Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 1 of 21 PageID 87
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
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`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`SONY ELECTRONICS INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 2:12-cv-02828 JPM tmp
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`JURY DEMAND
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`PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
`MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)
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`Richard M. Carter (TN B.P.R. #7285)
`Adam C. Simpson (TN B.P.R. #24705)
`MARTIN, TATE, MORROW & MARSTON, P.C.
`6410 Poplar Avenue, Suite 1000
`Memphis, TN 38119-4839
`Telephone: (901) 522-9000
`
`Robert E. Freitas (CA Bar No. 80948)
`Craig R. Kaufman (CA Bar No. 159458)
`Daniel J. Weinberg (CA Bar No. 227159)
`James Lin (CA Bar No. 241472)
`Qudus B. Olaniran (CA Bar No. 267838)
`FREITAS TSENG & KAUFMAN LLP
`100 Marine Parkway, Suite 200
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`Telephone: (650) 593-6300
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`B.E. Technology, L.L.C.
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`-1-
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`Dated: January 25, 2013
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 2 of 21 PageID 88
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
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`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
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`RELEVANT BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 1
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`III.
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`APPLICABLE LAW ......................................................................................................... 2
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`A.
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`B.
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`Motion to Strike Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) ............................. 2
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`The Twombly/Iqbal Standard Applies To Affirmative Defenses .......................... 5
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`IV.
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`SEL’S CONCLUSORY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT WITHSTAND
`A RULE 12(b)(6) CHALLENGE ...................................................................................... 8
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`First Affirmative Defense ...................................................................................... 8
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`Second Affirmative Defense ................................................................................ 11
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`Third Affirmative Defense ................................................................................... 12
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`Fourth Affirmative Defense ................................................................................. 12
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`Fifth Affirmative Defense .................................................................................... 13
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`V.
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`B.E. WILL BE PREJUDICED IF SEL’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ARE
`NOT STRICKEN ............................................................................................................. 13
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`VI.
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`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 14
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`-i-
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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 3 of 21 PageID 89
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`
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`FEDERAL CASES
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`Page(s)
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC¸
`2011 WL 6934557 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) ...............................................................................4
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Bradford Co. v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp.,
`2001 WL 35738792 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 31, 2001) .........................................................................13
`
`Conley v. Gibson,
`355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ...........................................................................................................5, 9
`
`Damron v. ATM Central LLC,
`2010 WL 6512345 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) ........................................................................3
`
`Del-Nat Tire Corp. v. A To Z Tire & Battery, Inc.,
`2009 WL 4884435 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2009) .........................................................................4
`
`Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Watson Laboratories, Inc.,
`2008 WL 5232908 (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2008) ..............................................................................9
`
`Elliot & Frantz, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
`457 F.3d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 2006)...............................................................................................6
`
`Groupon Inc. v. MobGob LLC,
`2011 WL 2111986 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011) .....................................................................10, 14
`
`HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer,
`708 F. Supp. 2d 687 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ..................................................................................3, 4
`
`Holley Performance Prods., Inc. v. Quick Fuel Tech., Inc.,
`2011 WL 3159177 (W.D. Ky. July 26, 2011) ...........................................................................5
`
`Iconfind, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
`2011 WL 4505779 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2011) ...........................................................................12
`
`In re Sterten,
`546 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2008).......................................................................................................6
`
`-ii-
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`
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`FEDERAL CASES
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`Page(s)
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`McLemore v. Regions Bank,
`2010 WL 1010092 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) .......................................................................9
`
`Montgomery v. Wyeth,
`580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................5, 9
`
`PB Farradyne, Inc. v. Peterson,
`2006 WL 132182 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2006) ............................................................................10
`
`Regions Bank v. SoFHA Real Estate, Inc.,
`2010 WL 3341869 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) ....................................................................2, 3
`
`Renalds v. S.R.G. Restaurant Group, Chicago, LLC,
`119 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ......................................................................................12
`
`Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp.,
`2008 WL 2558015 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008).........................................................................4
`
`Shinew v. Wszola,
`2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009) .........................................................................4
`
`Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc.,
`712 F. Supp. 2d 743 (N.D. Ill. 2010) .......................................................................................12
`
`Sprint Comms. Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc.,
