Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA505528
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`11/14/2012
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`92056218
`Plaintiff
`Sturm Foods, Inc.
`DIANE G ELDER
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`321 NORTH CLARK STREET, SUITE 2800
`CHICAGO, IL 60610-4764
`UNITED STATES
`PTOMailChicago@foley.com,delder@foley.com,cfochler@foley.com,aweinzierl
`@foley.com,jolsen@foley.com
`Reply in Support of Motion
`Charles R. Mandly, Jr.
`PTOMailChicago@foley.com,delder@foley.com,cmandly@foley.com,aweinzierl
`@foley.com,jolsen@foley.com
`/Charles R. Mandly, Jr./
`11/14/2012
`Opposition to Mot to Suspend and Exs.pdf ( 39 pages )(1197157 bytes )
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`Proceeding
`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
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`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
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`Sturm Foods, Inc.,
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`
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`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`Keurig Incorporated,
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Cancellation No. 92056218
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`
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`
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`Registrant.
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`PETITIONER’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO REGISTRANT’S MOTION TO
`SUSPEND PROCEEDING PENDING OUTCOME OF CIVIL MATTER
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`In accordance with Rule 2.127 of the Trademark Rules of Practice, 37 CFR ¶ 2.127, and
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`TBMP § 502.02, petitioner, Sturm Foods, Inc. (“Sturm”), responds the Motion To Suspend
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`Proceeding Pending Outcome Of Civil Matter filed by registrant, Keurig Incorporated
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`(“Keurig”). For the reasons set out below, Sturm respectfully requests that Keurig’s motion be
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`denied.
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`BACKGROUND
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`Keurig is a manufacturer of single serve coffee brewers offered under the KEURIG
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`name. See Keurig Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 699, 703-04 (D. Del. 2011).
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`Keurig coffee brewers may be used to make a variety of hot beverages including, inter alia,
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`coffee, tea and hot chocolate. Id. at 703. Keurig brewers utilize plastic cartridges containing,
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`inter alia, coffee, tea or cocoa mix used to brew the beverage. See id. Keurig’s cartridges are
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`offered under the names K-Cup and K-Cups, which terms have been registered as follows:
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`

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`K-CUPS
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`K-CUP
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`K-CUP
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`Reg. No.
`2,350,466
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`Reg. No.
`2,431,816
`
`Reg. No.
`3,291,667
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`Goods: Plastic cartridges each containing
`coffee and a filter, for use in coffee brewing
`machines
`Goods: Plastic cartridges each containing
`coffee and a filter, for use in coffee brewing
`machines
`Goods: Coffee and tea contained in plastic
`cartridges having filters, for use in brewing
`machines
`
`
`Although Keurig maintains that the generic term for cartridges fitting its brewers is “portion
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`pack,” there is extensive evidence that consumers and the trade understand the terms k-cup and
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`k-cups to be the generic term for Keurig brewer compatible cartridges.
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`
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`Sturm is in the business of manufacturing grocery products, including private label food
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`products such as sugar free drink mixes, hot cocoa and cappuccino mix and oatmeal. In
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`September 2010, Sturm introduced a Keurig brewer compatible single serve sealed cartridge
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`product under the name GROVE SQUARE. See Keurig, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d at 704. Sturm’s
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`products were the first Keurig brewer compatible single serve sealed cartridge product other than
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`those put out by Keurig or its licensees. To accurately describe its products, Sturm’s packaging
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`bears the phrase “*For use by owners of Keurig® coffee makers”, as well as the disclaimer
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`“*Sturm Foods, Inc. has no affiliation with Keurig, Incorporated.” Id. at 704, 708.
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`On October 1, 2010, Keurig filed a district court action against Sturm in the United States
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`District Court for the District of Delaware alleging claims for patent infringement, trademark
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`infringement (respecting the KEURIG mark only), trade dress infringement, unfair deceptive
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`trade practices, and unfair competition (“District Court Action”). Id. at 703. On October 18,
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`2010, Keurig filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin Sturm’s alleged infringement of
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`the mark KEURIG and certain allegedly false advertising claims. See id. In support of its
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`preliminary injunction motion, Keurig introduced evidence that numerous consumers referred to
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`2
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`Sturm’s cartridges as k-cups and then erroneously argued that such generic use of k-cups was
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`evidence that Sturm’s use of the KEURIG name and mark resulted in actual confusion. Keurig
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`Reply Br. in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4, Exhibit B. Following briefing and oral
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`argument, the District Court denied Keurig’s preliminary injunction motion in all respects.
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`Keurig Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
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`On March 24, 2011, Sturm filed an Answer and a counterclaim seeking, inter alia,
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`cancellation of the then-existing registrations for the terms k-cup and k-cups on the grounds that
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`these were generic terms for a Keurig brewer compatible single serve cartridge. Exhibit A to
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`Keurig Mot. To Suspend.
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`On July 26, 2012, Keurig filed a motion to dismiss Sturm’s counterclaims for
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`cancellation of the k-cup and k-cups registrations for lack of standing and subject matter
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`jurisdiction. See Exhibit A. In support of that motion, Keurig argued, inter alia, that:
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`i
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`i
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`i
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`The District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Keurig’s K-Cup and K-
`Cups registration because they were not plead and were not involved in the civil
`action. (Exhibit B at 4-5).
`
`Sturm lacked standing to bring its cancellation claims in the District Court
`because Sturm could not establish the requisite injury from the registrations
`because Keurig had not alleged that Sturm had infringed its purported marks K-
`Cup and K-Cups which are the subject of its federal registrations. (Exhibit A at 6;
`Exhibit B at 8).
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`Sturm lacked standing because it lacked any personal interest in using the k-cup
`and k-cups terms notwithstanding the fact that Sturm is a competitor. (Exhibit B
`at 9-10).
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`On September 13, 2012, the District Court granted Keurig’s motion to dismiss Sturm’s
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`cancellation counterclaim for lack of standing. Keurig Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., No. 10-cv-841,
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`2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130762, at *18 (D. Del. Sept. 13, 2012); Exhibit B to Keurig Mot. To
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`Suspend.
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`3
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`

