`ESTTA584336
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`01/28/2014
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`92056538
`Defendant
`Cook Collection Attorneys, P.L.C.
`DAVID J COOK
`COOK COLLECTION ATTORNEYS PLC
`165 FELL STREET
`SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102
`UNITED STATES
`Cook@squeezebloodfromturnip.com
`Motion for Summary Judgment
`David J. Cook
`Cook@squeezebloodfromturnip.com
`/s/ David J. Cook
`01/28/2014
`2014_01_28_18_54_25.pdf(1558206 bytes )
`2014_01_28_18_56_36.pdf(1324920 bytes )
`2014_01_28_18_58_40.pdf(881041 bytes )
`
`Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Ix)
`
`-Rb)
`
`SCOTT R. SMITH, an individual,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`VS.
`
`COOK COLLECTION ATTORNEYS,
`P.L.C., 21 Califomia corporation,
`
`Respondent.
`
`\./\/\/\/‘-/$/&/%€€%
`
`Cancellation No. 92056538
`Registration No. 3257604
`
`COOK COLLECTION ATTORNEYS, P.L.C.’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
`AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR
`SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
`
`
`
`Ix)
`
`PAGES:
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1064 BARS THE PROSECUTION OF THIS CANCELLATION
`
`PROCEEDING .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`I
`
`II.
`
`PRESUMED VALIDITY OF REGISTRATION. THE BURDEN FALLS UPON
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 2
`
`THE PETITIONER .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 2
`
`OO\.lC\UI-5'->3
`
`WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE MARK?
`
`.
`
`.
`
`IV.
`
`STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 3
`
`. 6
`
`THE RELEVANT MARKETPLACE .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`VI.
`
`VII.
`
`VIII.
`
`IX.
`
`THE MARK MUST BE SCANDALOUS TO A SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE
`OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC WITHIN THE MARKETPLACE .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`WHAT DOES “SQUEEZE BLOOD FROM A TURNIP” MEAN TO THE PUBLIC.
`AS DEFINED BY THE MARKETPLACE FOR T-SHIRTS? .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`INTENT TO USE BY RESPONDENT .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 7
`
`I 1
`
`I-I
`
`. IS
`
`PETITIONER’S STANDING .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. .. 19
`
`THE PROFANE .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`XI.
`
`PETITIONER’S REFERENCES TO THE PUTATIVE RESPONSES OF DEBTORS,
`DEBTORS’ COUNSELS, AND THIRD PARTIES, ARE IRRELEVANT .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`A.
`
`Petitioner‘s claims are speculative
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 20
`
`. 20
`
`. 21
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`No claim as to other scandalous trademark
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Marketplace is not concerned with meaning ofthc Mark .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Petitioner cannot convert an Italian proverb into a scandalous or disparaging
`D.
`expression .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`XII.
`
`XIII.
`
`OTHER USES OF SQUEEZE BLOOD FROM TURNIP .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 21
`
`. 22
`
`. 22
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 22
`
`ANALYSIS OF INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .
`
`XIV.
`
`CONCLUSION .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`c..-
`. 73
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`P_A§LE§
`
`CASES:
`
`1 7
`
`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
`
`477 U.S. 242 (1986)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 4
`
`Bell Laboratories. Inc. v. Colonial Products, Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 7
`
`644 F.Supp. 542 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Celotex v. Catrett
`
`477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 4
`
`Cerveceria Centroamericana, SA v. Cerveceria India. Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 3
`
`3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`892 F.2d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1989) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Cerveceria India Inc. v. Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 15
`
`ll
`
`12
`
`10 USPQ2d 1064 (TTAB 1989)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Continental Specialties Corp. v. Continental Connector Corp.
`
`192 U.S.P.Q. 449 (T.T.A.B. 1976)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 18
`
`Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy Limited Partnership
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 4
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`92 USPQZD 1537 ( TTAB) 2009 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`17
`
`FBI v. S0ciete.' M. Bril & Co.
`
`172 U.S.P.Q. 310 (T.T.A.B. 1971)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 18
`
`Glover v. Ampak, Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 2
`
`74 F.3d 57 (4th Cir. 1996) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 6
`
`6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (TTAB 1988)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co.
`
`238 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 3
`
`Hornblower & Weeks Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 4
`
`60 USPQZD 1733 (TTAB 2001)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`In re Bose Corp.
`
`580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 15
`
`ii
`
`
`
`In re Old Glory Condom Corp.
