Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA221031
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`06/27/2008
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`92049146
`Defendant
`Studio Moderna SA
`Mitchell P. Brook
`Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP
`11988 El Camino Real, Ste 200
`San Diego, CA 92130
`UNITED STATES
`Reply in Support of Motion
`Eric L. Lane
`elane@luce.com, mbrook@luce.com, akimball@luce.com,
`kbearfield@luce.com, cquatrino@luce.com
`/Eric L. Lane/
`06/27/2008
`reply.PDF ( 16 pages )(594113 bytes )
`
`Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`In the Matter of Registration No. 3,389,652
`TOP SHOP TV
`
`International Class: 35
`
`Registration Date: February 26, 2008
`
`Arcadia Group Brands Ltd.,
`
`Cancellation No. 92049146
`
`V.
`
`Studio Moderna SA,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`Respondent.
`
`\/\/\&\%\./€\)%/&/\/
`
`RESPONDENT STUDIO MODERNA’S
`
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-
`
`MOTION TO SUSPEND PENDING
`
`OUTCOME OF OPPOSITION NO.
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`91169226; AND
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`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
`
`RESPONDENT’S ALTERNATIVE
`
`MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER FED. R.
`
`CIV. P. 12(F) PARAGRAPHS 8-11 OF
`PETITIONER’S AMENDED PETITION
`
`TO CANCEL
`
`Registrant Studio Moderna SA (“Registrant” or “Studio Moderna”) hereby submits its
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`reply in support of its Cross-Motion to Suspend Pending Outcome of Opposition No. 91169226
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`and its reply in support of its Alternative Motion to Strike Paragraphs 8-11 of Petitioner’s
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`Amended Petition to Cancel.
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`It would be unusual to consolidate actions where the issues are not identical, and the
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`Applicant / Registrant does not consent — as Arcadia is requesting. Moreover, as discussed in
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`this paper, Arcadia has failed to meet its burden of persuasion. Accordingly, the interest of
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`conservation of judicial
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`resources is served by granting Studio Modema’s motion and
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`suspending the Cancellation Action pending the outcome of the long-standing opposition
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`proceeding.
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`

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`1.
`
`Petitioner Has Not Met Its Burden Of Persuasion On Consolidation
`
`Petitioner Arcadia Group Brands Ltd. (“Petitioner” or “Arcadia”) bears the burden of
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`persuasion on its motion to consolidate the proceedings. See BellSouth Intellectual Property
`
`Corp. v. RealTeleplzony, Inc., 2002 TTAB LEXIS 123 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2002) (“Turning to
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`app1icant’s motion to consolidate this proceeding with Opposition No. 121,751, applicant, as the
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`moving party bears the burden of persuading the Board to exercise its considerable discretion in
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`this regard”). Petitioner has not met this burden.
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`A.
`
`The Cited Precedent Does Not Support Consolidation
`
`The three cases cited in Petitioner’s Response for the proposition that it is typical to
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`consolidate opposition and cancellation actions are plainly inapposite.
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`Consolidation actually was not opposed in two of those relied upon cases. Such cases
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`where consolidation is not opposed are not applicable precedent because they do not involve a
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`moving party with a burden of persuasion.
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`In Hilson Research Inc. v. Society for Human Resources Management, the parties had
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`stipulated to consolidation, unlike here.
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`1993 TTAB LEXIS 14, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1423, n.1
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`(T.T.A.B. June 1, 1993) (“The Board, on September 10, 1991, approved the parties’ stipulation
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`to consolidate,
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`thereby allowing the parties to present
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`the opposition and cancellation
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`proceedings on the same record and briefs”). Also unlike the present case, there was a sua
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`sponte unopposed consolidation in 8440 LLC v. Midnight Oil Company LLC, 2001 TTAB
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`LEXIS 409, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1541, n.l (T.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2001) (“consolidation may be ordered
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`on the Board’s own initiative .
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`.
`
`.
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`. Accordingly, these cases are hereby consolidated”) (internal
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`citations omitted). Here, Studio Modema has opposed Petitioner’s motion to consolidate, and
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`Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion. See BellSouth at *6-7. Petitioner has failed to carry
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`

