Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 1 of 25 PageID 409
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
`WESTERN DIVISION
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`B.E. TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Case No. 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp
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`JURY DEMAND
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`)))))))))))
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`LINKEDIN CORPORATION,
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`v.
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`Defendant.
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`MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT LINKEDIN CORPORATION
`IN OPPOSITION TO B.E. TECHNOLOGY’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKE
`
`Of Counsel:
`
`J. David Hadden
`dhadden@fenwick.com
`Darren F. Donnelly
`ddonnelly@fenwick.com
`Saina S. Shamilov
`sshamilov@fenwick.com
`Ryan J. Marton
`rmarton@fenwick.com
`Clifford Webb
`cwebb@fenwick.com
`Justin Hulse
`jhulse@fenwick.com
`FENWICK & WEST LLP
`801 California Street, 6th Floor
`Mountain View, CA 94041
`(650) 988-8500
`
`Mark Vorder-Bruegge, Jr. (#06389)
`mvorder-bruegge@wyattfirm.com
`Glen G. Reid, Jr. (#8184)
`greid@wyattfirm.com
`WYATT, TARRANT & COMBS, LLP
`The Renaissance Center
`1715 Aaron Brenner Dr., Suite 800
`Memphis, TN 38120-4367
`(901) 537-1000
`
`Counsel for Defendant
`LINKEDIN CORP.
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 2 of 25 PageID 410
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
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`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2 
`
`III. 
`
`ARGUMENT.......................................................................................................................3 
`
`A. 
`
`LINKEDIN’S COUNTERCLAIMS ARE SUFFICIENTLY PLED AND
`SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED. ...........................................................................3 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims Meet the Requirements of the Federal Rules
`of Civil Procedure for Patent-Related Claims. ............................................4 
`
`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims Are Sufficient Under Twombly and Iqbal
`and Are Pled with the Level of Specificity Anticipated by this District’s
`Local Patent Rules. ......................................................................................6 
`
`B. 
`
`LINKEDIN’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES ARE SUFFICIENTLY PLED AND
`SHOULD NOT BE STRICKEN..............................................................................9 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`4. 
`
`Twombly and Iqbal Do Not Apply to Affirmative Defenses. ....................11 
`
`LinkedIn’s Affirmative Defenses Are Adequately Pled Under the
`Applicable “Fair Notice” Standard. ...........................................................15 
`
`LinkedIn’s Failure to State a Claim Defense and Reservation of
`Affirmative Defenses Are Proper. .............................................................16 
`
`B.E. Is Not Prejudiced by LinkedIn’s Affirmative Defenses. ...................17 
`
`IV. 
`
`CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................18 
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`i
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 3 of 25 PageID 411
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`
`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Ailey v. Midland Funding,
`LLC, No. 3:11-cv-77, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81028 (E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2011)..................12
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009)......................................................................................................... passim
`
`ASUSTeK Computer Inc. v. AFTG-TG LLC,
`No. 5:CV 11-000192-EJD, 2011 WL 6845791 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011)...............................8
`
`Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,
`No. 10-1045 RMB/JS, 2011 WL 6934557 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011)........................................14
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007)......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. U.S.,
`201 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1953) ...................................................................................................10
`
`Damron v. ATM Central LLC,
`No. 1:10-cv-01210, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142812 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2010).......... passim
`
`Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,
`148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Driessen v. Sony Music Entm’t,
`904 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Utah 2012)........................................................................................5
`
`Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc.,
`31 F. Supp. 296 (D. Conn. 1939).............................................................................................15
`
`Eastman Kodak Co. v. McAuley,
`2 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Elan Pharma Int’l Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd.,
`No. 09-1008, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306 (D. N.J. Mar. 31, 2010)...............................3, 7, 8
`
`Falley v. Friends Univ.,
`787 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Kan. 2011)......................................................................................13
`
`FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, LLC,
`No. 09-1204 (JBS/JS), 2011 WL 883202 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011) ..........................................14
`
`
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`-ii-
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 4 of 25 PageID 412
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(CONTINUED)
`
`Pages(s)
`
`Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc.,
`No. 3:11-cv-00481-RCJ-VPC, 2012 WL 607539 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2012) ............................14
`
`Forman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178 (1962)...................................................................................................................9
`
`Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co.,
`No. 1:10-cv-3008-AT, 2011 WL 5829674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) ........................................8
`
`Hahn v. Best Recovery Servs., LLC,
`No. 10-12370, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116136 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2010)............................13
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc.,
`58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).............................................................................................15
`
`Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Southgate,