`
`IQ
`
`26 USPQ2d 1216 (TTAB 1993)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 8, 16, 19, 22
`
`In re Franklin Press, Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 17
`
`OO\!©UI-bl»
`
`201 U.S.P.Q. 662 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`In re Hershey, dba Seaside Graphics
`
`6 USPQ2d 1470 (TTAB 1988)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 6, 8
`
`In re Mavety Media Group Ltd.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 3, 6, 9
`
`33 F.3d 1367, 31 USPQZD 1923 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`\O
`
`In re McGinley
`
`660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 6
`
`International Tel. and Telegraph Corp. v. International Mobile Machines Corp.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 18
`
`218 U.S.P.Q. 1024; 1983 T.T.A.B. LEXIS 227, *8-9 (T.T.A.B. 1983)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Int}. Mobile Machines Corp. v. Intl. Tel. & Telegraph Corp.
`
`800 F.2d 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 1, 2
`
`Jewelers Vigilance Committee v. Ullenberg Corp.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 18
`
`823 F.2d 490 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Law v. Harvey
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 19
`
`2007 WL 2990426, at *5 (N.D.Ca1. 2007) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.
`
`670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1981) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 17-19
`
`M2 Soflware, Inc. v. M2 Communs., Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 6
`
`450 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`PC Club v. Primex Techs., Inc.
`
`32 Fed. Appx. 576 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Peterson v. Islamic Republic ofIran
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 7
`
`.
`
`. .. 10
`
`(9"' Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1117 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Richard L. Stethem, et al. v. The Islamic Republic ofIran, et al.
`
`USDC, D. Columbia, Civil Action No. 00-0159 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 10
`
`iii
`
`
`
`l
`
`Ix)
`
`Ritchie v. Simpson
`
`170 F.3d lO92 (Fed. Cir. 1999) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 15, 17. 18
`
`Rocket Trademarks Pty. Ltd. v. Phard S.p.A.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 5
`
`98 USPQ2d 1066 (TTAB 2010)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 19
`
`735 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1984) .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`The Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc.
`
`586 F.3d 1352, 92 USPQ2d 1626 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 5
`
`University of Georgia Athletic Association v. Laite
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 7
`
`756 F.2d 1535 (11"‘ Cir. 1985)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Yard-Mun, Inc. v. Getz Exterminators, Inc.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 18
`
`157 U.S.P.Q. 100 (T.T.A.B. 1968)
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`l3
`
`STATUTES:
`
`l4
`
`Federal:
`
`l5
`
`15 United States Code
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 1, 17
`
`§ 1064 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Other:
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 13
`
`Article from the Alafarmnews.com .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`Article from the bankruptcy law firm of Ariano & Reppucci who .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 13
`
`Bible, including Exodus 20:7; Leviticus 19:12; 19:12; 24:1]-14; Matthew 6:5; l5:8-9, Malachi
`3:16-I8 and Psalms 50:16-18.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`. .. 19
`
`Giovanni Torriano produced his book entitled PIAZZA UNI VERSALE DI PROVERBI ITALIAN],
`OR, A COMMON PLACE OF ITALIAN PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAI. PHRASES DIGESTED
`IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER BY WA Y OF DICTIONAR Y: IN TERPRE TED, AND
`OCCASIONALLYILLUSTRATED WITHNOTES (I666) .
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. .. 3
`
`Guy Komblum, an established attorney in San Francisco, has published a blog which describes
`squeeze blood from a tumip, as follows:
`“I. You Can’t Get Blood Out ofa Turnip .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 12
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`SCALIA WARNS THAT BUDGET CUT WOULD HURT COURT’S OPERATIONS,
`apnewsarchive.eom, AP, Associated Press, News Archive BETA, March 8, 1988 .
`.
`.
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 12
`
`iv
`
`
`
`Trademark Act
`
`[9
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 1-3, 6-8, 13, 19
`
`Section 2(a)
`
`.
`
`Section 13 of the Trademark Act .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`. 18
`
`.
`
`I4
`
`Ab)
`
`Section 45, 15 U.S.C.§ 1127 .
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`1
`
`TTAB Rules 307.02 et seq.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`.
`
`“THE SCARLET LETTER OF TRADEMARK: THE BAR TO REGISTRATION OF IMMORAL
`AND SCANDALOUS TRADEMARKS,” pages 17-28, Vol. 13, Southern Law Journal, Fall 2004,
`and the Appendix at page 29.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`.
