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`ESTTA Tracking number:
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`ESTTA1253105
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`Filing date:
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`12/08/2022
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Proceeding no.
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`91273101
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`Party
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`Correspondence
`address
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`Submission
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`Filer's name
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`Filer's email
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`Signature
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`Date
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`Attachments
`
`Defendant
`Green Goat LLC
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`NICHOLAS D. MYERS
`THE MYERS LAW GROUP
`4695 MACARTHUR COURT, SUITE 200
`NEWPORT BEACH, CA 92660
`UNITED STATES
`Primary email: nicholas@themyerslg.com
`Secondary email(s): trademarks@themyerslg.com
`949-825-5590
`
`Opposition/Response to Motion
`
`Nicholas D. Myers
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`nicholas@themyerslg.com, evan@themyerslg.com, noemi@themyerslg.com
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`/Nicholas D Myers/
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`12/08/2022
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`2022.12.08 Appl. Green Goat's Opposition to Opp. 1161, Inc.'s Discove ry Mo-
`tions.pdf(6031858 bytes )
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`
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`
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
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`1661, INC.,
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` Opposer,
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` v.
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`GREEN GOAT, LLC,
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` Applicant.
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`
`
`
`
` Opposition No. 91273101 (Parent Case)
` Opposition No. 91277598
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` Serial Numbers: 90/410459, 90/880438
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`
`
`
`
`APPLICANT GREEN GOAT, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER 1661, INC.’S
`MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES AND MOTION TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENCY
`OF RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
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`1
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`I.
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`
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`INTRODUCTION
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`The motions (the “Motions”) to compel further discovery responses and to determine the
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`sufficiency of responses to Requests for Admission filed by Opposer 1661, Inc. (“1661”) represent
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`a colossal waste of time for the Board, 1661, and Applicant Green Goat, LLC (“Green Goat”). The
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`only possible reason that counsel for 1661 brought the motions is to drive up the burdens and costs
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`imposed on Green Goat, a relatively small player in the golf apparel and accessories space. 1661,
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`with an average annual revenue of in the hundreds of millions, based on sales of collectible
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`sneakers and extremely high-priced unique third-party branded products under the brand GOAT –
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`“greatest of all time”, is seeking to drive Green Goat, which sells no items priced over $80, out of
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`business. Confronting the difficulty of establishing any consumer confusion between the marks
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`used by the two parties, to date 1661 has approached discovery as a means to harass Green Goat.
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`The instant motions provide prime examples of this conduct. Additionally, the motions
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`demonstrate 1661’s refusal to engage in good faith in the process of meeting and conferring with
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`counsel for Green Goat to avoid unnecessary motion practice.
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`On Friday, November 18, 2022, with no advance notice to Green Goat, 1661 served a flurry
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`of discovery including premature deposition notices (there having been no documents produced to
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`date by 1661 in the proceeding) and then filed the instant motions. (See Decl. of J. Evan Shapiro
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`in Support of Applicant Green Goat, LLC’s Opposition to Opposer 1661, Inc.’s Motion to Compel
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`Further Discovery Responses and to Determine the Sufficiency of Responses to Requests for
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`Admission sworn to on Dec. 8, 2022 and submitted herewith (“Shapiro Decl.”) ¶ 5.) The Motions
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`seek: (1) to force Green Goat to “cut and paste” a 10 page statement of its position that there exists
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`no likelihood of confusion between the marks based largely on facts in the public domain and
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`arguments into an interrogatory answer; (2) to force Green Goat to provide responses to seven
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`2
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`interrogatories concerning Green Goat’s sale of individual t-shirts featuring famous athletes and
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`pop culture characters, incorrectly asserting that the Board has held that an applicant’s
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`unauthorized use of images of individuals and characters is relevant to the “thirteenth” DuPont
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`factor of “bad faith” or “intent to confuse”; (3) to require Green Goat to produce documents
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`relating to any third-party financing of its defense to this proceeding, arguing that such production
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`is necessary to obtain applicant’s possible communications with third parties concerning this
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`proceeding, even though Green Goat has agreed to produce documents concerning such third-party
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`communications; and (4) to improperly force Green Goat to issue admissions in response to
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`vaguely-worded Requests for Admission that involve complex legal contentions or that are
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`unnecessary in light of document requests and interrogatories 1661 also propounded on Green
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`Goat.
