Proceeding
`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
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`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
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`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA566021
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`10/21/2013
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`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`92057838
`Defendant
`World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.
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`WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT INC
`1241 EAST MAIN STREET
`STAMFORD, CT 06902
`UNITED STATES
`Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)
`Christopher M. Verdini
`USPTO.LitigationDocket@klgates.com, christopher.verdini@klgates.com,
`curtis.krasik@klgates.com
`/Christopher M. Verdini/
`10/21/2013
`Motion_to_Dismiss_Patterson_Petition_to_Cancel_(WWE_Superstars).pdf(8641
`bytes )
`Memo_in_Support_of_Motion_to_Dismiss_Patterson_Cancellation_Action_(WW
`E_Superstars).pdf(36528 bytes )
`Verdini_Declaration_in_Support_of_WWE_s_Motion_to_Dismiss_Patterson_Pet
`ition_to_Cancel_(WWE_Superstars).pdf(2317474 bytes )
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`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
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`Cancellation No. 92/057,838
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`Reg. No. 3,871,019
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`Mark: WWE SUPERSTARS
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`)))))))))))
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`ALBERT PATTERSON,
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`WORLD WRESTLING
`ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
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`Registrant.
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`Petitioner,
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`vs.
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`REGISTRANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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`For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum of Law in Support of Registrant’s Motion
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`to Dismiss, which is being filed concurrently herewith and is incorporated herein by reference,
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`Registrant World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. respectfully moves for an Order dismissing the
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`Petition to Cancel filed by Petitioner Albert Patterson.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Christopher M. Verdini
`Curtis B. Krasik, Esquire
`Christopher M. Verdini, Esquire
`K&L GATES LLP
`K&L Gates Center
`210 Sixth Avenue
`Pittsburgh, PA 15222
`(412) 355-6500 (Telephone)
`(412) 355-6501 (Facsimile)
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`Attorneys for Registrant
`World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.
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`October 21, 2013
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`
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`I hereby certify that on this 21st day of October, 2013, a true and correct copy of the
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`foregoing REGISTRANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS was served, via United States Mail, First
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`Class, postage prepaid, upon the Petitioner at the following address of record:
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`Albert Patterson
`3840 N. Sherman Blvd.
`Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53206
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`/s/ Christopher M. Verdini
`Attorney for Registrant
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`
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`Cancellation No. 92/057,838
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`Reg. No. 3,871,019
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`Mark: WWE SUPERSTARS
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`
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`)))))))))))
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`ALBERT PATTERSON,
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`WORLD WRESTLING
`ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
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`Registrant.
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`Petitioner,
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`vs.
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`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF REGISTRANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Registrant World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (“Registrant” or “WWE”) files this
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`Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion to Dismiss Petitioner Albert Patterson’s
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`(“Patterson”) Petition to Cancel.
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`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Patterson’s Petition to Cancel WWE’s WWE SUPERSTARS registration (the
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`“Registration”), is the latest instance of Patterson’s abuse of the legal process to harass WWE.
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`In filing the Petition to Cancel, Patterson has willfully disregarded the prior orders of a federal
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`district court and this Board that conclusively establish he cannot prevent WWE from using the
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`term “Superstars.” He also has violated a binding settlement agreement with WWE in which he
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`agreed that he could not commence any action -- like the filing of the Petition to Cancel -- to
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`attempt to prevent WWE from using the term “Superstars” or “WWE Superstars.”
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`In addition to violating prior court rulings dispositively rejected the basis for his Petition
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`to Cancel and his own agreement not to file a Petition to Cancel, Patterson’s Petition to Cancel is
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`manifestly deficient on its face, as he supported his claim with only the following sentence:
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`

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`The registered trademarks should be cancelled because of the
`likelihood of confusion, and the fact that its [sic] misleading to the
`consumer when searching for one organization another
`organization comes up.
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`As is plain from his single averment, Patterson has in no way stated any claim for relief under
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`the Lanham Act. Indeed, Patterson does not assert any of the basic requisites for filing a petition
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`to cancel including, but not limited to, (1) ownership of any marks; (2) priority; or (3) damage
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`resulting from WWE’s Registration. As such, the Petition must be dismissed.
