Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
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`ESTTA Tracking number:
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`ESTTA965982
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`Filing date:
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`04/10/2019
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Proceeding
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`91243459
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`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
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`Filer's Name
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`Filer's email
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`Signature
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`Date
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`Attachments
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`Plaintiff
`Pinkette Clothing, Inc.
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`AMANDA V DWIGHT
`DWIGHT LAW GROUP
`2603 MAIN STREET SUITE 200
`IRVINE, CA 92614
`UNITED STATES
`adwight@dwightlawgroup.com
`949-515-0003
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`Opposition/Response to Motion
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`Amanda V. Dwight
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`adwight@dwightlawgroup.com
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`/amanda dwight/
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`04/10/2019
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`Pinkette Opposition to MSJ.pdf(199940 bytes )
`Pinkette Evidentiary Objections ISO Opposition to MSJ.pdf(91109 bytes )
`Pinkette Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts.pdf(93732 bytes )
`Declaration of Edward Kim ISO Opp to MSJ.pdf(1521722 bytes )
`Declaration of Amanda Dwight ISO Opp to MSJ.pdf(4474469 bytes )
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`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Pinkette Clothing, Inc. a California
`corporation,
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`Opposer,
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`Finance Arts, LLC, an Indiana Limited
`Liability Company
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`Applicant.
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`Opposition No. 91243459
`Re Application Serial No. 87628012
`Mark: LVN LVSH
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`Pinkette Clothing, Inc.’s Opposition to Applicant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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`And/Or in the Alternative, Judgment Be Summarily Entered in Favor of Opposer
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`Submitted by:
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`Amanda V. Dwight
`Dwight Law Group
`2603 Main Street, Suite 200
`Irvine, CA 92614
`(949) 515-0003
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`(949) 266-8680
`adwight@dwightlawgroup.com
`Attorneys for Opposer
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`Table of Contents
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`I.
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`Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
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`II. Statement of Relevant Facts.................................................................................................... 2
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`A. The LUSH Brand ................................................................................................................... 2
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`B. The LVN LVSH Mark ............................................................................................................. 3
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`C. Statement of Opposer’s Undisputed Material Facts ........................................................... 4
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`III. Summary Judgment Standard ................................................................................................. 5
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`IV. Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 6
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`A. Opposer Has Standing and Prior Rights ............................................................................... 6
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`B.
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`Applicant’s Mark Is Likely To Cause Confusion With Opposer’s LUSH® Mark ................. 7
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`1. Applicant Wrongly Conflates Third-Party Registration with Third-Party Use. ................. 8
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`a. Opposer is the Lone Holder of a “LUSH” Registration. ................................................ 8
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`b. Third-Party Use is Irrelevant in the Du Pont Analysis. .................................................. 9
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`2. Being the only one registered with the USPTO, Opposer’s LUSH Mark Is Strong and
`Well Known. ........................................................................................................................... 11
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`a. Applicant’s Lack of Distinctiveness Argument is Spurious. ........................................ 13
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`3. Even the Examining Attorney Initially Found That the Marks are Confusingly Similar. 14
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`a. Applicant’s Own Admission that its Mark has Multiple Interpretations is Reason
`Alone to Deny the MSJ. ...................................................................................................... 14
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`b. The Near Identicalness of the Marks is Likely to Cause Confusion. ........................... 15
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`c. This is Not a Case Where the Junior Mark Contains a Famous Mark to Distinguish
`itself from the other Famous Mark. .................................................................................. 17
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`d. Applicant’s Admission that Goods are Identical and In The Same Channels Is Grounds
`for Denying the MSJ. .......................................................................................................... 18
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`4. Applicant’s References to the Cosmetic Warriors’ Litigation Actually Supports a Finding
`of Likely Confusion. ................................................................................................................ 19
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`V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 19
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`i
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`Table of Authorities
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`Cases
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`7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1717 n.2 (TTAB 2007) ............................................. 10
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`Angos Tropical Cafe, Llc V. Paradise Restaurant Group, Inc. Of St Augustine, 2014 WL 3427348
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`(TTAB 2014) ............................................................................................................................... 10
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`Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Leupold & Stevens Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1475, 1477 (TTAB 1988) .................... 14
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`Bose v. QSC Audio Products, Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 12
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`Bristol Meyers Squibb Co. v. McNeil, 973 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.1992) .............................................. 17
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`Brown Shoe Co. v. Robbins, 90 USPQ2d 1752, 1754 (TTAB 2009) .................................................. 7
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`Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) .................................................................... 6
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`Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1698,
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`1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................................. 18
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`Coach/Braunsdorf Affinity, Inc. v. 12 Interactive, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1458, 1476 (TTAB 2014)..... 10
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`Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Intl., Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 15557, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir.