`. 9
`
`
`
`I. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 BARS THE PROSECUTION OF
`THIS CANCELLATION PROCEEDING.
`
`Respondent’s registration is dated 7/3/07. This Petition was filed on 1/28/12. 15 U.S.C. §
`
`1064 provides as follows:
`
`§ 1064. Cancellation of registration
`A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon, may,
`upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed as follows by any person who believes
`that he is or will be damaged, including as a result of a likelihood of dilution by
`blurring or dilution by tamishment under section 1125( c) of this title, by the
`registration of a mark on the principal register established by this chapter, or under
`the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905:
`(1) Within five years from the date of the registration of the mark under this chapter.
`
`The two claims are fraud in the registration and that the mark violates Section 2(a) of the
`
`Trademark Act (“Section 2(a)”).
`
`TTAB Rules 307.02 et seq. spell out the time limitation to file a Petition for Cancellation of
`
`the Mark. The basis sought by Petitioner would be the same basis for the issuance of the Mark.
`
`These are grounds which could have prevented the registration initially. More than 5 years have
`
`elapsed. Accordingly, this Petition for Cancellation is not only late-filed, but 15 U.S.C. § 1064 is a
`
`statute of repose which extinguishes any potential Petition.
`
`Directly on point is Intl. Mobile Machines Corp. v. Intl. Tel. & Telegraplz Corp., 800 F.2d
`
`1118, 1119-20 (Fed. Cir. 1986), in which the court stated as follows:
`
`Cancellation of a mark's registration within the initial five years of registration may
`be based upon any ground which could have prevented registration initially. Fort
`Howard Paper Company v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 390 F.2d 1015, 157 USPQ 55
`(CCPA), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 99, 21 L.Ed.2d 101 (1968); see
`International Order ofJob's Daughters v. Lindeburg and Company, 727 F.2d 1087,
`220 USPQ 1017 (Fed.Cir.l984) (cancellation of a mark's registration which did not
`serve the function of a trademark). The registrant, here IMM, enjoys the benefit of a
`primafacie evidence of the validity of the registration for the goods or services
`specified in the certificate.’ In this case there is no contest over whether the IMM's
`goods match those specified in the certificate. In order to rebut the prima facie
`evidence of validity of registration, petitioner, here ITT, must prove improper
`registration by a preponderance of the evidence. See Massey Junior College v.
`Fashion Institute of Technology, 181 USPQ 272, 275 (CCPA 1974) (to rebut the
`absence of ‘‘likelihood of confusion”).
`
`The continued prosecution of this Petition should end, given the late filing of this Petition.
`
`This is jurisdictional.
`
`©OO\lC\i.h-D’-4Jl\)
`
`10
`
`ll
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`II. PRESUMED VALIDITY OF REGISTRATION.
`THE BURDEN FALLS UPON THE PETITIONER.
`
`The registration in favor of Respondent is presumed to be valid. The burden of proof falls
`
`upon the petitioning party. See Intl. Mobile Machines Corp. v. Int]. Tel. & Telegraph C027)., supra.‘
`
`see also. Glover v. Ampak. Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. I996), in which the court stated:
`
`Because a trademark's certificate of registration carries with it the presumption that
`the mark is valid, see l5 U.S.C. § l057(b), a party seeking cancellation of a
`registration on the ground that the mark has become generic must carry the burden
`of proving that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See Pizzeria Una. 747 F.2d
`at 1529 n. 4. Such evidence may come from purchaser testimony, consumer surveys,
`listings and dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers, and other publications. See
`Magic Wand, 940 F.2d at 641. Only by showing that the public understands by the
`mark the class of goods or services of which the trademarked product or service is a
`part can the party who seeks to cancel a registration carry its burden.
`
`Accordingly, the burden is borne by the Petitioner.
`
`In this motion for summary judgment and/or
`
`summary adjudication, Petitioner is obligated to make out his entire case. Respondent in this
`
`motion unequivocally demonstrates that Petitioner can never make out this case, no matter how
`
`framed.
`
`III. WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE MARK?
`
`Petitioner’s claim is that in some way the Mark violates Section 2(a). Petitioner can never
`
`make out this claim.
