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`THIS ORDER IS NOT A
`PRECEDENT OF THE
`TTAB
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`RSC
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`P.O. Box 1451
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
`General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
`General Email: TTABInfo@uspto.gov
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`July 22, 2020
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
`
`Nir Ron
`
`v.
`
`Luoyang Hangyuan E-commerce Co., Ltd.
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`
`
`Before Kuhlke, Lykos, and Coggins,
`Administrative Trademark Judges.
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`By the Board:
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`This proceeding now comes before the Board for consideration of Petitioner’s
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`motion for partial summary judgment on the ground of likelihood of confusion under
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`Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). The motion is contested by
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`Respondent. Petitioner did not file a reply brief in support of the motion.
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`I. Background
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`Petitioner has petitioned to cancel Respondent’s Principal Register Registration
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`Nos. 5780133 and 5774901, both for the mark HAIRCUBE in standard characters,
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`for the following goods:
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`Colognes, perfumes and cosmetics; Cosmetic hand creams; Cosmetic oils;
`Cosmetic preparations for body care; Cosmetic suntan lotions; Cosmetics; Face
`creams for cosmetic use; Facial masks; Lip stains; Lipstick; Make-up removing
`lotions; Nail paint; Nail polish remover pens; Pre-moistened cosmetic wipes;
`Cleansing creams; Cosmetic creams for skin care; Cosmetic preparations for
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`protecting the skin from the sun’s rays; Cosmetic preparations for removing
`gel nails, acrylic nails, and nail polish; Cosmetic products in the form of
`aerosols for skincare; Cosmetics for children, in International Class 3,1 and
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`Aerosol dispensers for medical use sold filled with hair growth stimulants;
`Analgesics; Anti-inflammatories; Cytostatics for medical purposes; Hair
`growth stimulants; Human growth hormone; Medical plasters; Medicated hair
`care preparations; Medicated hair serums; Medicated skin soap; Medicinal
`herbs; Medicinal oils; Medicinal preparations for stimulating hair growth;
`Sterilizing preparations; Sticking plasters for medical use; Dietetic foods
`adapted for medical purposes; Medicated balms for treatment of hair;
`Medicated lotions for hair; Medicated serums for treatment of hair; Medicinal
`hair growth preparations, in International Class 5.2
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`As grounds for cancellation, Petitioner alleges likelihood of confusion under
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`Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), false suggestion of a connection
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`under Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), and dilution by blurring
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`under Trademark Act Section 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).3 In support of his claims,
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`Petitioner alleges ownership of prior common law rights, since at least as early as
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`March 2008, to the following H3 HAIR CUBED composite mark for hair care and
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`related cosmetics:4
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`1 Registration No. 5780133, filed on November 5, 2018, issued on June 18, 2019, based on use
`in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), and claiming September
`1, 2018, as both the date of first use of the mark anywhere and in commerce.
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`2 Registration No. 5774901, filed on November 5, 2018, issued on June 11, 2019, based on use
`in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), and claiming September
`1, 2018, as both the date of first use of the mark anywhere and in commerce.
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`3 Petition for Cancellation (1 TTABVUE).
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`4 Id. at ¶¶ 3, 15 (1 TTABVUE 5, 8). Petitioner further alleges ownership of pending U.S.
`Application Serial No. 88446156, filed May 24, 2019, for the same mark. Id. at ¶ 5 (1
`TTABVUE 5-6).
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`2
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`Respondent, in its answer, denied the salient allegations in the petition for
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`cancellation.5
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`II. Petitioner’s Pleadings
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`Because Petitioner’s pleading is before us as a result of his motion, we exercise
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`our discretion to review all of Petitioner’s claims to determine their legal sufficiency.
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`See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Asian & W. Classics B.V. v. Selkow, 92 USPQ2d 1478, 1480
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`(TTAB 2009) (motion for summary judgment requires review of operative pleading
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`because a party may not obtain summary judgment on an unpleaded or legally
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`insufficient claim). Petitioner’s claims of likelihood of confusion and dilution are
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`sufficiently pleaded.
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`However, Petitioner’s claim of false suggestion of a connection is not.6 To properly
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`assert a claim of false suggestion, Petitioner must allege: (i) the defendant’s mark is
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`the same or a close approximation of plaintiff’s previously used name or identity (as
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`opposed to plaintiff’s pleaded marks); (ii) the mark would be recognized as such, in
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`that the mark points uniquely and unmistakably to the plaintiff; (iii) the plaintiff is
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`not connected with the goods sold or activities performed by the defendant under the
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`mark; and (iv) the plaintiff’s name or identity is of sufficient fame or reputation that
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`5 6 TTABVUE.
