Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 1 of 14 PageID 728
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
`
`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Civil Action No. 12-cv-02824-JPM-tmp
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG TELECOMMUNICATIONS
`AMERICA, LLC,
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
`
`Civil Action No. 12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA
`INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`THE SAMSUNG DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO
`COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL INFRINGEMENT CONTENTIONS
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 2 of 14 PageID 729
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`B.E. HAS NOT PROVIDED REASONABLE NOTICE OF ITS
`INFRINGEMENT THEORIES…………………………… ............................................. 1
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`This Court's Multilayer Decision Does Not Make Unexplained
`Screenshots Adequate To Satisfy L.P.R. 3.1. ........................................................ 1
`
`B.E.’s Opposition Brief Demonstrates the Inadequacy of Its Contentions
`By Attempting To Fill In the Holes In Its Contentions. ........................................ 3
`
`The Explanations B.E. Provides For the First Time In Its Opposition Are
`Insufficient to Put Samsung On Notice of B.E.'s Infringement Theories. ............. 3
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`“User Profile”............................................................................................. 3
`
`“User Library” ........................................................................................... 4
`
`“Server”...................................................................................................... 4
`
`“User-Selectable Items … A Link to an Information Resource
`Accessible via the Network” ...................................................................... 5
`
`“Operable upon Execution to Receive from Server One of the User
`Profiles” ..................................................................................................... 5
`
`“Display a User-Selectable Item for User Links Contained within
`the User Profile” … “Access the File Associated with the Selected
`User Link from the User Library Associated with the Received
`User Profile” .............................................................................................. 6
`
`7.
`
`“Browser.” ................................................................................................. 6
`
`D.
`
`B.E’s Allegations Against the Google-Samsung Galaxy Nexus Are Not
`Illustrative of the Entirety of B.E.’s ICs. ............................................................... 7
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Use of Advertisements. .............................................................................. 7
`
`“Non-volatile storage device.” ................................................................... 8
`
`“Program stored on said non-volatile data storage device.” ...................... 8
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`
`
`B.E.’S CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
`DO NOT COMPLY WITH LPR 3.1(E)…………………… ............................................ 8
`
`B.E.’S CROSS-MOTION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING A
`REPRESENTATIVE PRODUCTS STIPULATION SHOULD BE DENIED ................. 9
`
`CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………….…….10
`-i-
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 3 of 14 PageID 730
`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Creagi, Inc. v. Pinnacliffe, Inc.,
`11-cv-06635 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 5389775 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2012) ......................... 8, 9
`
`Digital Reg of Texas, LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`12-01971, 2013 WL 633406 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013) ........................................................... 1
`
`Droplets, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`C12-03733, 2013 WL 1563256 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2013) .......................................... 2, 3, 4, 5
`
`France Telecom, SA v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.,
`12-cv-04967 WHA (NC), 2013 WL 1878912, (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) ............................. 9
`
`Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. MSC Mktg. & Tech., Inc.,
`2:12-cv-02112-JPM-tmp (D.E. 90), (W.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013) ..................................... 1, 2, 6
`
`RULES
`
`Local Patent Rule 3.1 ...................................................................................................... 1, 2, 3, 6, 9
`
`
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 4 of 14 PageID 731
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`Defendants
`
`Samsung Electronics America,
`
`Inc.
`
`(“SEA”)
`
`and
`
`Samsung
`
`Telecommunications America, LLC (“STA”) (collectively, “Samsung”) hereby submit their
`
`reply in support of their motion to compel Plaintiff B.E. Technology, Inc. (“B.E.” or “Plaintiff”)
`
`to serve supplemental infringement contentions that comply with Local Patent Rule (“L.P.R.”)
`
`3.1.
`
`I.
`
`B.E. HAS NOT PROVIDED REASONABLE NOTICE OF ITS INFRINGEMENT
`THEORIES
`
`A.
`
`This Court’s Multilayer Decision Does Not Make Unexplained Screenshots
`Adequate To Satisfy L.P.R. 3.1.