`No. 2:11-cv-14719, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85952 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2012) ....................17
`
`Jeeper’s of Auburn, Inc. v. KWJB Enter., L.L.C.,
`No. 10-13682, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53492 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2011) ................11, 12, 17
`
`Joao Control & Monitorining Sys. Of Cal., LLC v. Sling Media, Inc.,
`No. C-11-6277 EMC, 2012 WL 3249510 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012).........................................5
`
`Kilgore-Wilson v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
`No. 2:11-cv-02601-JTF, 2012 WL 4062663 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2012).................10, 12, 17
`
`Lawrence v. Chabot,
`182 Fed. App’x. 442 (6th Cir. 2006) .......................................................................................11
`
`Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty, Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit,
`507 U.S. 163 (1992)...................................................................................................................5
`
`Lone Star Document Mgmt., LLC v. Atalashoft, Inc.,
`No. 2:11-cv-00319-JRG, 2012 WL 4033322 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 12, 2012) ..................................5
`
`Mark IV Indus. Corp. v. TransCore, L.P.,
`No. 09-418 GMS, 2009 WL 4828661 (D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009)...................................................6
`
`McLemore v. Regions Bank,
`Nos. 3:08-cv-0021; 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 WL 1010092 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010)..............13
`
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`-iii-
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 5 of 25 PageID 413
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(CONTINUED)
`
`Pages(s)
`
`McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
`501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................5
`
`Memory Control Enter. LLC v. Edmunds.com,
`No. CV 11-7658 PA, 2012 WL 681765 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012)...........................................14
`
`Montgomery v. Wyeth,
`580 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Overnite Trans. Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
`Am., AFL-CIO,
`168 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)..................................................................................10
`
`Palmetto Pharms. LLC v. Astrazeneca Pharms. LP,
`No. 2:11-cv-00807, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177185 (D. S.C. Nov. 6, 2012)....................3, 7, 8
`
`Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,
`726 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2010) .........................................................................................8
`
`Recticel Automobilsysteme GmbH v. Auto Components Holdings, LLC,
`No. 2:10-cv-14097-SFC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127261 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2011) ...........16
`
`Select Retrieval, LLC v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,
`No. 2:12-cv-00003-NT, 2012 WL 5381503 (D. Me. Oct. 31, 2012).........................................6
`
`Sewell v. Allied Interstate, Inc.,
`No. 3:10-cv-113, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 983 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2011) .........................10, 12
`
`Shane v. Bunzl Distrib. USA, Inc.,
`200 Fed. App’x. 397 (6th Cir. 2006) .........................................................................................9
`
`Sony/ATV Music Publ’g LLC v. DJ Miller Music Distribs., Inc.,
`No. 3:09-cv-01098, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116158 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2011)........10, 12, 17
`
`Teirstien v. AGA Med. Corp.,
`No. 6:08-cv-14, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2009)...............6, 7, 8, 16
`
`Tetsuya v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. C 11-01210 HRL, 2011 WL 10632812 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011)....................................16
`
`Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co.,
`777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Pa. 2011) .......................................................................................14
`
`
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`-iv-
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 6 of 25 PageID 414
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(CONTINUED)
`
`Vistan Corp. v. Fadei USA, Inc.,
`No. C-10-4862 JCS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47099 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2011)................15, 16
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C.
`§§ 101-105 .............................................................................................................................5, 7
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`Pages(s)
`
`RULES
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8...............................................................................................................................6
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ..............................................................................................................8, 13, 14
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)................................................................................................................6, 12
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) ........................................................................................................................13
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) ........................................................................................................................13
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................................13
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).......................................................................................................9, 10, 14, 15
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 84.........................................................................................................................4, 5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P., Appendix of Forms, Form 18.........................................................................4, 5, 7
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P., Appendix of Forms, Form 30.......................................................................1, 4, 17
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`-v-
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 7 of 25 PageID 415
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`Defendant LinkedIn Corp. (“LinkedIn”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby
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`submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Strike filed by Plaintiff B.E.
