`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc
`
`JURY DEMAND
`
`) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
`
`
`
`
`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`TWITTER, INC.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT TWITTER INC.’S MEMORANDUM IN
`OPPOSITION TO B.E.’S MOTION TO DIMISS AND STRIKE
`
`
`
`J. David Hadden
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`Darren F. Donnelly
`ddonnelly@fenwick.com
`Saina S. Shamilov
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`Ryan J. Marton
`rmarton@fenwick.com
`Clifford Webb
`cwebb@fenwick.com
`Justin Hulse
`jhulse@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`801 California Street, 6th Floor
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`(650) 988-8500
`
`Glen G. Reid, Jr. (#8184)
`greid@wyattfirm.com
`Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr. (#06389)
`mvorder-bruegge@wyattfirm.com
`WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
`The Renaissance Center
`1715 Aaron Brenner Dr., Suite 800
`Memphis, TN 38120-4367
`(901) 537-1000
`
`Counsel for Defendant
`TWITTER, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 2 of 27 PageID 428
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`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2
`
`III.
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................3
`
`A.
`
`Twitter’s Counterclaims Are Sufficiently Pled and Should Not Be
`Dismissed. ................................................................................................................3
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Twitter’s Counterclaims Meet the Requirements of the Federal
`Rules of Civil Procedure for Patent-Related Claims. ..................................4
`
`Twitter’s Counterclaims Are Sufficient Under Twombly and
`Iqbal and are Pled with the Level of Specificity Anticipated by
`this District’s Local Patent Rules. ................................................................6
`
`B.
`
`Twitter’s Affirmative Defenses Are Sufficiently Pled and Should Not
`Be Stricken. ............................................................................................................10
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Twombly and Iqbal Do Not Apply to Affirmative Defenses. ....................11
`
`Twitter’s Affirmative Defenses Are Adequately Pled Under the
`Applicable “Fair Notice” Standard. ...........................................................15
`
`Twitter’s Failure to State a Claim Defense and Reservation of
`Affirmative Defenses Are Proper. .............................................................17
`
`4.
`
`B.E. is Not Prejudiced by Twitter’s Affirmative Defenses. ......................17
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................19
`
`i
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 3 of 27 PageID 429
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Ailey v. Midland Funding,
`LLC, No. 3:11-cv-77, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81028 (E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2011)..................12
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`ASUSTeK Computer Inc. v. AFTG-TG LLC,
`No. 5:CV 11-000192-EJD, 2011 WL 6845791 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011) ...............................8
`
`Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,
`No. 10-1045 RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011)........................................14
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. U.S.,
`201 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1953) ...................................................................................................10
`
`Damron v. ATM Central LLC,
`No. 1:10-cv-01210, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142812
`(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) ............................................................................................. passim
`
`Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,
`148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Driessen v. Sony Music Entm’t,
`904 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Utah 2012) ........................................................................................5
`
`Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc.,
`31 F. Supp. 296 (D. Conn. 1939) .............................................................................................15
`
`Eastman Kodak Co. v. McAuley,
`2 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Elan Pharma Int’l Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd.,
`No. 09-1008, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306 (D. N.J. Mar. 31, 2010)...............................3, 7, 8
`
`Falley v. Friends Univ.,
`787 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Kan. 2011) ......................................................................................13
`
`Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc.,
`No. 3:11-cv-00481-RCJ-VPC, 2012 WL 607539 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012) ............................14
`
`
`
`ii
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 4 of 27 PageID 430
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Forman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178 (1962) ...................................................................................................................9
`
`FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, LLC,
`No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL 883202 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) ..........................................14
`
`Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co.,
`No. 1:10-cv-3008-AT, 2011 WL 5829674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) ........................................8
`
`Hahn v. Best Recovery Services, LLC,
`No. 10-12370, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116136 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2010) ............................13
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc.,
`58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) ............................................................................................15
`
`Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Southgate,
`No. 2:11-cv-14719, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85952
`(E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2012) ......................................................................................................17
`
`Jeeper’s of Auburn, Inc. v. KWJB Enter., L.L.C.,
`No. 10-13682, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53492
`(E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2011) .........................................................................................11, 12, 17
`
`Joao Control & Monitorining Sys. Of Cal., LLC v. Sling Media, Inc.,
`No. C-11-6277 EMC, 2012 WL 3249510 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012).........................................5
`
`Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
`No. 2:11-cv-02601-JTF, 2012 WL 4062663
`(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) ........................................................................................10, 12, 17
`
`Lawrence v. Chabot,
`182 Fed. App’x. 442 (6th Cir. 2006) .......................................................................................11
`
`Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty., Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit,
`507 U.S. 163 (1992) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Lone Star Document Mgmt., LLC v. Atalashoft, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-00319-JRG, 2012 WL 4033322
`(E.D. Tex. Sep. 12, 2012) ..........................................................................................................6
`
`
`
`iii
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 5 of 27 PageID 431