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`that burden, particularly in that the issues are not identical, and consolidation will
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`lead to
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`introduction of new issues into the two-year old action.
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`With the third case, Petitioner seeks to discount any differences between the word and
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`design marks - relying on the O.J. Simpson case, which is hardly precedent here. In Ritchie v.
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`OJ. Simpson,
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`the issues concerned the scandal and disparagement that would arise from Mr.
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`Simpson’s (infamous for allegations of spouse abuse and murder) registration of a trademark for
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`containing “SIMPSON”, and whether a surname is registrable at all. See Ritchie v. Simpson,
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`1996 TTAB LEXIS 46, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1859 (Dec. 6, 1996), reversed, 170 F.3d 1092, 50
`
`U.S.P.Q.2d 1023 (Fed.Cir.1999).
`
`Indeed, the Federal Circuit reversed and both oppositions then
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`ended. Because likelihood of confusion was not the issue, the differences in the disputed marks
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`were not relevant to discovery and the Board’s analysis of the issues involved. Also, in the
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`present case, Petitioner Arcadia has interjected other new issues in the Petition to Cancel, such as
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`the Statement of Use, all of which renders the issues non-identical.
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`In conclusion,
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`the cases cited by Petitioner do not support consolidation, and the
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`cancellation and opposition proceedings should not be consolidated.
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`B.
`
`Petitioner Has Not Demonstrated The Efficiency Of Consolidation;
`Suspension Would Be More Efficient Because Disposition Of The Opposition
`Could Lead To Resolution Of This Cancellation And Even
`
`Moot The Cancellation
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`Petitioner has not carried its burden of demonstrating the efficiency of consolidation.
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`While there are some common legal and factual
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`issues in Cancellation No. 92049146 (the
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`“Cancellation”) and Opposition No. 91169226 (the “Opposition”),
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`there also are new, non-
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`overlapping issues raised by Petitioner in the Cancellation. Consolidating the proceedings would
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`require the parties to litigate, and the Board to decide, the non-overlapping issues. By the same
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`

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`token, simply resolving the Opposition likely would decide the overlapping issues and help to
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`dispose of both cases, rendering the non-overlapping issues moot.
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`In addition, starting a new
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`proceeding when the first one is at a much more advanced stage is counterproductive for the
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`Board and the parties. Efficiency and conservation of resources heavily favors resolving the
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`Opposition first.
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`The primary legal issue common to both proceedings is which party has prior rights to
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`the disputed marks in the United States which would bar registration, which it does not possess
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`in Europe.
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`In particular, the question is whether Petitioner has any pre—existing continuously-
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`used trademark rights in the U.S. to serve as a basis for barring registration Studio Moderna’s
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`trademarks in the United States. However, there are significant distinctions between the two
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`proceedings such as the differences in the services, Petitioner’s allegations about the Statement
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`of Use in the Cancellation, and the design element in only one of the challenged marks.
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`Petitioner’s key argument on overlap glaringly fails since the issue is subject to issue
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`preclusion. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion,
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`the allegation that
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`the parties’ pre—existing
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`settlement agreement
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`that settled an opposition in Europe prevents Studio Moderna from
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`applying for marks for services other than those in Class 25 cannot properly be considered a
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`common issue for consolidation analysis. That issue already was disposed of by the Board’s
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`summary judgment decision in the Opposition.
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`It is deficient for Petitioner to rely on an already
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`decided claim subject to create a question common to both actions.
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`Accordingly, suspension of the Cancellation proceeding would be the most efficient way
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`to proceed and the best procedural solution.
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`