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`1991 ............................................................................................................................................. 5
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`Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) .............................. 16
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`Hilson Research Inc. v. Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., 27 USPQ2d 1423, 1429 (TTAB 1993) ........ 15
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`In re America Online Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1618, 1622-23, 1625 (TTAB 2006) .................................... 13
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`In re CHA Direct, Inc., 2008 WL 4354131 (TTAB 2018) ............................................................. 8, 14
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`In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ................................. 7
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`In Re Felt Racing, LLC, 2013 WL 3188885, Serial No. (TTAB 2013) .............................................. 18
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`In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .......................... 18
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`In re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (TTAB 1994) .................................................. 14
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`In re United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985) ................................................. 18
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`Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc., 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) ... 11
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`King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA 1974) . 14
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`ii
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`King-Kup Candies, Inc. v. King Candy Co., 288 F.2d 944, 129 USPQ 272, 273 (CCPA 1961) ......... 14
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`L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, 86 USPQ2d 1883, 1887 (TTAB 2008) ............................................... 7
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`Life Zone Inc. v. Middleman Group Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1953, 1956 n.5 (TTAB 2008) ....................... 11
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`Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406, 407 (CCPA 1967) .................... 18
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`Lloyd's Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli's, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 25 USPQ2d 2027, 2029 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ........ 6
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`Mag Instrument Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., 96 USPQ2d 1701, 1708 (TTAB 2010) .......................... 11
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`Maybelline Company v. Matney, 194 USPQ 438, 440 (TTAB 1977) ............................................. 14
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`Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 16 USPQ2d 1055, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990) .................... 6
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`Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103
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`U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................... 16
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`n re Max Capital Group Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1248 (TTAB 2010) .............................................. 19
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`n re Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (TTAB 1994) ..................................................... 8
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`Nabisco Inc. v. Warner Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43 (2d Cir.2000) .................................................. 17
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`Nike Inc. v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018, 1031 (TTAB 2011) ........................................................... 13
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`Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ..... 7
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`Opryland USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 851, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
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`1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ......................................................................................................... 5
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`Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189, 224 USPQ 327, 330 (1985) ........................... 14
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`Pharm Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir.1993) .......................................................... 17
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`Pinkette Clothing, Inc. v. Lawrence Mallard, Opposition No. 91223575 (TTAB 2018) ................. 16
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`Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .................. 11
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`Safer Inc. v. OMS Investments Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031, 1039 (TTAB 2010) .................................... 10
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`Seaboard Corp. v. R&R Turf Supply Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1826, 1832 n. 13 (TTAB 2012) ................... 9
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`Specialty Brands Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 223 USPQ 1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ......... 13
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`Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. Corp. v. Fred S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 50 USPQ2d 1532, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 14
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`The United States Shoe Corp. v. Kiddie Kobbler Ltd., 231 USPQ 815, 818 n. 7 (TTAB 20 WAI-
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`3129049v3 1986) ......................................................................................................................... 9
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`iii
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`UMG Recordings Inc. v. Mattel Inc., 100 USPQ2d 1868, 1885 (TTAB 2011) ................................ 17
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`Universal Furniture International, Inc. V. Welcome Industrial Corporation, 2012 WL 8254586
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`(TTAB 2012) ............................................................................................................................... 10
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`University Of Kentucky V. Kentucky Gameday, LLC, 2015 WL 9906634 (TTAB 2015) .................. 14
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`Statutes
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`15 U.S.C. § 1052 ............................................................................................................................ 10
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`15 U.S.C. § 1065 ............................................................................................................................ 16
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`TBMP § 528.01 ................................................................................................................................ 9
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`TBMP § 704.03 .............................................................................................................................. 12
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`TMEP § 1207.01 ...................................................................................................................... 19, 21
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`Trademark Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. §1115(b) .................................................................................. 16
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`Treatises
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`MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:91 ............................................................ 16
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`iv
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`Applicant moves for summary judgment (“MSJ”), alleging that there are no disputed
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`facts and the application of the law to those facts dictate judgment in Applicant’s favor.1
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`Applicant is wrong on the facts and the law. First, Applicant’s claim that no likelihood of
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`confusion exists is ungrounded. Applicant’s mark is “LVN LVSH” and Opposer’s mark is “LUSH.”
