Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA149593
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`07/05/2007
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`92045000
`Plaintiff
`Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C.Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C.
`Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C. Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C.
`Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C.
`2500 East Kearney
`Springfield, MO 65898
`UNITED STATES
`Dennis J.M. Donahue III
`Husch & Eppenberger, LLC
`190 Carondelet Plaza Suite 600
`St. Louis, MO 63105
`UNITED STATES
`trademark@husch.com
`Rebuttal Brief
`H. Frederick Rusche
`trademark@husch.com, fred.rusche@husch.com
`/H. Frederick Rusche/
`07/05/2007
`Petitioner's Reply Brief.pdf ( 30 pages )(87741 bytes )
`Exhibit 24.PDF ( 1 page )(318046 bytes )
`Exhibit 25.PDF ( 10 pages )(413722 bytes )
`Exhibit 26.PDF ( 4 pages )(311165 bytes )
`Exhibit 27.PDF ( 8 pages )(449418 bytes )
`Exhibit 28.PDF ( 143 pages )(4948685 bytes )
`
`

`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`In the matter of trademark Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`For the mark SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE HUNTING FISHING CAMPING RELOADING
`
`OUTERWEAR FOOTWEAR and Design
`
`Date registered: October 3, 2000
`
`Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C
`
`V
`
`Sportsman’s Warehouse, Inc.
`
`\_/\_/\_/\_/
`
`Cancellation No. 92045000
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
`
`

`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................ ..
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. ..
`
`iii
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ ..
`
`FACTS .................................................................................................. ..
`
`III.
`
`SUPPLEMENTAL/REBUTTAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE
`
`RECORD ............................................................................................... ..
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT ......................................................................................... ..
`
`A. Bass Pro’s Claims Are Not Barred By Laches ................................ ..
`
`1. Respondent Has Not Proven The Existence Of
`Unreasonable Delay .......................................................... ..
`
`2. The Inevitability Of Confusion Precludes Respondent’s
`Laches Defense ................................................................. ..
`
`B. The Likelihood Of Confusion Warrants Cancellation Of
`
`Respondent’s Registration ............................................................... ..
`
`l.
`
`2.
`
`The Parties’ Respective Marks Are Similar ...................... ..
`
`The Parties’ Respective Goods Are Unquestionable
`Similar ............................................................................... ..
`
`12
`
`Bass Pro’s Evidence Of Actual Confusion Is Admissible
`
`And Probative Of Likelihood Of Confusion ..................... ..
`
`There Is No Truth To Respondent’s Claim That There Is
`No Market Interface .......................................................... ..
`
`Bass Pro’s Survey Evidence Is Admissible And
`Reliable ............................................................................. ..
`
`C. Bass Pro’s Common Law Mark Provides A Basis For
`
`Cancellation ..................................................................................... ..
`
`1. Bass Pro’s First Use Of
`
`Its Common Law
`
`“SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE” Mark Pre—Dates
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`Purported
`Its
`First Use Of
`Respondent’s
`“SPORTSMAN WAREHOUSE” Mark ........................... ..
`
`2. Bass Pro Was The First To Acquire Secondary Meaning
`In The Common Law “SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE”
`
`Mark .................................................................................. ..
`
`D. Respondent Has Offered No Credible Evidence To Rebut Bass
`Pro’ s Fraud Claim ............................................................................ ..
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... ..
`
`VI.
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................. ..
`
`18
`
`19
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`

`
`Petiti0ner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`TABLE OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`Advanced Cardiovascular Systems v. SciMed Ly‘e Systems,
`
`988 F.2d 1157, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ................................. ..
`
`AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co.,
`
`1 F.3d 611, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1758 (7th Cir. 1993) .......................................... ..
`
`4
`
`18
`
`American Scientific Chemical, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply
`
`Corp.,
`
`690 F.2d 791, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1080 (9th. Cir. 1982) ....................................... ..
`
`11
`
`Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co.,
`
`693 F.2d 1155, 271 U.S.P.Q. 145 (5th Cir. 1982) ........................................ ..
`
`6, 13
`
`Bridgestone/Firestone Research,
`
`Inc.
`
`v. Automobile Club De
`
`L’Quest De La France,
`
`245 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .................................................................... ..
