throbber
ESTTA Tracking number:
`
`ESTTA1401827
`
`Filing date:
`
`12/13/2024
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Ex Parte Appeal -
`Serial No.
`
`98054433
`
`Appellant
`
`Blaine Laboratories, Inc.
`
`Applied for mark
`
`HEELS
`
`Correspondence
`address
`
`Submission
`
`Attachments
`
`Appealed class
`
`KIRK M HARTUNG
`MCKEE VOORHEES & SEASE PLC
`801 GRAND AVE STE 3200
`DES MOINES, IA 50309-2721
`UNITED STATES
`Primary email: patatty@ipmvs.com
`515-288-3667
`
`Appeal brief
`
`HEELS Appeal Brief.pdf(555336 bytes )
`
`Class 005. First Use: Dec 3, 2022 First Use In Commerce: Dec 3, 2022
`All goods and services in the class are appealed, namely: MEDICATED SKIN
`CARE CREAM
`
`Filer's name
`
`Filer's email
`
`Signature
`
`Date
`
`Andrew J. Morgan
`
`patatty@ipmvs.com
`
`/andrew j. morgan/
`
`12/13/2024
`
`

`

`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`In re Trademark Application of Blaine Laboratories, Inc.
`Serial No.: 98054433
`Filing Date: June 22, 2023
`Mark: HEELS
`Intl. Class: 5
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`P.O. Box 1451
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
`
`
`APPLICANT’S APPEAL BRIEF
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`I.
`II. DESCRIPTION OF THE RECORD ................................................................................ 1
`III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ....................................................................................... 1
`IV. BACKGROUND FACTS ................................................................................................... 2
`V.
`THE EXAMINING ATTORNEY’S TEST FOR GENERICNESS IS INOPPOSITE
`TO THE MEANING PRESCRIBED BY THE LANHAM ACT ................................... 5
`VI. THE EXAMINING ATTORNEY’S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY
`THE HEAVY BURDEN REQUIRED TO FIND GENERICNESS ............................... 7
`VII. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................11
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`Clairol, Inc. v. Roux Distributing Co., Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. 1165, 280 F.2d 863,
`126 U.S.P.Q. 397 (1960) ............................................................................................................. 9
`H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int 'l Ass 'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987 (Fed. Cir. 1986) .............. 4
`In re Am. Fertility Soc., 188 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ................................................................ 4
`In re Country Music Ass 'n, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1824 (T.T.A.B. 2011).................................... 4, 9
`In re MBNA America Bank, N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............... 6
`
`
`
`i
`
`

`

`In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
`1141 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ................................................................................................................ 10
`In re Rodale Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1696, 2006 WL 2091269 (T.T.A.B. 2006) ................................. 7
`In re Tennis Indus. Assn., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671 (T.T.A.B. 2012) ......................................... 4, 8, 10
`In re Texas Meat Brokerage, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 40, 1978 WL 21220 (T.T.A.B. 1978) .................. 9
`In re Women's Publishing Co. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876, 1992 WL 224555
`(T.T.A.B. 1992) ......................................................................................................................... 10
`Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ...................................................... 4
`Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 105 S. Ct. 658,
`83 L. Ed. 2d 582, 224 U.S.P.Q. 327 (1985) ................................................................................ 6
`Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................... 4
`Statutes
`15 U.S.C.A. § 1064 ......................................................................................................................... 6
`Other Authorities
`2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1 (5th ed.) ........................................... 6
`3 Callmann on Unfair Comp., Tr. & Mono. § 18:14 (4th ed.) ........................................................ 9
`Rules
`TBMP § 1203.02 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`TMEP § 1209.0l .......................................................................................................................... 7, 8
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Blaine Laboratories, Inc. (“Applicant”) applied to register the mark, HEELS, on June 22,
`
`2023, giving rise to Application Serial No. 98/054,433 (the “Application”). The trademark
`
`examining attorney assigned to the Application (hereinafter, “Examining Attorney”) refuses
`
`registration of Applicant’s mark on the basis that HEELS is generic. Applicant respectfully
`
`submits that the applied-for mark is not generic within the meaning contemplated by the Lanham
`
`Act or as espoused in the relevant caselaw and should thus be entitled to registration on the
`
`Supplemental Register.
`
`II.
`
`DESCRIPTION OF THE RECORD
`The evidence properly on record in this ex parte appeal comprises of the follow evidence
`
`listed below:
`
`A.
