IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFI(
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`TTAB
`
`KOHLER CO.
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`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`BALDWIN HARDWARE CORPORATION
`
`Registrant.
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`%€%§/%%%%\/\2
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`Cancellation No. 92041434
`
`Registration No. 2,267,737
`Mark: DEVONSHIRE
`
`REGISTRANT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CANCELLATION
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`lllllllllllllllllillll|lfl||||||l|||||||l||||||||l
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`i
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`oe+26-2005
`u.s. Patent & wore/TM Mail Rap! or. #34
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`i
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`\ |
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`

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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`PAGE
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................................... ..1v
`
`INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... .. 1
`
`DESCRIPTION OF THE RECORD ........................................................................................................... ..3
`
`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ................................................................................................................ ..3
`
`RECITATION OF THE FACTS ................................................................................................................. ..4
`
`ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................................. ..6
`
`I.
`
`Kohler’s Allegation of Fraud Is Unpled and Must be Given no Consideration by
`the Board ........................................................................................................................................ ..7
`
`II.
`
`Kohler Does not Have Priority ....................................................................................................... ..9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`Standard for Demonstrating Priority of Trademark Rights ............................................. .. 10
`
`Summary of Kohler’s Evidence in Support of its Claim of Priority ............................... .. 12
`
`The Majority of Kohler’s Evidence Purporting to Demonstrate Use of
`the DEVONSHIRE Mark prior
`to Baldwin’s Priority Date
`is
`Inadmissible and Cannot be Considered by the Board ................................................... ..13
`
`Chandler Exhibits 26, 27 and 28 Do not Establish Priority ............................................ .. 18
`
`Chandler Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 Do not Establish Priority .................................................. ..20
`
`Mr. Chandler’s Testimony Evidence Does not Establish Priority .................................. ..22
`
`Kohler Has Failed to Establish Priority .......................................................................... ..25
`
`III.
`
`No Likelihood of Confusion Exists .............................................................................................. ..26
`
`A.
`
`The Standard for Evaluating Likelihood of Confusion under the DuPont
`Factors ............................................................................................................................. ..26
`
`Kohler’s Natural Expansion Argument ........................................................................... ..27
`
`The Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks in their Entireties as to
`Appearance, Sound, Connotation and Commercial Impression...................................... ..3O
`
`

`
`
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`G.
`
`H.
`
`I.
`
`J.
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`K.
`
`L.
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`The Similarity or Dissimilarity and Nature of the Goods or Service as
`Described in an Application or Registration or in Connection with which
`a Prior Mark Is in Use ..................................................................................................... ..3l
`
`The Similarity or Dissimilarity of Established, Likely-to-Continue Trade
`Channels .......................................................................................................................... ..33
`
`The Conditions under which and Buyers to whom Sales Are Made, i.e.
`“Impulse” vs. Careful, Sophisticated Purchasing ............................................................ ..35
`
`The Fame of the Prior Mark (Sales, Advertising, Length of Use). ................................. ..36
`
`The Number and Nature of Similar Marks in Use on Similar Goods ............................. ..37
`
`The Nature and Extent of any Actual Confusion and the Length of Time
`during and Conditions under which there Has Been Concurrent Use
`without Evidence of Actual Confusion. .......................................................................... ..39
`
`i.e. whether de Minimis or
`The Extent of Potential Confusion,
`Substantial ....................................................................................................................... ..39
`
`Any other Established Fact Probative of the Effect of Use ............................................ ..40
`
`Kohler has not Demonstrated that a Likelihood of Confusion Exists ............................. ..40
`
`CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... ..41
`
`EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS ............................................................................................................... ..42
`
`iii
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`