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`In addition, the Board should not grant Patterson leave to file an amended petition
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`because his claims are barred as a matter of law by res judicata and the parties’ prior settlement
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`agreement. Over the course of more than fifteen years, Patterson repeatedly has attempted (and
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`failed every time) to prevent WWE from using the phrase “Superstars.” As a result of such
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`unsuccessful efforts, Patterson is subject to the following orders and agreements that establish
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`that any attempt to cancel WWE’s Registration would be futile:
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`• A 1993 Consent Order from the District Court for the Eastern District of
`Wisconsin that expressly states Patterson cannot preclude WWE from using
`the term “Superstars;”
`• A 1999 Order from the Board dismissing Patterson’s attempt to cancel
`WWE’s “WWF Superstars” mark because, among other things, the preclusive
`effect of the 1993 Consent Order; and
`• A 2007 Settlement Agreement entered between Patterson and WWE after the
`District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary
`judgment in favor of WWE in which Patterson agreed not to again challenge
`WWE’s use of “Superstars.”
`This Board should not countenance Patterson’s abuse of the inter partes procedures
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`established to redress properly supported grievances by granting him the opportunity to press his
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`vendetta against WWE. Accordingly, the Board should dismiss the Petition with prejudice.
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`II.
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`In October 1990, Patterson through his wholly-owned predecessor company, filed a
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`Complaint against WWE (formerly known as Titan Sports, Inc.) in the United States District
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`Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin alleging unfair competition, trade name and
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`unregistered service mark infringement of SUPERSTAR WRESTLING, SUPERSTARS OF
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`WRESTLING, and SUPERSTARS OF PRO WRESTLING. See Ex. 1.1 Following an initial
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`jury finding for Patterson, the District Court vacated the jury verdict and ordered a new trial.
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`Thereafter, Patterson and WWE, both represented by counsel, negotiated a consent agreement
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`which the parties signed on November 25, 1992 in the presence of the District Court. Ex. 2.2
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`The Court embodied the negotiated settlement in two Orders issued on January 22, 1993 and
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`December 21, 1993 (the “1993 Consent Order”). Exs. 3-4.
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`The 1993 Consent Order enjoined WWE from using three specific marks, SUPERSTAR
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`WRESTLING, SUPERSTARS OF WRESTLING and SUPERSTARS OF PRO WRESTLING,
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`in connection with wrestling activities in the United States. Id. The 1993 Consent Order,
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`1 In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Board may consider documents that are properly subjects for
`judicial notice. See Caymus Vineyards v. Caymus Med., Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1519, 1522 (T.T.A.B.
`2013); see also Wigod v. Well Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012). It is well-established
`that a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including filings and decisions from other
`courts. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n.1 (1986) (“Although this case comes to us on a
`motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), we are not precluded in our review of the
`complaint from taking notice of items in the public record . . . .”); Sebastian v. U.S., 185 F.3d 1368, 1374
`(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In deciding whether to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may
`consider matters of public record.”); 4901 Corp. v. Town of Cicero, 220 F.3d 522, 527 n.4 (7th Cir. 2000)
`(noting that in ruling on a motion to dismiss, court can take judicial notice of state court order settlement
`agreement attached to motion); Henson v. CSS Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
`that public court documents filed in an earlier state court case were properly considered on a motion to
`dismiss). To the extent the Board determines that the documents attached hereto are not properly
`considered on a motion to dismiss, WWE respectfully request the Board treat this filing as a Motion for
`Summary Judgment. See Trademark Rule 2.127(e)(1) (Board can properly convert motion to dismiss to
`motion for summary judgment before initial disclosures when claim or issue preclusion is raised).
`2 Although the Settlement Hearing Transcript is dated November 25, 1993, the date is a typographical
`error as the 1993 Consent Order entered on January 22, 1993 makes reference to the parties’ settlement
`hearing, and refers to its date as November 25, 1992 and the final page of the transcript is signed on
`February 9, 1993.
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`however, expressly ordered that “[t]his judgment does not preclude any party from using the
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`term ‘Superstars.’” Id. As reflected in the Settlement Hearing Transcript, Patterson explicitly
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`manifested his understanding and acceptance of the terms of the settlement:
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`THE COURT: (Reading the agreement into the record) This offer of
`judgment does not preclude any party from using the term “Superstars.”