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`II.
`
`The Board’s Summary Judgment Order Should Be Deemed Final For Issue
`Preclusion Purposes And Petitioner’s Allegations Regarding Interpretation Of The
`Settlement Agreement Should Be Stricken
`
`Moreover, Petitioner’s argument against issue preclusion only serves to highlight reasons
`
`why it is appropriate here, and why paragraphs 8-11 of the Amended Petition should be stricken.
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`Petitioner relies on an irrelevant and unsupported fact issue to assert that the Board’s
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`summary judgment based on law should not be granted preclusive effect because of a purported
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`“vastly changed’ circumstance.
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`Setting up their misguided argument, Petitioner paraphrases and mischaracterizes the
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`Board’s Opinion. They convey the impression that the Board relied upon an assertion that
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`Studio Moderna did not sell clothing or class 25 goods in its retail network. Actually, the Board
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`ruled:
`
`[E]ven assuming arguendo that applicant [Studio Moderna] does sell clothing, footwear
`or headgear items through its various retail services, there is no evidence of record that
`
`shows the goods themselves are marketed under the TOP SHOP mark.
`In fact the record
`clearly demonstrates that applicant does not seek to register its proposed TOP SHOP TV
`and design mark for any goods in International Class 25. (Summary Judgment, p. 5,
`emphasis added)
`
`The “vastly changed” circumstance is an allegation that
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`recent discovery in the
`
`Opposition has allegedly uncovered that Studio Modema sells clothing or other goods that might
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`be classified in class 25 under the mark. Actually there is nothing whatsoever newly discovered.
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`Studio Moderna, as a significant European retailer, sells many different goods in its retail
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`channels, including clothing. That fact was before the Board on the summary judgment motion
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`already decided in a declaration by Branimir Brkljac, an officer of Studio Moderna.
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`(the
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`“Branimir Dec.”, dated September 8, 2006, annexed as Exhibit 1).
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`In the declaration, Mr.
`
`Brkljac stated that, “Clothing is one of the types of goods sold by Studio Moderna through its
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`

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`TOP SHOP and TOP SHOP TV shopping channels”, in Europe. A copy of this Declaration is
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`annexed as Exhibit 1 and the quoted passage appears in Paragraph 11. Mr. Brkljac went on to
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`state “I never would have signed a Settlement limiting Studio Moderna’s ability to sell other
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`companies’ clothing products through the TOP SHOP TV retail and advertising channels”
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`(Brkljac Dec. 1] 11). Thus Petitioner raises a red herring arguing there is a “vastly changed”
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`circumstance.
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`Moreover, Petitioner makes a bald assertion. There is no evidence provided to support
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`the statement, no declaration. Accordingly,
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`this assertion should be given no weight
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`in
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`consideration of the motion. See, e.g.,
`
`Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc. 899 F.2d
`
`1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(“a conclusory statement on an ultimate issue does not create a
`
`genuine issue of fact”)(emphasis in original); Mendenhall v. CMI Corp, 5 F.3d 1557 (Fed. Cir.
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`1993); Nutrite Corp. v. United States, 43 Fed.Cl. 297, 1999 U.S. Claims LEXIS 56, *6 (Ct.Cl.
`
`1999).
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`Even assuming, arguendo, what Petitioner implied, but failed to actually state (and which
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`Studio Moderna denies), that Studio Moderna markets Class 25 goods in the U.S. (or elsewhere)
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`labeled with the mark at issue (or with “Top Shop”), that could not alter the construction of the
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`parties’ prior Agreement made by the Board as a matter of law. Since the Board correctly ruled
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`that Studio Moderna has not been seeking registration under class 25 goods.
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`In other words,
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`even if, as Petitioner asserts, factual “circumstances are vastly changed” since the Board’s
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`summary judgment ruling, the Board’s correct legal conclusion on the language of the settlement
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`agreement cannot change. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, failure to strike paragraphs 8-ll
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`would result in judicial inefficiency in that the question already has been decided. Moreover,
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`

`
`coming long after the time for a motion for reconsideration has passed, this argument should be
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`dismissed as untimely, sufficient reason to strike paragraphs 8—1l of the complaint.
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`In any event, if the Board consolidates the Opposition and Cancellation proceedings — as
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`requested by Petitioner — then the summary judgment opinion will apply, since it would be a
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`single case anyway. So the only tenable outcome here for judicial consistency would be to apply
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`issue preclusion in the Cancellation action.
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`All of the above only highlights why issue preclusion and striking of paragraphs 8-11 of
`
`the amended Petition are appropriate. Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, the Board’s April 26,
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`2007 summary judgment order should be deemed final for purposes of issue preclusion on the
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`issue of interpretation of the parties’ settlement agreement. That order correctly rejected
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`Arcadia’s argument that the parties’ settlement agreement could be construed to cover goods
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`other than those in which the mark is labeled on goods falling within International Class 25, and
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`the time for reconsideration has passed.
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`Rule 54(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., relied on by Petitioner here, does not apply to collateral
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`estoppel analysis. See, e.g., Security People, Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d
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`1040, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 1999), afl’d, 243 F.3d 555 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that a
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`prior summary judgment ruling could not be the basis of collateral estoppel because it did not
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`meet the finality requirement of Rule 54(b)).
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`In Security People,
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`the defendant moved for
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`summary judgment on issue preclusion based on a prior summary judgment decision. The
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`plaintiff,
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`like Petitioner here, relied on Rule 54(b) in opposition to the motion. The court
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`rejected the plaintiffs argument
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`that
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`the prior summary judgment ruling could not have
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`preclusive effect because of Rule 54(b), noting that the rule pertains to appeals:
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`