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`
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`On the same day the Court dismissed Sturm’s cancellation counterclaims, the Court
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`granted Sturm summary judgment on Keurig’s claims of patent infringement, rejecting Keurig’s
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`anticompetitive attempt to control the market of containers that can be used in Keurig brewers by
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`asserting patents covering the brewer and not the containers for use in the brewer:
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`Here, plaintiff is attempting to institute a post sale restriction that
`prevents non-Keurig cartridges from being used in Keurig brewers.
`Supreme Court precedent prevents plaintiff from undertaking such
`an end run [around the doctrine of patent exhaustion].
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`Id. at *16.
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`The District Court Action is set for trial beginning February 25, 2013.
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`ARGUMENT
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`The decision to suspend a Board proceeding pending the disposition of a civil action is
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`not automatic, but is vested in the Board’s sound discretion. See Trademark Rule of Practice
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`2.117(a); see also TBMP § 510.02(a). While the Board may ordinarily suspends proceedings in
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`favor of a district court action, Sturm contends that the Board should exercise its sound
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`discretion to deny the requested suspension under the particular circumstances of this
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`proceeding. At the core of the practice of suspension is a goal of efficiently resolving disputes
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`between parties. Cf., Realty Experts, Inc. v. RE Realty Experts, Inc., No. 11-cv-154, 2012 U.S.
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`Dist. LEXIS 26934, at *10-11 (S.D. Cal. March 1, 2012) (deferring to the U.S.P.T.O. and noting
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`that “continued determination of registration by the TTAB is the most efficient course of
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`action”). As shown below, suspension in the particular circumstances of this action will disserve
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`this goal.
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`It is well established that competitors, such as Sturm, have a strong interest in using
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`descriptive and generic terms to offer their goods to consumers. See e.g., De Walt, Inc. v. Magna
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`Power Tool Corp., 289 F.2d 656, 661, 129 U.S.P.Q. 275, 280-281 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Further, the
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`4
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`public interest is served through allowing unimpeded use of generic terms. See W. Landes & R.
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`Posner, Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 190-91 (2003); see also Lipton
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`Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1030, 213 U.S.P.Q. 185, 189 (C.C.P.A.
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`1982)
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`Sturm’s cancellation counterclaims in the District Court Action stand dismissed as a
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`result of Keurig’s motion. If Keurig’s motion was correctly decided (i.e., Sturm has no standing
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`to seek cancellation in the District Court Action), then Sturm will never have the opportunity to
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`obtain a decision from the District Court on the merits of its cancellation claim.
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`Even assuming that the District Court’s prior dismissal is ultimately reversed upon
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`appeal, however, such relief is unlikely for years. The initial trial of this action (which excludes
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`Sturm’s cancellation claim) is not to occur until February 25, 2013, with any appeal and ultimate
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`remand unlikely to be resolved until 2014. See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
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`Circuit Median Disposition Time Statistics, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-
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`court/statistics/Median_Disp_Time_chart_02-11-.pdf,
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`available
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`at
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`http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html.1
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` Only
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`thereafter, and assuming a
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`successful appeal, will Sturm have the opportunity to seek redress of its cancellation claims. In
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`sharp contrast, trial procedures before the Board are to be completed by December 13, 2013. See
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`Scheduling Order (Sept. 24, 2012).
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`Delays in the nature of those which will necessarily result from suspension of this
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`proceeding disserve the above described public interest in assuring the free use of descriptive and
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`generic terms. As long as Keurig’s registrations for the terms k-cup and k-cups remain
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`1 As previously noted, the District Court Action involves patent claims, thereby
`conferring appellate jurisdiction in this matter upon the Federal Circuit.
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`5
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`