`
`5
`
`Coach House Restaurant v. Coach and Six Restaurants,
`
`223 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1984) .............................................................. ..
`
`7, 8
`
`Cornetta v. United States,
`
`851 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................................... ..
`
`Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.,
`
`222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ..................................................................... ..
`
`E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,
`
`12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1657 (E.D. Cal. 1989) .......................................................... ..
`
`5
`
`12
`
`16
`
`iii
`
`

`
`Petiti0ner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co.,
`
`967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................... ..
`
`Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp.,
`
`60 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ........................................................................ ..
`
`G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd.,
`
`917 F.2d 1292, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ................................. ..
`
`Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc.,
`
`710 F.2d 1565, 218 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .................................... ..
`
`Heartland Bank v. Heartland Home Finance, Inc. ,
`
`335 F.3d 810, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 2003) ...................................... ..
`
`Industria Espanola de Perlas Imitacion, S.A. v. National Silver
`
`Co.,
`
`459 F.2d 1049 (CCPA 1972) ....................................................................... ..
`
`In re Appetito Provisions Co., Inc.,
`
`3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1553 (T.T.A.B. 1987) ............................................................ ..
`
`In re DNI Holdings Ltd.,
`
`77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435 (T.T.A.B. 2005) .......................................................... ..
`
`In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
`
`476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (CCPA 1973) ......................................... ..
`
`In re Majestic Distilling Co.,
`
`315 F.3d 1311, 65 U.S.P.Q.2D 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................... ..
`
`Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Concorde Battery Corp.,
`
`228 U.S.P.Q.2d 39 (T.T.A.B. 1985) ............................................................ ..
`
`iv
`
`17
`
`7
`
`10
`
`9
`
`10
`
`9
`
`8
`
`10
`
`8
`
`12
`
`10
`
`

`
`Petiti0ner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`Lincoln Logs Ltd. V. Lincoln Pre—cut Log Homes, Inc.,
`
`971 F.2d 732, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ................................... ..
`
`Mustang Motels, Inc. v. Patel,
`
`226 U.S.P.Q. 526 (C.C. Cal. 1985) .............................................................. ..
`
`Nat’l Cable Television Ass ’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc.,
`
`937 F.2d 1572, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ................................. ..
`
`National Football League Properties, Inc. v. New Jersey Giants,
`
`Inc.,
`
`637 F.Supp. 507, 229 U.S.P.Q. 785 (D. N.J. 1986) ..................................... ..
`
`Perma Ceram Enterprises, Inc. v. Preco Industries, Ltd.,
`
`23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1134 (T.T.A.B. 1992) ......................................................... ..
`
`PiperAircraft Corp. v. Wag—Aero, Inc.,
`
`741 F.2d 925, 223 U.S.P.Q. 202 (7th Cir. 1984) ........................................ ..
`
`Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Financial Group,
`
`Inc.,
`
`4
`
`13
`
`5
`
`16
`
`19
`
`6
`
`149 F.3d 722, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (7th Cir. 1998) ...................................... ..
`
`11
`
`Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser—Rotli Corp.,
`
`81 F.3d 455 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ........................................................................ ..
`
`Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc.,
`
`340 F.2d 978 (CCPA 1965) ......................................................................... ..
`
`Soutliland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co.,
`
`7
`
`9
`
`108 F.3d 1134, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................... ..
`
`18
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co.,
`
`833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987) .................................................................... ..
`
`The Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Inc.,
`
`372 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .................................................................... ..
`
`10
`
`11
`
`Turner v. Hops Grill & Bar, Inc.,
`
`52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1310 (T.T.A.B. 1999) .......................................................... ..
`
`4, 8
`
`Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Lego Systems, Inc.,
`
`5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023 (D. N.J. 1987) ............................................................... ..
`
`Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co.,
`
`231 U.S.P.Q. 926 (T.T.A.B. 1986) .............................................................. ..
`
`Statutes And Other Authorities:
`
`15 U.S.C. §1064(1) ................................................................................................. ..
`
`37 C.F.R. §2.111(b) ................................................................................................ ..
`
`McCarthy,
`
`J. Thomas, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
`
`16
`
`10
`
`5
`
`5
`
`Competition §15. 11 (4‘h ed. 2007) .............................................................. ..