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`As demonstrated below, the Motions find no support in the TTAB procedural rules,
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`governing case law or common sense. Further, with respect to two discovery requests at issue in
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`the Motions, counsel for Green Goat demonstrated to counsel for 1661 – prior to the filing of the
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`Motions – that 1661 would obtain the discovery it was seeking by virtue of Green Goat’s
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`agreement to comply with other discovery requests issued by 1661. (See Shapiro Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9,
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`12.) Counsel for 1661 simply ignored counsel for Green Goat’s efforts to avoid motion practice
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`with respect to these two discovery requests. (See id.)
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`
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`Accordingly, the motions provide the Board with an opportunity to remind the parties to
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`this proceeding that (1) they should give serious consideration before filing discovery motions
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`with flimsy legal support, and (2) discovery motions should not be filed solely as a means to drive
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`up an opponent’s litigation expenses.
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`3
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`In an effort to reduce the number of issues before the Board raised by 1661’s motions, and
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`despite its view that further responses were not necessary, Green Goat served today a number of
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`supplemental responses to some of the 1661 discovery requests discussed herein. Further, Green
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`Goat has requested counsel for 1661 to inform the Board that the issues pertaining to the discovery
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`requests to which Green Goat has now served supplemental responses have been resolved.
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`II. FACTS IMPORTANT TO ADJUDICATION OF 1661’S MOTIONS
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`The discovery requests at issue in the motions now before the Board were served by 1661
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`on May 2, 2022, on Eric Gates and Mario Tovar, who were named as Applicants in 1661’s Notice
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`of Opposition. (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 3.) On June 1, 2022, Messrs. Gates and Tovar served their
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`responses and objections to the discovery requests on 1661. (See id.) Prior to today, no
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`supplemental responses to the discovery requests have been served either by Messrs. Gates and
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`Tovar or by Green Goat. (See id.)
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`On August 5, 2022, the Board ruled that Green Goat should be substituted as Applicant in
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`the proceeding for Messrs. Gates and Tovar. See 12 TTABVUE. On or around September 2, 2022,
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`counsel for Green Goat agreed with counsel for 1661, that the discovery served on Messrs. Gates
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`and Tovar would be deemed discovery served on Green Goat, and that the responses and objections
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`served by the two men would be deemed responses and objections served by Green Goat on 1661.
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`(See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 4.)
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`On November 16, 2022, the parties held a meet-and-confer call at which some of the
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`responses and objections that form the basis for the motions now before the Board were discussed.
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`(See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 9.) During the call, counsel for both sides discussed 1661’s RFP No. 37,
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`which seeks all documents relating to “any financing or potential financing of this opposition by
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`another person and/or entity.” (See id.) Counsel for 1661 explained that such documents were
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`4
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`
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`relevant because they would assist 1661 in discovering communications between Green Goat (and
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`its officers and employees) and third parties concerning the instant proceeding. (See id.) Counsel
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`for Green Goat noted that Messrs. Gates and Tovar had already agreed to produce documents
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`responsive to RFP No. 35, which requests:
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`concerning
`DOCUMENTS
`non-privileged
`All
`any
`communications between YOU and a third party regarding 1661
`and/or the GOAT MARKS, including any communications related
`to this opposition, the GOAT MARKS, or the GREEN GOAT
`MARK.
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`(See id.; Mario Tovar’s Responses to First Set of Requests for Production of Opposer 1661, Inc.,
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`Shapiro Decl. Exh. B, at 20 (emphasis added).)