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Mark IV Indus. Corp. v. TransCore, L.P.,
`No. 09-418 GMS, 2009 WL 4828661 (D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009) ...................................................6
`
`McLemore v. Regions Bank,
`Nos. 3:08-cv-0021; 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092
`(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2012) ...........................................13
`
`McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Memory Control Enter. LLC v. Edmunds.com,
`No. CV 11-7658 PA, 2012 WL 681765 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012) .....................................14, 15
`
`Montgomery v. Wyeth,
`580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Overnite Trans. Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
`Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO,
`168 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)..................................................................................10
`
`Palmetto Pharms. LLC v. Astrazeneca Pharms. LP,
`No. 2:11-cv-00807, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177185
`(D. S.C. Nov. 6, 2012) .......................................................................................................3, 7, 8
`
`Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,
`726 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2010) .........................................................................................8
`
`Recticel Automobilsysteme GmbH v. Auto Components Holdings, LLC,
`No. 2:10-cv-14097-SFC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127261
`(E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2011) .......................................................................................................16
`
`Select Retrieval, LLC v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,
`No. 2:12-cv-00003-NT, 2012 WL 5381503
`(D. Me. Oct. 31, 2012) ...............................................................................................................6
`
`Sewell v. Allied Interstate, Inc.,
`No. 3:10-cv-113, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 983
`(E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2011) ...................................................................................................10, 12
`
`Shane v. Bunzl Distrib. USA, Inc.,
`200 Fed. App’x. 397 (6th Cir. 2006) .........................................................................................9
`
`
`
`iv
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`
`
`
`
`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 6 of 27 PageID 432
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Sony/ATV Music Publ’g LLC v. DJ Miller Music Distribs., Inc.,
`No. 3:09-cv-01098, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116158
`(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2011) ...........................................................................................10, 12, 17
`
`Teirstien v. AGA Med. Corp.,
`No. 6:08-cv-14, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002
`(E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2009) ............................................................................................6, 7, 8, 16
`
`Tetsuya v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. C 11-01210 HRL, 2011 WL 10632812
`(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) ..........................................................................................................16
`
`Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co.,
`777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Pa. 2011) .................................................................................14, 15
`
`Vistan Corp. v. Fadei USA, Inc.,
`No. C-10-4862 JCS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47099
`(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011) ........................................................................................................16
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ........................................................................................................................5, 7, 8
`
`35 U.S.C. §§ 101-105 ......................................................................................................................7
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 ........................................................................................................................5, 7, 8
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ........................................................................................................................5, 7, 8
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................................5, 7, 8
`
`RULES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ...............................................................................................................................6
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ....................................................................................................................8, 14
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ................................................................................................................6, 13
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) ........................................................................................................................13
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) ........................................................................................................................13
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................................14
`
`
`
`v
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 7 of 27 PageID 433
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(Continued)
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`Page(s)
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ...........................................................................................................10, 11, 15
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 .........................................................................................................................4, 5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P., Appendix of Forms, Form 18 ....................................................................... passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P., Appendix of Forms, Form 30 ....................................................................... passim
`
`Patent L.R. 3.3-3.6 .......................................................................................................................2, 4
`
`
`
`vi
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 8 of 27 PageID 434
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`
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`Defendant Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby
`
`submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff B.E. Technology, LLC’s (“B.E.”)’s Motion
`
`to Dismiss and Strike.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Twitter’s Counterclaims for invalidity and non-infringement are sufficiently pled under
`
`the accepted notice pleading standard codified by Form 30 to the Federal Rules of Civil
`
`Procedure and unchanged by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
`
`U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). They provide a short and plain
`
`statement of Twitter’s claim for non-infringement and an explanation of the statutory bases of
`
`Twitter’s claim for invalidity. This is all that is required. Likewise, Twitter’s affirmative
`
`defenses are more than adequate under the controlling Sixth Circuit fair notice standard—which
`
`requires only a general statement of the theory on which a party intends to defend.