`
`“Squeeze blood from turnip” means total and complete futility. This expression means the
`
`impossible. Blood does not come from a tubular vegetable. This expression means that you
`
`cannot get something out of nothing. This has been the meaning from the 17"‘ century to the 21"
`
`century. This brief will demonstrate that for the last 350 hundreds years, and specifically common
`
`American usage, that this Mark means futile or the impossible. The fact of futility does not fall
`
`within the confines of Section 2(a). Petitioner claim that the Mark is disparaging. “Broke” has a
`
`180 listings. “Debtor" has I5 listings. “Consumer debt" has 10 listings. “Collection agencies" has
`
`16 listings. These expressions mean that someone owes money and bears financial distress.
`
`This brief introduction is to aid this tribunal in making its decision that an expression which
`
`represents futility, at every level of society and for the past 350 years, does not qualify as a
`
`“scandalous, etc.” mark under Section 2(a). The courts have already passed on what is scandalous.
`
`Ix)
`
`.5\O0O\lO\U'I-I2-La-J
`
`—4
`
`._o
`
`_. Ix)
`
`—.- 14.!
`
`I —
`
`‘ U!
`
`u— C‘
`
`-—- \l
`
`-—-I 00
`
`S
`
`I») 3
`
`I») —-
`
`I9 I\)
`
`Ix)
`
`
`
`._n
`
`.5\OOO\lO\UI-(>bJl\)
`
`See In re Mavely Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1372, 31 USPQZD 1923, 1925 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`In 1666, Giovanni Torriano produced his book entitled PIAZZA UNIVERSALE DI
`
`PROVERBI ITALIANI, OR, A COMMON PLACE OF ITALIAN PROVERBS AND PROVERBIAL
`
`PHRASES DIGESTED IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER BY WA Y OF DICTIONARY:
`
`INTERPRETED, AND OCCASIONALLY ILLUSTRA TED WITH NOTES (1 666), in which he states
`
`at page 232, no. 12, as follows: “There 's no blood to be got out ofa turnip. " Note 15 amplifies
`
`this proverb, as follows: “Alluding, that from such a Creditor, payment cannot be expected, quite
`
`broke.” (Relevant pages marked Exhibit “A ”')
`
`This Petition brought by Scott R. Smith (“Petitioner”) should be denied with prejudice.
`
`Smith mistakes the meaning of the Mark (i.e., total futility) with the claimed perception of the
`
`Mark by others in some type of unproven application to a group of individual who have not had
`
`and do not have any contact with the product bearing the Mark (i.e., t-shirts). Whether the use of
`
`“Squeezebloodfromtumip” as used by this Respondent or otherwise appears in the public domain,
`
`positively or negatively, is irrelevant.
`
`IV. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
`
`This is a motion for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication. The initial core of
`
`this motion is that at the time of registration, Respondent put the t-shirts in commerce by
`
`distribution to clients and friends. However, Petitioner’s claim is that the Mark violates Section
`
`2(a). Petitioner bears the affirmative burden of proof under this claim. See I-Ioover Co. v. Ro_1~'aI
`
`Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001) [“In opposition proceedings, the
`
`opposer bears the burden of establishing that the applicant does not have the right to register its
`
`mark.”]; Cerveceria Centroamericana, SA v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 1023 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 1989) [“Because a trademark owner’s certificate of registration is ‘prima facie evidence of the
`
`validity of the registration’ and continued use of the registered mark, the burden of proof is placed
`
`upon whose who seek cancellation.”]
`
`' All exhibits are incorporated by reference as though fully set forth in this Memorandum
`in their entirety and are attached to the Declaration of David J. Cook, Esq. which is filed
`contemporaneously herein.
`
`
`
`l
`
`I\)
`
`\OOO\lC\Lli-bu)
`
`10
`
`ll
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`I9 -—I
`
`I\)I0
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`The starting point of all summary judgments is Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106
`
`S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), in which the court stated:
`
`“Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
`responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
`identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
`and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes
`demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike the Court of
`Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving
`party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the
`opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56( c), which refers to "the affidavits, if
`any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. And if there
`were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such doubt is
`clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide that claimants and
`defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without
`supporting aflidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that,
`regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion
`with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is
`before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary
`judgment, as set forth in Rule 56( c), is satisfied. One of the principal purposes of
`the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually un- supported
`claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to
`accomplish this purpose?" (P. 324)
`
`See also, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986) [movant has burden of
`
`showing the absence of a genuine issue of fact, but nonmovant is not relieved of its own burden to
`
`produce evidence pointing to genuine issue); Enbridge, Inc. v. Excelerate Energy Limited
`
`Partnership, 92 USPQZD 1537, 1540 ( TTAB) 2009 [nomnovant must proffer countering evidence
`
`to show existence of genuine factual dispute for trial); and Hornblower & Weeks Inc. v.