`233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kansas 2006) ............................................................................................10
`
`Surface Shields, Inc. v. Poly-Tak Protection Sys., Inc.,
`213 F.R.D. 307 (N.D. Ill. 2003) .................................................................................................3
`
`Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co.,
`777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (D. Del. 2011) ...................................................................................6, 7, 8
`
`United States v. Quadrini,
`2007 WL 4303213 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007) ..........................................................................4
`
`Williams v. Provident Inv. Counsel, Inc.,
`279 F. Supp. 2d 894, 906 (N.D. Ohio 2003) ..............................................................................3
`
`Westbrook v. Paragon Sys. Inc.,
`2007 WL 7715075 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) ...........................................................................4
`
`Zampieri v. Zampieri,
`2009 WL 3241741 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2009) ........................................................................4
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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 5 of 21 PageID 91
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`FEDERAL STATUTES
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`Page(s)
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`35 U.S.C. § 100 ................................................................................................................................9
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`35 U.S.C. § 101 ........................................................................................................................2, 8, 9
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`35 U.S.C. § 102 ..................................................................................................................2, 8, 9, 10
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`35 U.S.C. § 103 ............................................................................................................2, 8, 9, 10, 11
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`35 U.S.C. § 112 ..................................................................................................................2, 8, 9, 11
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`35 U.S.C. § 286 ..........................................................................................................................2, 13
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`35 U.S.C. § 288 ....................................................................................................................2, 12, 13
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`RULES
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 7(a) ..................................................................................................................8
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a) ....................................................................................................4, 5, 6, 14
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a)(2) .............................................................................................................3
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(b) ......................................................................................................4, 5, 6, 7
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(b)(1)(A) .......................................................................................................7
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(c) ........................................................................................................ passim
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 ....................................................................................................................7
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(f) ...................................................................................................... passim
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b) ................................................................................................................3
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) .......................................................................................................3, 8
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c) ................................................................................................................8
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(h)(2) ...........................................................................................................8
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 19(b) ................................................................................................................8
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller,
`Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 1380 (3d ed. 2004) ....................................................2
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`5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller,
`Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 1381 (3d ed. 2004) ....................................................7
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION.
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`Plaintiff B.E. Technology, L.L.C. (“B.E.”) respectfully moves to strike defendant Sony
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`Electronics Inc.’s (“SEL”) Affirmative Defenses that B.E.’s pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
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`Procedure 12(f). For the reasons stated below, the Court should grant B.E.’s motion.
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`II.
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`RELEVANT BACKGROUND.
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`B.E. is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in
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`Memphis, Tennessee. D.E. 1. B.E. owns all right, title, and interest in United States Patent No.
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`6,771,290 (“’290 patent”). The ’290 patent is entitled “Computer Interface Method And
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`Apparatus With Portable Network Organization System And Targeted Advertising,” and claims
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`inventions related to user interfaces for maintaining, organizing and communicating information
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`accessible to a computer network such as the Internet and, in particular, to user interfaces that
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`provide the user with availability to that information in a personalized manner. Id.
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`SEL is a Delaware corporation. B.E. filed its Complaint in this matter on September 21,
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`2012. Id. B.E. alleged that “[SEL] has infringed at least Claim 2 of the ’290 patent by using,
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`selling, and offering to sell in the United States tablet computer products that directly infringe at
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`least Claim 2 of the ’290 patent either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. The accused
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`products include Smart Phones: Xperia Smartphones; Smart TVs: LED HX750 Internet TVs,
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`LED EX640 Internet TVs, Google TV; Smart Blu-Ray/DVD Player: Sony 3D Blu-Ray Disc
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`Player, Sony Streaming Player; Game Consoles: PS 2, PS 3, PS Vita; e-Readers: Reader PRST1,
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`Reader PRST2; Tablets: Xperia Tablet S, Sony Tablet S, Sony Tablet P.” Id. at 2-3. Following
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`a substantial extension of time designed to permit, among other things, SEL to investigate the
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`claims of the complaint (see D.E. 13 at 3), SEL filed its Answer on December 31, 2012. D.E.