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`6 Petitioner references Section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) in his petition for cancellation.
`Trademark Act Section 43(a) refers to liability “in a civil action” and is therefore inapplicable
`to Board proceedings. See Carano v. Vina Concha Y Toro S.A., 67 USPQ2d 1149, 1150 n.3
`(TTAB 2003). However, since the ESTTA cover sheet is read in conjunction with the
`allegations in the petition for cancellation, and the cover sheet identifies Trademark Act
`Section 2(a), the Board construes Petitioner’s false suggestion claim to be brought under
`Section 2(a).
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`3
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`when the defendant’s mark is used on the goods or services, a connection with the
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`plaintiff would be presumed. See Petróleos Mexicanos v. Intermix SA, 97 USPQ2d
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`1403, 1405 (TTAB 2010) (citing Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food
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`Imps. Co., Inc., 703 F2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505, 508-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Nike, Inc. v.
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`Palm Beach Crossfit Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1025, 1031 (TTAB 2015); Buffet v. Chi-Chi’s,
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`Inc., 226 USPQ 428, 429 (TTAB 1985). The petition for cancellation does not
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`sufficiently plead elements one, two, or four. Accordingly, we sua sponte dismiss the
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`false suggestion of a connection claim. See NSM Res. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 113
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`USPQ2d 1029, 1039 n.19 (TTAB 2014) (Board may sua sponte dismiss any
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`insufficiently pleaded pleading).
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`As further indicated at the end of this order, in our discretion we find it
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`appropriate to afford Petitioner the opportunity to attempt to cure his defective
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`pleading in due course. See, e.g., Wise F&I, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 120 USPQ2d
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`1103, 1110 (TTAB 2016); Nike, 116 USPQ2d at 1033.
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`III. Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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`Summary judgment is appropriate only where the movant shows the absence of
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`any genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a
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`matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
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`323-324 (1986); Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co. Inc., 833 F.2d 1560, 4
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`USPQ2d 1793, 1796 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Freki Corp. N.V. v. Pinnacle Entm’t, Inc., 126
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`USPQ2d 1697, 1700 (TTAB 2018). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
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`Board may not resolve any factual dispute; it may only determine whether a genuine
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`4
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`dispute of material fact exists. See, e.g., Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 16
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`USPQ2d 1055, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Lloyd’s Food Prod. Inc. v. Eli’s Inc., 987 F.2d
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`766, 25 USPQ2d 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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`A factual dispute is genuine if, on the evidence of record, a reasonable fact finder
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`could resolve the matter in favor of the non-movant. Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am.
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`Music Show Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Olde Tyme
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`Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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`The non-movant must be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt as to whether a
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`genuine dispute as to a material fact exists, and the evidentiary record on summary
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`judgment and all inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts must be viewed
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`in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Opryland, 23 USPQ2d at 1472.
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`The movant’s burden at summary judgment is greater than the burden of proof at
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`trial, which is a preponderance of the evidence, and which permits appropriate
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`inferences to be drawn from the evidence of record. See, e.g., Gasser Chair Co. v.
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`Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 34 USPQ2d 1822, 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see
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`also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) § 528.01
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`(2020). Only when the movant has supported its motion with sufficient evidence that,
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`if unopposed, indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the
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`moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, does the burden then shift
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`to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact
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`to be resolved at trial. Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy LP, 92 USPQ2d 1537, 1540
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`(TTAB 2009). Specifically, “[t]he party opposing the motion must point to an
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`5
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`evidentiary conflict created on the record at least by a counter statement of a fact or
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`facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant.” Barmag Barmer
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`Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.3d 831, 221 USPQ 561, 564 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1984).
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`On summary judgment, Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that there is
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`no genuine dispute of material fact that: 1) he has standing; 2) he has priority; and
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`3) the contemporaneous use of the parties’ marks for the goods alleged by Petitioner
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`and identified in Respondent’s registrations is likely to cause confusion as to the
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`source of the goods. Threshold.TV, Inc. v. Metronome Enters., Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1031,
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`1036 (TTAB 2010).