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`
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`On this basis, counsel for Green Goat insisted that any motion to compel with respect to
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`RFP No. 37 could not be justified. (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 9.) Green Goat’s compliance with Messrs.
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`Gates and Tovar’s agreement to produce documents concerning “communications between
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`[themselves] and a third party… related to this opposition” would satisfy 1661’s stated need to
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`discover third party communications. (See id.) Nevertheless, 1661 filed a motion to compel
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`concerning RFP No. 37. (See id.)
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`In meet-and-confer correspondence, counsel for Green Goat also provided counsel for
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`1661 with a reason to avoid the motion it has filed concerning 1661’s RFA No. 25. (See id. ¶12.)
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`That RFA seeks an admission that Green Goat “and 1661 use similar marketing channels.” 17
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`TTABVUE 11. In an email dated November 15, 2022, counsel for Green Goat, J. Evan Shapiro,
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`stated to counsel for 1661, Adam A. Herrera, that:
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`Green Goat will not supplement its response to this RFA. Green
`Goat has agreed to identify each of its marketing channels in a
`supplemental response to 1661’s Interrogatory No. 4. Once Green
`Goat has done so, 1661 will be in a position to make whatever
`arguments it intends to make concerning the identity or overlap
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`5
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`between the 2 parties’ marketing channels. This RFA is thus
`duplicative, in addition to the fact that its use of “similar” is vague.
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`(Shapiro Decl. ¶ 12 (quoting Shapiro Decl. Exhibit F).) This statement references an agreement by
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`counsel for Green Goat (see Shapiro Decl. ¶ 12) to supplement its responses to 1661’s
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`Interrogatory No. 4, which asks Green Goat to “Describe in detail the marketing, sales, and
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`distribution channels used by YOU or that YOU intend to use to advertise, offer, sell, and/or
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`provide YOUR goods and services related to the GREEN GOAT MARK.” 17 TTABVUE 49 (Exh.
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`B to the Motions, 1661’s First Set of Special Interrogatories to Applicants Eric Gates and Mario
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`Tovar).
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`In disregard of this reminder that other discovery served by 1661 would provide 1661 with
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`the discovery it seeks concerning a comparison of the marketing channels used by the two parties
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`to this proceeding, counsel for 1661 proceeded to file what Green Goat views as an unnecessary
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`motion concerning RFA No. 25. (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 6.)
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`1661’s refusal to consider Green Goat’s agreements to comply with other discovery
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`requests issued by 1661 when deciding to move to compel with respect to RFP No. 37, and to
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`move for a determination by the Board concerning the sufficiency of Green Goat’s response to
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`RFA No. 25, indicate that counsel for 1661 is seeking improperly to use the discovery process for
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`improper purposes. (See id. ¶17.)
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`III. GREEN GOAT DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT A COMPLETE RESPONSE TO
`INTERROGATORY NO. 11 IS REQUIRED.
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`At the time this opposition to 1161’s motion to compel was filed, Green Goat had served
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`on 1661 a supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 11 containing a complete response to the
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`interrogatory and not making reference to the Answer or to any other pleading in this
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`6
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`proceeding.1 Green Goat has also requested that 1661, Inc. inform the Board in writing that the
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`motion to compel with respect to Interrogatory No. 11 has been resolved.2 Green Goat has
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`included this section of its Opposition to 1661’s Motions in the event that 1661 fails to so inform
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`the Board.