`
`Hornblower & Weeks Inc., 60 USPQZD 1733, 1735 (TTAB 2001) [if moving party meets burden
`
`of demonstrating absence of genuine issue of material fact, nonmoving party must present evidence
`
`that one or more material facts is at issue].
`
`Respondent has already made an Initial Disclosure. See Document 36.
`
`Respondent seeks a suspension of all proceedings, including discovery. Given the clarity of
`
`these issues, Respondent is entitled to a prompt hearing on the motion for summary judgment
`
`and/or adjudication, not only for the purpose of ending a meritless Petition, but moreover avoiding
`
`the continuous personal harangues perpetrate by the Petitioner.
`
`The evidence in support of this motion consists of the Declaration of David J. Cook which
`
`memorializes the use of the t-shirts at or about the time of the registration, and specifically the
`
`
`
`I\J
`
`©OO\lO\LII-Ab-I
`
`distribution. Needless to say, the entire registration is part and parcel of this proceeding. See The
`
`Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 92 USPQ2d 1626, 1628
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2009) [the entire file of a subject registration, including any evidence made of record
`
`during prosecution of the underlying application, is part of the record in a cancellation proceeding
`
`without any action of the parties). See also, Rocket Trademarks Pty. Ltd. v. Phard S.p.A., 98
`
`USPQ2d 1066, 1070 (TTAB 2010) [record includes pleadings and file of the opposed application].
`
`In support of the claim that the Mark represents futility, Respondent has engaged in a mass
`
`survey of every potential actual use of the expression “squeeze blood from a turnip” to demonstrate
`
`that the term means futility, and nothing more. This Respondent overwhelmingly demonstrates the
`
`public perception of the Mark, by multiple layers. See Index of Authorities in support of this
`
`motion filed contemporaneously herein. All accompanying documents in support of the Index are
`
`too voluminous to be efiled with the court, therefore, Respondent will Federal Express a box to the
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Madison East, Course
`
`Level, Room C 55, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 contemporaneously herein.
`
`Should this court deny the motion for summary judgment, Respondent seeks a motion for
`
`summary adjudication on the following issues:
`
`1. At or about the time of the registration, Respondent has the prerequisite intent to use the
`
`involved Mark on the identified goods, i.e., t-shirts, around the filing date for the application of the
`
`involved registration.
`
`2. Respondent purchased, pursuant to Invoice No. 15166, approximately 1,000 t-shirts,
`
`blue in color, which bore the Mark, “Squeeze Blood From Turnip.”
`
`3. Respondent caused the t-shirts to be distributed, by mail, hand delivery, Federal
`
`Express, or otherwise, to friends, clients, bar associations, and associates.
`
`4. The t-shirts themselves bore the Mark on their face.
`
`5. The meaning of the Mark is of fiitility, i.e., that you cannot get something from nothing.
`
`6. The Mark is well understood and well known, among the federal and state judiciary, the
`
`House of Representatives of the United States Congress, academia, the news media, and the public
`
`at large, that some matters, including an obligation to pay money, is completely and totally futile.
`
`
`
`._.
`
`5\OOO\lO\LII-bbJl\J
`
`—n
`
`._g
`
`—o 5-)
`
`u-4 DJ
`
`a—I -b
`
`—- LII
`
`a—l ON
`
`a—A \.l
`
`u—-- 00
`
`7. The Mark is not a) scandalous; b) disparaging; c) humiliating; d) immoral; e) obscene; l)
`
`prurient; and g) does not have a salacious connotation.
`
`8. The Mark is not prohibited under Section 2(a).
`
`V. THE RELEVANT MARKETPLACE.
`
`This Petition to Cancel the trademark registration of Cook Collection Attorneys, P.L.C.,
`
`Cancellation No. 92056538, Registration No. 3257604, Serial No. 77020236, for the Trademark
`
`“Squeezebloodfromtumipcom,” appearing on t-shirts herein, is predicated upon two key issues as
`
`raised in the recent order (Document 33 at page 7) which consists of 1) the use of the t-shirts in
`
`commerce, and 2) whether the mark is immoral or scandalous under Section 2(a).