`And it’s signed by Michael, Best & Friedrich by Charles P. Graupner, one
`of the attorneys for the defendant, and it’s accepted by Albert P. Patterson,
`and it’s dated November 25, 1992…Mr. Patterson, does this accurately
`reflect the settlement of this matter?
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`MR. PATTERSON: Yes, sir.
`Ex. 2 at 18-19.
`After the entry of the 1993 Consent Order, Patterson engaged in a systematic pattern of
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`abuse, harassment, and malicious prosecution against WWE in violation of the terms of the 1993
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`Consent Order.3 Among other things, Patterson filed a frivolous Petition to Cancel WWE’s
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`“WWF SUPERSTARS” federal trademark registration (Cancellation No. 92/024,465). The
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`Board correctly dismissed Patterson’s 1995 Petition on the grounds that (1) under the 1993
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`Consent Order, both parties were permitted to use the term “Superstars;” (2) as a matter of law,
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`there would be no likelihood of confusion between WWF SUPERSTARS and any marks
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`containing the term “Superstars” that Patterson purportedly owned; and (3) as a matter of law,
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`Patterson “can suffer no real damage” from registration of WWF SUPERSTARS. See Ex. 5.
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`Undeterred, Patterson filed another lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of
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`Wisconsin attempting to prevent WWE from using, among other marks, WWF SUPERSTARS
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`and WWE SUPERSTARS. See Albert Patterson d/b/a World Wrestling Association v. World
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`Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., et. al., Case No. 03-c-0374 (E.D. Wisc.). After the District Court
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`granted summary judgment in favor of WWE and dismissed all of Patterson’s claims, the parties
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`3 For a history of Patterson’s abusive behavior, WWE respectfully refers the Board to WWE’s Motion to
`Dismiss Patterson’s Petition to Cancel “WWF SUPERSTARS” filed on March 4, 1996 in Cancellation
`No. 92/024465.
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`entered into a Settlement Agreement in which Patterson released any and all claims against
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`WWE for, among other things, its use of WWE SUPERSTARS. See Ex. 6.
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`Ignoring the District Court’s and the Board’s prior rulings and his Settlement Agreement
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`with WWE, on or around September 9, 2013, Patterson filed a wholly unsupported Petition to
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`Cancel WWE’s WWE SUPERSTARS registration. Among other deficiencies fatal to the
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`Petition, Patterson does not identify any trademark rights he claims to own or any facts that
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`could establish he has been harmed by WWE’s Registration. To the contrary, in the section
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`titled “Mark Cited by Petitioner as Basis for Cancellation,” Patterson cites only trademark
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`applications and registrations owned by WWE. Patterson also fails to provide a single factual
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`allegation or piece of evidence to support his conclusory statement that, “[t]he registered
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`trademarks should be cancelled because of the likelihood of confusion, and the fact that its
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`misleading to the consumer when searching for one organization another organization comes
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`up.” Indeed, Patterson’s entire Petition consists of that one conclusory statement.
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`III. ARGUMENT
`Patterson’s One Sentence Petition Cannot Survive a Motion to Dismiss
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`A.
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`Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4 the Board should
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`dismiss a Petition to Cancel when the allegations fail to “meet the standard of ‘plausibility.’”
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`Fitzpatrick v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t Inc., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing
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`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007)); see also Caymus
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`Vineyards, 107 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1521-22 (“claimant must allege well-pleaded factual matter and
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`more than ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
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`conclusory statements,’ to state a claim plausible on its face.”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
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`4 37 C.F.R. § 2.116 provides that the “procedure and practice in inter partes proceedings shall be
`governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
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`U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); Doyle v. Al Johnsons Swedish Restaurant & Butik, Inc., 2012 WL 695211
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`at *2 (T.T.A.B. 2012). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
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`that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
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`misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also
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`Corporation Habanos, S.A. and Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Rodriguez, 2011 WL 3871952 at
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`*1 (T.T.A.B. 2011) (Cancellation No. 92052146) (“In the context of cancellation proceedings
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`before the Board, a claim is plausible on its face when the petitioner pleads factual content that if
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`proved, would allow the Board to conclude, or draw a reasonable inference that, the petitioner
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`has standing and that a valid ground for cancellation exists”). The pleading standard “demands
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`more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Iqbal,, 556 U.S. at
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`678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell
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`Atlantic Corp., 309 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2002) (“bald assertions and conclusions of law will not
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`suffice.”).