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`A. The Parties’ Arguments and Evidence
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`In his motion, Petitioner asserts he has priority in view of his prior common law
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`use of the H3 HAIR CUBED composite mark and his pending application for the same
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`mark, Serial No. 88446156. Specifically, Petitioner contends his company has existed
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`since March 2008 and sells various hair care and related cosmetic products “under
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`the standard character and design marks ‘H3 Hair Cubed’, ‘Hair Cubed’, and ‘Hair
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`Cube’”, he has been actively and continuously using the H3 HAIR CUBED composite
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`mark since at least as early as March 2008, and he has owned the domain names
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`“haircube.com” and “haircubed.com” since at least as early as 2006.7 Petitioner
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`further contends he was the owner of a registration for his H3 HAIR CUBED
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`composite mark, but the registration was cancelled after Petitioner mistakenly failed
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`7 8 TTABVUE 15, ¶¶ 5-7.
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`6
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`to renew the registration, and so Petitioner filed the now pending application Serial
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`No. 88446156, alleging use since at least as early as May 2008.8
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`In support of his argument that likelihood of confusion exists, Petitioner reiterates
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`and “agrees” with the likelihood of confusion argument in an Office Action issued in
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`Petitioner’s application, that Respondent’s marks and goods are similar to
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`Petitioner’s mark and goods. Petitioner relies, inter alia, on the Examining Attorney’s
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`finding that the parties’ marks share the common wording “HAIR” and “CUBE,” and
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`the addition of “H3” in Petitioner’s mark is insufficient to obviate a likelihood of
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`confusion, as well as the Examining Attorney’s evidence of third-party retailers
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`showing the same entity commonly manufactures both parties’ goods and markets
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`those goods under the same mark. Petitioner further contends that the products in
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`his pending application “can also be classified as ‘cosmetics’.”9 Finally, Petitioner
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`maintains that since there are no restrictions in Respondent’s subject registrations,
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`the goods are presumed to travel in normal channels of trade, and these are the same
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`as Petitioner’s channels of trade.
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`In support of his arguments, Petitioner relies on his own declaration, a TSDR
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`printout showing the current status and title of Petitioner’s pending application, and
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`a copy of the Office Action issued against Petitioner’s pending application.10
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`8 Id. at 16, ¶¶ 8-10.
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`9 Id. at 10; see also Id. at 15, ¶ 4.
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`10 The copy of the Office Action does not include the evidence cited by the Examining Attorney
`therein. Petitioner also submitted TSDR printouts of Respondent’s subject registrations,
`which was unnecessary because the file of each registration forms part of the record without
`any action by the parties. Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1).
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`7
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`In response, Respondent maintains Petitioner’s priority is in dispute because the
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`cancellation of his earlier registration “forfeit[ed]” Petitioner’s claim to priority for
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`any date earlier than April 20, 2018, and that Petitioner’s ownership of the domain
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`names does not confer any trademark rights.
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`Respondent further contends there is no likelihood of confusion between the
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`parties’ marks because they are visually different, in that its marks are standard
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`character marks for HAIRCUBE while Petitioner’s mark is “stylized” and adds “H3”,
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`and the connotations and commercial impressions of the parties’ marks are different.
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`Respondent also argues the parties’ goods are “different in nature and can lead to
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`entirely distinct chemical or physical reaction” since its goods are for skin care or
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`medicated hair care products, while Petitioner’s goods are non-medicated hair care
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`products.11 Respondent also contends that its marks have acquired distinctness and
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`recognition in the marketplace, and the parties’ goods have co-existed in the
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`marketplace under their respective marks without any known instances of confusion.
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`In support of its response, Respondent submitted a photograph of packaging for a
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`“hairline mask” product and various Internet materials.12
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`11 9 TTABVUE 10.
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`12 9 TTABVUE 14-22. Respondent’s evidence was not submitted in connection with an
`authenticating declaration, and the majority of the evidence is not self-authenticating.
`However, the materials printed at 9 TTABVUE 17-21 include their source and the date on
`which they were accessed and, accordingly, are self-authenticating. See Trademark Rule
`2.122(e). Respondent also submitted a verification, attesting “that the averments and
`allegations of fact made in [its] Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment are
`true and correct”. 9 TTABVUE 22. This conclusory verification is insufficient to authenticate
`Respondent’s evidence.