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`Green Goat does not dispute that Interrogatory No. 11 should be responded to fully in
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`writing. However, Green Goat fails to see why 1661 believed it necessary to file a motion to
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`compel a response to the interrogatory. First, the interrogatory is extremely broad in nature,3
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`requiring an extremely lengthy response and therefore unduly burdensome. Second, as a
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`contention interrogatory, it was prematurely served as Green Goat has yet to receive any
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`information or documents from 1661 concerning 1661’s marks at issue in this consolidated
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`proceeding. Finally, although interrogatory responses require a verification, the nature of the type
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`of information elicited by it can be readily verified by 1661. It seeks a comparison of facts in the
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`public domain concerning the marks at issue – for example, facts stated in USPTO filings, and the
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`use of the marks in connection with products on publicly available websites. To the extent that it
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`elicits legal arguments counsel for Green Goat intends to make in this proceeding, 1661 gains no
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`benefit from such arguments being verified by an officer of Green Goat.
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`In light of these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Messrs. Gates and Tovar to
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`1 (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 7; Shapiro Decl. Exh. A.)
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` 2 (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 8.)
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` Interrogatory No. 11 states:
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`If YOU contend that the GREEN GOAT MARK, on the one hand,
`and the GOAT MARKS, on the other hand, are not confusingly
`similar, then please describe in detail all facts and reasons that
`support, disprove, and/or relate to this
`contention.
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`7
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` 3
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`respond to Interrogatory No. 11 by referring to the 10-page statement in the Answer to the Notice
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`of Opposition they filed demonstrating “that there is no likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
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`deception between Opposer’s Marks and Applicants’ Mark.” Answer, 8 TTABVUE 5. While
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`applicable caselaw does not absolutely reject reference to pleadings as a manner of responding to
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`interrogatories, in light of the objection to Interrogatory 11 made by Messrs. Gates and Tovar,
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`Green Goat concedes that it should have, at minimum, copied the text from the relevant portion of
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`the Answer and incorporated it into the responses themselves.
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`IV.
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`THE BOARD SHOULD NOT COMPEL GREEN GOAT TO RESPOND TO
`1661’S INTERROGATORIES NOS. 12-18, AS THEY ARE
`DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE NEEDS OF THIS PROCEEDING – AND AS
`THEY WERE OBJECTED TO ON SUCH GROUND.
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`1661 served seven interrogatories on Messrs. Gates and Tovar that were inspired by the
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`following products being sold – or that were sold previously – on Green Goat’s website: (1) a t-
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`shirt bearing the image of Muhammad Ali; (2) a t-shirt bearing the image of Tiger Woods; (3) a t-
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`shirt bearing the image of the character Happy Gilmore from the 1996 film “Happy Gilmore”; (4)
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`a t-shirt that includes the term “Masters”, referencing the Masters Tournament (of golf); (5) a t-
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`shirt bearing the image of the character Tony Montana from the 1983 film “Scarface”; (6) golf
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`balls bearing the term “Callaway,” referencing a golf equipment retailer; and (7) baseball hats
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`bearing the term “Just” (as in “Just Golf,” “Just Birdied,” “Just Bogey’d,” etc.). See 17 TTABVUE
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`4-6. The interrogatories seek information to determine whether Green Goat obtained consent,
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`permission, or authorization to use the images and references on these products. See id.
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`Messrs. Gates and Tovar objected to 1661’s Interrogatories Nos. 12-18 on the grounds that
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`they are “disproportionate to the needs of” this proceeding, citing Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1) and
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`TBMP § 402.01. See id. Green Goat adopts this position.
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`8
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`1661 contends that “the issue of IP rights to the images” used on a selective handful of
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`Green Goat’s t-shirts, caps and balls is “relevant, not overbroad and proportionate to the needs of
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`the case.” In support of this contention, it seriously mischaracterizes caselaw concerning discovery
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`into matters that might support the finding of the thirteenth DuPont factor of “bad faith” for
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`purposes of determining whether there exists a likelihood of confusion between marks. Moreover,
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`because 1661 has failed to – and, indeed, cannot – argue that Green Goat has sought to confuse
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`consumers with its use of the complained of images and references on a handful of individual
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`products, it cannot rely on the justification that the responses it seeks may help it establish the
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`presence of “bad faith” in this proceeding. Under governing caselaw, the mere copying of an image
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`is insufficient to establish the type of bad faith in the adoption of a mark that impacts the likelihood
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`of confusion analysis under DuPont.