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`Patterson undoubtedly has not met this standard here as he fails to plead any facts that
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`could establish the two basic requirements of a Petition to Cancel: (1) standing, and (2) valid
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`grounds under the Lanham Act as to why the registration should not continue to be registered.
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`37 C.F.R. § 2.112(a); Caymus Vineyards, 107 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1521-22; see also 3 McCarthy on
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`Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 20:41 (4th ed.) (“McCarthy”); Cunningham v. Laser Golf
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`Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting and approving two-part test set forth in
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`McCarthy).
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`With respect to standing, a petitioner must plead and ultimately prove facts sufficient to
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`show it has a real commercial interest in its own marks and a reasonable basis to assert that it is
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`being damaged by the registration. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095-99 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
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`Doyle, 2012 WL 695211 at *2-3; McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent,
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`2006 WL 2682345 at *2-6 (T.T.A.B. 2006). Patterson has not and cannot plead such facts.
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`Patterson does not even identify any marks that he purportedly owns, let alone sufficient facts to
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`show he has a commercial interest in any such marks. Even if Patterson could assert such facts,
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`Patterson is precluded from arguing that he could be damaged by WWE’s registration. As this
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`Board expressly found when Patterson tried to cancel WWE’s WWF SUPERSTARS
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`registration:
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` [A]s a matter of law, . . . [Patterson] can suffer no real damage
`from defendant’s [WWE] registration of WWF SUPERSTARS.
`The district court has held each party entitled to use “Superstars.”
`Defendant’s coupling of the acronym WWF with “Superstars” and
`registration of the resulting composite with a disclaimer of
`“Superstars” cannot be the source of damage to plaintiff
`[Patterson], in view of its pleaded marks.
`Ex. 5 at 9. The Board’s conclusion holds with equal force here as WWE’s Registration is for
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`WWE SUPERSTARS and it has disclaimed the term “Superstars.”5 Thus, Patterson cannot
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`assert facts sufficient to show he has standing.
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`Patterson also fails to assert sufficient facts that would make the substantive grounds for
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`cancellation “plausible.” Patterson’s only statement in support of his Petition is that “the
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`registered trademarks should be cancelled because of the likelihood of confusion, and the fact
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`that its misleading to the consumer when searching for one organization another organization
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`comes up.” On its face, this statement is an unsupported legal conclusion that is entitled to no
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`weight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-81 (dismissing complaint because allegations “amount to nothing
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`more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’” and such legal conclusions “are not entitled
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`5 The difference between the WWE mark at issue in the 1995 Cancellation action and the Registration
`here does not change the Board’s analysis. Just as WWF was an acronym for “World Wrestling
`Federation” (WWE’s prior business name), WWE is the acronym for “World Wrestling Entertainment,”
`which is WWE’s current business name.
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`to the assumption of truth”). Furthermore, Patterson’s statement does not even identify the
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`marks that are supposedly likely to be confused or what “search[es]” are misleading to the
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`unidentified “consumers.” Even if Patterson had provided this most basic information,
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`Patterson’s Petition could not survive a Motion to Dismiss because WWE’s use and registration
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`of WWE SUPERSTARS cannot be grounds for a likelihood of confusion claim pursuant to the
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`1993 Consent Order and the 1999 decision of this Board.
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`B.
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`The Board Should Dismiss Patterson’s Petition With Prejudice and Without Leave
`to Amend
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`Patterson’s attempt to cancel the WWE Registration is futile because it is barred by the
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`doctrine of res judicata and the express terms of the parties’ 2007 Settlement Agreement. Thus,
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`the Board not only should dismiss Patterson’s Petition but should do so with prejudice and
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`without leave to amend. Humanetics Corp. v. Neways, Inc., 2003 WL 22022072 at *2-3
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`(T.T.A.B. 2003) (denying motion for leave to amend pleading because “[a]llowing the
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`amendment would be futile”)
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` Res judicata is intended to protect a party from “being dragged into court time and time
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`again by the same opponent on the same cause of action.” Lee v. Village of River Forest, 936
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`F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Magnus Electronics, Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830
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`F.2d 1396, 1403 (7th Cir. 1987)). This case is the quintessential example of when the Board
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`should apply res judicata to protect WWE from Patterson’s abuse of the legal process. Patterson
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`has attempted over and over again to prevent WWE from using its corporate acronym (“WWE”
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`or “WWF”) in combination with “Superstars” and every time Patterson’s attempts have failed.