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`8
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`

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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`A. Standing
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`Standing is a threshold issue that must be proven by a plaintiff in every inter
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`partes case. Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111
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`USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d
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`1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213
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`USPQ 185 (CCPA 1982). Petitioner did not address the issue of standing in his
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`motion. Nonetheless, Petitioner submitted evidence of his pleaded application for the
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`H3 HAIR CUBED composite mark, and that his application has been refused
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`registration based on a likelihood of confusion with the subject registrations.13 Thus,
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`for purposes of this motion, we find no genuine dispute that Petitioner has established
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`his standing to petition to cancel the registrations.14 Toufigh v. Persona Parfum, Inc.,
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`95 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2010) (standing established based solely on testimony
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`that petitioner filed an application for an identical mark for goods that are similar to
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`those in the respondent’s registration); Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 111 USPQ2d at
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`1062 (petitioner’s application refused based on defendant’s registration).
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`B. Priority
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`To establish priority on a likelihood of confusion claim brought under Trademark
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`Act Section 2(d), a party must prove that, vis-à-vis the other party, it owns “a mark
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`or trade name previously used in the United States ... and not abandoned....” 15
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`U.S.C. § 1052(d). Petitioner does not own an existing registration upon which he can
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`13 8 TTABVUE at 19-22, 31-35.
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`14 Petitioner must maintain his standing through the proceeding, and evidentiary support
`must be provided at trial.
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`9
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`rely for purposes of priority. In addition, Petitioner cannot rely on the filing date of
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`his pleaded application as a constructive use date for purposes of priority because his
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`pleaded application has a later filing date (May 24, 2019) than the filing date of
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`the applications underlying the subject registrations (November 5, 2018). Similarly,
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`Petitioner cannot rely on the date of use alleged in his application. See 37 C.F.R.
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`§ 2.122(b)(2).
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`Therefore, in order for Petitioner to prevail on his claim of priority, Petitioner
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`must prove that he has a proprietary interest in the H3 HAIR CUBED composite
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`mark and that the interest was obtained prior to the filing date of the applications
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`underlying the subject registrations (November 5, 2018), or prior to any date of use
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`on which Respondent may rely. Petitioner’s rights may arise from prior common law
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`usage as a mark, prior use as a trade name, prior use analogous to trademark or
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`service mark use, or any other use sufficient to establish proprietary rights. Herbko
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`Int’l Inc. v. Kappa Books Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
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`Otto Roth & Co., Inc. v. Universal Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 209 USPQ 40, 43 (CCPA
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`1981); L. & J.G. Stickley Inc. v. Cosser, 81 USPQ2d 1956, 1966 (TTAB 2007). In this
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`case, Petitioner has alleged only common law use of a mark.
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`After reviewing the arguments and supporting evidence, we conclude that
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`Petitioner has not demonstrated there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to
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`priority of use between the parties. The only evidence submitted by Petitioner to
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`establish his common law use of the H3 HAIR CUBED composite mark is his own
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`declaration. However, this declaration is not sufficiently detailed as to the nature and
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`10
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`extent of Petitioner’s alleged prior use to substantiate Petitioner’s claim of priority.
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`Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner relies on the assertion that he has priority by
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`virtue of his 2006 ownership of the domain names “haircube.com” and
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`“haircubed.com”, Petitioner’s reliance is misplaced. Petitioner submitted no evidence
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`of such domain name registrations, and in any event, the mere registration of a
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`domain name does not constitute use of a trademark in commerce.15 Stawski v.
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`Lawson, 129 USPQ2d 1036, 1045 (TTAB 2018) (citing Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. W.
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`Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 50 USPQ2d 1545, 1555 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also In
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`re Eilberg, 49 USPQ2d 1955, 1957 (TTAB 1998) (domain name does not function as a
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`service mark).
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` There are, at a minimum, genuine disputes of material fact as to what goods
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`Petitioner offers under his composite mark, and when Petitioner first used his
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`composite mark for those goods.
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`15 Petitioner’s declaration also mentions “the standard character and design marks . . . ‘Hair
`Cubed’, and ‘Hair Cube’,” presumably referring to the domain names or how they may be
`used. These marks were not pleaded in the Petition for Cancellation. If at trial Petitioner
`intends to rely on marks not originally pleaded, then to avoid uncertainty regarding whether
`Respondent had sufficient notice, Petitioner should amend its petition to expressly plead all
`of its relevant marks. Cf. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. de C.V. v. Paleteria La Michoacana
`Inc., 98 USPQ2d 1921, 1924 (TTAB 2011) (“Because petitioner may not rely on unpleaded
`marks, we must determine whether petitioner’s attempt to prove its use of the mark LA
`MICHOACANA and petitioner’s Indian girl was tried by implied consent.”); Standard
`Knitting, Ltd. v. Toyota Jidosha K.K., 77 USPQ2d 1917, 1929 n.18 (TTAB 2006) (opposer may
`not rely on unpleaded marks or registrations). Moreover, there is no such thing as a common
`law “standard character” mark. “Standard characters” is an Office term which categorizes
`the form of the drawing of a mark in a federal application or registration. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.52;
`see also TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“TMEP”) § 807 (Oct. 2018). By
`contrast, Petitioner’s prior common law rights, if any, are based on how his mark is actually
`used.