`
`The Registrations enumerated in the Evidence Appendix attached to Applicant’s
`
`February 14, 2024 Response to Non-Final Office Action.
`
`B.
`
`The Pending Applications enumerated in the Evidence Appendix attached to
`
`Applicant’s February 14, 2024 Response to Non-Final Office Action.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`The Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition for the word “Heel”.
`
`Third-party webpages submitted by the Examining Attorney.
`
`
`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
`III.
`Whether Applicant’s HEELS trademark is generic where (1) there is no record evidence
`
`that it is the name for the applied-for goods, namely, medicated skin care cream, (2) dictionary
`
`evidence does not define the applied-for mark, or the word “heel” as medicated skin care cream
`
`or a related good, (3) and third-party use of the “heel” and “heels” is used descriptively?
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`BACKGROUND FACTS
`IV.
`On June 22, 2023, Applicant filed the Application at issue in order to register the mark,
`
`HEELS, for use with the identified goods, namely, medicated skin care cream.
`
`Thereafter, a non-final office action was issued against the Application on November 14,
`
`2023 (“First Office Action”). (November 14, 2024 Office Action).1 The First Office Action raised
`
`objections to registration on the basis of: (1) likelihood of confusion with U.S. Registration No.
`
`1,462,471 covering “-HEEL” for use with homeopathic pharmaceutical preparations, namely,
`
`anti-inflammatory, analgesic preparations and (2) that the applied-for mark merely describes the
`
`associated goods. The First Office Action also contained a request for information related to
`
`Applicant’s goods and an advisory that the mark may be generic.
`
`After Applicant submitted its February 14, 2024 response, a final office action was issued
`
`on February 29, 2024 (“First Final Office Action”). (February 29, 2024 Office Action). The First
`
`Final Office Action withdrew the likelihood of confusion objection and maintained refusal with
`
`respect to descriptiveness and request for information. The First Final Office Action further
`
`contained a continued advisory of genericness.
`
`On April 4, 2024, Applicant filed a request for reconsideration which included an
`
`amendment to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. (April 4, 2024 Request for
`
`Reconsideration after Final Action). The amendment was accepted2 and a new, non-final office
`
`
`1 Pursuant to TBMP § 1203.02 (e), Applicant is not herein submitting any supporting materials to the Appeal Brief.
`All citations refer to the documents submitted in connection with the filings in Application Serial No. 87647045 in
`the online database of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO’s”) Trademark Status & Document
`Retrieval (“TSDR”) system.
`2 (April 6, 2024 Amendment).
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`action was issued on May 29, 2024 (“Second Non-Final Office Action”). (May 29, 2024 Non-
`
`Final Office Action).
`
`The Second Non-Final Office Action refused registration of the applied-for mark as
`
`generic under Section 23(c) and is the sole ground for refusal. In making the genericness
`
`rejection, the Examining Attorney asserted that Applicant’s goods as identified in the
`
`Application, being medicated skin care cream, adequately defined the genus for the purposes of
`
`their analysis.
`
`
`
`Applicant’s mark was found to be generic on the assertion that internet evidence
`
`purportedly showed that HEELS “means skin care creams that help to repair dry and cracked
`
`heels and thus the relevant public would understand this designation to refer primarily to that
`
`genus of goods because heel cream is commonly used by others to refer to these type [sic] of
`
`goods.” Id. The referenced internet evidence comprised solely of webpages selling foot creams
`
`which made use of the word “heel” and was likewise offered as evidence to support the
`
`descriptiveness objection issued in the First Final Office Action. (February 29, 2024 Office
`
`Action).
`
`
`
`Applicant responded to the Second Non-Final Office Action challenging the Examining
`
`Attorney’s application of the second step of the primary significance test by identifying that only
`
`one of the products sighted by the internet evidence included the word “heels” and that all
`
`instances included the use of multiple other words. (April 4, 2024 Request for Reconsideration
`
`after Final Action). Applicant also submitted that the purported internet evidence does not
`
`analyze the public’s understanding of the term and merely conflates descriptiveness with
`
`genericness.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`
`
`Applicant’s response also referred to relevant case law in support of its contention that
`
`the evidence offered by the Examining Attorney, which comprised only product webpages and
`
`not other evidence such as dictionaries or studies, was insufficient to support the heavy burden of
`
`finding a mark to be generic and that the record evidence instead supports a finding that the
`
`relevant public does not understand the applied-for mark to identify or refer to the genus of
`
`Applicant’s goods. In re Country Music Ass 'n, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1824, *4-5 (T.T.A.B. 2011)
`
`(28 examples of third-party use insufficient to find “Country Music Association” generic); In re
`
`Tennis Indus. Assn., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671, *3, * 12 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (Dictionary definition, 10
`
`examples of third party use and 4 trademark registrations in sufficient); Princeton Vanguard,
`
`LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2015); H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int 'l
`
`Ass 'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989- 90 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB,
`
`Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Am. Fertility Soc., 188 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1999).
