affirmative
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`Defenses). Accordingly, striking Google’s affirmative defenses at this stage of the case would
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`undermine this Court’s patent rules. See also Wistron Corp. v. Phillip M. Adams & Assocs.,
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`LLC, No. C–10–4458 EMC, 2011 WL 1654466, at * 11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (“By
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`requiring the party claiming invalidity to flesh out and support its invalidity contentions early on,
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`the Patent Local Rules fulfill the function of Twombly and Iqbal, namely, mandating early notice
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`Case 2:12-cv-02830-JPM-tmp Document 46 Filed 06/07/13 Page 14 of 22 PageID 563
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`of the factual predicate for the suit so that the court may weed out unmeritorious claims and
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`relieve the defendant from the burden of unnecessary discovery.”). Moreover, B.E. is not
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`prohibited from propounding discovery requests seeking the factual bases for Google’s
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`remaining affirmative defenses. Accordingly, B.E. has not shown that it will be prejudiced by
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`any of Google’s asserted defenses.
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`In light of these considerations, and the fact that each of Google’s defenses is adequately
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`stated under Rules 8(b) and 8(c), as set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike should be
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`denied. Alternatively, to the extent that the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, Defendants
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`respectfully request leave to amend their affirmative defenses in accordance with the Court’s
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`ruling.
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`1.
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`Non-Infringement
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`Google’s First Defense provides that Google has not directly or indirectly infringed any
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`of the patents-in-suit, “either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, directly or indirectly,
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`willfully or otherwise” Doc. No. 25 at 4. This statement of Google’s defense is all that is
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`required to survive a motion to strike. See Avocent Redmond Corp. v. U.S., No. 08-69C, 2009
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`WL 367499, at *1 (Ct. Fed. Cl. Feb. 5, 2009) (finding affirmative defense of non-infringement
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`sufficient to survive a motion to strike where it stated that “[n]either the accused products nor
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`Rose have infringed or infringe any of the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit, either directly,
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`indirectly, literally, or under the doctrine of equivalents”).
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`B.E.’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. First, B.E. contends that Google’s
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`First Defense “does not even constitute an affirmative defense” as Google did not “provide any
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`facts sufficient to show that they even ‘plausible,’ let alone possible….” Doc. No. 36-1 at 9.
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`The Sixth Circuit, however, has expressly “decline[d] to adopt the heightened pleading standard
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`Case 2:12-cv-02830-JPM-tmp Document 46 Filed 06/07/13 Page 15 of 22 PageID 564
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`
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`of Twombly and Iqbal for the pleading of defenses.” Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 467–
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`68 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defense of repose, pled under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1) does not
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`require a heightened pleading standard and that defendant’s pleading was sufficient even though
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`it alleged only that “Plaintiff’s causes of action are barred in whole or in part by the applicable
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`statute of limitations and repose”). Google’s pleading clearly satisfies the standard applied in
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`Montgomery.
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`Second, B.E. asserts that Google’s non-infringement defense should be stricken because
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`“Google denied that it infringed B.E.’s patents, and “[t]here is no need for a redundant
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`affirmative defense.” Doc. No. 36-1 at 9. Under the express language of the Patent Act,
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`however, Google is required to plead non-infringement as a defense. See Trading Tech. Int'l.,
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`Inc. v. BCG Partners, Inc., No. 10-cv-715, 2011 WL 3946581, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2011)
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`(denying patentee’s motion to strike accused infringer’s non-infringement defense and
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`explaining that “the Patent Act requires that defendants plead non-infringement and invalidity as
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`defenses”). B.E. cites no case law that would suggest otherwise. Nor does B.E. cite to any Sixth
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`Circuit authority that would support striking an affirmative defense merely because it is
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`duplicative. Accordingly, B.E.’s Motion to Strike Google’s First Defense should be denied.
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`2.
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`No Injunctive Relief
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`Google’s Second Defense asserts that “B.E. is not entitled to injunctive relief because
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`Google has not infringed and is not infringing any valid claim of the asserted patents, and any
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`purported injury to B.E. is not immediate or irreparable.” Doc. No. 25 at 4. Google further
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`asserts, B.E. “would have an adequate remedy at law” and “the public interest and balance of
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`hardships disfavor an injunction under the circumstances of this case.” Id. B.E. contends that
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`this affirmative defense is duplicative of defenses already plead by Google. However, because
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`B.E. cites no applicable support for its contention that a defense may be stricken merely because
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`it is duplicative, B.E.’s Motion to Strike Google’s Second Defense should be denied.
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`3.
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`No Contributory Infringement
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`Google’s Third Defense states that “[t]o the extent B.E. purports to accuse any Google
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`product, B.E.’s claims for contributory infringement are barred in whole or in part under 35
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`U.S.C. § 271(c) in view of the substantial non-infringing uses of such allegedly infringing
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`product.” Doc. No. 25 at 4. B.E. argues that this defense should be stricken as irrelevant,
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`because “B.E. did not raise a claim for indirect infringement in its complaint.” B.E.’s Complaint
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`provides very little information regarding those claims. Given this lack of guidance and the
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`nature of the products and services at issue, Google presumed that B.E. intended to plead
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`contributory infringement. Of course, Google’s defense of “no contributory infringement” is
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`only necessary to the extent that B.E. intends to pursue such claims.
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`4. Waiver, Acquiescence, Equitable Estoppel, Implied License, and
`Unc