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`20.
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`SEL’s First Affirmative Defense states that, “[t]he ’290 Patent is wholly or partially
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`invalid for failure to comply with one or more of the conditions and requirements of the patent
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`laws, including, but not limited to, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 and 112, and the rules, regulations
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`and laws pertaining to those provisions.” D.E. 20 at 3.
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`SEL’s Second Affirmative Defense states that “SEL has not directly infringed, induced
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`others to infringe, or committed acts of contributory infringement of any valid and enforceable
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`claim of the ’290 Patent, either literally or by the doctrine of equivalents.” D.E. 20 at 3.
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`SEL’s Third Affirmative Defense states that “BET’s claims of infringement are barred in
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`whole or in part by the equitable doctrine of laches.” D.E. 20 at 3.
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`SEL’s Fourth Affirmative Defense states that “BET is barred from receiving costs
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`associated with this action under 35 U.S.C.§ 288.” D.E. 20 at 3.
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`SEL’s Fifth Affirmative Defense states that “BET’s claims for damages for any alleged
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`infringement are time limited under 35 U.S.C. § 286.” D.E. 20 at 3.
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`SEL’s Affirmative Defenses should be stricken.
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`III. APPLICABLE LAW.
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`A. Motion to Strike Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
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`Under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court may strike from a
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`pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
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`matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is the primary procedure for
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`objecting to an insufficient defense.” Regions Bank v. SoFHA Real Estate, Inc., 2010 WL
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`3341869, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (citing 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller,
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`Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 1380 (3d ed. 2004)). “[C]ourts have developed a three-
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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 9 of 21 PageID 95
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`part test to determine whether an affirmative defense survives a motion to strike.” HCRI TRS
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`Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
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`First, the matter must be properly pleaded as an affirmative
`defense. Second, the affirmative defense must be adequately
`pleaded under the requirements on Federal Rules of Civil
`Procedure 8 and 9. Finally, the affirmative defense must be able to
`withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.”
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`Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Surface Shields, Inc. v. Poly-Tak
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`Protection Sys., Inc., 213 F.R.D. 307, 308 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (applying the three-part test); Regions
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`Bank, 2010 WL 3341869, at *12 (“It has been recognized . . . that if a defendant’s affirmative
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`defense cannot withstand a Rule 12(b) challenge, the defense may be stricken as legally
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`insufficient.”) (citing Williams v. Provident Inv. Counsel, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 894, 906 (N.D.
`
`Ohio 2003)).
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`To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
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`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
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`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
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`(2007)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
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`550 U.S. at 555; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the
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`claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). As the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal,
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`“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
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`draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
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`U.S. at 678.
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`There is a split of authority, however, whether the Twombly/Iqbal standard applies to
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`affirmative defenses, and no Sixth Circuit or other circuit case law addresses the issue. Damron
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`v. ATM Central LLC, 2010 WL 6512345, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) (“The Sixth Circuit
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`has yet to decide whether the new pleading standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal apply to
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`affirmative defenses and the district courts are divided on the issue.”); Del-Nat Tire Corp. v. A
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`To Z Tire & Battery, Inc., 2009 WL 4884435, *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2009) (“Neither the Sixth
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`Circuit Court of Appeals nor any of the other Courts of Appeals have addressed this issue, and
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`the district courts have reached different conclusions.”). See also United States v. Quadrini,
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`2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007) (“Like the plaintiff, a defendant must also
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`plead sufficient facts to demonstrate a plausible affirmative defense, or one that has a
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`‘reasonably founded hope’ of success.”); Zampieri v. Zampieri, 2009 WL 3241741, at *3 (E.D.
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`Tenn. Sept. 30, 2009) (applying Twombly standard to the pleading of affirmative defenses).