`
`
`
`Nevertheless, on July 19, 2024, the Examining Attorney maintained the genericness
`
`objection on identical grounds and reasoning issuing a second final office action (“Second Final
`
`Office Action”). (July 19, 2024 Subsequent Final Office Action). In further support of their
`
`position, the Examining Attorney offered a dictionary reference for the word “HEEL” and the
`
`previously offered internet evidence; both of which were first offered to support their
`
`descriptiveness objection and before genericness was made a formal rejection. In response to
`
`Applicant’s assertion that the internet evidence was insufficient, the Examining Attorney merely
`
`included more of the exact same nature. The majority of the substantive analysis included in the
`
`Second Final Office Action was devoted to whether the term “heels” is descriptive—Applicant
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`was already seeking registration to the Supplemental Register at this point—and appears to be
`
`recycled from the First Office Action and First Final Office Action.
`
`
`
`Relying solely on the aforementioned evidence and analysis, the Examining Attorney
`
`summarily concluded that “consumers who encounter or will encounter the applicant’s mark in
`
`commerce in the context of the identified goods would immediately perceive the wording ‘heels’
`
`to pertain to a type of skin care remedy.” (July 19, 2024 Subsequent Final Office Action).
`
`
`
`Thereafter, Applicant filed a request for reconsideration in response to the Second Final
`
`Office Action. (September 24, 2024 Request for Reconsideration After Final Action). Applicant
`
`asserted that the Examining Attorney continued to conflate descriptiveness with genericness and
`
`maintained that the evidence relied upon by the Examining Attorney could not demonstrate that
`
`consumers understand the term “Heels” to refer to medicated skin care cream and was thus
`
`insufficient. The Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s request for reconsideration giving way
`
`to the present appeal where the only ground for refusal is the contention that the applied-for
`
`mark, HEELS, is generic.
`
`V.
`
`THE EXAMINING ATTORNEY’S TEST FOR GENERICNESS IS
`INOPPOSITE TO THE MEANING PRESCRIBED BY THE LANHAM ACT
`The Examining Attorney’s continued refusal and underlying rationale conflate the
`
`concept of genericness with the concept of descriptiveness. The misapplication of the test for
`
`genericness is made abundantly clear in the various bases for refusal within the prosecution
`
`history, and by the Examining Attorney’s conclusion that “consumers who encounter or will
`
`encounter the applicant’s mark in commerce … would immediately perceive the wording “heels”
`
`to pertain to a type of skin care remedy.” (July 19, 2024 Subsequent Final Office Action)
`
`(emphasis added). It is plain that the language used by the Examining Attorney pertains to
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`descriptiveness, not genericness. In re MBNA America Bank, N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 1332, 67
`
`U.S.P.Q.2d 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A mark is descriptive if it immediately conveys information
`
`concerning a quality or characteristic of the product”).
`
`Prior to 1989, the Lanham Act utilized the term “common descriptive name” rather than
`
`“generic”. The Supreme Court of the United States once, in dictum, stated that a generic term
`
`was one that “refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species.” Park 'N Fly, Inc.
`
`v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S. Ct. 658, 83 L. Ed. 2d 582, 224 U.S.P.Q.
`
`327 (1985). However, “refers to” is a vague and improper way of making a determination of
`
`genericness because it obfuscates the line between a generic name and a descriptive word. 2
`
`McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1 (5th ed.). Recognizing the need for
`
`clarity, Congress revised “common descriptive name” to “generic name” by enacting the
`
`Trademark Law Revision Act of 1989. Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (Effective Nov. 16,
`
`1989).
`
`Accordingly, the proper question here is whether the applied-for mark, HEELS is the
`
`name of medicated skin care cream. 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1
`
`(5th ed.) (internal citations omitted). Whether consumers would understand the term to pertain to
`
`Applicant’s good is not the test, they must believe it is the identity, or name, of those goods
`
`themselves.