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`
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`registered trademarks, Sturm is forced to either (1) use second-best communication to describe
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`its products and refer to them as something other than “k-cups” or (2) invite an action for
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`trademark infringement by using the generic term the majority of consumers use for its
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`products—“k-cups.” In addition, the Board has recognized that delaying proceedings may cause
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`further prejudice to parties in their ability to present their cases to the board. See New Orleans
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`Louisiana Saints LLC and NFL Properties LLC v. Who Dat?, Inc., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d 1550, 1551 n.4
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`(T.T.A.B. 2011) (noting that evidence and witnesses may be lost if there is protracted delay in
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`the ability of opposers to bring claims). Because Sturm, as a competitor, has the unquestionable
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`right to seek relief immediately from this Board on its cancellation claims, see, e.g., Books on
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`Tape, Inc. v. Booktape Corp., 836 F.2d 519, 520, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1301, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1987), and
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`its entitlement to seek such relief has been rejected by the district court, Sturm should be
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`permitted to proceed with the present proceeding.2
`
`
`2 Keurig’s cases are distinguishable. In General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Club Fashions,
`Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1933 (T.T.A.B. 1992), the Board suspended an action because an existing
`civil action was then-pending and would “be dispositive of the issues before the board.” Here,
`not only may the District Court Action not be dispositive of Sturm’s cancellation claim, it may
`never reach the merits of such claim. Marie Claire Album S.A. v. Kruger GmbH & Co. KG, 29
`U.S.P.Q.2d 1792 (T.T.A.B. 1993), involved a Section 44 application based upon applicant’s
`German registration. The opposer moved to suspend the Board’s proceeding pending outcome
`of a civil action in Germany in which the opposer sought cancellation of the German registration
`supporting the United States application. Because a Section 44 application requires a valid
`foreign registration, the German civil action was potentially dispositive of the opposition and the
`motion was granted. As established above, this is not the case in this proceeding.
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`6
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`

`

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`For the foregoing reasons, Sturm respectfully requests the Board deny Keurig’s Motion
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`CONCLUSION
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`To Suspend Proceeding Pending Outcome Of Civil Matter.
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`
`Dated: November 14, 2012
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`Respectfully submitted,
`FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
`
`By: /Charles R. Mandly, Jr./
`Charles R. Mandly, Jr.
`321 North Clark Street, Suite 2800
`Chicago, IL 60654-5313
`Telephone: 312.832.4500
`e-mail: cmandly@foley.com
`
`Attorney for Sturm Foods, Inc.
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`7
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`

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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response In Opposition To
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`Registrant’s Motion To Suspend Proceeding Pending Outcome Of Civil Matter was served by
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`United States mail on the attorneys of record for Registrant: Dean Karau, Cynthia A. Moyer, and
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`Sarah C.S. McLaren, FREDRICKSON & BYRON, P.A., Suite 4000, 200 South Sixth Street,
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`Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 by mailing it to their address of record by first class mail, postage
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`prepaid, this 14th day of November, 2012.
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`
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`/Charles R. Mandly, Jr./
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`Charles R. Mandly, Jr.
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`4844-3450-3697.3
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`8
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`

`

`EXHIBIT A
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`EXHIBIT A
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`