`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`
`
`PAGES
`
`4U Co. ofAmerica, Inc. v. Naas Foods, Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 251 (T.T.A.B. 1972) ................................... ..22
`
`American Optical Corp. v. American Olean Tile Co., 169 U.S.P.Q. 123 (T.T.A.B.
`1971) .......................................................................................................................................................... ..14
`
`American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, Commissioner, et al. 269 U.S. 372, 46 S. Ct.
`
`160, 70 L. Ed. 317 (1926) ......................................................................................................................... ..26
`
`AMF, Inc. v. American Leisure Products, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 268 (C.C.P.A. 1973) .......................... ..29, 33
`
`B.R. Baker Co. v. Lebow Bros, 32 C.C.P.A. 1206, 66 U.S.P.Q. 232 (C.C.P.A. 1945) .......... ..10, 22, 23, 25
`
`Boyds Collection Ltd. v. Herrington & Co., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 2017 (T.T.A.B. 2003) ................................. ..20
`
`Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307
`(Fed. Cir. 1989) ........................................................................................................................................... ..6
`
`Coca—Cola Co. v. Clay, 139 U.S.P.Q. 308 (C.C.P.A. 1963) ..................................................................... ..39
`
`Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 14 S.Ct. 151, 37 L. Ed. 1144 (1893). ................................... ..9
`
`Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. EDSA Micro Corp., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1460 (T.T.A.B.
`( 1992) .......................................................................................................................................................... ..29
`
`1 Exxon Corp. v. Fill—R—Up Systems, Inc., 182 U.S.P.Q. 443 (T.T.A.B. 1974) ........................................... ..20
`
`Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ................................ ..39
`
`igHerbko Int '1 Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ......................................... ..11
`
`Hilson Research, Inc. v. Society for Human Resources Management, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
`11423 (T.T.A.B. 1993) .................................................................................................................................. ..7
`
`In re American Olean Tile Co., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1823 (T.T.A.B. 1986) ....................................................... ..33
`
`In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ...........................................26, 30
`
`In re Redken Laboratories, Inc., 170 U.S.P.Q. 526 (T.T.A.B. 1971) ....................................................... ..36
`
`Jetzon Tire & Rubber Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 177 U.S.P.Q. 467 (T.T.A.B.
`1973) .................................................................................................................................................... ..29, 32
`
`Jim Dandy Co. v. Martha White Foods, Inc., 173 U.S.P.Q. 673 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ................................... ..11
`
`iv
`
`

`
`Kenny Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc. 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir.
`1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862, 113 S. Ct. 181, 121 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1992) .......................................... ..10
`
`Malcolm Nicol & Co. v. Witco Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1638 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ........................................... ..11
`
`Mason Engineering & Design Corp. v. Mateson Chemical Corp., 225 U.S.P.Q. 956
`(T.T.A.B. 1985) ......................................................................................................................................... ..28
`
`McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. 81 (2nd Cir. 1979) .............................................. ..30
`
`Micro Motion, Inc. v. Danfoss A/S, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1628 (T.T.A.B. 1998) ................................................ ..7
`
`Monarch Federal Sav. & Loan Asso. v. Genser, 156 N.J. Super. 107, 383 A.2d 475
`(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977) ................................................................................................................. ..14
`
`National Cable Television Ass ’n v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
`1424 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ................................................................................................................................ ..11
`
`Neville Chemical Co. v. Lubrizol Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. 756 (T.T.A.B. 1977) ........................................... ..22
`
`Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 209 U.S.P.Q. 40 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ........................................ ..11
`
`P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute v. Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A.
`eM Usellini, 196 U.S.P.Q. 801 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ....................................................................................... ..7
`
`Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 73
`U.S.P.Q.2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................................. ..37
`
`I Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645 (1943) ................................................... ..15
`
`Powermatics, Inc. v. Globe Roofing Products Co., 144 U.S.P.Q. 430 (C.C.P.A. 1965) .............. ..22, 24, 25
`
`. Prince Dog & Cat Food Co. v. Central Nebraska Packing Co., 134 U.S.P.Q. 366
`I (C.C.P.A. 1962) ........................................................................................................................................... ..6
`
`1; Red Carpet Corp. v. Johnstown American Enterprises, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1404
`(T.T.A.B. 1988) ......................................................................................................................................... ..30
`
`v. JFD Electronics Components Corp., 196
`}San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co.
`‘U.S.P.Q. 1 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ....................................................................................................................... ..10
`
`Sports Auth. Mich., Inc. v. PC Auth., Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1782 (T.T.A.B. 2001) .............................. ..29, 33
`
`U.S. v. Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595 (7”‘ Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1137, 118 S.
`Ct.1098,140 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1998) ........................................................................................................... ..16
`
`West Fla. Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Restaurants, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1660 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ............................... ..6, 25
`
`