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`SP1 argues that the order was an interlocutory order and not a final judgment, and
`that it therefore cannot have preclusive effect. For this proposition, SPI relies on
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). But SPI’s reliance on Rule 54(b) is misplaced for purposes
`of a collateral estoppel analysis. Rule 54(b) defines a judgment for purposes of an
`appeal
`.
`.
`.
`. a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel is any prior
`adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be “sufficiently
`firm’ to be accorded preclusive effect.” Security People, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
`
`The Vardon Golf decision cited by Petitioner is inapposite.
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`In that case, the Federal
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`Circuit was applying Seventh Circuit issue preclusion law. See Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten Mfg.
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`Corp., 294 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the court is applying the law of the
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`regional circuit because collateral estoppel is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
`
`Appeals for the Federal Circuit). Seventh Circuit law does not apply here.
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`Moreover, the law in the regional circuits is that partial summary judgment rulings are an
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`appropriate basis for issue preclusion between the same parties. See Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc.,
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`342 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Eleventh Circuit law and holding that partial
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`summary judgment of patent infringement was sufficiently deliberated and accorded conclusive
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`effect); Yamaha Corp. ofAmerica v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D.D.C. 1990), afi”’d
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`961 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.) (giving collateral estoppel effect to partial summary judgment ruling);
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`Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1429, 1436-37 (N.D.
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`Cal. 1988)(f1nding collateral estoppel applied to partial summary judgment rulings so long as the
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`collateral estoppel factors are met).
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`“Mindful of the ingenuity of counsel who can virtually
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`always point to some difference between the first and second case, however, we have been
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`exceedingly reluctant to permit a litigant to avoid the force of preclusion doctrine by pleading
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`"special circumstances." See, e.g., Western Coal Traffic League v. ICC, 236 App. D.C. 377, 735
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`

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`F.2d 1408, 1411 (D.C.Cir. 1984).” Sec. Ind. Ass ’n v. Bd. ofGov. ofthe Fed. Reserve Sys., 900
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`F.2d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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`Where, as here, the summary judgment decision conclusively resolves the issue decided,
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`the same parties were involved and represented by counsel, the decision is given preclusive
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`effect. See, e.g., Security People, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1045 (“a final judgment for purposes of
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`collateral estoppel is any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be
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`‘sufficiently firm’ to be accorded preclusive effect”). There is nothing tentative in the Board’s
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`partial summary judgment.
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`The Board’s April 26, 2007 summary judgment order in the Opposition is final and firm
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`on the issue of whether the parties’ previous settlement agreement can be construed to cover
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`services, not just goods in Class 25. The Board stated, “[u]pon careful consideration of the
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`arguments and evidence presented by the parties .
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`.
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`. we find that there is no genuine issue of
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`material fact for trial with regards to the plain meaning of the parties’ settlement agreement at
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`issue.” See Arcadia Group Brands Ltd. v. Studio Moderna SA, Opp. No. 91169226 (T.T.A.B.
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`Apr. 26, 2007) at 5 (emphasis added). The Board denied Opposer’s motion for partial summary
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`judgment and granted partial summary judgment in favor of Studio Moderna because “there is no
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`genuine issue of material fact that the provisions of the parties’ settlement agreement do not
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`place any limitations upon applicant’s use of the mark TOP SHOP in association with any
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`services, but only in connection with goods classified in International Class 25. .
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`.
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`.” This is a
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`reasoned, firm and final decision on interpretation of the settlement agreement.
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`In conclusion, the prior record on the summary judgment in the Opposition, and lack of
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`any evidentiary support by Petitioner, demonstrations the deficiency of Petitioner’s argument
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`