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`The 1993 Consent Order expressly precludes Patterson from attempting to prevent WWE
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`from using the term “Superstars.” Thus, by judicial decree embodying the parties’ intent,
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`WWE’s use of “Superstars” in its Registration is prima facie authorized. Furthermore, because
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`any party can use the term “Superstars,” no party can claim the exclusive right to use the mark
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`SUPERSTARS by itself. WWE properly makes no claim to exclusive use of the word
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`“Superstars” apart from the WWE SUPERSTARS mark. Indeed, this Board already dismissed
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`Patterson attempt to cancel WWE’s nearly identical WWF SUPERSTARS mark on the basis of
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`the 1993 Consent Order. Under these circumstances, res judicata must apply and would make
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`any amended petition to cancel WWE’s Registration futile. Chandler v. U.S., 31 Fed. Cl. 106,
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`110 (1994) (denying plaintiff’s motion to amend because all of the claims are “either barred by
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`res judicata or are otherwise without merit” and “amending the complaint would be futile”); D-
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`Beam v. Roller Derby Skate Corp., 316 Fed. Appx. 966, 968-69 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding
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`“district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint” because
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`“claims are futile on the grounds of res judicata”).
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`Patterson also is precluded by contract from attempting to cancel WWE’s WWE
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`SUPERSTARS mark. In 2003, Patterson filed an ill-conceived action to prevent WWE from
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`using several of its trademarks, including WWE SUPERSTARS. The District Court granted
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`WWE summary judgment on all of Patterson’s claims and also awarded WWE $51,308.47 in
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`attorneys’ fees and costs resulting from Patterson’s litigation misconduct. See Albert Patterson
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`d/b/a World Wrestling Association v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., et. al., Case No. 03-c-
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`0374 (E.D. Wisc.) at Dkt. 135, Dkt. 150. To settle the outstanding matters between the parties
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`and contractually obligate Patterson to refrain from filing frivolous actions against WWE relating
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`to its use of “Superstars,” the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement in 2007. See Ex. 6.
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`Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Patterson waived all appellate rights to challenge the
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`District Court’s summary judgment decision and released all claims against WWE, including
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`those claims that were raised in the 2003 District Court action. See id. at Paragraphs 3, 6.
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`Because the plain terms of the Settlement Agreement preclude Patterson from filing a Petition to
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`Cancel WWE’s Registration, Patterson’s claims, even if amended, would be futile. Accordingly,
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`the Board should dismiss this Petition with prejudice and without leave to amend.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, WWE respectfully requests that the Board dismiss the Petition
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`to Cancel with prejudice and without leave to amend.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`/s/ Christopher M. Verdini
`Curtis B. Krasik, Esquire
`Christopher M. Verdini, Esquire
`K&L GATES LLP
`K&L Gates Center
`210 Sixth Avenue
`Pittsburgh, PA 15222
`(412) 355-6500 (Telephone)
`(412) 355-6501 (Facsimile)
`
`Attorneys for Registrant
`World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.
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`October 21, 2013
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`
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`I hereby certify that on this 21st day of October, 2013, a true and correct copy of the
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`foregoing MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF REGISTRANT’S MOTION TO
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`DISMISS was served, via United States Mail, First Class, postage prepaid, upon the Petitioner at
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`the following address of record:
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`Albert Patterson
`3840 N. Sherman Blvd.
`Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53206
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`/s/ Christopher M. Verdini
`Attorney for Registrant
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`Cancellation No. 92/057,838
`
`Reg. No. 3,871,019
`
`Mark: WWE SUPERSTARS
`
`
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`)))))))))))
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`ALBERT PATTERSON,
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`WORLD WRESTLING
`ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
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`Registrant.
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`Petitioner,
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`vs.
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`DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER M. VERDINI, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF
`REGISTRANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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`I, Christopher M. Verdini, hereby declare:
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`1.
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`I am a member of the Bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and a partner of
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`the firm of K&L Gates LLP, counsel for Registrant, World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., in this
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`matter. The matters stated in this declaration are true to the best of my knowledge.