`
`B.E.’s demand that Twitter provide the full metes and bounds of its theories and defenses
`
`along with detailed factual allegations supporting them at this early stage is both unsupportable
`
`and untenable. This District’s Local Patent Rules govern those disclosures, and B.E.’s demands,
`
`if accepted, would significantly undermine this carefully considered procedure. Moreover, what
`
`B.E. demands of Twitter is far in excess of what its own cursory Complaint alleges—making
`
`only a one-sentence allegation of infringement. There is no basis for such a double standard in
`
`the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court precedent, or the applicable standards in
`
`the Sixth Circuit.
`
`For these reasons, Twitter respectfully submits that B.E.’s Motion should be denied in its
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`entirety. In the alternative, should this Court be inclined to grant B.E.’s Motion, Twitter requests
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`leave to amend to provide further detail in support of its Counterclaims and affirmative defenses.
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`
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`1
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 9 of 27 PageID 435
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`
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`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`B.E. initiated this lawsuit with a conclusory three-page, eleven-paragraph Complaint
`
`accusing Twitter of infringing United States Patent No. 6,628,314 (the “’314 patent”) in the most
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`general of terms. (See Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”).) The entirety of B.E.’s allegation of
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`infringement is that “Twitter has infringed the ’314 Patent by using a method of providing
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`demographically targeted advertising that directly infringes at least Claim 11 of the ’314 patent
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`either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” (Id. ¶ 11; see also Motion at 1.) B.E. does
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`not explain how Twitter allegedly infringes, or even what services are accused.
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`Responding to B.E.’s vague allegation of infringement, Twitter filed an Answer,
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`affirmative defenses, and Counterclaims to B.E.’s Complaint on December 31, 2012. (Dkt.
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`No. 19.) Twitter asserted Counterclaims for non-infringement and invalidity of the ’314 patent,
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`along with a handful of affirmative defenses—non-infringement, invalidity, dedication to the
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`public, laches, failure to state a claim, estoppel, and a reservation of subsequently discovered
`
`affirmative defenses. (Id. at 3–4.)
`
`Under this Court’s Local Patent Rules, on January 7, 2013, a week after Twitter filed its
`
`Answer and Counterclaims, B.E. served its initial infringement contentions. In turn, under these
`
`same rules, Twitter will have to shortly serve responsive non-infringement contentions on B.E.
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`providing its initial theory of non-infringement. This is followed shortly by Twitter’s invalidity
`
`contentions. See Patent L.R. 3.3-3.4, 3.5-3.6. B.E. does not dispute that these disclosures, when
`
`made, will provide it with the specifics of Twitter’s non-infringement and invalidity theories
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`along with relevant documentary support.
`
`2
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 10 of 27 PageID 436
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`
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`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
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`Twitter’s Counterclaims Are Sufficiently Pled and Should Not Be Dismissed.
`
`B.E. incorrectly contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v.