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`Technology, LLC (“B.E.”).
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims for invalidity and non-infringement are sufficiently pled under
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`the accepted notice pleading standard codified by Form 30 to the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure and unchanged by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
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`U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The Counterclaims provide a short
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`and plain statement of LinkedIn’s claim for non-infringement and an explanation of the statutory
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`bases of LinkedIn’s claim for invalidity. This is all that is required. Likewise, LinkedIn’s
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`affirmative defenses are more than adequate under the controlling Sixth Circuit fair notice
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`standard—which requires only a general statement of the theory on which a party intends to
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`defend.
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`B.E.’s demand that LinkedIn provide the full metes and bounds of its theories and
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`defenses, along with detailed factual allegations supporting them, at this early stage is both
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`unsupportable and untenable. This District’s Local Patent Rules govern those disclosures, and
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`B.E.’s demands, if accepted, would significantly undermine these Rules. Moreover, what B.E.
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`demands of LinkedIn is far in excess of what its own cursory Complaint alleges—making only a
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`one-sentence allegation of infringement. There is no basis for such a double standard in the
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`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court precedent, or the applicable standards in the
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`Sixth Circuit.
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`For these reasons, LinkedIn respectfully submits that B.E.’s Motion should be denied in
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`its entirety. In the alternative, should this Court be inclined to grant B.E.’s Motion, LinkedIn
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`requests leave to amend its Counterclaims and affirmative defenses with further supporting
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`details.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`B.E. initiated this lawsuit with a conclusory three-page, eleven-paragraph Complaint
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`accusing LinkedIn of infringing United States Patent No. 6,628,314 (the “’314 patent”) in the
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`most general of terms. (See Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”).) The entirety of B.E.’s allegation of
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`infringement is that “LinkedIn has infringed the ’314 Patent by using a method of providing
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`demographically targeted advertising that directly infringes at least Claim 11 of the ’314 patent
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`either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” (Id. ¶ 11; see also Motion at 1.) B.E. does
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`not explain how LinkedIn allegedly infringes, or even what services are accused.
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`In response to B.E.’s vague allegation of infringement, LinkedIn filed an Answer and
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`Counterclaims on December 31, 2012. (Dkt. No. 19.) Specifically, LinkedIn asserted
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`Counterclaims for non-infringement and invalidity of the ’314 patent, along with a handful of
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`affirmative defenses—non-infringement, invalidity, dedication to the public, laches, failure to
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`state a claim, estoppel, and a reservation of subsequently discovered affirmative defenses. (Id. at
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`3–4.)
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`Under this Court’s Local Patent Rules, on January 7, 2013, a week after LinkedIn filed its
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`Answer and Counterclaims, B.E. served its initial infringement contentions. In turn, under these
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`same Rules, LinkedIn will have to shortly serve responsive non-infringement contentions
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`providing its initial theory of non-infringement. Shortly thereafter, LinkedIn will serve its
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`invalidity contentions. See Patent L.R. 3.3-3.4, 3.5-3.6. B.E. does not dispute that these
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`disclosures, when made, will provide it with the specifics of LinkedIn’s non-infringement and
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`invalidity positions along with relevant documentary support.
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`2
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`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims Are Sufficiently Pled and Should Not Be
`Dismissed.
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`B.E. incorrectly contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) require LinkedIn, as
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`the defendant, to come forward with its specific factual bases of non-infringement and invalidity
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`in response to a Complaint that does not identify which LinkedIn products or services are
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`accused of infringement. (Motion at 12–15.) Indeed, B.E. expressly faults LinkedIn for not
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`providing an explanation of what products are non-infringing when B.E. itself has not even
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`accused any in the Complaint. (Id. at 15.) B.E. cites no Sixth Circuit authority for this pleading
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`double standard, nor could it. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Supreme
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`Court’s decisions in Twombly or Iqbal support, let alone compel, such divergent and prejudicial
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`treatment of complaints and counterclaims. See, e.g., Elan Pharma Int’l Ltd. v. Lupin Ltd., No.
