Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 1 of 15 PageID 434
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
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`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`) Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-02782
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`PANDORA MEDIA, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`) Jury Trial Demanded
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` ____________________________________________)
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`DEFENDANT PANDORA MEDIA, INC.’S
`RESPONSE OPPOSING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE
`DEFENSES PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 2 of 15 PageID 435
`Case 2:l2—cv—O2782—JPM—cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 2 of 15 Page|D 435
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ....................................................... 1
`I. NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ..................................................... .. 1
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`II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED .......................................................... 1
`II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED ........................................................ .. 1
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`A. Motions to Strike Under Rule 12(f) Are Rarely Granted............................................... 2
`A. Motions to Strike Under Rule 12(f) Are Rarely Granted ............................................. .. 2
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`B. The “Fair Notice” Standard, not Twombly/Iqbal, Applies to Rule 12(f) Motions to Strike
`B. The “Fair Notice” Standard, not Twombly/Iqbal, Applies to Rule 12(f) Motions to Strike
`Affirmative Defenses ...................................................................................................... 3
`Affirmative Defenses .................................................................................................... .. 3
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`C. Pandora Adequately Pled Its Affirmative Defenses...................................................... 7
`C. Pandora Adequately Pled Its Affirmative Defenses .................................................... .. 7
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`1. Failure to State a Claim ......................................................................................... 7
`1.
`Failure to State a Claim ....................................................................................... .. 7
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`2. Non-infringement ................................................................................................. 8
`2. Non-infringement ............................................................................................... .. 8
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`3.
`3.
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`Invalidity ............................................................................................................. 9
`Invalidity ........................................................................................................... .. 9
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`III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 10
`III.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... .. 10
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`i
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 3 of 15 PageID 436
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases 
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009)...............................................................................................passim
`Avocent Redmond Corp. v. U.S.,
`85 Fed. Cl. 724 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2009) .................................................................................. 8
`Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, CIV. 10-1045 RMB-JS,
`2011 WL 6934557 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) ....................................................................... 6
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007)...............................................................................................passim
`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. U.S.,
`201 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1953)........................................................................................ 3, 6
`Damron v. ATM Central LLC,
`2010 WL 6512345 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) ............................................................. 3, 4
`Graphic Packaging Int’l., Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co.,
`2011 WL 5829674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 01, 2011) .................................................................... 9
`Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
`2012 WL 4062663 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012) ............................................................ 4, 8
`Lawrence v. Chabot,
`182 Fed. Appx. 442 (6th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................. 2
`McKinnie v. Lundell Mfg. Co., Inc.,
`825 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) ................................................................................ 6
`McLemore v. Regions Bank,
`2010 WL 1010092 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010))................................................................ 3
`Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,
`459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................ 9
`Montgomery v. Wyeth,
`580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009)............................................................................................ 4
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`ii
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 4 of 15 PageID 437
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`Overnite Transp. Co. v. Int’l Broth. Of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am.,
`AFL-CIO,
`168 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)............................................................................ 3
`Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational Inc.,
`2011 WL 5525938 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) ................................................................... 9
`Ray v. Fedex Corp. Servs., Inc.,
`668 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) .......................................................................... 4
`Starnes Family Office, LLC v. McCullar,
`765 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) ...................................................................... 4, 6
`Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co.,
`777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (D. Del. 2011) ............................................................................ 5, 10
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`Statutes 
`35 U.S.C. § 282 ................................................................................................................. 9
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`iii
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 5 of 15 PageID 438
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`Defendant Pandora Media, Inc. (“Pandora”), by and through its undersigned counsel,
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`hereby submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiff B.E. Technology’s (“B.E.”) Motion to
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`Strike pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). For the reasons provided below, the Court should deny
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`B.E.’s motion.
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`I.
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`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
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`B.E. alleges that Pandora has infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,628,314 (“the ‘314 patent”).
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`See Dkt. 1. On September 10, 2012, B.E. filed a complaint alleging that “Pandora has infringed
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`the ‘314 patent by using a method of providing demographically targeted advertising that
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`directly infringes at least Claim 11 of the ‘314 patent either literally or under the doctrine of
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`equivalents.” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 11. The Complaint does not provide any specific details as to why
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`Pandora’s services allegedly infringe the asserted patent. Pandora filed its Answer on December
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`31, 2012, asserting three affirmative defenses. See Dkt. 20. Pandora’s First Affirmative Defense
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`states that “[t]he Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Dkt. 20 at 6.