`
`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) require Twitter, as the
`
`defendant, to come forward with its specific factual bases of non-infringement and invalidity in
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`response to a Complaint that does not identify which Twitter products or services are accused of
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`infringement. (Motion at 12–14.) Indeed, B.E. expressly faults Twitter for not providing an
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`explanation of what products are non-infringing when B.E. itself has not even specifically
`
`accused any in the Complaint. (Id. at 14.) B.E. cites no Sixth Circuit authority for this pleading
`
`double standard, nor could it. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Supreme
`
`Court’s decisions in Twombly or Iqbal support, let alone compel, such divergent and prejudicial
`
`treatment of complaints and counterclaims. See, e.g., Elan Pharma Int’l Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd., No.
`
`09-1008, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at *13 (D. N.J. Mar. 31, 2010) (“[t]here is no basis for
`
`this Court to, on the one hand, allow Elan to plead as it has while, on the other hand, require
`
`Lupin, inexplicably, to provide more detailed factual support for its counterclaim and defenses”);
`
`Palmetto Pharms. LLC v. Astrazeneca Pharms. LP, No. 2:11-cv-00807, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`177185, at *18–*19 (D. S.C. Nov. 6, 2012) (recognizing that “it would be ‘incongruous to
`
`require heightened pleading’ for invalidity counterclaims when the pleading standard for
`
`infringement does not require factual allegations to support the infringement claims”).1
`
`
`1 B.E. offers only two justifications for ignoring this case law and subjecting Twitter’s
`Counterclaims to a level of scrutiny that Plaintiff’s Complaint could not possibly survive: that
`(1) “[p]otential counterclaimants aware that their pleadings will be tested under the
`Twombly/Iqbal standard will hesitate to assert frivolous otherwise unsupportable claims” and
`(2) “[b]aseless claims will not be made, and expensive discovery or other proceedings will be
`avoided”. (Motion at 5.) These rationales do nothing to differentiate B.E.’s own claim of patent
`infringement and cannot possibly justify the disparate treatment that B.E. demands. Twitter, like
`any defendant in a patent case, knows that its non-infringement and invalidity cases will be the
`
`3
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 11 of 27 PageID 437
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`
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`1.
`
`Twitter’s Counterclaims Meet the Requirements of the Federal Rules
`of Civil Procedure for Patent-Related Claims.
`
`Form 30 to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that counterclaims, like
`
`Twitter’s, should be “[s]et forth . . . in the same way a claim is pleaded in a complaint.” Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P., Appendix of Forms, Form 30. Form 18, in turn, provides the required contents for a
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`sufficient complaint for patent infringement, including only:
`
`(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff
`owns the patent; (3) a statement that the defendant has been
`infringing the patent “by making, selling, and using [the device]
`embodying the patent”; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given
`the defendant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an
`injunction and damages.”
`
`Id., Form 18. Pleadings consistent with these forms “suffice under [the Federal Rules of Civil
`
`Procedure] and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that the[] rules contemplate.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`84; see also In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323,
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`1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that pleading in compliance with the forms is sufficient).
`
`Twitter’s Counterclaims plead each of the elements contemplated by Forms 18 and 30, as
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`necessarily modified for declaratory judgment counterclaims of non-infringement and invalidity.
`
`As to non-infringement, Twitter alleges (1) the basis for jurisdiction over its counterclaim and
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`the existence of an actual controversy (Counterclaim ¶¶ 5–7), (2) that B.E. has asserted
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`ownership of the ’314 patent (id. ¶ 9), (3) that, despite B.E.’s allegation to the contrary, Twitter
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`does not infringe the ’314 patent (id. ¶¶ 10–11), and (4) that a judgment of non-infringement
`
`should be entered. (Id. ¶ 12.) Twitter’s counterclaim for invalidity contains corresponding
`
`
`central matter of dispute. Nearly all of the effort and discovery of both parties will be geared
`towards either proving or disproving infringement and validity and will be tested early on by this
`District’s infringement, non-infringement, and invalidity disclosures requirements. See Patent
`L.R. 3.3-3.6. The suggestion that forcing Twitter to prematurely come forward with specific
`non-infringement and invalidity facts, in response to a Complaint that does not specifically
`accuse any products, will somehow avoid this dispute or discovery is completely meritless.