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`09-1008, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at *13 (D. N.J. Mar. 31, 2010) (“[t]here is no basis for
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`this Court to, on the one hand, allow Elan to plead as it has while, on the other hand, require
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`Lupin, inexplicably, to provide more detailed factual support for its counterclaim and defenses”);
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`Palmetto Pharms. LLC v. Astrazeneca Pharms. LP, No. 2:11-cv-00807, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`177185, at *18–*19 (D. S.C. Nov. 6, 2012) (recognizing that “it would be ‘incongruous to
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`require heightened pleading’ for invalidity counterclaims when the pleading standard for
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`infringement does not require factual allegations to support the infringement claims”).1
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`1.
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`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims Meet the Requirements of the Federal
`Rules of Civil Procedure for Patent-Related Claims.
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`Form 30 to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that counterclaims should be
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`“[s]et forth . . . in the same way a claim is pleaded in a complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P., Appendix of
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`Forms, Form 30. Form 18, in turn, provides the required contents for a sufficient complaint for
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`patent infringement, including only:
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`(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff
`owns the patent; (3) a statement that the defendant has been
`infringing the patent “by making, selling, and using [the device]
`embodying the patent”; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given
`the defendant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an
`injunction and damages.”
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`Id., Form 18. Pleadings consistent with these forms “suffice under [the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure] and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that the [] rules contemplate.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`84; see also In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323,
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`1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that pleading in compliance with the forms is sufficient).
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`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims plead each of the elements contemplated by Forms 18 and 30.
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`As to non-infringement, LinkedIn alleges (1) the basis for jurisdiction over its counterclaim and
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`the existence of an actual controversy (Counterclaim ¶¶ 5–7), (2) that B.E. has asserted
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`ownership of the ’314 patent (id. ¶ 9), (3) that, despite B.E.’s allegation to the contrary, LinkedIn
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`1 B.E. offers only two justifications for ignoring this case law and subjecting LinkedIn’s Counterclaims to a
`level of scrutiny that Plaintiff’s Complaint could not possibly survive: (1) “[p]otential counterclaimants aware that
`their pleadings will be tested under the Twombly/Iqbal standard will hesitate to assert frivolous otherwise
`unsupportable claims” and (2) “[b]aseless claims will not be made, and expensive discovery or other proceedings
`will be avoided.” (Motion at 5.) These rationales do nothing to differentiate B.E.’s own claim of patent
`infringement and cannot possibly justify the disparate treatment that B.E. demands. LinkedIn, like any defendant in
`a patent case, knows that its non-infringement and invalidity cases will be the central matter of dispute. Nearly all
`of the effort and discovery of both parties will be geared towards either proving or disproving infringement and
`validity and will be tested early on by this District’s infringement, non-infringement, and invalidity disclosure
`requirements. See Patent L.R. 3.3-3.6. The suggestion that forcing LinkedIn to prematurely come forward with
`specific non-infringement and invalidity facts, in response to a Complaint that does not specifically accuse any
`products, will somehow avoid this dispute or discovery is completely meritless.
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`does not infringe the ’314 patent (id. ¶¶ 10–11), and (4) that a judgment of non-infringement
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`should be entered. (Id. ¶ 12.) LinkedIn’s counterclaim for invalidity contains corresponding
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`foundational allegations along with an explanation that the asserted ’314 patent is “invalid for
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`failure to meet one or more of the conditions for patentability specified in Title 35, U.S.C., or the
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`rules, regulations, and law related thereto, including, without limitation, one or more of 35
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`U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112” and in turn requests a judgment invalidating the ’314
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`patent. (Id. ¶ 17.) LinkedIn’s compliance with Form 18 and 30 should end the inquiry
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`regardless of Twombly.
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`Indeed, the Supreme Court adopted the revised versions of Forms 18 and 30 as part of the
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`2007 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, just weeks before it announced its
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`decision in Twombly. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 84, note. The Federal Circuit, in analyzing the
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`continuing force and effect of these forms following Twombly, held that they remain the standard
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`against which claims for infringement and non-infringement are to be measured. See In re Bill of
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`Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 (“to the extent the parties argue that Twombly and its progeny conflict
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`with the Forms and create differing pleading requirements, the Forms control”) (citing McZeal v.