`
`
`
`OTHER
`
`PAGES
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) ................................................................................................................................... ..39
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) ..................................................................................................................................... ..9
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1127(1) ............................................................................................................................... ..8, 12
`
`37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1) ............................................................................................................................... ..9
`
`37 C.F.R. § 2.122(0) .................................................................................................................................. ..20
`
`37 C.F.R. § 2.123(k) ............................................................................................................................ ..13, 42
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) .................................................................................................................................... ..7
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (b) ................................................................................................................................... ..7
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ............................................................................................................................ ..18, 42
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) ............................................................................................................................ .. 18, 42
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) ....................................................................................................................... ..18, 42
`
`F.R.E. 602 ................................................................................................................................ ..42, 43, 44, 45
`
`F.R.E. 611(a) ........................................................................................................................... ..42, 43,44, 45
`
`y F.R.E. 611(0) ................................................................................................................................. ..42, 43, 44
`
`1 F.R.E. 802 ...................................................................................................................................... ..42, 43, 44
`
`1 F.R.E. 803(6) ............................................................................................................................................. ..14
`F.R.E. 901(a) ...............................................................................................................................................42
`kIyF.R.E. 1001(3) .............................................................................................................................................16
`
`‘F.R.E. 1002 .......................................................................................................................................... ..16, 42
`
`Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy On Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4“‘ Ed.
`2005) § 20:24 ........................................................................................................................................ ..7, 28
`
`Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy On Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4'h Ed.
`2005) § 20:28 ............................................................................................................................................ ..22
`
`IL Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy On Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4‘h Ed.
`2005) § 23:18 ............................................................................................................................................ ..39
`
`1
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`vi
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`

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`
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`TBMP § 314 ................................................................................................................................................ ..7
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`TMBP § 704.03(b)(1)(B) .................................................................................................................... ..29, 33
`
`TBMP § 704.06(b) .................................................................................................................................... ..23
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`TBMP § 707.02(b)(2) ................................................................................................................................ ..45
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`TBMP § 707.03(c) ..................................................................................................................................... ..42
`
`Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein ’s Evidence Manual (2005) § 8.01[3][e] ................................................. .. 14
`
`vii
`
`

`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`On October 21, 2002, more than three years after issuance of Baldwin Hardware Corporation’s
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`registration for DEVONSHIRE, and more than four years after Baldwin first used its DEVONSHIRE
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`mark in commerce, Petitioner, Kohler Company, petitioned for cancellation of Baldwin’s registration.
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`The petition was not filed because Baldwin’s use of its DEVONSHIRE mark was causing confusion to
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`consumers.
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`Indeed, there has been no confusion to consumers. This petition was filed solely because
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`Kohler received a refusal
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`to register the first of its two applications for DEVONSHIRE based on
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`Baldwin’s prior registration for DEVONSHIRE. However, since the commencement of this proceeding,
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`both of these applications have registered.
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`In an attempt to substantiate its filing of this cancellation action, Kohler has alleged a likelihood
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`of confusion between Baldwin’s use of DEVONSHIRE for metal door hardware, namely, locks, latches
`
`and knobs, and Kohler’s use of DEVONSHIRE for plumbing products, and its “expanded goods.”
`
`Baldwin agrees with Kohler that
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`the issues in this case are priority and likelihood of confusion.
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`Therefore, to prove its case, as the petitioner, Kohler bears the burden of proving both priority of use and
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`likelihood of confusion. Kohler has done neither. As the Board will realize, this cancellation proceeding
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`1
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`is pervaded by an utter failure of proof, with no evidence to substantiate Kohler’s claims.
`
`First, Kohler has failed to prove that it has priority of trademark rights. Kohler’s evidence of its
`
`it priority boils down to six documents and testimony by Mr. Chandler, Kohler’s Director of Sanitary
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`‘Marketing. All six of the documents are inadmissible on numerous grounds, and three of these six
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`documents were improperly produced, and are so ambiguous, inconsistent and without verification as to
`
`ltheir accuracy and reliability that they are virtually worthless. Further, Mr. Chandler’s testimony cannot
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`corroborate and does not support Kohler’s paltry documentary evidence. With this evidence, Kohler
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`cannot, and has not, carried its burden of demonstrating priority.
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`Even if Kohler’s documents were admitted and all inferences regarding the content of such
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`dbcuments drawn in favor of Kohler, at the very most, the documents might show priority of use for
`
`