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`The two are near identical – the only difference being that there is an adverb before the
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`misspelled mark for “LUSH.” The two are so similar there is a likelihood of confusion and the
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`initial examining attorney already found as much. Moreover, Applicant essentially conceded as
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`much in its arguments in the alternative. In any event, even without Applicant’s concessions,
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`Applicant misapplies the DuPont factors. Second, Applicant cannot base its MSJ solely on its
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`self-serving arguments as to the mispronunciation of its own mark. Consequently, as a matter
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`of fact and law, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board must deny Applicant’s MSJ.
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`If summary judgment is to be granted at this very early stage of the proceeding, it
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`should be in Opposer’s favor so that Applicant’s trademark application is immediately denied.
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`Indeed, all of the DuPont factors favor a finding of likelihood of confusion between the parties’
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`admittedly similar marks for identical goods and channels of distribution. Accordingly, Opposer
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`requests that Applicant’s motion be denied and judgment be entered in Opposer’s favor.
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`1 Applicant failed to file a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Opposer drafted a Statement of Disputed and
`Undisputed Material Facts for the convenience of the Board, filed concurrently herewith.
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`1
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`II.
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`Statement of Relevant Facts
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`A.
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`The LUSH Brand
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`Opposer has been selling apparel under the LUSH® trademark (“Opposer’s LUSH Mark”)
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`since at least 2003. (Declaration of Edward Kim, Par. 2). At all times, Opposer has continuously
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`operated a website with the URL lushclothing.com to promote its LUSH branded products. Id.
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`LUSH® branded products are sold in independent boutiques and major retail stores throughout
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`the U.S. and on the Internet including Nordstrom, Stitch Fix, TJ Maxx, Ross, and Bloomingdales.
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`Id. Between 2003 and 2016, Opposer’s sales of LUSH® branded products increased by over
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`6100%. (Kim Dec., Par. 3). In 2016, LUSH branded sales exceeded $65 Million. Id. Opposer
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`allocates over a million dollars annually to promote and advertise the LUSH® brand. Id. By virtue
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`of its sales and the excellence of its products, Opposer has developed exceedingly valuable
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`goodwill and public recognition with respect to the LUSH mark. Id.
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`The LUSH® brand has been featured in major fashion magazines including Glamour,
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`Cosmopolitan, People Style Watch, InStyle, Teen Vogue, PopSugar, Life & Style, Lucky and
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`Seventeen, to name a few. (Kim Dec., Par. 4, Exh. 1). A search of the term “Lush” for clothing on
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`the Internet using Google search engine reveals Opposer and its LUSH® branded apparel in the
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`first 15 results. (Kim Dec., Par. 5).
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`In 2010, Opposer received a federal registration for the LUSH trademark in connection
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`with its clothing. This registration, designated No. 3,816,441 (“Reg. No. ‘441”), is incontestable.
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`(Dkt, 1, pg. 7). Opposer owns the only registration for the LUSH name in connection with clothing
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`on the principal register. (Kim Dec., Par. 6).