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`District courts that have applied the Twombly/Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses
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`recognize that the underlying rationale of the Supreme Court’s decisions extend to affirmative
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`defenses. See, e.g., Shinew v. Wszola, 2009 WL 1076279, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009)
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`(“The Twombly decision also observed that discovery costs required to explore the factual basis
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`for a pleaded claim or defense are a problem.”); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., 2008
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`WL 2558015, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008) (explaining that applying the Twombly/Iqbal
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`standard to affirmative defenses will help streamline litigation). On the other hand, courts
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`concluding that the Twombly/Iqbal standard does not apply to affirmative defenses rely on
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`differences in the language of Rule 8(a), Rule 8(b), and Rule 8(c). See, e.g., Westbrook v.
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`Paragon Sys. Inc., 2007 WL 7715075, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) (“Neither [Rule 8(b) nor
`
`Rule 8(c)] expresses a requirement that the answer ‘show’ the defendant is entitled to prevail on
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`its affirmative defense.”); Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC¸ 2011 WL
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`6934557, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (stating that “textual differences between Rule 8(a),
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`which requires that a plaintiff asserting a claim show entitlement to relief, and Rule 8(c), which
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`requires only that the defendant state any defenses”) (emphasis in original); but see HCRI TRS
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`Acquirer, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 690-91 (“While the language in Civil Rule 8(a) differs from the
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`language in Civil Rule 8(b) & (c), this difference is minimal and simply reflects the fact that an
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`answer is a response to a complaint.”).
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`One post-Twombly/Iqbal Sixth Circuit decision, that did not address Twombly or Iqbal,
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`held that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a heightened pleading standard
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`for a statute of repose defense.” Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009)
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`(addressing whether the statute of repose defense codified in the Tennessee Products Liability
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`Act had been waived). The Court relied on Supreme Court precedent that a plaintiff must “give
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`the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
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`Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
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`41, 47 (1957)). A few district courts in this circuit have likened the Sixth Circuit’s comments on
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`the pleading requirements of the statute of repose—not an affirmative defense—to affirmative
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`defenses. See, e.g., Holley Performance Prods., Inc. v. Quick Fuel Tech., Inc., 2011 WL
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`3159177, at *2 (W.D. Ky. July 26, 2011) (“Given the Sixth Circuit’s ‘fair notice’ standard for
`
`pleading affirmative defenses, its ruling in Montgomery, and the total absence of appellate
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`precedent on this issue the Court declines to adopt the heightened pleading standard of Twombly
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`and Iqbal for the pleading of defenses.”). The Montgomery case does not address the holdings of
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`Twombly or Iqbal, neither of which articulates a “heightened pleading standard,” but B.E.
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`submits that the Twombly/Iqbal standard applies equally to defenses as it does to claims for
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`relief.
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`B.
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`The Twombly/Iqbal Standard Applies To Affirmative Defenses.
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`The Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards should apply to affirmative defenses because the
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`rationale upon which courts rely to conclude otherwise represents a misunderstanding of Rule
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`8(c). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
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`showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;” Rule 8(b) requires a pleader to “state in short and
`
`plain terms its defenses;” and Rule 8(c) requires a pleader to “affirmatively state any avoidance
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`or affirmative defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (b), & (c). In Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic
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`Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (D. Del. 2011), the court relied on these language differences to
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`support a holding that the Twombly/Iqbal standard does not apply to affirmative defenses. 777 F.
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`Supp. 2d at 900. In particular, the court noted that Rule 8(a) requires the pleading of a “short and
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`plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” whereas Rule 8(c)
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`requires a pleader to “state” affirmative defenses without mentioning any required “showing.”