`
`This Court recently held that initial infringement contentions must provide “reasonable
`
`notice to the defendant why the plaintiff believes it has a reasonable chance of proving
`
`infringement and raise a reasonable inference that all accused products infringe.” See Multilayer
`
`Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. MSC Mktg. & Tech., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-02112-JPM-tmp
`
`(D.E. 90), slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013) (citing Digital Reg. of Texas, LLC v. Adobe
`
`Sys., Inc., No. CV 12-01971-CW (KAW), 2013 WL 633406, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2013))
`
`(Ex. 1).1 B.E.’s infringement contentions (“ICs”) are deficient under this standard. B.E. does
`
`not dispute that its ICs include 10,000+ pages that do only two things: (1) repeat the claim
`
`language, and (2) include a series of unadorned, unexplained screenshots. These infringement
`
`contentions do not provide “reasonable notice” because they do not provide any explanation
`
`linking the screenshots, or any portions thereof, to the claim language. For example, the
`
`contentions use the same screenshot for different elements of the same claims, without any
`
`explanation. (See, e.g. Olaniran Decl. Ex. 6 (D.E. 53-7) at 16 and 35.) Indeed, L.P.R. 3.1
`
`1 Unless otherwise noted, all exhibits referenced herein are attached to the concurrently-
`submitted Reply Declaration of Justin A. MacLean in support of Samsung’s motion to compel
`supplemental infringement contentions. All references to “D.E.” refer to docket entries in B.E. v.
`STA, No. 2:12-cv-2824; identical motions and oppositions have been filed in B.E. v. SEA, No.
`2:12-cv-2825.
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 5 of 14 PageID 732
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`requires a “chart identifying specifically where each limitation of each asserted claim is found
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`within each Accused Instrumentality.” That requirement is not satisfied by unexplained
`
`screenshots: a claim chart which “parrots the language of the claim limitations, provides screen
`
`shots … and then states that [defendant’s] product infringes” is insufficient. Droplets, Inc. v.
`
`Amazon.com, Inc., No. C12-03733, 2013 WL 1563256 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2013) (evaluating
`
`compliance with identical language in the N.D. Cal. Patent Local Rules).
`
`Nothing in the Multilayer case suggests that unexplained screenshots are sufficient to
`
`satisfy L.P.R. 3.1. Indeed, the opposite is true. By applying the law established in the Northern
`
`District of California, because the Local Patent Rules here are similar to the rules there,
`
`Multilayer confirms that the reasoning in cases such as Droplets should be applied here to find
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`that unexplained screenshots are insufficient.
`
`This case is also different from the Multilayer case because there, the defendant was able
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`to provide initial noninfringement contentions in response to the plaintiff’s infringement
`
`contentions, and had waited for over a year to file its motion to compel. (See Ex. 2, at 2-3.)
`
`Here, Samsung is not able to provide the type of noninfringement contentions it would normally
`
`provide due to the lack of specificity in B.E.’s ICs.2 Moreover, Samsung filed its motion
`
`promptly after the stay in the instant litigation was lifted.
`
`
`2 B.E.’s statement that “the defendants … made a presentation to the Court at the initial case
`management conference that demonstrated a deep understanding of the patent-in-suit and the
`defendants’ belief that they do not infringe” (D.E. 53 at 19; see also id. at 1) is inaccurate with
`respect to Samsung. While some defendants in the co-pending litigations involving B.E.
`presented on ways that networked-computing technology generally would not infringe the
`patent-in-suit, Samsung’s attorneys did not give this presentation, and no statement was made
`about how Samsung’s products specifically do not meet each and every limitation of the ‘290
`patent claims, and for good reason: Samsung did not, and still does not, understand B.E.’s
`contentions as to why it believes Samsung’s products meet these limitations.
`-2-
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 6 of 14 PageID 733
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`B.
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`B.E.’s Opposition Brief Demonstrates The Inadequacy Of Its Contentions By
`Attempting To Fill In The Holes In Its Contentions.