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`2.
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`Attached as Exhibit 1 hereto is a true and correct copy of the complaint filed on
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`October 9, 1990 by Petitioner, Albert Patterson, through his wholly-owned predecessor
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`company, against WWE (formerly known as Titan Sports, Inc.) in the United States District
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`Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, captioned United Wrestling Association, Inc., d.b.a.
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`U.W.A. Superstar Wrestling v. Titan Sports, Inc., Case No. 90-C-0991 (the “1990 Action”).
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`3.
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`Attached as Exhibit 2 hereto is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the
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`November 25, 1992 Settlement Hearing held in the 1990 Action.
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`4.
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`Attached as Exhibit 3 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Judgment Order
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`entered in the 1990 Action by the Court on January 22, 1993.
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`5.
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`Attached as Exhibit 4 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Amended Judgment
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`Order entered in the 1990 Action by the Court on December 21, 1993.
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`6.
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`Attached as Exhibit 5 hereto is a true and correct copy of the Board’s August 12,
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`1999 Order dismissing Mr. Patterson’s Petition to Cancel WWE’s “WWF SUPERSTARS” mark
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`in Cancellation No. 24,465.
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`7.
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`Attached as Exhibit 6 hereto is a true and correct copy of the June 2007
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`Settlement Agreement entered into by and between, among others, WWE and Mr. Patterson.
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`I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
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`foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on October 21, 2013.
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`/s/ Christopher M. Verdini
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`- 2 -
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`

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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`
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`I hereby certify that on this 21st day of October, 2013, a true and correct copy of the
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`foregoing DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER M. VERDINI, ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF
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`REGISTRANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS was served, via United States Mail, First Class,
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`postage prepaid, upon the Petitioner at the following address of record:
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`Albert Patterson
`3840 N. Sherman Blvd.
`Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53206
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`/s/ Christopher M. Verdini
`Attorney for Registrant
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`- 3 -
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`EXHIBIT 1
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`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
`
`[U
`
`) ) )
`
`;
`)
`)
`
`) ) )
`
`INC.
`UNITED WRESTLING ASSOCIATION,
`d.b.a. U.W.A. SUPERSTAR WRESTLING
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v
`
`'
`TITAN SPORTS,
`
`INC.
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`Defendant.
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`COUNT ONE
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`I
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`Jury Trial Demanded
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`This is an action for unfair competition, and trade name and
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`service mark infringement of
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`the plaintiff's names
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`and marks
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`SUPERSTAR.WRESTLING, SUPERSTARS OF WRESTLING, and SUPERSTARS OF PRO
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`WRESTLING.
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`It arises under the laws of the United States including
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`the Federal Trade Mark Act of 1946,
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`§ 1051 et. seq. of Title 15 of
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`the United States Code, and the Laws of the State of Wisconsin
`relating to unfair competition and to trade name,
`trade mark and
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`service mark infringement.
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`The matter in controversy exceeds the
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`sum or value of $50,000, exclusive-of interest or costs, arises
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`under the laws of The United States and the State of Wisconsin, and
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`is between citizens of different states.
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`II
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`The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
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`parties under §§1121 and 1125(a) of Title 15 of the United states
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`Code as well as the provisions of §§1l13(a), 1332(a)
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`and (C),
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`1337(a) and (c), 1338(a) and (b) of Title 28 of the United States
`
`Code.
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`W”
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`f?Jc9~/<///
`
`COMPLAINT
`Civil Action 3
`NO
`'
`9G"’C"9.99~‘=-
`..
`
`~
`
`"
`
`

`
`.-_\\
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`III
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`United Wrestling" Association,
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`Inc.
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`is a corporatiLu1 duly
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`organized and existing under the laws of the State of Wisconsin
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`having its principle place of business at 1503 West Center Street,
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`Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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`IV
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`Defendant Titan Sports, Inc. is and at all times mentioned has
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`been a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
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`state of Massachusetts and has its principle place of business in
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`Stanford, Connecticut.
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`Venue as to this defendant and to each
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`count
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`in this complaint lies within the district as provided by
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`§§139l(b)(c) of Title 28 of The United States Code.
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`V
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`The court has jurisdiction over the unfair competition claims
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`here and under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1338(b)
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`in that said
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`claims are joined with the substantial and related claim under the
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`trademark laws of The United States, 15 U.S.C.S. §lO5l et seq.
