`
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`
`ESTTA974010
`
`Filing date:
`
`05/15/2019
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Proceeding
`
`91243895
`
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Defendant
`Coachillin' Holdings,, LLC
`
`KAREN KREIDER GAUNT
`DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
`255 EAST FIFTH STREET SUITE 1900
`CINCINNATI, OH 45202
`UNITED STATES
`karen.gaunt@dinsmore.com, trademarks@dinsmore.com,
`kethya.teuk@dinsmore.com
`513-977-8503
`
`Submission
`
`Filer's Name
`
`Filer's email
`
`Opposition/Response to Motion
`
`Ashley J. Earle
`
`ashley.earle@dinsmore.com, karen.gaunt@dinsmore.com,
`govinda.davis@dinsmore.com
`
`Signature
`
`Date
`
`/Ashley J. Earle/
`
`05/15/2019
`
`Attachments
`
`CoachillinHoldings Opposition to Motion to Consolidate.pdf(679355 bytes )
`
`
`
`THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`COACHELLA MUSIC FESTIVAL, LLC
`
`Petitioner/Opposer
`
`
`
`vs.
`
`
`
`COACHILLIN’ HOLDINGS, LLC,
`
`Respondent/Applicant
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91243895
`Cancellation No. 92070434
`
`Registration No. 4,597,127
`Registration No. 5,170,824
`
`Application Serial No. 87/422,327
`
`Mark: COACHILLIN
`
` OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE
`
`Respondent and Applicant, Coachillin’ Holdings, LLC (hereinafter “Coachillin’
`
`Holdings” or “Respondent”), by and through its counsel, files this Opposition to Petitioner’s
`
`Motion to Consolidate Cancellation No. 91243895 (the “Cancellation”) with Opposition
`
`Proceeding No. 91243895 (the “Opposition”).1 Petitioner and Opposer Coachella Music Festival
`
`LLC’s (“Coachella”) Motion should be denied because the two proceedings present neither a
`
`common question of fact nor a common question of law as required by Federal Rule of Civil
`
`Procedure 42 and TBMP § 511. Furthermore, even if the two proceedings were deemed to
`
`present a “common question,” consolidation is not mandatory and should not be ordered where,
`
`as here, consolidation would unfairly prejudice the non-moving party and such clear prejudice
`
`
`1While Coachillin’ Holdings recognizes the Board has ruled on Coachella’s Motion, this Opposition to the Motion to
`Consolidate is timely under 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(a) “…a brief in response to a motion shall be filed within twenty days
`from the date of service of the motion unless another time is specified by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.”
`Id. See also TBMP § 502.02. Coachillin’ Holdings asks the Board’s order to be set aside and Coachella’s Motion be
`denied for the reasons set forth herein.
`
`
`
`outweighs any benefits of consolidation. As such, Coachella’s Motion to Consolidate should be
`
`denied.
`
`A.
`
`Introduction:
`
`The Cancellation proceeding, which already encompasses two trademark registrations,
`
`should not be combined with the Opposition, as: (1) the proceedings do not involve common
`
`issues of law and fact; and (2) consolidation is discretionary and should not be required when it
`
`would be prejudicial to the parties, as is the case in the instant proceeding. These vast factual and
`
`legal differences between the Cancellation and the Opposition are such that if the proceedings
`
`were to be combined, it would create confusion, unfairness, and would prejudice Coachillin’
`
`Holdings.
`
`While the Motion to Consolidate submitted by Coachella states that “Coachella has
`
`asserted the same registrations for the same Coachella Marks,” this is not true. Coachella has
`
`asserted three additional marks in the Cancellation proceeding that were not asserted in the
`
`Opposition. Furthermore, Coachella asserted three additional causes of action in the
`
`Cancellation that were not raised in the Opposition. In its Motion to Consolidate, Coachella
`
`represented to the Board that these proceedings are “nearly substantively identical” with
`
`“substantive issues in the proceedings [that] are nearly identical” and “[t]here exists almost
`
`complete commonality between the proceedings” and “[a]lmost every aspect of these two
`
`proceedings overlap.” See Motion to Consolidate, Dkt. 8 at pp. 2 and 5. These statements are
`
`inaccurate and misleading. The two proceedings have differing factual and legal issues that, if
`
`combined, would undoubtedly prejudice Coachillin’ Holdings.
`
`B.