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`
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`toilets and pedestal
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`lavatories only. Predicated on these fatally flawed documents and ambiguous
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`testimony, Kohler seeks a determination that this claimed priority should extend to Kohler’s other goods,
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`so that a nexus between Kohler’s other goods and Baldwin’s goods can be more easily established.
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`However, Kohler has failed to prove that any the goods for which it has claimed use under the
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`DEVONSHIRE mark are a natural expansion of toilets and pedestal lavatories, and that any claimed
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`priority should extend beyond toilets and pedestal lavatories.
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`Kohler’s “natural expansion” argument is rather convoluted. The goods that form the basis for
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`the area of natural expansion are unclear, and the goods to which the priority should extend are unclear.
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`With the exception of toilets and pedestal lavatories, Kohler’s claimed dates of first use remain unstated
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`and unestablished by evidence.
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` Kohler has not established priority,
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`and even assuming priority is established for toilets and pedestal lavatories, it does not extend to goods of
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`the type that Baldwin sells.
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`Even assuming the Board finds that Kohler has demonstrated priority of trademark rights, and
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`1 even assuming the Board finds that this priority should extend beyond toilets and pedestal lavatories,
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`iKoh1er has not demonstrated that a likelihood of confusion exists between Baldwin’s goods, and those
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`with which Kohler claims to have actually used the DEVONSHIRE mark.
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`It is Kohler that bears the burden of establishing both priority and likelihood of confusion by a
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`preponderance of the evidence. As will be demonstrated, Kohler has done neither. Accordingly, the
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`Board should deny Kohler’s Petition for Cancellation, and should dismiss the instant cancellation
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`proceeding with prejudice.
`
`

`
`DESCRIPTION OF THE RECORD
`
`Baldwin agrees that the relevant portions of the record consist of the following, and Baldwin
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`refers to these portions of the record in a similar manner as Kohler, for ease of reference:
`
`1.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`7.
`
`Testimony deposition of Michael Chandler conducted on May 28, 2004, referred to as
`and accompanying exhibits referred to as Chandler Exhibit
`Chandler Test. Dep. at
`
`Testimony deposition of Michael Draves conducted on October 12, 2004, referred to as
`and accompanying exhibits referred to as Draves Exhibit
`Draves Test. Dep. at
`
`Testimony deposition of Peter Dohm conducted on August 4, 2004, referred to as Dohm
`Test. Dep. at.
`and accompanying exhibits referred to as Dohm Exhibit
`.
`
`Testimony deposition of Michael Babula conducted on August 4, 2004, referred to as
`Babula Test. Dep. at.
`and accompanying exhibits referred to as Babula Exhibit
`
`Testimony deposition of Alexander Rabinovich conducted on August 18, 2004, referred
`and accompanying exhibits referred to as Rabinovich
`to as Rabinovich Test. Dep. at.
`Exhibit
`.
`
`Kohler’s Notice of Reliance filed June 4, 2004, referred to as Kohler’s Notice of
`Reliance and accompanying exhibits.1
`
`Ba1dwin’s Notice of Reliance filed August 24, 2004, referred to as Baldwin's Notice of
`Reliance and accompanying exhibits.
`
`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
`
`Baldwin agrees that
`
`the two issues in this proceeding are (1) whether or not Kohler has
`
`1 demonstrated that it has priority of trademark rights; and (2) whether or not Kohler has demonstrated that
`
`la likelihood of confusion exists between Ba1dwin’s use of the DEVONSHIRE mark as shown in
`
`Registration No. 2,267,737 and Kohler’s use of DEVONSHIRE for its goods. The evidence simply does
`
`not show that Kohler has priority of trademark rights or that a likelihood of confusion exists.
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`‘ Baldwin filed a motion to strike portions of Kohler’s Notice of Reliance on August 23, 2004.
`
`

`
`RECITATION OF THE FACTS
`
`Baldwin is a manufacturer of high quality decorative metal hardware products, such as door
`
`handlesets, door knobs, door locks and kick plates. Baldwin’s business is headquartered in Reading,
`
`Pennsylvania, and Baldwin has been in the door hardware business for approximately 50 years. Dohm
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`Test. Dep. at 25.
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`Baldwin uses its DEVONSHIRE mark to denote a style of exterior door handlesets. Baldwin’s
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`DEVONSHIRE handlesets is one of Baldwin’s premium lock sets, featuring a tubular type of lock.
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`Dohm Test. Dep. at 25. Baldwin’s DEVONSHIRE handlesets are part of its ESTATE collection,
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`Baldwin’s most refined collection of exterior door handlesets, and which are 100% solid brass. An
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`image of Baldwin’s DEVONSHIRE handlesets is shown below. See e.g., Dohm Exhibit 3.
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`Baldwin’s DEVONSHIRE handlesets have a list price of approximately $540, and for this
`
`reason, are primarily sold through showrooms that are outlets that feature premium, high—end decorative
`
`hardware, though are occasionally also featured in large retail home centers such as Home Depot and
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`Expo. Dohm Test. Dep. at 14.
`
`