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`against issue preclusion.
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`Issue preclusion should apply and paragraphs 8-11 of the Amended
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`Petition should be stricken.
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`III.
`
`Conclusion
`
`For at least the foregoing reasons, Respondent Studio Moderna respectfully requests that
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`the Board (i) Deny the Motion to Consolidate; (ii) Grant Studio Moderna’s Motion To Suspend
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`this Cancellation proceeding pending resolution of the Opposition proceeding; and/or (iii) In the
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`alternative, Grant Studio Moderna’s Motion to Strike paragraphs 8-11 of Petitioner’s Amended
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`Petition to Cancel.
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`Dated:
`
`b 2'?" O 5)
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Mitchell P. Brook
`
`Andrea M. Kimball
`
`Eric L. Lane
`
`Attorneys for Respondent
`
`Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP
`11988 El Camino Real, Suite 200
`
`San Diego, California 92130
`Telephone: (858) 720-6335
`
`7010217391
`
`10
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`

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`
`
`EXHIBIT 1EXHIBIT 1
`
`

`
`DECLARATION OF BRANIMIR BRKLJAC
`
`I, BRANHVIIR BRKLJAC, declare:
`
`1.
`
`I am the President of Studio Modema SA, the party that has applied to register the
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`TOP SHOP TV trademark and service mark in the United States.
`
`2.
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`The statements set forth in this declaration are made on my personal knowledge,
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`or if made upon information and belief, are believed to be tme after a good faith investigation. If
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`called to testify in this matter, I could and would testify thereto.
`
`3.
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`Studio Modema was established at least as early as 1992. Studio Modema now is
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`the largest television sales brand in Central and Eastern Europe, where it operates in 20 countries
`
`and reaches a market of approximately 320 million people. Studio Modema also operates in
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`other countries, including countries in Western Europe and North America, via selling activity,
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`trading activity, trade shows, etc.
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`4.
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`Studio Modema is in several businesses. One is retailing, via home shopping
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`services, Internet, and brick and mortar locations. Studio Modema operates such retailing
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`channels internationally under the TOP SHOP and TOP SHOP TV brands. Studio Modema also
`
`develops and markets its own proprietary products, which include health-related products,
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`exercise and sporting equipment, mattresses, and sleepwear. Studio Modema sells both third-
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`party products and its proprietary products through its TOP SHOP retailing charmels.
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`5.
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`On or about April 30, 2004, I signed a settlement agreement, entitled
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`“Agreement,” between Studio Modema and Arcadia Group Brands Limited (“Arcadia”) (the
`
`15
`
`

`
`“Settlement”).
`
`I am searching my records to verify that the copy provided by Arcadia is a
`
`correct copy.
`
`6.
`
`Studio Modema and Arcadia entered into the Settlement in order to resolve
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`disputes concerning trademark applications of Studio Modema in Greece, Estonia, and Turkey
`
`on marks containing TOP SHOP. These were among several dozen countries — including,
`
`among others, countries in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe -— covered in international
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`trademark applications filed by Studio Modema.
`
`7.
`
`Paragraph 1 of the copy of the Settlement provided by Arcadia states that “Studio
`
`Modema undertakes not to use the mark TOP SHOP for designation of goods from class 25 of
`
`Nice classification (articles of clothing, footwear and headgear) in any country.” Paragraph 2 of
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`the Settlement has a reciprocal undertaking by Arcadia, stating, “Arcadia Group undertakes not
`
`to use the mark TOP SHOP for designation of goods from class 10 of Nice classification
`
`(surgical, medical, dental and veterinary apparatus and instruments, artificial limbs, eyes and
`
`teeth; orthopedic articles; suture materials) in any country, except the United Kingdom and
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`Republic of Ireland.”
`
`8.
`
`When I signed the Settlement on behalf of Studio Modema, I did so with the
`
`understanding that Studio Modema’s trademarks had priority over Arcadia’s, but I wished to
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`avoid the further expense of a contested matter by entering into a limited Settlement. The
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`Settlement was to allow Studio Modema’s trademark applications in the three countries to
`
`proceed to registration without further opposition. As part of the Settlement, I understood that
`
`both parties agreed not to use the TOP SHOP brand as applied to certain specified goods.
`
`In the
`
`case of Arcadia, Arcadia agreed not to use the mark TOP SHOP on specified goods in class 10.
`
`In the case of Studio Modema, I understood that Studio Modema agreed not to apply its
`
`16
`
`