`
`10, 11
`
`McCarthy,
`
`J. Thomas, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
`
`Competition §32.165 (4‘h ed. 2007) ............................................................. ..
`
`McCarthy,
`
`J. Thomas, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
`
`Competition §32.170 (4‘h ed. 2007) ............................................................. ..
`
`15
`
`17
`
`Vi
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner’s Case Brief establishes grounds for the relief Petitioner seeks,
`
`that
`
`is,
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`cancellation of Respondent’s Sportsman’s Warehouse, Inc.’s (“Respondent”) Registration No.
`
`2,390,988 for the mark SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE HUNTING FISHING CAMPING
`
`RELOADING OUTERWEAR FOOTWEAR and Design. Rather than specifically addressing
`
`head—on the facts and issues Bass Pro presents in its Case Brief, Respondent’s Case Brief instead
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`largely asks the Board to ignore the compelling evidence of record warranting cancellation.
`
`Respondent
`
`takes this approach for good reason—because consideration of the substantial
`
`evidence of actual confusion and the other indicia of likelihood of confusion, as well as the
`
`evidence of Respondent’s fraud,
`
`leads to the unavoidable conclusion that Respondent’s
`
`registration must be canceled.
`
`Respondent argues that Petitioner Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C.’s (“Bass Pro”) claims are
`
`barred by laches. However,
`
`the facts are clear that Bass Pro filed its Petition seeking
`
`cancellation only months after Respondent entered the Memphis market and began directly
`
`competing with Bass Pro—the events which principally gave rise to the likelihood of confusion.
`
`Bass Pro, without question, acted reasonably and promptly once its right to protection had clearly
`
`ripened.
`
`Respondent’s claim that
`
`the parties’
`
`respective marks are not confusingly similar
`
`completely ignores the evidence of record, which includes a substantial amount of evidence of
`
`actual confusion. Respondent’s own witnesses admitted that a significant number of instances of
`
`actual confusion have arisen and, as explained in Petitioner’s Case Brief, consideration of the
`
`remaining Du Pont factors weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`Finally, Respondent’s own witnesses admitted that contrary to the information
`
`Respondent provided during the prosecution of its application for the challenged registration,
`
`Respondent has never used its registered mark in conjunction with the offering of “wholesale
`
`services.” Respondent’s attempt
`
`to obscure this fact by relying on the self—serving and
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`disingenuous testimony of its chief officer, Stuart Utgaard, only serves as further proof that
`
`Respondent intentionally misled the United States Patent and Trademark Office in securing the
`
`challenged registration.
`
`For the reasons that follow, as well as those presented in Petitioner’s Case Brief,
`
`Respondent’ s registration must be canceled.
`
`II.
`
`FACTS
`
`Before addressing the merits of the arguments set forth in Respondent’s Case Brief, Bass
`
`Pro will briefly address some of the facts alleged in Respondent’s Case Brief.
`
`Respondent claims use of the mark “SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE” since late 1994.
`
`However, there is not one single document in evidence to substantiate this claim. In fact,
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`Respondent’s earliest documented trademark use of the common law mark “SPORTSMAN’S
`
`WAREHOUSE” is an advertisement dated June 16, 1995. See EXh. 13 of Petitioner’s Case
`
`Brief, Discovery Deposition of Stuart Utgaard, p. 13, lines 1-9.
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`Moreover, Respondent incorrectly points to this first use of the non—stylized, common
`
`law mark “SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE” as its first date of use for the challenged registered
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`mark—that is the combined word and design mark of Respondent’s Registration No. 2,390,988.
`
`EXh. 3 of Petitioner’s Case Brief, Respondent’s Registration No. 2,390,988. However, it is clear
`
`that the mark found in Respondent’s June 16, 1995 advertisement is NOT the mark that is found
`
`in Respondent’s registration, which is being contested in this matter. See id; EXh. 24, June 16,
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`1995 Desert News advertisement.1 Oddly enough, page 6 of Respondent’s Brief incorrectly cites
`
`Bass Pr o’s 1995 advertisement as proof of Respondent’s (EX. 4 of Respondent’s Case Brief)
`
`specimen and date of first use in 1995. In fact, the “Father’s Day advertisement” Respondent
`
`cites as its “best specimen of use” was an advertisement used in conjunction with Respondent’s
`
`first store in Provo, Utah—a store that did not open until May 8, 1998. See EXh. 8 of Petitioner’s
`
`Case Brief, Respondent’s Application Serial No. 75/411,966; EXh. 3 of Petitioner’s Case Brief,
`
`Respondent Sportsman’s Warehouse, Inc.’s Answers to Petitioner’s First Set of Interrogatories,
`
`Response to lnterrogatory No. 11, pp. 9. This misinformation regarding the nature of
`
`Respondent’s use of its registered mark is consistent with Respondent’s conduct during the
`
`prosecution of the application that ultimately issued as the challenged registration.