`
`4
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 12 of 27 PageID 438
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`
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`foundational allegations along with an explanation that the asserted ’314 patent is “invalid for
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`failure to meet one or more of the conditions for patentability specified in Title 35, U.S.C., or the
`
`rules, regulations, and law related thereto, including, without limitation, one or more of
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`35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112” and in turn requests a judgment invalidating the ’314
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`patent. (Id. ¶ 17.) Twitter’s compliance with Form 18 and 30 should end the inquiry regardless
`
`of Twombly.
`
`Indeed, the Supreme Court adopted the revised versions of Forms 18 and 30 as part of the
`
`2007 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, just weeks before it announced its
`
`decision in Twombly. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 84, note. The Federal Circuit, in analyzing the
`
`continuing force and effect of these forms following Twombly, held that they remain the standard
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`against which claims for infringement and non-infringement are to be measured. See In re Bill of
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`Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 (“to the extent the parties argue that Twombly and its progeny conflict
`
`with the Forms and create differing pleading requirements, the Forms control”) (citing McZeal v.
`
`Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). And Federal Rule of Civil
`
`Procedure 84 specifically provides that “any changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
`
`must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
`
`interpretation.” See In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.,
`
`Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1992)); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
`
`569 n.14 (acknowledging that the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be
`
`accomplished by “judicial interpretation”). Not surprisingly, therefore, numerous courts have
`
`followed the Federal Circuit in holding that claims related to infringement are sufficient if pled
`
`with the level of specificity contemplated by the forms. See, e.g., Driessen v. Sony Music
`
`Entm’t, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198–1201 (D. Utah 2012); Joao Control & Monitorining Sys. Of
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`5
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 13 of 27 PageID 439
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`
`
`Cal., LLC v. Sling Media, Inc., No. C-11-6277 EMC, 2012 WL 3249510, at *4–*5 (N.D. Cal.
`
`Aug. 7, 2012); Lone Star Document Mgmt., LLC v. Atalashoft, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00319-JRG,
`
`2012 WL 4033322, at *2, *3–*4 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 12, 2012); Select Retrieval, LLC v. L.L. Bean,
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`Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00003-NT, 2012 WL 5381503, at *2–*3 (D. Me. Oct. 31, 2012). Because
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`Twitter’s Counterclaims provide the same level of detail contemplated by Forms 18 and 30,
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`B.E.’s Motion should be denied.
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`2.
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`Twitter’s Counterclaims Are Sufficient Under Twombly and Iqbal
`and are Pled with the Level of Specificity Anticipated by this
`District’s Local Patent Rules.
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`Regardless of the applicability of the forms, however, nothing in Twombly or its progeny
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`requires more specific allegations than what Twitter has pled. Affirmative claims under Rule
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`8(a)(2) require “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
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`to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The premise of this requirement is to “give the defendant
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`fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” not every fact which
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`ultimately may be offered to support it. Id. As such, determining compliance is not “a ‘fact-
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`based’ question of law” (Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674) and “does not require ‘detailed factual
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`allegations.’” Id. at 678. It is a practical, context-specific inquiry requiring “the reviewing court
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`to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 556).
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`As B.E. is no doubt well-aware based on the lack of specificity in its own Complaint,
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`courts in the patent context have generally adopted a lenient standard for the specificity required
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`in complaints and counterclaims under Rule 8 following Twombly. See, e.g., Teirstien v. AGA
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`Med. Corp., No. 6:08-cv-14, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *12–*13 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13,
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`2009). In so doing, these courts recognize the difficulty of providing detailed allegations of
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`infringement, non-infringement, or invalidity at the pleading stage—before an opportunity for
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`investigation and discovery. See, e.g., Mark IV Indus. Corp. v. TransCore, L.P., No. 09-418
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`6
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 14 of 27 PageID 440
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`
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`GMS, 2009 WL 4828661, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009) (recognizing the “practical difficulties of
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`pleading patent infringement with more specificity than required by Form 18”); Elan Pharma
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`Int’l, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at *13 (“[t]he motion that Lupin must identify what theories
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`of invalidity it intends to pursue, and the facts supporting such theories at this stage is not
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`plausible”).