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`
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`1661 argues that the responses to Interrogatories Nos. 12-18 “may show that Green Goat
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`has a pattern of “violating third parties’ intellectual property rights,” which, in turn, “can show that
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`Green Goat had bad faith in adopting the GREEN GOAT mark, “which would be considered in
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`the likelihood of confusion analysis under the DuPont test.” For this proposition 1661 cites three
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`cases: Autoxcel Corp. v. Dent Wizard Int’l Corp., 2020 WL 5991308, at *12 (TTAB 2020);
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`L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434 (TTAB 2012); and Coca-Cola Co. v. Meenaxi Enter.,
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`2021 TTAB LEXIS 213 (TTAB 2021), reversed on other grounds by Meenaxi Enter. v. Coca-
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`Cola Co., 38 F.4th 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2022). None of these three cases addresses possible evidence
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`concerning the “violat[ion of] third parties’ intellectual property rights” generally as counsel for
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`1661 misleadingly suggests. Moreover, each of them is summarily distinguished from the instant
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`proceeding.
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`9
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`Autoexcel Corp. stands only for the proposition that “bad faith, or the intent to confuse,
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`falls under the thirteenth DuPont factor.” 2020 WL 5991308, at *12. It involved no allegation that
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`an applicant in an opposition proceeding had engaged in any “IP rights violation.” Meenaxi Ent.
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`did not involve any trademark infringement or “likelihood of confusion” analysis, and the court
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`did not apply any of the DuPont factors, including the thirteenth one of “bad faith.”4 In L’Oreal,
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`the court determined that an applicant’s “demonstrated pattern of filing applications to register
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`various well-known marks” of third parties in the past meant that the “applicant’s adoption of the
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`L’OREAL PARIS mark was in bad faith, with the intention to trade off of opposer’s famous
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`L’OREAL and L’OREAL PARIS marks.” 102 USPQ2d at 1442 (emphasis added). By contrast,
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`here, 1661 has not argued that the handful of products about which it inquires in Interrogatories
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`Nos. 12-18 represent an attempt by Green Goat to “fil[e] applications to register well known
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`marks.” (It cannot because Green Goat has not engaged in filing such applications. (See Shapiro
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`Decl. ¶ 16.)
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`
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`1661 has incorrectly characterized the “bad faith” factor considered in the DuPont
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`likelihood of confusion analysis. “Bad faith” in this context is not synonymous with an “intent to
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`copy” an image or name. As the Federal Circuit explained in a recent case, application of the “bad
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`faith” factor involves both (1) knowledge of a prior similar mark before adopting it, and (2) “an
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`intent to confuse” consumers. QuikTrip West, Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1036
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`(Fed. Cir. 2021). In emphasizing the critical nature of the “intent to confuse” aspect of a party’s
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`“bad faith” adoption of another’s mark, the QuickTrip West Court offered the following holding
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`4 The case involved use of evidence of a party’s long-established pattern of selling counterfeit
`products using very close copies of logos associated with the original version of those products
`to support the finding that a registrant had attempted deliberately to pass off its own goods as
`those of another. See Meenaxi Ent., 2021 TTAB LEXIS 213, at 49-61.
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`10
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`
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`by the Second Circuit: “[T]he ‘only relevant intent is intent to confuse. There is a considerable
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`difference between an intent to copy and an intent to deceive.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
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`Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 117 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting 4 J.
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`Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
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`23.113).)