`
`In its opposition brief (“Opposition”) (D.E. 53), B.E. defends its ICs by offering, for the
`
`very first time, explanations of how the bare screenshots included in its ICs connect to the
`
`limitations of the claim. If the descriptions in B.E.’s Opposition provide adequate notice to
`
`Samsung of B.E.’s infringement theories, which they do not as discussed in the following
`
`section, then these statements should have been in B.E.’s ICs. It is the ICs, and not any follow-
`
`up briefing, that must “identify[] specifically where each limitation of each asserted claim is
`
`found….” LPR 3.1(c). Explanation in an opposition brief is insufficient and highlights the
`
`inadequacy of B.E.’s contentions. See Droplets, 2013 WL 1563256, at *5.
`
`C.
`
`The Explanations B.E. Provides For The First Time In Its Opposition Are
`Insufficient To Put Samsung on Notice of B.E.’s Infringement Theories.
`
`Even B.E.’s attempts in its Opposition to link the screenshots to the claim language in its
`
`ICs are insufficient to give Samsung reasonable notice of B.E.’s infringement theories, and do
`
`not raise a reasonable inference that all accused products infringe.
`
`1.
`
`“User Profile”
`
`B.E. asserts in its Opposition that “the ‘Google Account’ meets the ‘user profile’
`
`limitation” as applied to the Google-Samsung Galaxy Nexus product. (D.E. 53 at 7; see also id.
`
`at 12, “the ‘user profile’ is the ‘Google Account’ and ‘Samsung Account.’”) However, this
`
`contention appears to contradict B.E.’s ICs, which state that the Google Account is something
`
`that “[t]he user may use … to access his or her Google user profile….” (Olaniran Decl. Ex. 6
`
`(D.E. 53-7) at 1.) Thus, according to the ICs, the Google Account accessing the “user profile” is
`
`not the “user profile” itself, and B.E.’s Opposition only creates further confusion as to where
`
`B.E. contends the “user profile” exists in the accused products.
`
`
`
`-3-
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 7 of 14 PageID 734
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`2.
`
`“User Library”
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`Even with B.E.’s Opposition, Samsung cannot tell what in its products B.E. contends
`
`meets the “user library” limitation. The Opposition specifies that it is “the user’s ‘music files,
`
`books, magazine [sic], TV shows, movies, [and] apps’ constitute the ‘one or more files’ that are
`
`contained within the user’s library, and that links within the user’s profile enable access to those
`
`‘one or more files’” (D.E. 53 at 7). This does not say what the library is—at most it describes
`
`what it contains. Is the library the entire phone?
`
`Moreover, B.E. goes on to contradict itself, stating that its screenshots “show what
`
`happens when the previously identified links from the user’s library are selected.” (Id. at 11.)
`
`But according to B.E.’s earlier statement, links are found in the user profile, not the user library.
`
`This contradiction underscores the confusion created by B.E.’s vague contentions; even B.E.
`
`seems not to be sure what it is accusing of infringement.
`
`3.
`
`“Server”
`
`B.E. now identifies quotes from various advertisements, allegedly from Google’s
`
`website, that it contends evidence the presence and role of a “server.” (D.E. 53 at 7-8.) The link
`
`between the advertising statements and the claimed “server” was not made clear until B.E.’s
`
`Opposition, which is impermissible. See Droplets, 2013 WL 1563256, at *5. Moreover, the
`
`Opposition only refers to “evidence [of] B.E.’s contention that the applications are stored on
`
`servers … because the applications can be accessed from multiple devices.” (D.E. 53 at 8.)
`
`Samsung still does not know what B.E. contends is the server storing the accused “user profile”
`
`as claimed in the ‘290 Patent.
`
`
`
`-4-
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 8 of 14 PageID 735
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`4.