`
`To detennine whether a mark is scandalous or immoral, the Federal Circuit has developed a
`
`three-pronged test: (1) the mark must be shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety, or
`
`call out for condemnation; (2) the mark must be considered in the context of the marketplace as
`
`applied to only the goods or services in the application for registration; and (3) the mark must be
`
`scandalous to a substantial composite of the general public, as measured from the context of
`
`contemporary attitudes. See In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., supra; Greyhound Corp. v. Both
`
`Worlds Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639 (TTAB 1988); In re McGz'nley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A.
`
`1981) [In determining whether appellant’s mark may be refused registration as scandalous, the
`
`mark must be considered in the context of the marketplace as applied to only the goods or services
`
`described in the application for registration."]
`
`This relevant marketplace approach is firmly entrenched in Trademark Law. See, e.g., In re
`
`Hershey, dba Seaside Graphics, 6 USPQ2d I470 (TTAB 1988) [“to determine whether a
`
`designation is properly refused as scandalous, the mark must be considered in the context of the
`
`marketplace as applied to the goods or services described in the application”].
`
`Determinations under trademark law hinge upon the definition of the relevant marketplace
`
`or “channels of trade.” See. e.g., M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Communs., Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1383
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2006) [no likelihood of confusion when identical marks were used to brand products in
`
`different channels of trade]; PC Club v. Primex Techs., Inc., 32 Fed. Appx. 576, 577 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2002) [degree of care potential consumers will exercise when purchasing one product over another
`
`
`
`can mitigate likelihood of confusion]; Bell Laboratories, Inc. v. Colonial Products, Inc., 644
`
`F.Supp. 542, 544 (S.D. Fla. 1986) [marketing channels used is operative to the likelihood of
`
`confusion analysis]; University of Georgia Athletic Association v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (l 1"‘ Cir.
`
`1985) [same].
`
`The product attached to the Mark are t-shirts. Nowhere in the Petition, and commencing at
`
`paragraph 28 through 59, or paragraphs 65 through 69, does Petitioner identify the marketplace for
`
`the t-shirts. While Petitioner vocalizes his personal view that the Mark associated with the t-shirt,
`
`he does not allege, nor could he allege that the Mark associated with the t-shirt is allegedly
`
`“offensive" in a particular marketplace. Petitioner bears the affirmative burden of proof by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence that the Mark is “offensive” in the context of the marketplace as
`
`applied only to the goods or services in the application for registration. Whether or not the Mark is
`
`offensive to others, based upon the rendition of legal services, collection activities, or anything like
`
`that, is irrelevant under the marketplace analysis. Without more, this Panel should grant the
`
`summary judgment given the wholesale failure to allege, or ever could be alleged, that the Mark
`
`associated with the t-shirt is scandalous in the marketplace.
`
`Accordingly, the initial touchstone is the identification of the market. Petitioner does not
`
`identify the marketplace for these t-shirts. Rather, Petitioner claims in some way that the general
`
`public, debtors, judges, lawyers, or others would allegedly find the Mark scandalous, etc., as
`
`defined under Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act.’
`
`V]. THE MARK MUST BE SCANDALOUS TO A SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE
`OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC WITHIN THE MARKETPLACE.
`
`The TTAB has heard and considered many cases in which a mark was alleged to be
`
`offensive in some way under Section 2(a). Before engaging in a discussion conceming this
`
`particular Mark attached to the t-shins, the starting point is viewing the Mark based upon the
`
`marketplace itself. An illustrative case is In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 USPQ2d 1216
`
`(TTAB 1993). The subject of this action in which the refusal to register was reversed by the TTAB
`
`2 For purposes of brevity, the reference to Section 2(a) would necessarily include the claim
`that the Mark is scandalous, etc., as defined by Section 2(a).
`
`7
`
`._a
`
`S\DOO\lC'\LlIJ>-!.~Jl\)
`
`—a
`
`._a
`
`n—- l\)
`
`v—I DJ
`
`E —
`
`o (II
`
`v—- Ch
`
`u—- \l
`
`v—- 00
`
`To
`
`lu0
`
`I9 n—n
`
`l\J l\)
`
`l\.) U)
`
`I\.)-l>
`
`Ix) LII
`
`N ON
`
`I0 \I
`
`l\J 00
`
`
`
`._n
`
`'5©OO\lO\UI-Dsbdlxl
`
`._. —4
`
`was the use of the American flag on a condom. The analysis by the TTAB is helpful in that the
`
`decision noted that some individuals might be offended by the use of the American flag as a
`
`decoration of a condom. The decision referred to a U.S. Supreme Court case, a video by the rock
`
`star, Madonna, and potentially other uses of the American flag w