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`
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`Here, 1661 seeks to obtain discovery about images and words that are utterly dissimilar to
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`the marks at issue in this proceeding – marks involving the word or acronym “goat”.5 1661 has not
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`alleged that the Green Goat products implicated in its Interrogatories Nos. 12-18 are part of a
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`deliberate scheme to register third party marks or to pass off counterfeit products using well-
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`established logos belonging to others. The one-off use of an image of Tiger Woods or Mohammad
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`Ali on single t-shirt product bears no comparison to the broad and multi-year pattern of adopting
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`world-famous marks including “L’OREAL PARIS” established in L’Oreal, or of
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`the sale of counterfeit products under stolen logos (for example, the sale of a lemon-lime soft drink
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`in bottles bearing a logo nearly identical to a logo used by Coca-Cola to sell a similar drink) at
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`issue in Meenaxi Ent.
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`
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`Counter to the misleading argument made by 1661, trademark case law does not support
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`discovery into each and every instance an applicant in an opposition proceeding such as this has
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`used the image of a famous figure, or a word used in another company’s logo, on one of its
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`products. Not surprisingly, the case law cited by 1661 demonstrates that the Board and the federal
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`judiciary only consider substantial patterns of conduct involving the intentional creation of
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`5 The four letters g, o, a, and t placed next to each other as a word, in other words “goat,” is often
`understood as an acronym for the expression “the greatest of all time.” See, e.g.,
`https://www.mmguardian.com/teenslang/goat#:~:text=GOAT%20stands%20for%20Greatest%2
`0of,Home (last viewed 12/8/2022 at 2:23 pm).
`
`
`
`11
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`
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`customer confusion concerning the source of goods or the deliberate misrepresentation of the
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`source of goods as relevant to determining parties’ intent with respect to their use and registration
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`(or application for registration) of marks. The relevance of such prior conduct derives from its
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`potential and obvious impact on the consumer – not on the allegation that a third party’s
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`“intellectual property rights” may have been violated. Here, 1661 has made no showing that the
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`items at the center of Interrogatories Nos. 12-18 even remotely indicate a possible substantial
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`pattern by Green Goat of intentionally creating consumer confusion.
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`
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`Accordingly, Interrogatories 12-18 inquire about subject matter that is not proportionate to
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`1661’s needs in this proceeding. Therefore, Green Goat should not be compelled to respond to
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`these Interrogatories.
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`V.
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`
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`
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`1661 HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY BASIS FOR REQUIRING THE
`PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ANY THIRD-PARTY
`FUNDING OF THE DEFENSE OF THIS OPPOSITION PROCEEDING.
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`At the time this opposition to 1161’s motion to compel was filed, Green Goat served a
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`supplemental response to RFP No. 37 stating that Green Goat is unable to comply with Request
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`for Production No. 37 because no documents exist concerning “any financing or potential
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`financing” by another person and/or entity of the defense to this opposition proceeding, and
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`that Green Goat has no documents in its possession, custody or control concerning Opposer
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`1661, Inc.’s initiation and prosecution of this opposition proceeding.6 Green Goat has also
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`requested that 1661 inform the Board in writing that the motion to compel with respect to RFP
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`No. 37 has been resolved.7 Green Goat has included this section of its Opposition to 1661’s
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`Motions in the event that 1661 fails to so inform the Board.
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`6 (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 6; Shapiro Decl. Exh B.)
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`12
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` (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 7.)
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` 7
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`1661 has moved to compel the production of documents responsive to the following
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`Request for Production that it served on Messrs. Gates and Tovar on May 2, 2022: “Request for
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`Production No. 37: All DOCUMENTS concerning any financing or potential financing of this
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`opposition by another person and/or entity.”
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`
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`The most obvious problem with 1661’s motion is that it is 1661 – not Green Goat – who is
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`likely to have documents concerning the financing of “this opposition” – filed by 1661 and not
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`Green Goat. Green Goat – and the applicants who preceded it, Messrs. Gates and Tovar, have been
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`engaged in a defense against this opposition. Presumably 1661 is “financing… this opposition.”
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`On this ground alone, 1661’s motion to compel should be denied.