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`Case 1:10-cv-00841-SLR-MPT Document 285 Filed 08/02/12 Page 1 of 14 PageID #: 4569
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`
`KEURIG, INCORPORATED’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS
`COUNT IV OF STURM FOODS, INC.’S COUNTERCLAIMS FOR LACK OF
`STANDING AND LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
`
`Karen E. Keller (No. 4489)
`Jeffrey T. Castellano (No. 4837)
`David M. Fry (No. 5486)
`SHAW KELLER LLP
`300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1120
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`(302) 298-0700
`kkeller@shawkeller.com
`jcastellano@shawkeller.com
`dfry@shawkeller.com
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Keurig, Incorporated
`
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`Michael A. Albert
`Gerald B. Hrycyszyn
`Chelsea A. Loughran
`Christopher W. Henry
`WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
`600 Atlantic Avenue
`Boston, MA 02210
`617-646-8000
`
`Dated: July 26, 2012
`
`
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`
`
`C.A. No. 10-841-SLR-MPT
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`
`
`
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
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`KEURIG, INCORPORATED,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`v.
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`
`
`
`STURM FOODS, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:10-cv-00841-SLR-MPT Document 285 Filed 08/02/12 Page 2 of 14 PageID #: 4570
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.   NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................ 1 
`II. 
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................................ 1 
`III.  LEGAL STANDARDS ......................................................................................................... 2 
`A.  Rule 12(b)(1) .................................................................................................................. 2 
`B.  Standing ......................................................................................................................... 3 
`C.  Jurisdiction Over Cancellation Claims Under the Lanham Act ..................................... 4 
`IV.  ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................ 6 
`V.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 9 
`
`- i -
`
`

`

`Case 1:10-cv-00841-SLR-MPT Document 285 Filed 08/02/12 Page 3 of 14 PageID #: 4571
`
`
`CASES 
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
`300 U.S. 227 (1937) .................................................................................................................... 7
`
`Ballentine v. United States,
`486 F.3d 806 (3d Cir. 2007) ....................................................................................................... 2
`
`Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.,
`222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................ 4, 5
`
`Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc.,
`954 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1992) ....................................................................................................... 4
`
`ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc.,
`586 F. Supp. 2d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ........................................................................................ 5
`
`Gotha v. United States,
`115 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................................... 3
`
`Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Milo Corp.,
`1985 WL 1282 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 1985) ...................................................................................... 9
`
`Hoffman’s Estate v. Nabisco, Inc.,
`444 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ............................................................................................. 5
`
`Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,
`727 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Joint Stock Society v. UDV N. Am., Inc.,
`266 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.,
`670 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1982) .................................................................................................. 5
`
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................................................ 3, 8
`
`MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
`549 U.S. 118 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 7
`
`Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
`549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977) ....................................................................................................... 3
`
`Mullin v. Sussex County, Del., CA 11-580-LPS, 2012 WL 1753662 (D. Del. May 15, 2012) . 3, 8
`
`- ii -
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`

`

`Case 1:10-cv-00841-SLR-MPT Document 285 Filed 08/02/12 Page 4 of 14 PageID #: 4572
`
`
`Nat’l Ass’n of State Utility Consumer Advocates v. F.C.C.,
`457 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC,
`663 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 11-982, 2012 WL 425184 (U.S. June 25, 2012) ....... 4
`
`Polaroid Corp. v. Berkley Photo, Inc.,
`425 F. Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1976) ............................................................................................. 7, 8
`
`Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. ON Semiconductor Corp.,
`541 F. Supp. 2d 645 (D. Del. 2008) ........................................................................................ 2, 3
`
`Scott v. Mego Int’l, Inc.,
`519 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Minn. 1981) ............................................................................................ 5
`
`Sierra Club v. Morton,
`405 U.S. 727 (1972) .................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co.,
`735 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................. 5, 8
`
`Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
`523 U.S. 83 (1998) ...................................................................................................................... 2
`
`Universal Sewing Mach. Co., Inc. v. Standard Sewing Equipment Corp.,
`185 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ............................................................................................. 9
`
`World Market Center Venture, LLC v. Texas Int’l Property Assocs.,
`2009 WL 3303758 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2009) ........................................................................... 6, 8
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES 
`
`McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:110 (4th ed. 2010) ................................. 4
`
`RULES 
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)............................................................................................................... 2, 9
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ............................................................................................................................ 1
`
`
`
`- iii -
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`