`
`“User-Selectable Items … A Link to an Information Resource
`Accessible via the Network”
`
`B.E. acknowledges that the text in its ICs “incorporates the claim language” and then
`
`“immediately provides images to substantiate the contentions contains [sic] therein.” (D.E. 53 at
`
`9.) The insufficiency of these bare statements (see Droplets, 2013 WL 1563256, at *5) is
`
`demonstrated by the need to spend the next paragraph describing what exactly those screenshots
`
`depict. B.E. now contends, for instance, that “YouTube is operable to show a number of user
`
`selectable items on the ‘YouTube Autos’ page, including” three specific apparently user-
`
`selectable items. Samsung still does not understand—even after reading B.E.’s Opposition—
`
`whether B.E. contends that these three items constitutes the “number of user-selectable items”
`
`that meet that particular claim limitation, or whether every item displayed on the “YouTube
`
`Autos” page constitutes such “number of user selectable items.” The ‘290 patent also requires
`
`separate “user-selectable items,” “links,” and “information resource[s] over the network,” all of
`
`which are “associated with” each other, but Samsung does not understand, even from B.E.’s
`
`Opposition, whether the aforementioned “user selectable items” constitute any or all of these
`
`three features.3
`
`5.
`
`“Operable upon Execution to Receive from Server One of the User
`Profiles”
`
`B.E.’s Opposition acknowledges that the claim requires “receipt” from the server of “one
`
`of the user profiles” upon “execution” (D.E. 53 at 10), but fails to describe how its ICs (in
`
`screenshots or otherwise) depict the programs installed on the accused products “receiving” a
`
`
`3 Moreover, the Opposition is the first time that B.E. has attempted to link the “Audi R8 video
`playing at the 3:17 mark” with the “preceding screen capture,” and even then, does not explicitly
`state that the “Audi R8 video” was “accessed” by selecting a link associated with that video in
`the “preceding screen capture” nor that the video was accessed “via the network” (as opposed to
`locally). While Samsung can now hazard a guess that this is what B.E. contends—guided for the
`first time by statements in B.E.’s Opposition—that is not enough to provide reasonable notice.
`-5-
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`
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 9 of 14 PageID 736
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`user profile “from the server” as required by the claims. As B.E. admits, its ICs state that the
`
`program does this in a conclusory fashion (id.; see also Olaniran Decl. Ex. 6, at 9 (D.E. 53-7)),
`
`but does not “specifically identify where [this] limitation … is found within each Accused
`
`Instrumentality.” As a result, the ICs do not provide Samsung with “reasonable notice as to why”
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`B.E. believes this element is met as required by LPR 3.1(c). See Multilayer, slip op. at 1-2.
`
`6.
`
`“Display a User-Selectable Item for User Links Contained within the
`User Profile” … “Access the File Associated with the Selected User
`Link from the User Library Associated with the Received User
`Profile”
`
`B.E.’s contentions suggest that these limitations are present somewhere in the accused
`
`devices. But that is not enough. Here, again, the ‘290 patent requires separate (but associated)
`
`“user-selectable items,” “user links,” and “files,” and Samsung is at a loss as to whether the
`
`described items constitute any or all of these three elements. Moreover, the user-selectable item
`
`at issue in this claim phrase of the ‘290 patent must be displayed “upon execution,” and it is
`
`unclear whether B.E. contends, for instance, only one or all five of the “My Apps” page, “image
`
`of the user’s books,” “links for the user’s magazine’s [sic],” “music,” and/or “movies” (see D.E.
`
`53 at 10) are displayed upon execution. B.E. fails to specify this in its ICs or its Opposition.
`
`7.
`
`“Browser.”
`
`Samsung raised the insufficiency of B.E.’s contentions with respect to Dependent Claim
`
`3 of the ‘290 patent (D.E. 46 at 7 n.5), including the lack of screenshots or other explanatory
`
`material, and B.E. made no response in its Opposition. Thus, B.E. should be compelled to
`
`identify where the additional limitations in Claim 3 are met with respect to each of the accused
`
`products.4
`
`
`4 Claim 3 of the ‘290 patent requires that each program B.E. accuses of infringing be “operable
`upon execution and in response to selection of one of the “user selectable items” identified in
`Claim 2, part (c), to access the associated information resource over the network using a browser.