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`2
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`Pinkette expends over 80% of its legal fees policing, monitoring, and protecting the well-
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`known and valuable LUSH® name. (Kim Dec., Par. 7, Exh. 3, which is the Official Gazette Watch
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`Service Notice regarding the LVN LVSH application). In fact, in 2018 alone, Opposer successfully
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`opposed or objected to eleven (11) applications to register marks it deemed confusingly similar
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`to the LUSH® brand, including LASH CLOTHING, LUS’, TWIRLUSH, LUSH LUXE, BELLA LUSH, LUSH
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`GIRL, LUSH & LAVISH, LUS’, L.U.S.H., LUSH COUTURE, LUSHIDI and LUS. (Dwight Dec., Par. 2). In
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`addition to the foregoing objections and oppositions, Opposer also sends cease and desist letters
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`and/or files trademark infringement claims against unauthorized use of confusingly similar LUSH®
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`marks including the following unauthorized uses: LUSH CLOTHING, LUSH, and LUSH LIFE (Dwight
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`Dec. ., Par. 3). Also in 2018, Opposer successfully defeated an attempt to cancel Reg. No. ‘441.
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`(Kim Dec., Par. 8, Exh. 4; Dwight Dec., Par. 4, Exh. 2).
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`B.
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`The LVN LVSH Mark
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`On September 29, 2017, Applicant applied to register the mark LVN LVSH (“Applicant’s
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`Mark”) in connection with “apparel, namely, t-shirts, tank tops, sweatshirts, hats, pants and
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`shorts” (“Applicant’s Goods”) based on first use date of August 1, 2017. (Dkt. 1, pg. 1). This
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`Application was published for opposition on August 28, 2018, and is the subject of Application
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`Serial No. 87628012 (“Serial No. ‘012”). (Dkt. 1).
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`On or about October 19, 2017, Opposer filed a Letter of Protest with the USPTO, stating
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`its objection to the registration of Applicant’s Mark because of likelihood of confusion with
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`Opposer’s LUSH® Mark. (Dwight Dec., Par. 5). On or about November 3, 2017, counsel for
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`Opposer advised counsel for Applicant of its objections to Applicant’s use and registration of
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`the confusingly similar LVN LVSH mark for identical goods. (Dwight Dec., Par. 5; Dkt. 6, Exhibit U
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`3
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`to Furminger Dec.). On or about November 30, 2017, Applicant rejected Opposer’s objections.
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`(Dwight Dec., Par. 6; Dkt. 6, Exhibit U to Furminger Dec.). On or about January 8, 2018, an
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`office action was issued against Serial No. ‘012 refusing registration because of a likelihood of
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`confusion with Opposer’s LUSH® Mark in Reg. No. ‘441. (Dkt. 6, Exhibit U to Furminger Dec.).
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`The office action states: “Given the similar general impressions of the marks LVN LVSH and
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`LUSH, their use on similar clothing and apparel goods is likely to confuse purchasers as to a
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`common source of goods.” Id.
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`Notwithstanding Opposer’s objections and the initial refusal to register Serial No. ‘012,
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`the Applicant’s Mark was published for opposition on August 28, 2018.
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`C.
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`Statement of Opposer’s Undisputed Material Facts
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`Applicant concedes the following facts in its Trademark Application and Motion:
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`1.
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`Opposer is the prior user of the LUSH mark. (Opposer’s Statement of Undisputed
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`Material Facts (“SUMF”) No. 24; Dkt. 6, MSJ Brief, pg. 9, Par. 1, 3);
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`2.
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`Applicant first began using Applicant’s Mark in August 2017. (SUMF No. 25; Dkt.
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`1, pg. 1).
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`3.
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`The parties’ goods are identical. (SUMF No. 26; Dkt. 6, Notice of Motion and MSJ,
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`pg. 4, Par. 3)
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`4.
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`5.
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`The parties’ goods travel in the same channels of trade. (SUMF No. 27; Id.);
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`The parties’ goods are ordinary consumer items and the class of consumers for
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`such goods is the public at large. (SUMF No. 28; Id.); and
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`6.
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`The name LVN LVSH can be interpreted as “LIVIN’ LUSH.” (SUMF No. 29; Dkt. 6,
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`Exhibit U to Furminger Dec.).
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`4
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`7.
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`The USPTO could determine that “LVN LVSH” is similar to “LUSH.” (SUMF No. 30;
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`Dkt. 6, MSJ brief, Page 8 (“Even if the Board determines that the marks are
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`minimally similar … .”), Page 23 (Even if [confusion is] possible,… .”); Page 27
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`(“even if Applicant’s Mark was minimally similar, … .”)
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`III.