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`
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`Second, assuming that RFP No. 37 is capable of being interpreted as concerning the
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`“financing” of Green Goat’s defense to “this opposition”, Messrs. Gates and Tovar properly
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`objected to the RFP on the ground that it is “disproportionate to the needs of the case” pursuant to
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`FRCP 26(b)(1) and TBMP § 402.01. This is particularly so given the fact that Messrs. Gates and
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`Tovar agreed, in response to 1661’s RFP No. 35, which seeks “DOCUMENTS concerning … any
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`[non-privileged] communications [with third parties] related to this opposition.” (See Shapiro
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`Decl. ¶ 9; Shapiro Dec. Exh. C (at 20).) During a meet-and-confer call held between the parties in
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`November 2022, Counsel for Green Goat explained to counsel for 1661 that assuming that the
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`purpose of RFP No. 37 was to obtain any non-privileged third-party communications relating to
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`this proceeding, such documents would be produced pursuant to 1661’s RFP No. 35, and therefore
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`there was no need for 1661 to file any motion to compel. (See Shapiro Decl. ¶ 9.) Counsel for 1661
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`rejected that suggestion and filed its motion. (See id.)
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`1661 justifies its motion to compel with respect to its RFP No. 37 by arguing that
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`“[d]ocuments which show that Green Goat is receiving financing for this opposition… can reveal
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`13
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`the identities of relevant third parties, as well as communications with those parties.” 17
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`TTABVUE 10. The problem with this justification is that any need of 1661 to obtain “the identities
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`of relevant third parties” and “communications with those [third] parties” would be satisfied by
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`the production of documents responsive to RFP 35, to which Green Goat has agreed.
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`Green
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`Goat does not dispute that 1661 has the right under TBMP § 414 to obtain discovery relating to
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`the identities of any parties “who sent or received pertinent communications.” That is why Green
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`Goat has agreed to produce documents responsive to RFP No. 35. Thus the “simple example”
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`provided by 1661 on page 10 of the motions to support its motion – speculation that Green Goat
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`has a “funder” to which it has allegedly stated that “it has a risk of losing because of consumer
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`confusion that has occurred” – is unavailing. 17 TTABVUE 10.8 Any such correspondence would
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`be responsive to 1661’s RFP No. 35 and would have been produced to date. 1661 speculates further
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`that “[t]he list goes on, as there are a variety of things that Green Goat may have disclosed to a
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`potential funder that are relevant for analyzing the likelihood of confusion.” 17 TTABVUE 11.
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`Each of these hypothetical disclosures would be required to be produced in light of Green Goat’s
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`agreement to produce documents under RFP No. 35. (However, to the undersigned counsel’s
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`knowledge, no such disclosures were ever made.)
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`8 Green Goat submits that counsel for 1661’s repeated use of speculative “examples” –
`hypotheticals – in its briefing on the motions, that are extremely prejudicial to Green Goat, is
`highly inappropriate. Let it be clear that Green Goat has never told any party that any “customer
`confusion” concerning its marks and any marks owned by 1661 has occurred. (See Shapiro Decl.
`¶ 15.) No such confusion has occurred to Green Goat’s knowledge. (See id.) Moreover, there is no
`evidence in the record (see id. ¶ 14) concerning any entry by Nike into a partnership with Green
`Goat in which Nike had a “mistaken belief that Green Goat and its products are somehow affiliated
`with [1661].” 17 TTABVUE 8. This hypothetical, which counsel for 1661 refers to as an
`“example,” has no basis in fact, is highly prejudicial, and therefore should not have been used in
`the briefing of the instant motions.
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`14
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`1661’s citation to Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145636 (S.D.