`-6-
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 10 of 14 PageID 737
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`D.
`
`B.E’s Allegations Against the Google-Samsung Galaxy Nexus Are Not
`Illustrative of the Entirety of B.E.’s ICs.
`
`Instead of squarely addressing B.E.’s deficiencies with respect to its contentions against
`
`the Samsung Acclaim product (see Pettus Decl. Ex. A (D.E. 46-2)), B.E. chose to “walk
`
`through” its contentions against a totally different product, the Google-Samsung Galaxy Nexus.
`
`(See Olaniran Decl. Ex. 6 (D.E. 53-7).) B.E.’s decision to do this highlights differences between
`
`its contentions against the Galaxy Nexus and those against the Acclaim (and other accused
`
`products), thereby effectively conceding that the latter contentions are deficient. Moreover,
`
`based on B.E.’s comments with respect to this different product, Samsung has uncovered several
`
`other similar deficiencies in B.E.’s contentions with respect to other products. For example:
`
`1.
`
`Use of Advertisements.
`
` B.E. describes its contentions with respect to the Nexus product as containing “images
`
`from the defendants’ advertising materials for the Nexus smartphone” (D.E. 53 at 7) and further
`
`argues that “use of the accused infringer’s advertising materials is sufficient evidence for initial
`
`infringement contentions,” (D.E. 53 at 4). Not only did Samsung not previously understand that
`
`B.E.’s screenshots depict “advertising materials for the Nexus smartphone,” B.E.’s contentions
`
`against the Samsung Acclaim product clearly do not reference “advertising materials” for the
`
`Acclaim phone. To the contrary, they reference “articles” allegedly pulled from Google’s and
`
`Samsung’s websites, discussing the general features of various applications. (D.E. 46-2 at 2-9.)
`
`The same is true for the vast majority of the other accused products.
`
`
`(‘290 patent, claim 3.) The patent defines a “browser” as a program that can communicate over
`a network using http or another protocol and that can display html information and other
`information. (‘290 patent, col. 3, ll. 65-67.) B.E. should, at the very least, identify what it
`contends is html information and what it contends is other (non-html) information, in a
`screenshot or similar description for each accused product and program.
`-7-
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 11 of 14 PageID 738
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`2.
`
`“Non-volatile storage device.”
`
`B.E. argues that the “publicly available specifications for the Nexus smartphones
`
`showing the internal memory” are sufficient to show the “non-volatile data storage device” (D.E.
`
`53 at 8; see also D.E. 53-7 at 4-5). However, the claim chart for B.E.’s contentions against the
`
`Samsung Acclaim does not depict “publicly available specifications… showing the internal
`
`memory,” but rather a similar set of screenshots apparently used to depict the allegedly
`
`infringing programs. (See D.E. 46-2 at 9-14.)
`
`3.
`
`“Program stored on said non-volatile data storage device.”
`
`B.E. argues that its ICs for the Nexus smartphone “explain[] that the Nexus smartphone
`
`contains a program, including identifying by name the programs, stored on the above-mentioned
`
`non-volatile data storage device in a computer readable format,” and then “include[] a screen
`
`shot of … Google Play [and] YouTube program[s] in operation.” (D.E. 53 at 8.) But nothing in
`
`B.E.’s screenshots indicates that Google Play, YouTube, or any of the other accused software
`
`applications are actually contained on the Nexus or Acclaim products. In fact, with respect to
`
`other products, the screenshots contain conflicting information on which programs are in fact
`
`included with the product. (See Ex. 3, contention that the Samsung Galaxy Camera “includes a
`
`program, Google Play, YouTube, Android Market, Samsung Apps, Media Hub or Music Hub”
`
`followed by a screenshot listing only “Samsung Media Hub” as being included.)
`
`II.