`
`Respondent claims that Bass Pro currently operates only one retail location using the
`
`SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE mark in St. Louis, Missouri, despite Respondent’s knowledge
`
`that sworn testimony and documentary evidence was introduced in this case which clearly
`
`establishes that Bass Pro continues to use its mark in Memphis, Tennessee (in addition to St.
`
`Charles, Missouri). See Exh. 25, Trial Testimony Deposition of Haden Holley, p. 18, line 4 —
`
`page 20, line 18; Exh. 26, Trial Testimony Deposition of Stan Lippelman, p. 16, line 12 — page
`
`24, line 8.
`
`Respondent claims that the self—serving, unsubstantiated testimony of Stuart Utgaard
`
`establishes that Respondent has engaged in the practice of offering wholesale services under the
`
`challenged mark. However, such unreliable, uncorroborated and wholly unsubstantiated
`
`testimony flies directly in the face of the sworn testimony of a number of Respondent’s own
`
`witnesses and its own discovery response. See, Exh. 4 of Petitioner’s Case Brief, Respondent
`
`1 The attached exhibits are continuous of the exhibits identified in Bass Pro’s Case brief filed on May 21, 2007 and,
`thus, are numbered herein beginning with Exh. 24.
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`Sportsman’s Warehouse, Inc.’s Answers to Petitioner’s First Set of Interrogatories, Response to
`
`Interrogatory No. 8, p. 8; EXh. 9 of Petitioner’s Case Brief, Discovery Deposition of William
`
`Bome, p. 35, lines 7-16; EXh. 10 of Petitioner’s Case Brief, Discovery Deposition of Joel
`
`Michael McRae, p. 28, lines 1-16; EXh. 11 of Petitioner’s Case Brief, Discovery Deposition of
`
`Jason Perez, p. 26, lines 14-25; EXh. 16 of Petitioner’s Case Brief, Discovery Deposition of Paul
`
`Otte, p. 28, lines 6-21.
`
`III.
`
`SUPPLEMENTAL/REBUTTAL DESCRIPTION OF THE RECORD
`
`Bass Pro supplements its previous description of the record to include the Expert Rebuttal
`
`Report of Gary T. Ford.
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Bass Pro’s Claims Are Not Barred By Laches.
`
`Respondent has the burden of proof on its laches defense. See Tamer v. Hops Grill &
`
`Bar, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1310, 1311 (T.T.A.B. 1999). The mere passage of time does not
`
`constitute laches. See Advanced Cardiovascular Systems v. SciMed Life Systems, 988 F.2d 1157,
`
`1160, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Rather, as Respondent correctly admits, a
`
`prima facie laches defense requires a showing of (1) unreasonable delay in asserting one’s rights
`
`against another, and (2) material prejudice to the latter as a result of the delay. Lincoln Logs Ltd.
`
`v. Lincoln Pre-cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 734, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1701, 1703 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1992). Both of these factual premises must be met, predicate to the weighing of the facts of
`
`delay and prejudice to determine whether justice requires that the claim be barred. See Advanced
`
`Cardiovascular Systems, 988 F.2d at 1160, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1041.
`
`In the context of a trademark or cancellation proceeding, this defense must be tied to a
`
`party’s registration of a mark rather than its use of the mark. National Cable Television Assoc.,
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d 1572, 1580, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1424, 1432 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1991). Thus, “laches begins to run from the time action could be taken against the acquisition by
`
`another of a set of rights to which objection is later made.” Id. Accordingly, Respondent is
`
`incorrect to argue that laches should be measured by the alleged seven year period from the
`
`commencement of Respondent’s alleged first use of the challenged mark until the time Bass Pro
`
`filed its cancellation Petition. As explained below, the correct time frame for measuring laches
`
`is just over three (3) years.