`
`Procedural Background:
`
`2
`
`
`
`Coachella first filed the Opposition in September 2018 against Coachillin’ Holding’s
`
`trademark application for COACHILLIN (U.S. Serial No. 87/422,327) in Class 41 on the basis
`
`of priority and likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d), false association under Section 2(a),
`
`and dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). See Notice of Opposition, Dkt. 1 in the Opposition. The
`
`Opposition was filed based on Coachella’s COACHELLA registration
`
`in Class 41,
`
`COACHELLA VALLEY MUSIC AND ARTS FESTIVAL registration
`
`in Class 41,
`
`COACHELLA (Stylized) registration in Class 41, and ancillary registrations in Classes 16, 18,
`
`21, and 25. Id. In the Opposition, the Parties have exchanged initial disclosures, sent and
`
`received discovery (including Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Requests for
`
`Production), and have had numerous “meet and confer” discussions and unsuccessful settlement
`
`attempts.
`
`Four months later, Coachella later filed the Cancellation in January 2019 against
`
`COACHILLIN in Class 25 (U.S. Reg. No. 4,597,127) and COACHILLIN in Class 35 (U.S. Reg.
`
`No. 5,170,824). (See Petition for Cancellation, Dkt. 1 in the Cancellation). In this proceeding,
`
`Coachella alleged numerous grounds for the cancellation, including fraud on the USPTO,
`
`violation of law against assignments in gross, nonuse of the mark in commerce, priority and
`
`likelihood of confusion, dilution by blurring, and false association. Id. The Cancellation is based
`
`on the marks asserted in the Opposition, as well as three additional marks – COACHELLA in
`
`Class 14, COACHELLA in Class 43, and COACHELLA (Stylized) in Class 43. Id. In the
`
`Cancellation, the two registrations at issue, U.S. Reg. No. 4,597,127 for COACHILLIN in Class
`
`25 and U.S. Reg. No. 5,170,824 for COACHILLIN in Class 35, were initially filed and owned
`
`by Jeremy Joseph, a third-party who assigned the trademarks to Coachillin’ Holdings in 2016.
`
`3
`
`
`
`Further, in the Cancellation, the parties have only just exchange initial disclosures and have not
`
`yet exchanged discovery requests.
`
`The parties have engaged in numerous discussions regarding settlement negotiations and
`
`discovery issues over the last few months. In one such teleconference call to discuss Coachella’s
`
`proposal to consolidate the proceedings, Coachillin’ Holdings expressed the concerns outlined
`
`herein in great detail and indicated that Coachillin’ Holdings would not consent to a motion to
`
`consolidate, but would be willing to align discovery dates and discovery proceedings to conserve
`
`resources. This call and the understanding regarding discovery is acknowledged by Coachella in
`
`its motion. See Motion to Consolidate, Dkt. 8 at p. 2. Yet despite explicit knowledge of the
`
`prejudice to Coachillin’ Holdings, Coachella proceeded to file its Motion, stating that, “[y]et
`
`surprisingly, Coachillin will not agree to consolidate the proceedings” and “Coachillin’s counsel
`
`surprisingly declined.” Id. at pp. 2 and 4. These representations to the Board are again
`
`misleading given the extensive discussions between the parties and the concerns expressed to
`
`Coachella regarding Coachillin Holding’s reasons not to consolidate.
`
`C.
`
`The Proceedings Do Not Involve Common Issues of Fact and Law:
`
`As mentioned, Coachella represented to the Board in its Motion to Consolidate that these
`
`proceedings are “nearly substantively identical” with “substantive issues in the proceedings
`
`[that] are nearly identical.” See Motion to Consolidate, Dkt. 8 at p. 2. This is blatantly false.
`
`Coachella has asserted three additional trademarks and three additional causes of action in the
`
`Cancellation proceeding that were not asserted in the Opposition. In Coachella’s own motion, it
`
`acknowledges that different trademarks asserted in different proceedings could be prejudicial and
`
`is grounds for denying a motion to consolidate. See Motion to Consolidate Dkt. 8 and p. 6 (citing
`
`Envirotech Corp. v. Solaron Corp., 211 USPQ 724, 726 (TTAB 1981) (“consolidation denied as
`
`4
`
`
`
`possibly prejudicial to defendant where defendant’s involved marks were not all the same”)
`
`(emphasis added)). The same is true here -- the two proceedings involve marks that are not all
`
`the same and have differing factual and legal issues that, if combined, would obfuscate the issues
`
`at hand and prejudice Coachillin’ Holdings.