`
`
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`On December 11, 1997, Baldwin filed intent-to-use Application Serial No. 75/403,837 for the
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`mark DEVONSHIRE; filed a Statement of Use in April, 1999, specifying a May, 1998 date of first use;
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`and on August 3, 1999, Registration No. 2,267,737 issued on the Principal Register covering “metal door
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`hardware, namely,
`
`locks,
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`latches and knobs” in Class 6.
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`Baldwin has continuously used its
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`DEVONSHIRE mark in connection with the goods specified in the Registration since its first use.
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`Babula Test. Dep. at. J 6 -29, Babula Exhibit 1.
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`On December 13, 2001, Kohler filed intent-to-use Application Serial No. 78/098,179 for the
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`mark DEVONSHIRE, covering plumbing products in Class 11. Registration of this application was
`
`refused based on Baldwin’s prior Registration No. 2,267,737. Kohler filed Cancellation No. 92041434
`
`on October 21, 2002, noting the refusal to register as the basis for its standing to petition to cancel
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`Baldwin’s registration, and alleging a likelihood of confusion with Baldwin’s mark. Baldwin denied the
`
`salient allegations of the Petition.
`
`The Examining Attorney subsequently withdrew the refusal to register Application Serial No.
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`78/098,179, and approved this application for publication. This application matured to registration on
`
`i~
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`the Principal Register on December 23, 2003 under No. 2,799,158, and reciting “plumbing products and
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`6, fixtures, namely, bathtubs, whirlpool baths, showers, shower and bath cubicles, lavatories with toilets,
`
`‘
`
`toilet seats, sinks, water tapes for pipes, faucets, fixed bath spouts on walls and directly on the baths,
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`1 basins and sanitary apparatus and installations, namely, pipes being part ofsanitaryfacilities.”
`
`On March 20, 2003, Kohler filed intent-to-use Application Serial No. 78/228,099 for the mark
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`DEVONSHIRE for goods in Classes 6, 20 and 21. This application was approved for publication
`
`Iwithout substantive refusal, was published for opposition and was allowed. On April 19, 2005 Kohler
`
`filed its Statement of Use for Classes 6, 20 and 21. This application matured to registration on July 26,
`
`2005 under No. 2,978,620 and recites “metal robe hooks, bathroom accessories, namely drinking
`
`glasses; wash basins; soap dishes,‘ soap dispensers; paper towel dispensers; toilet paper holders and
`
`

`
`
`
`dispensers; towel bars and towel holders; and toothbrush holders, shelves made ofglass or porcelain for
`
`bathroom use.”
`
`In the Petition for Cancellation, Kohler alleged damage as a result of the Office’s refusal to
`
`register in Application Serial No. 78/098,179. Kohler claimed priority of trademark rights over
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`Applicant’s intent-to-use filing date and its first use and dates by Virtue of its first use of the
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`DEVONSHIRE mark in association with toilets and lavatories in July, 1996. Kohler alleged a likelihood
`
`of confusion between Baldwin’s metal door hardware and Kohler’s plumbing products and fixtures.
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`Baldwin answered the Petition for Cancellation, denying the salient allegations in the Petition.
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`The parties took discovery and took testimony depositions. Kohler filed its Notice of Reliance on June 9,
`
`2004. On August 23, 2004, Baldwin filed a Motion to Strike portions of Kohler’s Notice of Reliance,
`
`and filed its Notice of Reliance on August 24, 2004. Kohler opposed the Motion to Strike on September
`
`9, 2004. The parties await a ruling on this motion. Kohler filed its trial brief on July 25, 2005.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Registration No. 2,267,737 was granted on the Principal Register by the Office and is entitled to
`
`p a presumption of validity. West Fla. Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Restaurants, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1660 (Fed. Cir.
`
`1994); Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
`
`} To cancel Baldwin’s legitimately-granted registration, Kohler must sustain its burden of proof, leaving
`
`1 nothing to conjecture. Prince Dog & Cat Food Co. v. Central Nebraska Packing Co., 134 U.S.P.Q. 366
`
`(C.C.P.A. 1962).
`
`Kohler’s sole basis for the Petition for Cancellation is its allegation of a likelihood of confusion
`
`between Baldwin’s DEVONSHIRE mark as used in association with its metal door hardware, and
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`Kohler’s DEVONSHIRE mark as used in association with plumbing products and bathroom accessories.
`
`To succeed on a theory of likelihood of confusion, Kohler must first prove that it has priority of
`
`tifademark rights, and second,
`
`that a likelihood of confusion exists, and must prove both by a
`
`preponderance of the evidence. As will be fully detailed, Kohler has done neither.
`
`