`
`It should also be noted that when a limitation on the period for bringing suit has been set
`
`by statute, laches will generally not be invoked to shorten the statutory period. See Cornetta v.
`
`United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`1.
`
`Respondent has not proven the existence of unreasonable delay.
`
`The cases cited by Respondent in its case brief on the issue of “unreasonable delay” can
`
`be very easily distinguished from the facts of this case before the Board. Respondent cites
`
`Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Automobile Club De L’0nest De M France, 245 F.3d
`
`1359, 1362, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1460, 1462-63 (Fed. Cir. 2001), Where the petitioner waited twenty-
`
`seven (27) years after registration of the challenged mark and respondent’s evidence of undue
`
`delay was uncontroverted by the petitioner. Unlike the petitioner in Bridgestone, Bass Pro’s
`
`initiation of this cancellation proceeding occurred within a much shorter time—frame—within the
`
`five—year limit imposed by 15 U.S.C. §1064(1). See 15 U.S.C. §1064(1); 37 C.F.R. § 2.111(b).
`
`Similarly, Respondent also cites Turner, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1312, Where petitioner
`
`provided no reason for a five—year delay other than lack of actual knowledge of Respondent’s
`
`registration, and Teledyne, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1210, Where petitioner was “conspicuously silent
`
`regarding its reasons for delay” and provided no evidence to explain its delay in seeking
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`cancellation. Unlike the petitioners in the cases relied upon by Respondent, Bass Pro had
`
`legitimate reasons for the timing of its filing of a petition seeking cancellation of Respondent’s
`
`mark.
`
`First, as Respondent notes in its Case Brief, since at least as early as 2004 and continuing
`
`until some time in 2006, Bass Pro and Respondent engaged in talks regarding the potential
`
`merger of the two companies. See Respondent’s Case Brief. The time during which the parties
`
`explored a potential merger, which would have resolved the current dispute between the parties
`
`concerning Respondent’s trademark registration, see EX. 14 of Respondent’s Case Brief, January
`
`13, 2006 Letter from John Morris to Stuart Utgaard (“we clearly miss the opportunity to
`
`immediately resolve the dispute concerning the Sportsman’s Warehouse name”), should not be
`
`counted toward laches. See Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm C0., 693 F.2d 1155, 1161, 271
`
`U.S.P.Q. 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1982) (two years of negotiations not counted toward laches); Piper
`
`Aircraft Corp. v. Wag—Aer0, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 932, 223 U.S.P.Q. 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1984) (“It
`
`would disserve the strong policy of nonjudicial dispute resolution” if a three and a half year
`
`period of settlement negotiations were counted toward laches.). Therefore, the relevant time
`
`period runs from the date of Registration—October 3, 2000—to the time just over 3 years later,
`
`when the parties began negotiating a possible merger in 2004.
`
`Moreover, Bass Pro had a very good reason for filing its cancellation Petition in
`
`September 2005.
`
`In the year 2000, Bass Pro opened its Sportsman’s Warehouse retail store in
`
`Memphis, Tennessee. See Exh.
`
`5 of Petitioner’s Case Brief, Petitioner’s Responses to
`
`Registrant’s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Response to
`
`lnterrogatory 2, pp. 5-6.
`
`It was not until June 15, 2005 that Respondent first opened a
`
`“Sportsman’s Warehouse” retail store in Memphis, Tennessee. See Exh. 4 of Petitioner’s Case
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`Brief, Respondent Sportsman’s Warehouse,
`
`Inc.’s Answers
`
`to Petitioner’s First Set of
`
`lnterrogatories, Response to lnterrogatory No. 11, p. 10. It was not until June 2005—around the
`
`time Respondent’s Memphis retail store opened—that Bass Pro became aware of any likely or
`
`actual confusion arising out of Respondent’s use of its registered mark and, thus, had reason to
`
`believe it may be damaged by Respondent’s registration. See Exh. 5 of Petitioner’s Case Brief,
`
`Petitioner’s Responses to Registrant’s First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
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`Documents, Response to lnterrogatory 15, p. 15. Less than four (4) months later, Bass Pro filed
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`its Petition, seeking cancellation of Respondent’s registration. See Exh. 27, Bass Pro’s Petition
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`(filed September 30, 2005). Bass Pro’s decision to seek cancellation once it became aware of the
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`likelihood of confusion and once the circumstances gave rise to a belief that Bass Pro had a
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`legitimate basis for proving its case for cancellation, was reasonable and should preclude
`77
`
`Respondent’s argument that Bass Pro’s delay was “unreasonable.