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`Id. at 897. Rule 8(c), however, does not merely say that a defendant must “state” its defense, it
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`provides that “a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense,” and lists
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`examples of matters that must be pleaded affirmatively. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). The point of Rule
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`8(c) is that matters of avoidance or affirmative defense must be affirmatively stated, on pain of
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`waiver. The drafters of the rule did not intend to specify the form of the required affirmative
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`statement, and the essence of Rule 8(c) is missed by a reading separating “affirmatively” from
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`“state.” See In re Sterten, 546 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Rule 8(c) governs affirmative
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`defenses, which are generally waived if not specifically raised by responsive pleading or by
`
`appropriate motion.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Elliot & Frantz, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand
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`Co., 457 F.3d 312, 321 (3d Cir. 2006)). Rule 8(c) does not concern the sufficiency of the
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`allegations of an affirmative defense.
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`It is Rule 8(b), not Rule 8(c), which provides the pleading requirement for defenses
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`analogous to the requirement of Rule 8(a) applicable to claims for relief. Like Rule 8(a), Rule
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`8(b) requires a “short and plain” statement. The defendant must “state in short and plain terms
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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 13 of 21 PageID 99
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`its defenses to each claim asserted against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(A). Given its purpose,
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`Rule 8(b) could not be expected to require that the defendant’s short and plain statement of its
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`defense show that the defendant “is entitled to relief.” That is not the point of a defense. A
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`defense is supposed to show that the plaintiff is “not entitled to relief,” and there is no reason to
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`expect the rule to specify the obvious fact that this is what the defense should show, and no
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`distinction to be drawn from the absence of a reference to the required “showing.” Nothing
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`would be added if Rule 8(b)(1)(A) said that must “state in short and plaint terms its defenses to
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`each claim asserted against it showing that the opposing party is not entitled to relief” or “state in
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`short and plaint terms its defenses showing that the opposing party is not entitled to relief to each
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`claim asserted against it.”
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`Rule 12(f) itself makes clear that the Tyco court was wrong to find in Rule 8(c) a basis for
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`excluding a content requirement on the “statement” of an affirmative defense. Rule 12(f)
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`provides, among other things, that an “insufficient defense” may be stricken. There is no reason
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`to doubt that the “insufficiency” concept embodied in Rule 12(f) includes that “insufficient”
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`factual statement of a defense, as there is little else it could include, and many cases support the
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`conclusion that defenses are to be tested for their factual sufficiency. Indeed, Rule 12(f) was
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`added in 1948 to provide a specific basis for a pleading attack on the sufficiency of an
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`affirmative defense after debate in the courts as to the proper basis on which such challenges
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`could be made. See Advisory Committee Note on 1948 Amendment of Rule 12; 5C Charles
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`Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 1381 (3d ed. 2004).1
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`1 The Wright and Miller treatise explains the situation as follows: “As indicated in the Advisory
`Committee’s Note accompanying the 1948 amendment, prior to the modification of Rule 12(f) in
`that year the method of challenging the sufficiency of a defense was a matter that troubled some
`federal courts, although an attack was permitted ‘in one way or another.’ Some pre-amendment
`decisions insisted that the motion to strike was not an appropriate remedy to test a pleading’s
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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 14 of 21 PageID 100
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`The Tyco court’s error is also made clear by Rule 12(h)(2), which provides that “[f]ailure
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`to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, to join a person required by Rule 19(b), or to
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`state a legal defense to a claim may be raised” in any Rule 7(a) pleading, in a Rule 12(c) motion,
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`or at trial. If “state” in Rule 8(c) had the meaning suggested in Tyco (to “state” in any manner,
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`regardless of form, and without regard to whether an entitlement to relief is shown), Rule
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`12(h)(2) would make no sense. A “failure to state a defense” would be an omission to assert the
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`defense, something that would never be challenged by the opposing party in a pleading, a
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`motion, or at trial, as there would be nothing to challenge. A plaintiff would have no need to
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`challenge a defense that was not “stated” at any of these stages of a case.
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`IV.
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`SEL’S CONCLUSORY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT WITHSTAND A
`RULE 12(b)(6) CHALLENGE.
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`A.
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`First Affirmative Defense.