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`
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`11
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`C. Likelihood of Confusion
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`Determining whether there is a genuine dispute regarding likelihood of confusion
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`involves an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
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`thirteen factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
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`USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“du Pont factors”). We look to whether there are
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`genuine disputes as to any facts which would be material to a decision on the merits.
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`“Not all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of
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`significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph
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`Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In
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`re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The Board
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`must deny summary judgment if there are genuine disputes as to any of those du
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`Pont factors which would be material to a decision on the merits.
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`After reviewing the arguments and supporting evidence, we conclude that
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`Petitioner has not demonstrated there is no genuine dispute of material fact that
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`there is a likelihood of confusion.16 At a minimum, there are genuine disputes
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`regarding the similarities of the marks, including their connotations and commercial
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`impressions, and the relatedness of the parties’ goods and trade channels.17
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`16 The Examining Attorney’s ex parte Office Action is not controlling in a Board proceeding.
`The Board has the responsibility of reaching its own decision on likelihood of confusion based
`on all the facts adduced in the inter partes proceeding. See Super Bakery, Inc. v. Benedict, 96
`USPQ2d 1134, 1135 n.1 (TTAB 2010); Formica Corp. v. Saturn Plastics & Eng’g Co., 185
`USPQ 251, 253 (TTAB 1975).
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`17 As for the relationship of the goods at issue, the goods do not have to be identical or even
`competitive for the Board to find that there is a likelihood of confusion. See In re Iolo Techs.,
`LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010). It is sufficient that the parties’ goods are related
`in some manner or that the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they are
`likely to be encountered by the same persons under circumstances that, because of the marks
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`12
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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`D. Summary
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`Accordingly, having reviewed the record on summary judgment, and viewed the
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`evidence in a light most favorable to Respondent, we find, as set forth above, that
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`Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
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`his Section 2(d) claim. Petitioner has not shown the absence of a genuine dispute of
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`material fact with respect to priority or likelihood of confusion, and his motion for
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`partial summary judgment is DENIED.18
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`IV. Notice to Respondent – U.S. Counsel Information Required
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`Respondent is domiciled outside of the United States, and it appears that
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`Respondent is represented by an attorney. Effective August 3, 2019, the USPTO
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`amended its rules to require all practitioners qualified under § 11.14(a) to be an active
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`member in good standing and to provide the name of a state in which he or she is an
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`active member in good standing; the date of admission to the bar of the named state;
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`and the bar license number, if one is issued by the named state. 37 C.F.R. § 2.17(b)(3).
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`used in connection therewith, would lead to the mistaken belief that they originate from the
`same source. See, e.g., On-Line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 56 USPQ2d
`1471 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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`18 The fact that we have identified and discussed certain genuine disputes of material fact as
`sufficient bases for denying the motion for summary judgment should not be construed as a
`finding that these are necessarily the only disputes that remain for trial. In addition, the
`parties are reminded that evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for
`summary judgment is of record only for consideration of that motion. Any such evidence to
`be considered at final hearing must be properly introduced during the appropriate trial
`period. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. R. Joseph Sportswear Inc., 28 USPQ2d 1464, 1465, n.2
`(TTAB 1993). The parties are further reminded that, with two exceptions not present here,
`exhibits attached to a pleading are not evidence on behalf of the party to whose pleading they
`are attached unless they are thereafter, during the time for taking testimony, properly
`identified and introduced in evidence as exhibits. Trademark Rule 2.122(c).
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`
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`13
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`

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`Cancellation No. 92072279
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`Accordingly, Respondent is allowed until THIRTY DAYS from the date of this
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`order to provide the information above using the Change of Address form in ESTTA.
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`The bar information entered on the ESTTA Change of Address form will be masked
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`from public view in TTABVUE.
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`If Respondent fails to comply with this requirement, the Board may issue an order
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`to show cause why judgment should not be entered against Respondent.
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`Proceedings otherwise remain SUSPENDED. The parties will be notified by the
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`Board when proceedings are resumed, and dates will be reset as appropriate,
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`including time for Petitioner to file an amended petition for cancellation.
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`14
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