`
`See Gasser Chair Co. v.
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`Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 777, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1822, 1827-28 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
`
`(holding that the measure of delay for laches purposes begins when a plaintif ’s “right ripens into
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`one entitled to protection”); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser—R0th Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462, 38
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`U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding a district court to be in error for applying
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`estoppel by laches where a plaintiff “chose to delay its pursuit of a remedy until its right to
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`protection had clearly ripened”).
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`2.
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`The inevitability of confusion precludes Respondent’s laches defense.
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`Even if unreasonable delay and material prejudice are proven to substantiate a defense of
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`laches, laches will not prevent cancellation where there is a determination that confusion is
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`inevitable. See Teledyne, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1212; Coach House Restaurant v. Coach and Six
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`Restaurants, 223 U.S.P.Q. 176, 178 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
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`“This is so because any injury to
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`respondent caused by petitioner’s delay is outweighed by the public’s interest in preventing
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`confusion in the marketplace.” Turner, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1312.
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`Although inevitable confusion has been found in cases where the marks and the goods in
`
`question are the same or substantially similar, Respondent’s argument that “confusion has been
`
`deemed inevitable only in situations in which parties use identical marks in connection with the
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`same or substantially similar goods,” is an inaccurate statement and a misstatement of the
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`standard for inevitable confusion. See Respondent’s Case Brief, p. 13 (emphasis added). As the
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`Board aptly notes in Tamer, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1313 “to determine whether confusion is
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`inevitable, we must use the multifactor analysis required by In re E.I. da Pont de Nemours &
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`Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See also Coach House
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`Restaurant, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 178 n.6. For the reasons discussed in detail in Petitioner’s Case
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`Brief, an analysis of the DuPont factors leads to the conclusion that confusion was inevitable
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`(and, in fact, did occur). Moreover, given the fact that the literal dominant portions of the
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`parties’ respective marks are identical2 (i. e., the Words “SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE”), see
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`In re Appetito Provisions Co., Inc., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1553, 1554 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (“if one of the
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`marks comprises both a word and a design, then the word is normally accorded greater weight
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`because it would be used by purchasers to request the goods or services”), and Bass Pro’s
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`services are substantially similar to those claimed in Respondent’s registration3, confusion is
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`inevitable. See Turner, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1313 (“laches will not prevent cancellation where the
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`marks and goods or services of the parties are substantially similar and it is determined that
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`confusion is inevitable”).
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`2 See Petitioner’s Case Brief at pp. 10-11 for a discussion of the identical nature of the dominant portions of the
`parties’ respective marks.
`3 See Petitioner’s Case Brief at pp. 11-12 for a discussion of the virtually identical nature of the parties’ respective
`services.
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`B.
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`The Likelihood of Confusion Warrants Cancellation Of Respondent’s
`Registration.
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`1.
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`The parties’ respective marks are similar.
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`In arguing that
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`the parties’ respective marks are dissimilar, Respondent’s principle
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`argument is that because the words “SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE” were disclaimed in Bass
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`Pro and Respondent’s respective registrations, those words should be ignored and cannot lead to
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`a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. However, “it is well settled that the disclaimed
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`material still forms a part of the mark and cannot be ignored in determining the likelihood of
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`confusion.” Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir. 1983)
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`(citing Industria Espanola de Perlas Imitacion, S.A. v. National Silver Co., 459 F.2d 1049, 59
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`C.C.P.A. 1058 (C.C.P.A. 1972)); Schwarzkopfv. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 52 C.C.P.A.
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`957 (C.C.P.A. 1965). “Such disclaimers are not helpful in preventing likelihood of confusion in
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`the mind of consumers, because he is unaware of their existence. Therefore, the disclaimed
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`portions of the mark must be considered in determining the likelihood of confusion.” Id.