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`Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).2 Not surprisingly, therefore,
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`numerous courts have followed the Federal Circuit in holding that claims related to infringement
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`are sufficient if pled with the level of specificity contemplated by the forms. See, e.g., Driessen
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`v. Sony Music Entm’t, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198–1201 (D. Utah 2012); Joao Control &
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`Monitorining Sys. Of Cal., LLC v. Sling Media, Inc., No. C-11-6277 EMC, 2012 WL 3249510, at
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`*4–*5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012); Lone Star Document Mgmt., LLC v. Atalashoft, Inc., No. 2:11-
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`2 Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 specifically provides that “any changes to the Federal Rules of
`Civil Procedure must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”
`See In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty, Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit,
`507 U.S. 163, 168 (1992)); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (acknowledging that the requirements of the
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be accomplished by “judicial interpretation”).
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`5
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 12 of 25 PageID 420
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`cv-00319-JRG, 2012 WL 4033322, at *2, *3–*4 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 12, 2012); Select Retrieval,
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`LLC v. L.L. Bean, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00003-NT, 2012 WL 5381503, at *2–*3 (D. Me. Oct. 31,
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`2012). Because LinkedIn’s Counterclaims provide the same level of detail contemplated by
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`Forms 18 and 30, B.E.’s Motion should be denied.
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`2.
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`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims Are Sufficient Under Twombly and Iqbal
`and Are Pled with the Level of Specificity Anticipated by this
`District’s Local Patent Rules.
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`Regardless of the applicability of the forms, however, nothing in Twombly or its progeny
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`requires more specific allegations than what LinkedIn has pled. Affirmative claims under Rule
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`8(a)(2) require “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
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`to relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The premise of this requirement is to “give the defendant
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`fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” not every fact which
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`ultimately may be offered to support it. Id. As such, determining compliance is not “a ‘fact-
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`based’ question of law” (Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674) and “does not require ‘detailed factual
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`allegations.” Id. at 678. It is a practical, context-specific inquiry requiring “the reviewing court
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`to draw on its experience and common sense.” Id. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 556).
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`As B.E. is no doubt well-aware based on the lack of specificity in its own Complaint,
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`courts in the patent context have generally adopted a lenient standard for the specificity required
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`in complaints and counterclaims under Rule 8 following Twombly. See, e.g., Teirstien v. AGA
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`Med. Corp., No. 6:08-cv-14, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *12–*13 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13,
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`2009). In so doing, these courts recognize the difficulty of providing detailed allegations of
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`infringement, non-infringement, or invalidity at the pleading stage—before an opportunity for
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`investigation and discovery. See, e.g., Mark IV Indus. Corp. v. TransCore, L.P., No. 09-418
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`GMS, 2009 WL 4828661, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009) (recognizing the “practical difficulties of
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 13 of 25 PageID 421
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`pleading patent infringement with more specificity than required by Form 18”); Elan Pharma
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`Int’l, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at *13 (“[t]he motion that Lupin must identify what theories
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`of invalidity it intends to pursue, and the facts supporting such theories at this stage is not
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`plausible”).
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`For example, in Teirstien, the Eastern District of Texas held that the allegations for a
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`counterclaim for invalidity, just as for a claim of infringement, need only be “clear enough as to
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`effectively put Plaintiff on notice of the legal and factual grounds for the asserted invalidity.”
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`Teirstien, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *12-*13. Based on this standard, the court denied a
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`motion to dismiss the defendant’s counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity. Id at *16. The
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`counterclaim alleged only that “[t]he claims of the [patent in suit] are invalid for failing to satisfy
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`one or more of the statutory requirements of patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103,
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`and/or 112”—language almost identical to that pled by LinkedIn here (compare to
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`Counterclaims ¶ 17). Teirstien, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *11–*12. According to
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`Teirstien, this was sufficient under Twombly because it put the plaintiff on notice by listing the
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`statutory sections under which the patent was allegedly invalid, and because it was a “short and
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`plaint statement of the claim,” that showed that the pleader was entitled to relief. Id. at *12
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`(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.)
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`Numerous other courts have taken a similar approach, refusing to dismiss comparably
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`pled counterclaims of invalidity. See, e.g., Elan Pharma Int’l, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at
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`*11 (alleging that “the ’249, ’802, and the ’986 patents are invalid under one or more provisions
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`of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-105” sufficient following Twombly); Palmetto Pharms., 2012 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 177185, at *19 (sufficient to allege that a patent “is invalid for failure to comply with one
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`or more of the conditions of patentability specified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and/or 112”);
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`Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 921, 937–38 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (allegation that asserted
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`patents are “invalid for failure to comply with one or more of the conditions of patentability set
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`forth in Title 35 of the United States Code” sufficient to state a counterclaim for invalidity).