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`For example, in Teirstien, the Eastern District of Texas held that the allegations for a
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`counterclaim for invalidity, just as for claim of infringement, need only be “clear enough as to
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`effectively put Plaintiff on notice of the legal and factual grounds for the asserted invalidity.”
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`Teirstien, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *12-*13. Based on this standard, the court denied a
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`motion to dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity. Id at *16. The
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`counterclaim alleged only that “[t]he claims of the [patent in suit] are invalid for failing to satisfy
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`one or more of the statutory requirements of patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103,
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`and/or 112”—language almost identical to that pled by Twitter here (compare to Counterclaims
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`¶ 17). Teirstien, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *11–*12. According to Teirstien, this was
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`sufficient under Twombly because it put the plaintiff on notice by listing the statutory sections
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`under which the patent was allegedly invalid, and because it was a “short and plain statement of
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`the claim,” that show[ed] that the pleader was entitled to relief.” Id. at *12 (citing Twombly, 550
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`U.S. at 555.)
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`Numerous other courts have taken a similar approach, refusing to dismiss comparably
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`pled counterclaims of invalidity. See, e.g., Elan Pharma Int’l, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at
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`*11 (alleging that “the ’249, ’802, and the ’986 patents are invalid under one or more provisions
`
`of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-105” sufficient following Twombly); Palmetto Pharms., 2012 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 177185, at *19 (sufficient to allege that a patent “is invalid for failure to comply with one
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`7
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 15 of 27 PageID 441
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`
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`or more of the conditions of patentability specified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112”);
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`Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 921, 937–38 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (allegation that asserted
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`patents are “invalid for failure to comply with one or more of the conditions of patentability set
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`forth in Title 35 of the United States Code” sufficient to state a counterclaim for invalidity).
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`Similarly general allegations of non-infringement have been found sufficient as well. See, e.g.,
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`Id. (alleging that counterclaimant’s products do not infringe the asserted patents sufficient to
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`state a counterclaim for non-infringement).
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`In refusing to dismiss counterclaims, like Twitter’s, these courts have recognized that a
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`pragmatic approach to pleading in the patent context makes particular sense in light of local
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`patent rules providing for early disclosure of non-infringement and invalidity theories. See, e.g.,
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`Teirstien, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *14 (explaining that a heightened pleading standard
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`“would undermine the purpose of the Court’s Local Patent Rules”); Elan Pharma Int’l, 2010
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`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at *14 (explaining that where the District of New Jersey’s Patent Local
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`Rules called for the service of non-infringement and invalidity contentions following the
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`plaintiff’s infringement contentions, it would defy logic to require detailed pleadings in the
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`counterclaims); Palmetto Pharms., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177185, at *19–*20 (explaining that
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`the “disclosure of invalidity contentions . . . militates against dismissal of insufficient invalidity
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`counterclaims”); Pfizer, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 938 (“dismissal of Apotex’s counterclaims for failure
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`to satisfy Rule 8(a) would undermine the Local Patent Rules, which require more detailed
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`disclosures at a later stage”); see also ASUSTeK Computer Inc. v. AFTG-TG LLC, No. 5:CV 11-
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`000192-EJD, 2011 WL 6845791, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011) (reasoning that “requiring a
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`heightened pleading of invalidity would circumvent this Court’s Patent Local rules which
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`required detailed disclosures of invalidity contentions soon after the suit is filed”); Graphic
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`8
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`Case 2:12-cv-02783-JPM-cgc Document 48 Filed 08/02/13 Page 16 of 27 PageID 442
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`Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co., No. 1:10-cv-3008-AT, 2011 WL 5829674, at *5 (N.D.
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`Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) (stating that “the Patent Local Rules operate to make further factual pleading
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`unnecessary”). The Local Patent Rules in this District counsel for the same result. As explained
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`above, regardless of th