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`SEL’s First Affirmative Defense of invalidity states that “[t]he ’290 Patent is wholly or
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`partially invalid for failure to comply with one or more of the conditions and requirements of the
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`patent laws, including, but not limited to, 35 U.S.C. § 101, 102, 103 and 112, and the rules,
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`regulations and laws pertaining to those provisions.” D.E. 20 at 3. This is deficient under any
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`pleading standard.
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`Even if this court determines that the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard does not govern,
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`an affirmative defense that fails to specify the grounds for invalidity and fails to state sufficient
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`facts may be stricken under Rule 12(f) because it does not provide “fair notice” of the defense.
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`sufficiency; other courts considered that the proper vehicle for dealing with an insufficient
`defense was either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment; yet another group of
`cases prior to the amendment treated a Rule 12(f) motion as if it were a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
`However, a number of courts did accept the proposition that there should be some mechanism for
`disposing of a wholly insufficient defense at the pleading stage and concluded that a motion to
`strike was an acceptable remedy. This last approach obviously was the one formally adopted by
`the rulemakers in 1948.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 15 of 21 PageID 101
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`“[T]he Sixth Circuit has consistently used ‘fair notice’ as the standard for whether a defendant
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`has sufficiently pleaded an affirmative defense.” McLemore v. Regions Bank, 2010 WL
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`1010092, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010); see also Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 468 (“citing
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`Conley for the “fair notice” requirement). Invalidity affirmative defenses have been struck under
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`Rule 12(f) for lack of fair notice when they take the form of SEL’s conclusory, fact-free,
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`recitation of the section of Title 35 of the United States code.
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`In Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Watson Laboratories, Inc., 2008 WL 5232908 (D.
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`Nev. Dec. 12, 2008), for example, the defendant asserted a counterclaim for a declaratory
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`judgment and an affirmative defense that the asserted patent was not valid. The affirmative
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`defense alleged that “[t]he claims of the ’969 patent are invalid because they fail to comply with
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`one or more of the statutory requirements of patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.”
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`2008 WL 5232908, at *4. The District of Nevada granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike for the
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`same reasons that it granted the motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment counterclaim: “[b]y
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`failing to specify which of the many possible grounds of patent invalidity it is relying upon,
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`[defendant] does not put [plaintiff] on fair notice as to the basis of its counterclaim.” Id.
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`Duramed relied on Qarbon.com v. eHelp Corp., which dismissed a similarly deficient
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`invalidity counterclaim, finding it “radically insufficient.” Qarbon.com, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046,
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`1050 (N.D. Cal. 2004). In Qarbon.com, the district court explained that
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`eHelp alleges that “the ’441 patent is invalid and void under the
`provisions of Title 35, United States Code §§ 100 et seq., and
`specifically, §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112 . . . .” Such a pleading is
`“radically insufficient” . . . By making general allegations, eHelp
`fails to give “fair notice” to Qarbon. “Effective notice pleading
`should provide the defendant with a basis for assessing the initial
`strength of the plaintiff’s claim, for preserving relevant evidence,
`for identifying any related counter-or cross-claims, and for
`preparing an appropriate answer.”
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`Case 2:12-cv-02828-JPM-tmp Document 23-1 Filed 01/25/13 Page 16 of 21 PageID 102
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`Id. at 1050-51 (internal citations omitted); see also Groupon Inc. v. MobGob LLC, 2011 WL
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`2111986, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011) (“In its second affirmative defense, MobGob claims that
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`the patent is invalid, but rather than providing Groupon with notice of the basis for its claims, it
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`simply cites a whole series of statutory provisions that address a number of topics.”); Sprint
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`Comms. Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615, 618 (D. Kansas 2006) (“Title 35 of the
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`United States code includes 112 discreet sections. It is unreasonable to make Sprint guess which
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`of these sections [defendant] is relying upon to contend that Sprint’s patent claims are
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`unenforceable.”); PB Farradyne, Inc. v. Peterson, 2006 WL 132182, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17,
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`2006) (striking invalidity affirmative defense that alleged “[t]o the extent they are alleged to be
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`infringed, the claims of the ‘950 and ‘724 patents are invalid for failure to meet one or more of
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`the require