`
`B.E.’S CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS DO
`NOT COMPLY WITH LPR 3.1(E)
`
`B.E. states that a more detailed doctrine of equivalents contentions is required only at a
`
`later stage of litigation. (D.E. 53 at 17.) B.E. is incorrect. Courts have required even initial
`
`infringement contentions, served at the outset of the case, to “specify in what way [a
`
`defendant’s] products infringe under the doctrine of equivalents….” Creagri, Inc. v. Pinnacliffe,
`
`
`
`-8-
`
`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 12 of 14 PageID 739
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`Inc., No. 11-cv-06635 LHK (PSG), 2012 WL 5389775, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2012) (cited
`
`by B.E. in its Opposition). B.E. “cannot merely add boilerplate language asserting that the
`
`doctrine of equivalents has been met as an alternative theory.” Id. B.E. admits that its ICs
`
`“simply reserve the right to contend that if literal infringement is not present, B.E. will present its
`
`case under the doctrine of equivalents.” (D.E. 53 at 17.) This is not permitted by LPR 3.1(e).
`
`See France Telecom, SA v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., No. 12-cv-04967 WHA (NC), 2013
`
`WL 1878912, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) (“[U]nder no reading of the Patent Local Rules do
`
`they provide for a place holder to assert future claims of infringement.”). B.E. should be
`
`required to “specify in what way [Samsung’s] accused products infringe … under the doctrine of
`
`equivalents, or drop the contention altogether.” Creagri, 2012 WL 5389775, at *6; see also
`
`France Telecom, 2013 WL 1878912, at *6.
`
`III.
`
`B.E.’S CROSS-MOTION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING A REPRESENTATIVE
`PRODUCTS STIPULATION SHOULD BE DENIED
`
`B.E.’s cross-motion, which would require Samsung to agree to a representative products
`
`stipulation before B.E. provides supplemental infringement contentions, is not supported by any
`
`case law, but only by B.E.’s bald assertion that “the 178 accused products are virtually identical
`
`for purposes of infringement.” (D.E. 53 at 18.) In short, B.E. assumes its conclusion—that a
`
`handful of products are “representative” of every product that is accused of infringement.
`
`Without a better understanding of what exactly it is that B.E. contends meets each of the
`
`limitations of the claims of the ‘290 patent, however, Samsung is in no position to either agree or
`
`disagree that particular products are “representative” of other products in this case. The
`
`discussion in Section II.C., supra, underscores Samsung’s point. Only after receiving more
`
`information about what B.E. contends infringes can Samsung even take initial steps to determine
`
`
`
`-9-
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`

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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 13 of 14 PageID 740
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`whether the components of Samsung’s accused devices and software programs are sufficiently
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`similar so as to agree to a “representative products stipulation.”
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Samsung respectfully requests that the Court grant its motion
`
`to compel amended ICs.
`
`DATE:
`
`August 19, 2013
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Jonathan E. Nelson
`Shepherd D. Tate (TN BPR #05638)
`Jonathan E. Nelson (TN BPR #028029)
`BASS, BERRY & SIMS, PLC
`100 Peabody Place, Suite 900
`Memphis, Tennessee 38103
`Telephone: (901) 543-5900
`Facsimile:
`(901) 543-5999
`state@bassberry.com
`Email:
`
`jenelson@bassberry.com
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`Richard C. Pettus (admitted pro hac vice)
`Joshua L. Raskin (admitted pro hac vice)
`Justin A. MacLean (admitted pro hac vice)
`GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`Telephone:
`(212) 801-9200
`Facsimile:
`(212) 801-6400
`pettusr@gtlaw.com
`Email:
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`raskinj@gtlaw.com
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`
`macleanj@gtlaw.com
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`Attorneys for Defendants, Samsung Electronics
`America, Inc. and Samsung Telecommunications
`America, LLC
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`-10-
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`Case 2:12-cv-02825-JPM-tmp Document 62 Filed 08/19/13 Page 14 of 14 PageID 741
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The foregoing document was filed under the Court’s CM/ECF system, automatically
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`effecting service on counsel of record for all other parties who have appeared in this action on
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`the date of such service.
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`
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` /s/ Jonathan Nelson
`Jonathan Nelson
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`-11-