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`Similarly general allegations of non-infringement have been found sufficient as well. See, e.g.,
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`Id. (alleging that counterclaimant’s products do not infringe the asserted patents sufficient to
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`state a counterclaim for non-infringement).
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`In refusing to dismiss counterclaims, like those pled by LinkedIn, these courts have
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`recognized that a pragmatic approach to pleading in the patent context makes particular sense in
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`light of local patent rules providing for early disclosure of non-infringement and invalidity
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`theories. See, e.g., Teirstien, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125002, at *14 (explaining that a
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`heightened pleading standard “would undermine the purpose of the Court’s Local Patent Rules”);
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`Elan Pharma Int’l, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32306, at *14 (explaining that where the District of
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`New Jersey’s Patent Local Rules called for the service of non-infringement and invalidity
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`contentions following the plaintiff’s infringement contentions, it would defy logic to require
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`detailed pleadings in the counterclaims); Palmetto Pharms., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177185, at
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`*19–*20 (explaining that the “disclosure of invalidity contentions . . . militates against dismissal
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`of insufficient invalidity counterclaims”); Pfizer, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 938 (“dismissal of Apotex’s
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`counterclaims for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a) would undermine the Local Patent Rules, which
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`require more detailed disclosures at a later stage”); see also ASUSTeK Computer Inc. v. AFTG-
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`TG LLC, No. 5:CV 11-000192-EJD, 2011 WL 6845791, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011)
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`(reasoning that “requiring a heightened pleading of invalidity would circumvent this Court’s
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`Patent Local rules which required detailed disclosures of invalidity contentions soon after the
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`suit is filed”); Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc. v. C.W. Zumbiel Co., No. 1:10-cv-3008-AT, 2011
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`Case 2:12-cv-02772-JPM-tmp Document 50 Filed 08/01/13 Page 15 of 25 PageID 423
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`WL 5829674, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) (stating that “the Patent Local Rules operate to
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`make further factual pleading unnecessary”).
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`The Local Patent Rules in this District counsel for the same result. As explained above,
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`regardless of the pleading standard imposed, LinkedIn will be required to provide its response to
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`B.E.’s infringement contentions providing its non-infringement analysis in less than three weeks
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`and will soon thereafter have to provide disclosures of its invalidity theories. B.E. does not
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`contend that it will be prejudiced by this disclosure schedule. Indeed, the parties stipulated to it
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`in connection with the initial case management conference held on July 26, 2013.
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`LinkedIn’s Counterclaims are sufficiently pled under any applicable standard. They
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`provide a short and plain statement of the bases of LinkedIn’s Counterclaims for non-
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`infringement and invalidity, including the statutory bases for that invalidity. This is all that is
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`required under Forms 18 and 30 and the post-Twombly cases discussed above. B.E. will be
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`provided a disclosure of LinkedIn’s non-infringement and invalidity theories in its upcoming
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`disclosures under the Local Patent Rules. In these circumstances, it would be grossly unfair to
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`allow B.E. to plead patent infringement with the meager allegations it has provided and then hold
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`LinkedIn to a significantly more rigorous standard. B.E.’s Motion should be denied. However,
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`should the Court be inclined to grant the Motion, LinkedIn respectfully requests that it be granted
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`leave to amend its Counterclaims. See Shane v. Bunzl Distrib. USA, Inc., 200 Fed. App’x. 397,
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`405–06 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (allowing party
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`amendment of dismissed claims).
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`B.
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`LinkedIn’s Affirmative Defenses Are Sufficiently Pled and Should Not Be
`Stricken.
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`In addition to seeking dismissal of LinkedIn’s Counterclaims, B.E.’s Motion also seeks to
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`strike all of LinkedIn’s affirmative defenses under Rule 12(f). (Motion at 16-18.) The purpose
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`of a motion to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) is to eliminate “from a pleading
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`an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 12(f). The Sixth Circuit expressly discourages such moti