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`The expert report of Dr. Michael Mazis provides further evidence of the similarity of the
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`respective parties’ marks and its bearing on likelihood of confusion. See Exh. 20 of Petitioner’s
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`Case Brief, Expert Report of Michael Mazis, Ph.D. at p. 14. Thirty percent (30%) of the survey
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`respondents either felt that Respondent’s mark (1) is put out, (2) needed permission or approval,
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`or (3) is affiliated with the same company that owns the Bass Pro registered mark.
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`Id.
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`In
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`addition, Dr. Mazis’ analysis revealed that 22% of the survey participants who had indicated that
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`the parties’ respective marks had a common source or were somehow connected “mentioned that
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`similarity of the names was the reason.” Id.4
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`4 This evidence also rebuts Respondent’s argument that the marks are dissimilar in connotation and commercial
`impression.
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`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`The cases relied upon by Respondent, Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833
`
`F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987) and Johnson Controls,
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`Inc. v. Concorde Battery Corp., 228
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`U.S.P.Q.2d 39 (T.T.A.B. 1985) are distinguishable because in those cases, the subject matter in
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`question was deemed merely descriptive and, therefore, unprotectable in the absence of evidence
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`of acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning. However, that is not the case here. Although
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`Bass Pro disclaimed the Words “SPORTSMAN’S WAREHOUSE” in its registration, Bass Pro’s
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`mark has acquired secondary meaning since the time of the disclaimer. See In re DNI Holdings
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`Ltd., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1442 (T.T.A.B. 2005) (“It is clear that a disclaimer does not preclude
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`registrant, as a matter of law, from later demonstrating .
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`.
`
`. rights in the disclaimed matter if it
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`can show that the disclaimed words have, with time and use, become distinctive of such goods or
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`services”).
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`Whether or not a mark has acquired secondary meaning is a question of fact. See G.H.
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`Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292, 1294, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1637 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1990). Secondary meaning can be, and most often is, proven by circumstantial evidence.
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`See Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hosliino Gakki Co., 231 U.S.P.Q. 926, 929 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (in
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`seeking to prove secondary meaning to register a mark, there is no obligation to introduce survey
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`evidence, the Federal Circuit remarking that “absence of consumer surveys need not preclude a
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`finding of acquired distinctiveness”); Heartland Bank v. Heartland Home Finance, Inc., 335
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`F.3d 810, 820, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1418 (Sm Cir. 2003) (“In any case, circumstantial evidence
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`can be sufficient to establish a claim. In fact, in a trademark case, circumstantial evidence may
`
`be all that is available to establish secondary meaning”). Evidence of actual confusion is strong
`
`evidence of secondary meaning. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
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`Competition § 15.11 (4th ed. 2007). Professor McCarthy explains:
`
`10
`
`

`
`Petitioner’s Reply Brief
`Registration No. 2,390,988
`
`It must be recognized that secondary meaning and likelihood of buyer
`confusion, although two separate legal
`issues, will be difficult
`to
`distinguish in viewing the evidence. That is, if buyers are confused, then
`this also means that they must have recognized plaintiff’s word as a
`trademark and associated it only with plaintiff. If this is not so, how could
`there be any confusion?
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`Thus, “actual confusion is an indicium of secondary meaning.” American Scientific
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`Chemical, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791, 793, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1080, 1082
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`(9th Cir. 1982); see also Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Financial Group, Inc., 149
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`F.3d 722, 733, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587, 1595 (7th Cir. 1998)(dissent: “Actual confusion logically
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`must be an indication of at least some amount of secondary meaning .
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`.
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`. [C]onsumer confusion is
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`direct evidence of the existence of a protectable mark.”). In this case, the substantial evidence of
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`actual confusion, see Petitioner’s Case Brief at pp. 16-22, demonstrates the acquired
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`distinctiveness or secondary meaning of Bass Pro’s mark.
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`Moreover, the size of a company and its sales figures are relevant evidence from which to
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`infer the existence of secondary meaning. See The Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health and
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`Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1340 n. 6, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173, 1185 n. 6 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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`(“Secondary meaning can be established through direct consumer testimony; survey evidence;
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`exclusivity, manner and length of use of a mark; amount and manner of advertising; amount
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`of sales and number of customers; established pl