`

`Case 1:10-cv-00841-SLR-MPT Document 285 Filed 08/02/12 Page 5 of 14 PageID #: 4573
`
`
`Because no case or controversy exists regarding the registrability of Keurig’s federally
`
`registered K-CUP and K-CUPS marks,1 Keurig hereby moves to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Count IV of Sturm’s Counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. D.I.
`
`60.
`
`I.
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
`
`Keurig has asserted against Sturm claims of trademark infringement, false designation of
`
`origin, false advertising, trademark dilution, and unfair competition, D.I. 41, claims which
`
`involve Keurig’s registered KEURIG mark2 and relate to Sturm’s sale of beverage cartridges
`
`advertised for use in Keurig single-serve brewers, including those sold under the “Grove Square”
`
`brand and private labels. Keurig did not assert against Sturm the K-CUP Marks.
`
`In its answer, Sturm counterclaims for, inter alia, cancellation of Keurig’s K-CUP
`
`Registrations. D.I. 60 at 33–34, ¶¶ 25–30 (Count IV of Sturm’s Counterclaims).
`
`Discovery is now closed. The pretrial conference is set for September 13, 2012. D.I. 67.
`
`A ten-day jury trial is scheduled for October 2012. Id.
`
`II.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`1.
`
`No case or controversy exists regarding Keurig’s K-CUP Marks’ registrability
`
`because: (1) Keurig has not asserted its K-CUP Marks against Sturm; and (2) Sturm is not in any
`
`other way injured or damaged by Keurig’s K-CUP Registrations.
`
`
`1 Keurig owns United States trademark registrations for the marks K-CUP (U.S. Reg. Nos.
`2,431,816 and 3,291,667) and K-CUPS (U.S. Reg. No. 2,350,466). The registrations for
`Keurig’s K-CUP and K-CUPS marks are in full force and effect. D.I. 36 at ¶ 12, Exs. F–H.
`Keurig’s K-CUP and K-CUPS marks are hereinafter referred to collectively as Keurig’s “K-CUP
`Marks.” Those marks’ registrations are hereinafter referred to collectively as Keurig’s “K-CUP
`Registrations.”
`2 Keurig owns United States trademark registrations for the mark KEURIG (U.S. Reg. Nos.
`2,933,253 and 2,057,361). Both registrations are in full force and effect. See D.I. 1, Exs. C & D.
`
`- 1 -
`
`