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`VI
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`Plaintiff adopted the marks SUPERSTAR WRESTLING, SUPERSTARS
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`OF WRESTLING and SUPERSTARS OF PRO WRESTLING on or about October
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`16, 1979 and has used the mark in Interstate Commerce in the sale,
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`advertising and promotion of entertainment, services — namely,
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`promotion, production and exhibition of pmofessional wrestling
`matches.
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`

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`VII
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`As an independent claim for relief, plaintiff alleges unfair
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`competition by defendants under 15 U.S.C. §l125(a) and at common
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`law. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matters and the
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`parties to this action under §1332(a)(c) and §1338(b) of Title 28
`of United States Code.
`Since 1979 plaintiff has used and its
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`related and affiliated companies have used and are using the trade
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`names
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`and
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`service marks
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`SUPERSTAR WRESTLING,
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`SUPERSTARS OF
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`WRESTLING and SUPERSTARS OF PRO WRESTLING.
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`VIII
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`By virtuei of substantial advertising,
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`promotion of
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`its
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`business, and entertainment service sales under the mark "Superstar
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`Wrestling", and plaintiff's maintenance of high quality standards
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`relating to such services,
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`the name and mark have become known by
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`the public as indicating a source or origin of these services in
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`plaintiff and its related or affiliated companies.
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`IX
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`Attached as plaintiff's exhibits A through E are examples of
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`plaintiff's advertising and promotional activities in conjunction
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`with the service marks SUPERSTAR.WRESTLING, SUPERSTARS OF WRESTLING
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`and SUPERSTARS OF PRO WRESTLING.
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`X
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`The plaintiff believes and upon such belief alleges that in
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`/ 1986 the defendant adopted and commenced use of the designation
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`"Superstars of Wrestling" with the intention of cpmpeting unfairly
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`with plaintiff. Defendant has misappropriated the name “superstars
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`

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`of Wrestling" by advertisimg in the manner and form shown in
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`exhibits F through P attached hereto and incorporated by reference.
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`Since adoption of the name and mark “Superstars of Wrestling" by
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`defendant, public confusion has arisen and is likely to continue
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`as
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`to
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`the
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`source,
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`origin
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`or
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`sponsorship
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`of
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`defendant's
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`entertainment and promotional service business.
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`XI
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`The plaintiff
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`is
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`informed and believes,
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`and upon such
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`information and belief alleges, that defendant had actual knowledge
`of plaintiff's ownership of
`the trade name and service. marks
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`SUPERSTAR WRESTLING, SUPERSTARS OF WRESTLING and SUPERSTARS OF PRO
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`WRESTLING prior to the first adoption or use by defendant of such
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`trade name or service mark.
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`XII
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`Defendant has neither
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`sought nor obtained permission of
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`plaintiff or any of plaintiff's affiliates or related companies to
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`use "Superstars of Wrestling"
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`in connection with defendant's
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`business.
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`COUNT TWO
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`Federal Unfair Competition
`
`XIII
`
`Plaintiff
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`hereby
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`realleges,
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`as
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`fully set
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`forth,
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`the
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`allegations of paragraphs I through XII,
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`inclusive of Count One
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`herein.
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`

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`XIV
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`Continually since on or about October, 1979, plaintiff has
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`used the mark SUPERSTAR WRESTLING to identify its services and to
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`distinguish them from those produced, disseminated and sold by
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`others, by, among other things, prominently displaying thepmarks
`SUPERSTAR WRESTLING, et al.,
`in association with advertising the
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`services
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`and on displays associated with the services.
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`In
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`addition, plaintiff has prominently displayed said mark in store
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`fronts, periodic advertising, radio and television advertising and
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`by other means common to the pertinent trade.
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`XV
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`Said services and advertisements have been performed and
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`distributed in the trade area where defendant is doing business.
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`XVI
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`-As result of said sales and advertising by plaintiff under
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`said mark, said mark has developed and possesses a secondary and
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`distinctive trademark meaning to purchasers of such services. Said
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`mark has come to indicate to said purchasers entertainment services
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`originating with the plaintiff.
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`XVII
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`As a result of this said association by purchasers of the
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`marks SUPERSTAR WRESTLING, SUPER