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`Pandora’s Second Affirmative Defense provides that “Pandora has not infringed and is not
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`infringing, any valid claim of the ‘314 patent.” Dkt. 20 at 7. Finally, Pandora’s Third
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`Affirmative Defense states that “[e]ach of the claims of the ‘314 patent is invalid for failing to
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`comply with the conditions of patentability set forth in the patent laws of the United States, 35
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`U.S.C. § 1, et. seq., including without limitation, at least 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and/or 112.”
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`Dkt. 20 at 7. On January 25, 2012, B.E. filed a Motion to Strike Pandora’s affirmative defenses.
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`Dkt. 31.
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`II.
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED
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`B.E. argues in its Motion that the standard for pleading complaints, articulated in Bell
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`Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
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`1
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 6 of 15 PageID 439
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`applies to the pleading of affirmative defenses. Dkt. 31-1 at 5. Specifically, B.E. contends that
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`defendants pleading affirmative defenses should not be held to the “fair notice” standard
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`traditionally applied by the Sixth Circuit when analyzing Rule 12(f) motions to strike, but,
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`instead should be held to the higher Twombly/Iqbal standard requiring complaints to state claims
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`with “facial plausibility.” Dkt. 31-1 at 2-5. B.E. subsequently argues that Pandora’s First
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`Affirmative Defense and Second Affirmative Defense are insufficient and do not constitute
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`affirmative defenses, and that Pandora’s Third Affirmative Defense fails to meet both the “fair
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`notice” standard and the Twombly/Iqbal heightened pleading standard. Dkt. 31-1 at 8-12.
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`B.E.’s Motion should be denied because this Court consistently applies the “fair notice”
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`standard when reviewing Rule 12(f) motions to strike affirmative defenses, not the
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`Twombly/Iqbal heightened pleading standard, and Pandora’s affirmative defenses provide fair
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`notice. Therefore, Pandora respectfully requests that the Court deny B.E.’s Motion in its entirety.
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`Alternatively, to the extent that the Court grants B.E.’s Motion, Pandora respectfully requests
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`leave to amend its affirmative defenses in accordance with the Court’s ruling.
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`A. Motions to Strike Under Rule 12(f) Are Rarely Granted
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`Under Rule 12(f), a court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense.”
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`Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “An affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to
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`be sufficient. . . as long as it gives plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.” Lawrence v.
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`Chabot, 182 Fed. Appx. 442, 456 (6th Cir. 2006). “To grant a Rule 12(f) motion, the court must
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`determine that the challenged allegations are so unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims as to be
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`unworthy of any consideration as a defense and that their presence in the pleading throughout the
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`proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving party.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
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`Federal Practice & Procedure § 1380 (3d ed. 2004). Furthermore, “[m]otions to strike are
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 7 of 15 PageID 440
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`‘disfavored remedies to be used sparingly only when the ends of justice require it.’” Damron v.
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`ATM Central LLC, 2010 WL 6512345, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010) (citing Overnite
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`Transp. Co. v. Int’l Broth. Of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen, & Helpers of Am., AFL-
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`CIO, 168 F. Supp. 2d 826, 850 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit expressly
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`discourages motions to strike, characterizing them as “a drastic remedy to be resorted to only
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`when required for the purposes of justice.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. U.S., 201
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`F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953). Therefore, even if a court grants a Rule 12(f) motion, “the general
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`practice is to grant the defendant leave to amend.” Id.
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`B.
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`The “Fair Notice” Standard, not Twombly/Iqbal, Applies to Rule 12(f)
`Motions to Strike Affirmative Defenses
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`As B.E. cited in its Motion, “‘the Sixth Circuit has consistently used ‘fair notice’ as the
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`standard for whether a defendant has sufficiently pleaded an affirmative defense.’” Dkt. 31-1 at 8
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`(citing McLemore v. Regions Bank, 2010 WL 1010092, at *14 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010)).
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`B.E., nevertheless, asks this Court to abandon the “fair notice” standard, which it has
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`consistently applied when evaluating affirmative defense pleadings, in favor of the
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`Twombly/Iqbal heightened pleading standard. To support its position, B.E. argues:
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`1. The Sixth Circuit has not addressed, and there is a split of authority regarding, the
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`appropriate pleading standard for affirmative defenses following the Twombly and Iqbal
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`decisions. Dkt. 31-1 at 3.
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`2. A District of Delaware decision misunderstood Rule 8(c) in holding that the
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`Twombly/Iqbal standard does not apply to affirmative defenses. Dkt. 31-1 at 5-7.