`

`Case 1:10-cv-00841-SLR-MPT Document 285 Filed 08/02/12 Page 6 of 14 PageID #: 4574
`
`
`2.
`
`Sturm has no commercial interest in Keurig’s K-CUP Marks. It does not use
`
`them and has not indicated any intent to do so.
`
`3.
`
`Contrary to clear, controlling case law, Sturm is seeking an advisory opinion as to
`
`the registrability of Keurig’s K-CUP Marks.
`
`4.
`
`The record is devoid of any activity establishing either an actual injury suffered
`
`by Sturm or a basis to believe that such injury is likely from Keurig’s K-CUP Registrations.
`
`5.
`
`For the above reasons, Sturm lacks standing to assert, and the Court lacks subject
`
`matter jurisdiction to hear, Count IV of Sturm’s counterclaims. That Count must therefore be
`
`dismissed.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Rule 12(b)(1)
`
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move for dismissal on
`
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`the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(1) “authorizes dismissal of a
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`complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or if the plaintiff lacks standing to
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`bring his claim.” Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. ON Semiconductor Corp., 541 F. Supp. 2d 645,
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`648 (D. Del. 2008).3
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`Indeed, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
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`court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
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`3 See also Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A motion to dismiss
`for want of standing is . . . properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing is a
`jurisdictional matter.”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (noting
`that whether standing exits is the “threshold jurisdictional question”); id. (“Standing to sue is part
`of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.”). Except where
`otherwise noted in this brief, internal citations, quotations, and alterations are omitted, and
`emphasis is added.
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`The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v.
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`Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
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`“‘When ruling on motion to dismiss for lack of standing, federal courts may consider
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`affidavits and other factual materials in the record.’” Mullin v. Sussex County, Del., CA 11-580-
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`LPS, 2012 WL 1753662, at *3 (D. Del. May 15, 2012) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of State Utility
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`Consumer Advocates v. F.C.C., 457 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006)).4
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`B.
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`Standing
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`Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution confers upon the federal courts “the judicial
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`Power of the United States,” and Article III, Section 2 provides that this power extends to
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`specified categories of “Cases” and “Controversies.” Joint Stock Society v. UDV N. Am., Inc.,
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`266 F.3d 164, 174 (3d Cir. 2001). As a result, the existence of a case or controversy is a
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`prerequisite to all federal actions. Id. Article III standing demands:
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`(1) injury in fact, which means an invasion of a legally protected interest that
`is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
`hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged
`conduct, which means that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action
`of the defendant and has not resulted from the independent action of some third
`party not before the court; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by
`a favorable decision, which means that the prospect of obtaining relief from the
`injury as a result of a favorable ruling is not too speculative.
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`Mullin, 2012 WL 1753662, at *2 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (1992)). “These
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`requirements ensure that plaintiffs have a ‘personal stake’ or ‘interest’ in the outcome of the
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`4 See also Samsung, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (“In reviewing a factual challenge to the Court’s
`subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint, and the
`presumption of truthfulness does not attach to the allegations in the complaint. Instead, the
`Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits, depositions and
`testimony, to resolve any factual issues bearing on jurisdiction.”) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed.
`Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977); Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179
`(3d Cir. 1997)).
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`proceedings, sufficient to warrant their invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify
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`exercise of the court’s remedial powers on their behalf.” Joint Stock Society, 266 F.3d at 175.
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`C.
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`Jurisdiction Over Cancellation Claims Under the Lanham Act
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`The Lanham Act allows a party to request cancellation of a mark registered with the
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`United States Patent and Trademark Office only if that party can show “that he is or will be
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`damaged . . . by the registration.” See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2000) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1064).5
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`Title 15, United States Code, Section 1119 (§ 37 of the Lanham Act), which gives federal
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`courts certain powers over trademark registrations, is not itself a jurisdictional statute — it
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`“creates a remedy for trademark infringement rather than an independent basis for federal
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`jurisdiction.” Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 11-982,
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`2012 WL 425184 (U.S. June 25, 2012). “Both the Third Circuit and the Federal Circuit have
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`held that, by its plain terms, this provision requires that ‘a controversy as to the validity of or
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`interference with a registered mark . . . exist before a district court has jurisdiction to grant the . .
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`. remedy.’” Id. (quoting Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 873
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`(3d Cir. 1992) (noting that § 1119 provides no independent basis for jurisdiction)) (citing
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`Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 828 F.2d at 758–59; McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
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`30:110 (4th ed. 2010) (“[Section 1119] alone does not create grounds for federal jurisdiction.”)).
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`5 Jurisdiction in this Court cannot be based on Section 14(c) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.
`§ 1064(3)) as that statute only authorizes trademark cancellation petitions to the USPTO — it
`“does not . . . authorize suits for cancellation in district courts.” Windsurfing Int’l Inc. v. AMF
`Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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`Further, Section 1119 does not relieve a party seeking cancellation of a registered
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`trademark of its obligation to demonstrate standing. See ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc., 586 F.
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`Supp. 2d 219, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A plaintiff seeking cancellation of a federal trademark
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`registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1119 must satisfy the standing requirements set forth in 15 U.S.C.
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`§ 1064.”).6 Such a party must prove “facts showing a ‘real interest’ in the proceeding,” Star-Kist
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`Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 735 F.2d 346, 349 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Int’l Order of Job’s
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`Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984), i.e., facts demonstrating “a
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`real and rational basis for [its] belief that [it] would be damaged by the registration sought to
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`be cancelled.” Id. (citing Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1029
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`(C.C.P.A. 1982)).7
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`6 See also Cunningham, 222 F.3d at 945 (“The party seeking cancellation must prove two
`elements: (1) that it has standing; and (2) that there are valid grounds for canceling the
`registration. Standing . . . requires . . . that the party seeking cancellation believe that it is likely
`to be damaged by the registration. A belief in likely damage can be shown by establishing a
`direct commercial interest.”); Scott v. Mego Int’l, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1118, 1139 (D. Minn. 1981)
`(“Although § 1119 has no explicit standing requirement like that of § 1064, claims for
`cancellation have been dismissed where the claimant has not alleged ‘the requisite damage to
`establish its standing to seek cancellation.’ The doctrine of standing requires that a party
`must itself have suffered an injury in order to seek judicial action.”) (citing Sierra Club v.
`Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Hoffman’s Estate v. Nabisco, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 106, 109
`(S.D.N.Y. 1978)); Hoffman’s Estate, 444 F. Supp. at 109 (dismissing a claim for cancellation of
`a trademark: “[P]laintiff has failed to allege the requisite damage to establish its standing to seek
`cancellation.”).
`7 Cancellation claims that target the mark asserted against the party seeking cancellation are
`allowed under Section 1119 because the assertion of the mark creates a case or controversy
`related to that mark. See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:109 (4th ed.
`2012 ) (“[A] [trademark] registration may be collaterally attacked in any civil action where
`validity of the mark is in issue. For example, a defendant charged with infringement of a
`registered mark may counterclaim for cancellation of that registration.”). But here, Keurig has
`not asserted the K-CUP marks against Sturm.
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`Case 1:10-cv-00841-SLR-MPT Docume