`
`To find otherwise is to stand in direct contravention of the statutory text of the Lanham
`
`Act which explicitly recites the requirement as being a “generic name for goods or services.” 15
`
`U.S.C.A. § 1064(3) (Cancellation); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (Defining “abandonment”); 15 U.S.C.A.
`
`§ 1065(4) (Exception to incontestable status).
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Importantly, the Examining Attorney does not assert that the applied-for mark is the
`
`name of Applicant’s products, or those belonging to the same genus, in any of the Office Actions
`
`issued. In fact, the word “name” does not appear at all. All that is submitted is that the mark
`
`“pertains to”, “refers to” or “identifies a type” of medicated skin care cream. The Examining
`
`Attorney’s statements merely assert that HEELS describes the product, not that it is the name of
`
`a genus of products.
`
`As such, the Examining Attorney’s application of the concept of genericness is contrary
`
`to law and Applicant respectfully requests that the Board reverse the Examining Attorney’s final
`
`refusal of Applicant’s mark.
`
`VI.
`
`THE EXAMINING ATTORNEY’S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
`SATISFY THE HEAVY BURDEN REQUIRED TO FIND GENERICNESS
`To the extent the Examining Attorney conducted a genericness analysis, the evidence
`
`used was insufficient to conclude that “HEELS” is generic. The burden is on the Examining
`
`Attorney “to establish a prima facie case that a term is generic by providing a reasonable
`
`predicate (or basis) that the relevant purchasing public would primarily use or understand the
`
`matter sought to be registered to refer to the genus of goods or services in question.” See TMEP
`
`§ 1209.0l(c)(i).
`
`This Board has held that the burden of establishing a rejection based on genericness can
`
`only be met by “clear evidence of generic use”. In re Rodale Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1696, 2006 WL
`
`2091269 (T.T.A.B. 2006). The evidence presented by the Examining Attorney, consisting only of
`
`a single dictionary entry and a smattering of webpages selling various creams and lotions, is
`
`neither clear evidence, nor evidence of generic use.
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`The test of whether a designation is generic comprises two questions. First, what is the
`
`genus of goods at issue; and second, whether the relevant public understands the designation to
`
`primarily be the name of that genus of goods. In re Tennis Indus. Assn., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671 at
`
`*3; TMEP § 1209.0l(c)(i). In the instant case, neither party contests that the genus of goods are
`
`those identified in the instant application, namely, medicated skin care cream. (May 29, 2024
`
`Non-Final Office Action).
`
`While third party usage is indeed a permissible source in assessing genericness, so too is
`
`any other competent source of evidence “bearing on how consumers perceive a term’s meaning,”
`
`including dictionaries, research databases, magazines, newspapers, or other publications. See
`
`TMEP § 1209.0l(c)(i).
`
`In the instant case, the Examining Attorney makes reference to one dictionary entry. (July
`
`19, 2024 Subsequent Final Office Action) (citing November 14, 2023 Non-Final Office Action).
`
`While the cited Merriam-Webster definition of “heel” does include references to the human foot,
`
`amongst others, absent from the definition are medicated skin care creams. As such, the
`
`Examining Attorney’s dictionary entry does not support that the applied-for mark HEELS is the
`
`generic name of Applicant’s goods; instead, it indicates that Applicant’s mark is descriptive and
`
`thus registrable on the Supplemental Register.
`
`Furthermore, the internet evidence, to the extent they have any relevance whatsoever,
`
`supports the conclusion “HEELS” is not generic. That said, a number of these webpages are
`
`clearly not relevant as, on their face, they do not comprise goods of the genus, i.e. medicated skin
`
`care cream. Numerous entries are clearly non-medicated lotions while others leave doubt.
`
`Further, several examples, such as “Heel Rescue® Foot Cream”, use the disputed term as a part
`
`of a registered mark. (February 29, 2024 Final Office Action). Without exception, all third-party
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`uses proffered by the Examining Attorney use the term “heel(s)” as an adjective to modify one or
`
`more nouns to describe the product.