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`3. Rule 8(c) should be read in the context of Rule 12(f) and (h)(2), and therefore imposes
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`a factual sufficiency requirement for affirmative defense pleadings. Dkt. 31-1 at 6-7.
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`None of these arguments is persuasive.
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`Regarding B.E.’s first argument, although there has been a split of authority among
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`various district courts, the Sixth Circuit, following the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, held that
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`the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a heightened pleading standard for. . .
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`defense[s].” Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009). Although Montgomery
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`did not expressly discuss pleading standards for affirmative defenses, subsequent district court
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`decisions analyzing the issue have concluded that the proper pleading standard for affirmative
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`defenses is “fair notice” and not the heightened standards of Twombly and Iqbal. See e.g.,
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`Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A., 2012 WL 4062663, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012)
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`(“Montgomery strongly bolsters a finding that Defendant’s statutory defenses… are sufficiently
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`plead to provide fair notice….As to [] other affirmative defenses… the Court finds no reason
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`under Sixth Circuit precedent that these should be subjected to any different level of scrutiny
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`than utilized in Montgomery.”); Starnes Family Office, LLC v. McCullar, 765 F. Supp. 2d 1036,
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`1047 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (“an affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be
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`held to be sufficient. . . as long as it gives plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense”)
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`(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Damron, 2010 WL 6512345, at *2 (finding that
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`“Defendant’s affirmative defenses have been sufficiently pled to give fair notice to the Plaintiff”
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`in part because “there is a Sixth Circuit case post-Twombly and Iqbal that, while not discussing
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`these cases directly, does state that ‘[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a
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`heightened pleading standard for . . . defense[s].”) (citing Montgomery, 580 F.3d at 468); Ray v.
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`Fedex Corp. Servs., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (“An affirmative
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`defense may be pled in general terms provided the plaintiff has fair notice of the defense.”)
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`(citation omitted).
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`Notably, B.E. does not cite, and Pandora is unable to find, any case from this District
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`requiring affirmative defenses to be pled according to the Twombly/Iqbal heightened standard.
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`This Court applies the “fair notice” standard for affirmative defenses.
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`Next, B.E. argues that courts declining to apply the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard to
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`affirmative defenses misunderstand Rule 8(c). Dkt. 31-1 at 5. B.E. reaches this conclusion by
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`citing a Delaware district court case holding that the Twombly/Iqbal standard does not apply to
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`affirmative defenses, in part, because “Rule 8 provides that a party must merely state, not show,
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`an affirmative defense.” Dkt. 31-1 at 5 (quoting Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F.
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`Supp. 2d 893, 901 (D. Del. 2011)). B.E. argues that the Tyco court’s holding represented a
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`misunderstanding of Rule 8(c) because the “showing” requirement of Rule 8(a) for complaints
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`supposedly requires the same level of specificity as the “state” requirement of Rule 8(c) for
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`affirmative defenses. Therefore, B.E. posits that the Twombly/Iqbal standard applicable for Rule
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`8(a) complaints is equally applicable for Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses.
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`The holding in Tyco represented an accurate analysis of Rule 8. Specifically, while Rule
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`8(a) provides that “a claim for relief” must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
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`showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” (emphasis added), Rule 8(c), by contrast, requires
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`only that a party “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.” (emphasis added).
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`Furthermore, there are many reasons articulated by courts as to why affirmative defenses
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`are not required to meet the heightened Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard:
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`(1)
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`(2)
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`(3)
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`a diminished concern that plaintiffs receive notice in light of their ability to obtain
`more information during discovery;
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`the absence of a concern that the defense is “unlocking the doors of discovery”;
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`the limited discovery costs, in relation to the costs imposed on a defendant, since
`it is unlikely that either side will pursue discovery on frivolous defenses;
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`(4)
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`(5)
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`(6)
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`(7)
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`the unfairness of holding the defendant to the same pleading standard as the
`plaintiff, when the defendant has only a limited time to respond after service of
`the complaint . . . ;
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`the low likelihood that motions to strike … would expedite the litigation given
`that leave to amend is routinely granted;
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`the risk that a defendant will waive a defense at trial by failing to plead it at the
`early stage of the litigation;
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`the lack of detail in Form 30, which demonstrates the appropriate pleading of an
`affirmative defense; and
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`(8)
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`the fact that a heightened pleading requirement would produce more motions to
`strike, which are disfavored.