`
`While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) affords the tribunal the discretion to
`
`consolidate cases involving common questions of law or fact, “[t]he underlying objective [of
`
`consolidation] is to administer the court’s business with expedition and economy while providing
`
`justice to the parties.” Advey v. Celotex, Corp., 962 F.2d 1177, 1181 (6th Cir. 1992);
`
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1993); Mitchell v.
`
`Dutton, 865 F.2d 1268, 1989 WL 933, at *2 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and
`
`citation omitted). In Cantrell, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals advised that “the decision to
`
`consolidate is one that must be made thoughtfully…Care must be taken that consolidation does
`
`not result in unavoidable prejudice or unfair advantage.” 999 F.2d at 1011.
`
`Rule 42 does not define “common question of law or fact,” however, courts have held
`
`that “the plain meaning of this phrase indicates that a common question is one that must be
`
`answered identically in each case in which it is presented.” Van Patten v. Wright, 2009 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 60763, *3-4 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (emphasis added). The proceedings at issue here do not
`
`have common question of law or fact. Indeed, the proceedings have numerous factual and legal
`
`differences.
`
`For instance, as discussed supra, the proceedings differ at least in having: (1) different
`
`legal standards (one being the opposition of an application and one being cancellation
`
`proceedings of two registrations); (2) different marks asserted by Coachella; (3) different causes
`
`of action asserted by Coachella, as well as different defense raised by Coachillin’ Holdings; (4)
`
`5
`
`
`
`different factual backgrounds, as the registrations were initially owned by a third-party and
`
`assigned to Coachillin’ Holdings, the assignment of which is being challenged by Coachella; and
`
`(5) the proceedings are at different stages in the discovery process. Indeed, the only overlap
`
`between the proceedings is the parties at issue and the mark being challenged -- COACHILLIN.
`
`However, one commonality is not sufficient to mandate consolidation. Confusion in the
`
`proceedings is almost guaranteed to result if the Cancellation and Opposition are combined,
`
`given the numerous different issues present in both cases.
`
`C.
`
`Consolidation
`
`is Discretionary and Should Not be Ordered When
`
`Prejudicial:
`
`As noted above, “the decision
`
`to consolidate
`
`is one
`
`that must be made
`
`thoughtfully…Care must be taken that consolidation does not result in unavoidable prejudice or
`
`unfair advantage.” 999 F.2d at 1011. If the conservation of judicial resources achieved through
`
`consolidation “are slight, the risk of prejudice to a party must be viewed with even greater
`
`scrutiny.” Id. The Cantrell Court further instructed that a court should consider “whether the
`
`specific risks of prejudice and possible confusion [are] overborne by the risk of inconsistent
`
`adjudications of common factual and legal issues, the burden on parties, witnesses and available
`
`judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the length of time required to conclude multiple
`
`suits as against a single one, and the relative expense to all concerned of the single-trial,
`
`multiple-trial alternatives.” Id. (quoting Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492,
`
`1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)).
`
`However, even in cases sharing common questions of fact and law, if “all of the parties
`
`have already cooperated to align the protective orders in place in both cases, and have privately
`
`agreed that any discovery conducted in either case may be used in the other…the existence of
`
`6
`
`
`
`these overlapping counterclaims does not weigh heavily in favor of consolidation.” LSP Techs.,
`
`Inc. v. Metal Improvement Co., LLC, No. 2:10-cv-00526, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89193 at *7
`
`(S.D. Ohio 2010). The Court in LSP Techs denied the motion for consolidation, stating that
`
`“[b]ecause both cases are pending in the same court and before the same United States District
`
`Judge…preparation for Case 10-526’s Markman hearing would not be nearly as onerous as for
`
`Case 08-38’s hearing, which again, is already scheduled. For this same reason, the risk of
`
`inconsistent claim constructions is minimal.” Id. at *9. See also Beverlly Jewerlly Co., Ltd. v.
`
`Tacori Enters., No. 1:06-cv-1967, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85359, 2006 WL 3304218, at *6 (N.D.
`
`Ohio 2006) (“[T]o the extent that [the parties] will be engaging in the same discovery for their
`
`respective cases, those discovery efforts can be coordinated by the parties whether or not those
`
`actions are formally consolidated.”); Roxane Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:12-cv-312, 2013
`
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132784, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 16, 2013) (while denying consolidation in a
`
`patent infringement case, the court stated that “The Court can therefore coordinate discovery
`
`and minimize the risk and burden of duplicative discovery even without consolidation.”)