`
`
`
`I.
`
`KOHLER’S ALLEGATION OF FRAUD IS UNPLED AND MUST BE GIVEN NO
`CONSIDERATION BY THE BOARD.
`
`For the very first time, in its trial brief, Kohler alleges fraud in Baldwin’s filing of its Statement
`
`of Use. However, Petitioner neither included a claim of fraud as a basis for cancellation in the Petition
`
`for Cancellation, nor did Kohler seek to amend its Petition to include a claim of fraud.2 Baldwin objects
`
`to the introduction of this claim, which was not previously plead, for which no amended pleading was
`
`requested, about which Baldwin has had no opportunity to take discovery, and which has not been tried.
`
`As TBMP § 314 states unequivocally, “[a] plaintiff may not rely on an unpleaded claim. The
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`plaintiff’ s pleading must be amended (or deemed amended), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. l5(a) or (b), to
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`assert the matter.” See, for example, cases cited therein, P.A.B. Produits et Appareils de Beaute v.
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`Satinine Societa in Nome Collettivo di S.A. e M. Usellini, 196 U.S.P.Q. 801, 804 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
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`(registrant did not have fair notice that petitioner was attempting to establish a two-year period of nonuse
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`extending beyond two-year period alleged in petition); Hilson Research, Inc. v. Society for Human
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`Resources Management, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1423, 1439 — 1440 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (issue of abandonment
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`argued in final brief was neither pleaded nor tried); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Danfoss A/S, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
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`1628 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (motion to amend opposition filed with final brief denied where pleaded issue was
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`, genericness and applicant was not on notice of unpled issue of mere descriptiveness so that applicant
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`1 could have put on defense of acquired distinctiveness). “[I]n an opposition proceeding, as in any inter
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`1 partes litigation, the parties are limited in their proof by the grounds and facts alleged in the pleadings.”
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`J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4'h Ed. 2005) § 20:24 (citations
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`omitted).
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`2; Baldwin notes that Kohler indicated at the conclusion of Mr. Babula’s testimony deposition:
`MR. JOHNSTON:
`I think we are going to be amending our petition to assert a new basis for the cancellation, and
`the new basis is going to be fraud, and it is going to be in a filing in a statement of use when there was no bona fide
`use at the time, or there was no use in commerce, and I think it is probably going to be necessary to have some
`discussions about how we address that issue.
`MS. MURPHY: You have to file a motion.
`MR. JOHNSTON:
`I think that’s correct, but I just wanted to make that statement.
`Btlbula Test. Dep. at 81 — 82.
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`

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`
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`Baldwin notes that Kohler repeatedly references the allegedly fraudulent actions throughout its
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`brief. See, Kohler’s Brief at 2, I4, 15, 35, 36, and 37. The last minute inclusion of this claim of fraud by
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`Kohler would appear to be an attempt to cast a pall over Baldwin’s registration, its case, its arguments,
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`and its proofs. Baldwin notes that Kohler makes much of Baldwin’s statements that the first use
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`identified in Baldwin’s Application Serial No. 75/403,837 suggests that no actual sale occurred, and asks
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`the Board to assume that Baldwin has therefore committed fraud in the filing of the Statement of Use.
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`Kohler is apparently unaware that such first use can also result from the transportation of goods bearing
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`the DEVONSHIRE mark in commerce, for example, a shipment of Baldwin’s DEVONSHIRE products
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`to a trade show location, for display at the trade show. See, e. g. Babula Test. Dep. at 24.
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`This type of use is specifically provided for in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127(1), which
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`states:
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`The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade,
`and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be
`deemed to be in use in commerce —
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`(1)
`(A)
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`(B)
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`on goods when —
`it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated
`therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
`placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
`the goods are sold or transported in commerce.
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`This is precisely the reason all claims must be pled in the Petition for Cancellation, to allow the
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`3 parties to take discovery and fully try the issue. Accordingly, because Kohler did not properly plead a
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`TIN fraud claim, and did not seek leave to amend its Petition to Cancel after Baldwin expressly informed
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`lKohler that it would need to seek leave from the Board to add such a claim, the Board must give no
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`consideration to Kohler’s fraud claim.
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`

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`
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`II.
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`KOHLER DOES NOT HAVE PRIORITY.
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`It is well settled that between conflicting claiman