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`Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, CIV. 10-1045 RMB-JS, 2011 WL 6934557,
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`at *1-*2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (collecting cases). B.E. fails to address these additional reasons
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`why a heightened pleading standard should not apply to affirmative defenses.
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`Finally, B.E. argues that Rule 8(c) should be read in the context of Rule 12(f) and Rule
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`12(h)(2), thereby imposing sufficiency requirements not explicitly stated in Rule 8(c). Dkt. 36-1
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`at 6-7. Regarding Rule 12(f), B.E. posits that Rule 8(c) requires that defense pleadings may be
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`factually “insufficient” because “many cases support the conclusion that defenses are to be tested
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`for their factual sufficiency.” Id. Notably, B.E. cites none of the “many cases” that support its
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`position. In fact, B.E.’s position contradicts the case law. See Starnes Family Office, 765 F.
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`Supp. at 1047 (for the purposes of Rule 12(f), a “defense is insufficient ‘if as a matter of law, the
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`defense cannot succeed under any circumstances.’”) (emphasis added); see also McKinnie v.
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`Lundell Mfg. Co., Inc., 825 F. Supp. 834, 835 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (“An affirmative defense is
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`insufficient if, as a matter of law, the defense cannot succeed under any circumstances.”) (citing
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`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 201 F.2d at 822).
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`B.E., likewise, offers no support for its argument that Rule 12(h)(2) requires a defendant
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`to state the facts of a defense rather than simply to assert a defense. Once again, B.E.’s position
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`contradicts the case law. Rule 12(h)(2) provides a means for challenging the legal sufficiency of
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`a defense, not the factual sufficiency. See, e.g., Hughes v. Lavender, No. 2:10-cv-674, 2011 WL
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`2945843 at *2 (Rule 12(h)(2) provides a party the “right to challenge [the] legal sufficiency of
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`affirmative defense[s] at any time”). Accordingly, neither Rule 12(f) nor Rule 12(h)(2) provides
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`any basis for this Court to abandon the fair notice standard and impose a heightened pleading
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`standard for affirmative defenses.
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`C.
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`Pandora Adequately Pled Its Affirmative Defenses
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`In light of these considerations, each of Pandora’s affirmative defenses is adequately pled
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`under Rule 8(c) for the reasons set forth below, and thus B.E.’s Motion to Strike should be
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`denied.
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`1.
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`Failure to State a Claim
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`Referring to Pandora’s First Affirmative Defense, B.E. asserts that “Pandora’s One-
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`Sentence Unenforceability Affirmative Defense Does Not Withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) Challenge.”
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`Dkt. 31-1 at 12. This assertion is nonsensical for two reasons: 1) Pandora has not pled an
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`unenforceability affirmative defense, and 2) Pandora’s affirmative defense pleadings must
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`withstand a Rule 12(f) challenge, not a rule 12(b)(6) challenge.
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`Pandora’s First Affirmative Defense states that “[t]he Complaint fails to state a claim
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`upon which relief may be granted.” Dkt. 20 at 6. To the extent BE takes issue with this defense,
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`Pandora’s statement comports with Form 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The forms
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`in the Appendix [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] suffice under these rules and illustrate
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`the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 84. Further, Form 30
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`satisfies the pleading requirements of Rule 8. Thus, Pandora’s statement provides “fair notice.”
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`See Kilgore-Wilson, 2012 WL 4062663, at *2 (holding that a defense stating only that “Plaintiff
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`fails to state a claim against these Defendants upon which relief may be granted” provides “fair
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`notice” in satisfaction of Rules 8 and 12). Therefore, Pandora has sufficiently pled its First
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`Affirmative Defense and B.E.’s Motion should be denied.
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`2.
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`Non-infringement
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`Pandora’s Second Affirmative Defense states that it “has not infringed and is not
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`infringing, any valid claim of the ‘314 patent.” Dkt. 20 at 7. B.E. asserts that this defense is
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`“insufficient and does not even constitute an affirmative defense.” Dkt. 31-1 at 11. In fact,
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`Pandora’s Affirmative Defense provides enough specificity to state a non-infringement defense
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`under Rule 8(c). See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. U.S., 85 Fed. Cl. 724, 725 (Ct. Fed. Cl.
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`2009) (finding affirmative defense of non-infringement sufficient where it stated “[n]either the
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`accused products nor Rose have infringed or infringe any of the asserted claims of the patents-in-
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`suit, either directly, indirectly, literally, or under the doctrine of equivalents”).