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`Cal. Aug. 12, 2020), a patent infringement case, in support of its right to obtain document
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`discovery into any third-party funding upon which Green Goat might be relying is highly
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`misleading. In Impact Engine, the court noted that “[t]here is a split of authority on whether a
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`plaintiff’s source of litigation funding is within the scope of relevant discovery.” Id. at *3 (quoting
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`V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 312 (D. Nev. 2019)). Reviewing the opposing reasoning
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`of the two lines of authority to which it had referred, the court noted that “courts that have denied
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`discovery of litigation funding agreements have also recognized that patent infringement cases
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`present a ‘special litigation context[]’ where courts have permitted this discovery.” Impact
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`Engine, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145636, at *3-4 (emphasis added). The Court ultimately ruled that
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`“any litigation funding agreements and related documents are relevant to the patent infringement
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`claims at issue here.” Id., *4 (emphasis added). Impact Engine’s holding is limited on its face to
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`patent infringement claims, and possibly to funding agreements that are entered into by plaintiffs
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`– or, at the very least, parties that initiate proceedings. The decision is therefore inapposite; 1661
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`should never have cited it.
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`Impact Engine is relevant to the instant dispute to the extent that it demonstrates that there
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`is a substantial body of federal case law holding that discovery into litigation funding arrangements
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`is barred. See id., at *3, explaining:
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`The courts that have denied discovery of litigation funding
`agreements have found them irrelevant to the issues presented. See,
`e.g., In re Valsartan, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 616 (“Plaintiffs’ litigation
`funding is a ‘side issue’ that has nothing to do with the key issues in
`the case. . . ."); V5 Techs, 334 F.R.D. at 312 ("[T]he Court agrees
`with Plaintiff that its litigation funding is not relevant to the claims
`or defenses in this case.”).
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`15
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`There are ample additional examples of federal decisions denying discovery into litigation funding
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`arrangements. See, e.g., Benitez v. Lopez, No. 17-cv-3827-SJ-SJB, 2019 WL 1578167 (E.D.N.Y.
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`Mar. 14, 2019) (denying defendants’ motion to compel, finding that documents concerning
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`litigation financing were irrelevant and that asserted potential related problems were speculative);
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`In re Valsartan N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA) Contamination Prods. Liab. Litig., 405 F. Supp.
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`3d 612, 615 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2019) (denying the discovery request and holding the litigation
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`funding information was irrelevant but stating that discovery could be allowed if the defendant
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`showed good cause, e.g., where “something untoward occurred,” or a non-party was making
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`litigation decisions, or the interests of the class were not being protected or a conflict of interest
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`existed).
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`Here, 1661 has argued only that it requires Green Goat to produce documents concerning
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`third party funding of “this opposition” because it seeks the contents of communications between
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`Green Goat and any party funding the opposition concerning the opposition and the marks
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`involved in the opposition, and the identity of the funders. It has failed to articulate any discovery
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`need it has with respect to communications or documents that strictly concern a funding
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`arrangement itself, or any improper involvement of a “funder” in this proceeding. In light of these
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`circumstances, and Green Goat’s prior agreement to produce certain third-party communications
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`to 1661, 1661’s motion to compel with respect to its RFP No. 37 should be soundly rejected.
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`VI.
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`THE CURRENT RESPONSES TO 1661’S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION NOS. 6
`AND 25 ARE NEITHER UNDULY EVASIVE NOR DEFICIENT.
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`1661 moves the Board to determine that the responses to 1661’s Requests for Admission
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`Nos. 6 and 25, are insufficient and to compel Green Goat to “serve full, complete, and proper
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`responses” to those two RFAs. The only authority cited by 1661 for this motion relating to the two
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`RFAs is Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4) (“[W]hen good faith requires a party qualify an answer or deny
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`16
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`
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`only a part of the matter, the answer must specify the part admitted or deny the rest.”). 1661’s
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`motion with respect to RFAs 6 and 25 should be denied.
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`A.
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`RFA No. 6 – “Incorporation” of the “GOAT MARKS”
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`RFA No. 6 asks Green Goat to “[a]dmit that the GREEN