`
`In general, “A generic term categorizes; while a descriptive term, on the other hand,
`
`characterizes; that is, it identifies the characteristics and qualities of the article, such as its color,
`
`odor, functions, dimensions or ingredients.” 3 Callmann on Unfair Comp., Tr. & Mono. § 18:14
`
`(4th ed.) (citing Clairol, Inc. v. Roux Distributing Co., Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. 1165, 280 F.2d 863, 126
`
`U.S.P.Q. 397 (1960); In re Texas Meat Brokerage, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 40, 1978 WL 21220
`
`(T.T.A.B. 1978). “The typical descriptive term is an adjective, rather than a noun. Instead of
`
`naming a product or service, it attributes some characteristic to it.” 3 Callmann on Unfair Comp.,
`
`Tr. & Mono. § 18:14 (4th ed.).
`
`Here, the vast majority of third party uses cited by the Examining Attorney comprise
`
`some formative of “heel cream”. In such examples, the term “heel” is modifying, or describing,
`
`the term “cream” to indicate that such creams are meant to be used on ones’ heel. Such use is not
`
`generic but instead undoubtedly descriptive. Therefore, the use cited by the Examining Attorney
`
`is not evidence of generic use by third parties.
`
`Accordingly, none of the evidence demonstrates that Applicant’s mark is an unregistrable,
`
`generic designation; rather, it demonstrates that the mark is, at worst, descriptive, and capable of
`
`registration on the Supplemental Register.
`
` Yet even if the websites were relevant and somehow supported the Examining Attorney’s
`
`position, the Examining Attorney’s sole reliance on this evidence is nevertheless insufficient.
`
`For example, in In re Country Music Ass 'n, Inc. , 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1824, *4-5 (T.T.A.B.
`
`2011), the Board referenced 28 examples of third party usages cited by the examining attorney as
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`not “clearly establish[ing] genericness,” stating in part: “[W]e are not convinced that the
`
`examining attorney’s evidence of use of the phrase ‘Country Music Association’ suffices as clear
`
`evidence that the relevant purchasers perceive the phrase as naming the genus of the services at
`
`issue.”
`
`Similarly, the examining attorney in In Re Tennis Indus. Assn., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d at *4- 8
`
`cited not only dictionary definitions for each of the proposed trademark’s terms, but also at least
`
`five examples of generic use of the proposed mark in its entirety, at least eight examples of
`
`generic use of a portion of the proposed mark, at least five relevant websites, and at least four
`
`trademark registrations, yet the Board nevertheless found that the examiner had “not met its
`
`difficult burden of establishing by clear evidence that the designation . .. , as a whole, [was]
`
`generic [for the relevant genus of services.]” 102 U.S.P.Q.2d at *4- 8.
`
`Again, the internet evidence, even if relevant, does not show generic use. Such is made
`
`clear from the fact that the evidence was recycled from that put forth to support the Examining
`
`Attorney’s contention that Applicant’s mark was merely descriptive prior to the amendment to
`
`seek registration on the Principal Register. Accordingly, the Examining Attorney has failed to
`
`present any evidence that the applied-for mark is generic and has not met its burden, and nor is
`
`there any evidence available to demonstrate, that “HEELS” is generic of Applicant’s goods. As
`
`such, and especially in view of this Board’s precedent in resolving reasonable doubt in favor of
`
`registration3, Applicant respectfully requests that the Examining Attorney’s final refusal of
`
`Applicant’s mark be reversed.
`
`
`
`
`
`3 In re Women's Publishing Co. Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876, 1992 WL 224555 (T.T.A.B. 1992); In re Merrill
`Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`VII. CONCLUSION
`Because the Examining Attorney’s application of the test and concept of genericness is
`
`contrary to law, and because the evidence of record does not demonstrate that the applied-for
`
`mark, HEELS, is the generic name of the applied-for goods, medicated skin care cream, the
`
`Examining Attorney has failed to satisfy its heavy burden to demonstrate a prima face case that
`
`the subject mark is generic. Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests that the Board reverse
`
`the Examining Attorney’s final refusal of Applicant’s mark.
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`/s/ Andrew J. Morgan
`Andrew J. Morgan
`McKEE, VOORHEES & SEASE, P.L.C.
`801 Grand Avenue, Suite 3200
`Des Moines, IA 50309-2721
`Phone: 515-288-3667
`Fax: 515-288-1338
`Email: andrew.morgan@ipmvs.com
`Email: patatty@ipmvs.com
`
`ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANT
`
`CERTIFICATE OF FILING
`I hereby declare that the foregoing document has been filed via the Electronic
`System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) this 13th day of December 2024.
`/s/ Andrew J. Morgan
`
`
`
`11
`
`

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