`
`trademark TOP SHOP to “articles of clothing, footwear and headgear,” which fall within
`
`International Class 25.
`
`9.
`
`However, it was also my understanding that the Settlement did not prevent Studio
`
`Modema from selling clothing that does not bear the mark TOP SHOP, or from registering TOP
`
`SHOP as a service mark for Studio Modema’s home shopping services in International Class 35
`
`(regardless of whether clothing was offered through Studio Modema’s home shopping services).
`
`I also did not understand that the Settlement would bar Studio Modema from registering its TOP
`
`SHOP mark in either of International Classes 25 or 35.
`
`10.
`
`No one at Arcadia ever told or suggested to me (or, to my knowledge, ever told or
`
`suggested to anyone else from Studio Modema) that the Settlement was intended to prevent
`
`Studio Modema from selling clothing that does not bear the mark TOP SHOP, or from
`
`registering TOP SHOP as a service mark for Studio Moderna’s home shopping services in
`
`International Class 35.
`
`11.
`Clothing is one of the types of goods sold by Studio Modema through its TOP
`SHOP and TOP SHOP TV shopping channels. Accordingly, I never would have signed a
`
`Settlement limiting Studio Modema’s ability to sell other companies’ clothing products through
`
`the TOP SHOP TV retail and advertising channels.
`
`12.
`
`As of April 29, 2004, I was aware that Studio Modema had previously filed two
`
`trademark applications with the United States Patent & Trademark Office seeking registration of
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`TOP SHOP TV marks for, among other things, home shopping services in International Class
`
`35.
`
`I did not understand that the Settlement would have any effect upon those trademark
`
`applications. No one at Arcadia ever told or suggested to me (or, to my knowledge, ever told or
`
`suggested to anyone else from Studio Modema) that the Settlement would have any effect on
`
`17
`
`

`
`Stud" Mode
`‘°
`States.
`
`.
`.
`-
`-
`~
`-
`'
`ma 5 Pending apphcanons to regzsner the TOP suop rv marks m an; unitcd
`
`Idc I
`'
`.
`C 3” ““d°1' Pfiflfllt)’ °fP€IJu!y under the laws ofthe Unncd States that the foregoing is
`true and correct and that this declaration was executed at
`Las V as Nevada
`
`on September _3_, 2005,
`
`
`
`SB/Q8
`
`39Vd
`
`10 SSEVISFE NVIJ.3N3/\
`
`vBSDbIbZB1‘.
`
`98569
`
`SBBZ/BB/GB
`
`

`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT STUDIO MODERNA’S
`
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION TO SUSPEND PENDING OUTCOME OF
`
`OPPOSITION NO. 91 169226; AND REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT’S ALTERNATIVE
`
`MOTION TO STRIKE UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 12(F) PARAGRAPHS 8-1 1 OF PETITIONER’S
`
`AMENDED PETITION TO CANCEL to the following attorneys Via electronic mail at the email
`
`addresses set forth below and Via U.S. mail at the postal address set forth below.
`
`Floyd A. Mandell
`William J. Dorsey
`Cathay Y. N. Smith
`KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP
`
`Attorneys for Petitioner
`525 West Monroe Street
`
`Chicago, Illinois 60661-3693
`floydmandell@l<attenlaw.com
`william.dorsey(u1kattenlaw.com
`catl_1ay.s1nith@kattenlaw.com
`
`Date:
`
`E/Z7-/O?
`
`Signature:
`
`(
`
`‘Z
`
`Eric L. Lane
`
`LUCE, FORWARD, HAMILTON &
`SCRIPPS, LLP
`
`11988 El Camino Real, Suite 200
`San Diego, California 92130
`
`7010221411