`
`Here, like Beverlly Jewerlly and Roxane Labs, the parties have agreed to coordinate
`
`discovery efforts to minimize the risk and burden of duplicative discovery. Supra; see also
`
`Motion to Consolidate, Dkt. 8 at 2. Moreover, like LSP Techs, the existence of overlapping
`
`claims does not weigh heavily in favor of consolidation, and like in that case, both proceedings
`
`are pending before the same entity, here the TTAB. Roxane Labs., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
`
`89193 at *7. As such, preparation for separate proceedings is not onerous and the risk of
`
`inconsistent results is less likely since both the Opposition and the Cancellation are pending
`
`before the Board. See id.
`
`7
`
`
`
`Notwithstanding the foregoing, even if a common question of law and fact existed (which
`
`Coachillin’ Holdings does not concede), Coachella’s Motion should be denied, as Coachillin’
`
`Holdings would be prejudiced by consolidation. The Board should weigh “the interests of
`
`judicial economy against the potential for new delays, expense, confusion or prejudice.” Consol.
`
`Parlodel Lit., 182 F.R.D. at 444. In balancing these factors, “considerations of convenience and
`
`economy must yield to a paramount concern for a fair and impartial trial.” Schneck v. IBM Corp.,
`
`No. 92-4370, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10126, at*4 (D. N.J. June 21, 1996) (quoting Debruyne v.
`
`Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 11 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993)). “Indeed, consolidation where
`
`prejudice results to a defendant amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Id.
`
`As previously noted, Coachella has asserted three additional marks and three additional
`
`grounds in the Cancellation proceeding than in the Opposition. It would be unfair and prejudicial
`
`to impute those assertions to the Opposition by consolidating these proceedings. Furthermore, in
`
`the Cancellation, Coachella has asserted an astounding six grounds for cancellation and asserted
`
`ten trademark registrations in total. Confusion in the proceedings is almost guaranteed to result if
`
`the Cancellation and Opposition are combined, given the numerous different issues present in
`
`both cases. Any convenience and savings to judicial economy alleged by Coachella was obviated
`
`by the parties’ agreement to harmonize discovery efforts and synchronize the discovery
`
`schedule. Moreover, here, as in Schneck, the paramount concern must be for a fair and impartial
`
`decision, which can only be attained by not consolidating the proceedings here. 1996 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 10126, at *4. Because consolidation would be prejudicial to Coachillin’ Holdings, the
`
`proceedings should not be consolidated and Coachella’s Motion to Consolidate should be denied.
`
`8
`
`
`
`D.
`
`Conclusion:
`
`Coachella has the burden of proof on a motion for consolidation. Consol. Parlodel Lit.,
`
`182 F.R.D. at 444. However, Coachella has not met this burden. Instead, Coachella has set forth
`
`inaccurate facts that broadly generalize that the two are alike and should be consolidated. The
`
`proceedings do not share common issues of fact or law. Furthermore, even if the proceedings did
`
`share a common question of law or fact, (which they do not), because Coachillin’ Holdings
`
`would be unfairly prejudiced, the Board should deny Coachella’s Motion for Consolidation. The
`
`potential for prejudice, unfairness, burden and confusion are such that the Opposition and
`
`Cancellation proceedings should not be combined. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the
`
`Board should deny Coachella’s Motion to Consolidate.
`
`
`
`Dated: May 15, 2019
`
` s/Ashley J. Earle/
`
`
`
`
`
` Karen Kreider Gaunt
`Ashley J. Earle
`Govinda M. Davis
`DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP
`255 East Fifth Street, Suite 1900
`Cincinnati, OH 45202
`(513) 977-8503-direct
`(513) 977-8141-fax
`karen.gaunt@dinsmore.com
`ashley.earle@dinsmore.com
`govinda.davis@dinsmore.com
`
`Attorneys for Coachillin’ Holdings, LLC
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Response was served on counsel for
`
`Petitioner via email on May 15, 2019 to:
`
`Steven E. Lauridsen
`Tucker Ellis LLP
`515 South Flower Street, 42nd Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`trademarks@tuckerellis.com,
`david.steele@tuckerellis.com,
`steven.lauridsen@tuckerellis.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Ashley J. Earle
`
`s/Ashley J. Earle/
`
`10
`
`