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`Remarkably, B.E. demands that Pandora provide greater specificity in its non-
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`infringement defense than B.E. provided in its complaint alleging infringement. B.E.’s
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`complaint offers little more than the general and conclusory allegation that “Pandora has
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`infringed the ‘314 patent by using a method of providing demographically targeted advertising
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`that directly infringes at least Claim 11 of the ‘314 patent either literally or under the doctrine of
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`equivalents.” Dkt. 1 at 3. The complaint alleges no details regarding the accused Pandora
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`service or asserted patent claims, yet B.E. argues that Pandora should be required to provide
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`more details in its affirmative defenses in this early stage in the proceedings. Such a requirement
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`would be illogical and inequitable. See Graphic Packaging Int’l., Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co., 2011
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 13 of 15 PageID 446
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`WL 5829674, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 01, 2011) (“To require [defendant] to meet a higher pleading
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`standard on its… affirmative defenses than [plaintiff] must meet in pleading its infringement
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`claims would be illogical and inequitable.”). Pandora has provided fair notice of its non-
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`infringement defense.
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`Furthermore, contrary to BE’s argument, the Federal Circuit has explicitly stated that
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`non-infringement is an affirmative defense to infringement. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d
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`1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Affirmative defenses to infringement include noninfringement,
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`unenforceability, invalidity . . . patent misuse, . . . and the existence of an implied license”). The
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`patent statute specifies that non-infringement is a defense that “shall be pleaded.” See 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 282 (“(b) Defenses. The following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or
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`infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) Noninfringement. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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`Therefore, Pandora’s Second Affirmative Defense is properly pled under Rule 8(c), and B.E.’s
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`Motion should be denied.
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`3.
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`Invalidity
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`Pandora’s Third Affirmative Defense states that “[e]ach of the claims of the ‘314 patent
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`is invalid for failing to comply with the conditions of patentability set forth in the patent laws of
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`the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq., including without limitation, at least 35 U.S.C. §§ 102,
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`103, and/or 112.” Dkt. 20 at 7. This short and plain statement of Pandora’s invalidity defense
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`complies with pleading requirements and provides fair notice of the grounds on which the
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`defense is based, such that B.E. will not suffer any prejudice. See, e.g., Paducah River Painting,
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`Inc. v. McNational Inc., 2011 WL 5525938, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2011) (denying motion to
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`strike defense that patent is invalid “under one or more of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. §§102,
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`103, and/or 112”); Graphic Packaging, 2011 WL 5829674, at *3 (“invalidity counterclaims and
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 14 of 15 PageID 447
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`affirmative defenses that allege only their statutory bases are adequate to survive a Rule 12
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`motion challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings.”); Tyco Fire Prods. LP, 777 F. Supp. 2d at
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`903 (denying motion to strike affirmative defense that Plaintiff’s patents were “invalid and/or
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`unenforceable for failure to comply with the conditions of patentability specified in Title 35 of
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`the United States Code, including, without limitation, at least §§ 101, 102, 103 and 112”). Thus,
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`B.E.’s Motion to Strike this defense should be denied.
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, B.E.’s Motion should be denied in its entirety. Alternatively,
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`and to the extent the Court grants B.E.’s Motion, Pandora requests leave to amend its Answer to
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`supplement any affirmative defenses found to be insufficiently pled.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Glen G. Reid, Jr.
`Glen G. Reid, Jr. (#8184)
`Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr. (#06389)
`WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
`1715 Aaron Brenner Drive, Suite 800
`Memphis, TN 38120-4367
`Phone: 901.537.1000
`Facsimile: 901.537.1010
`greid@wyattfirm.com
`mvorder-bruegge@wyattfirm.com
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`BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD.
`J. Pieter van Es
`Matthew P. Becker
`Azuka C. Dike
`Dargaye H. Churnet
`Ten S. Wacker Dr. Ste. 3000
`Chicago, IL 60606
`(312) 463-5000
`pvanes@bannerwitcoff.com
`mbecker@bannerwitcoff.com
`adike@bannerwitcoff.com
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`Case 2:12-cv-02782-JPM-cgc Document 44 Filed 07/25/13 Page 15 of 15 PageID 448
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`dchurnet@bannerwitcoff.com
`Attorneys for Defendant
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The foregoing document was filed under the Court’s CM/ECF system, automatically
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`effecting service on counsel of record for all other parties who have appeared in this action on
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`the date of such service.
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`/s/ Glen G. Reid, Jr.
`Glen G. Reid, Jr.
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`60421157.1
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