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`Summary Judgment Standard
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`A party is entitled to summary judgment only “if the record evidence shows no
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`remaining material factual dispute and [Applicant’s] entitlement to a legal ruling in its favor”
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`Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Intl., Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 15557, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir.
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`1991). “A genuine dispute is shown to exist if sufficient evidence is presented such that a
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`reasonable fact finder could decide the question in favor of the nonmoving party.” Opryland
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`USA Inc. v. The Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 851, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471, 1473
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`(Fed. Cir. 1992) (vacating Board’s grant of summary judgment to applicant finding it
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`“improvidently granted” based in part on an incorrect legal analysis of the similarity of the
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`marks). “The evidence submitted by the non-movant, in opposition to a motion for summary
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`judgment, is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.” Id.; see
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`also TBMP § 528.01 (“the evidentiary record on summary judgment, and all inferences to be
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`drawn from the undisputed facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
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`moving party”).
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`The party seeking judgment in its favor carries the burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v.
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`Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the function of
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`the Board is not to try issues of fact, but to determine if there are any genuine disputes of
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`material fact to be tried. See TBMP § 528.01 (2013), and cases cited therein. Evidence on
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`5
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`

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`summary judgment must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, and all
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`justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Lloyd's Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli's,
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`Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 25 USPQ2d 2027, 2029 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland USA, 23 USPQ2d at 1472.
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`The Board may not resolve genuine disputes as to material facts; it may only ascertain whether
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`genuine disputes as to material facts exist. Lloyd's Food Prods., 25 USPQ2d at 2029; Olde Tyme
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`Foods, 22 USPQ2d at 1544. TBMP § 528.01 (2015), and cases cited therein. If there is a real
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`dispute about a material fact or factual inference, summary judgment is inappropriate; the
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`factual dispute should be reserved for trial. Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc., 912 F.2d 1459, 16
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`USPQ2d 1055, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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`IV.
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`Analysis
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`A.
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`Opposer Has Standing and Prior Rights
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`Applicant concedes Opposer is the owner of a prior registration upon which this
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`opposition is based, and has used the LUSH® mark in commerce for goods since as early as 2003
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`(SUMF Nos. 24-25). Accordingly, Opposer has standing to oppose and priority over Applicant’s
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`Serial No. ‘012, filed December 8, 2008 for the LVN LVSH Mark. In the Application, Applicant
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`admits it first began using Applicant’s Mark in the United States in 2017. (SUMF No. 25). See
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`Brown Shoe Co. v. Robbins, 90 USPQ2d 1752, 1754 (TTAB 2009) (priority and standing
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`established by making pleaded registrations of record); L.C. Licensing Inc. v. Berman, 86
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`USPQ2d 1883, 1887 (TTAB 2008) (priority and standing established where pleaded registrations
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`are of record, show that opposer is the current owner and that each is valid and subsisting, and
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`evidence showing use further established priority).
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`6
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`B.
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`Applicant’s Mark Is Likely To Cause Confusion With Opposer’s LUSH® Mark
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`Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act states, in pertinent part, that a trademark shall be
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`refused registration if it so resembles a prior used or registered mark “as to be likely, when
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`used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause
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`mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). In determining likelihood of confusion, the Board
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`weighs the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 563, 567
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`(C.C.P.A. 1973), to the extent those factors are relevant to the case at hand. See Opryland USA
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`Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[n]ot all of the du
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`Pont [sic] factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case”). Here, the relevant du Pont
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`factors are:
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`(1) the renown of Opposer’s LUSH® mark;
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`(2) the virtual identity of the parties’ marks;
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`(3) the relatedness of the parties’ respective goods and services;
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`(4) the overlap of the parties’ trade channels and consumers; and
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`(5) the lack of sophistication of the parties’ consumers; and
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`(6) the lack of third-party registration of similar marks.
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`In its Motion, Applicant focuses on 2 factors: the similarity of the marks and the
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`strength of the LUSH® mark. This is not proper analysis. The Board is obligated to determine
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`the issue of likelihood of confusion by analyzing all the du Pont factors. See In re Smith and
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`Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (TTAB 1994); In re CHA Direct, Inc., 2008 WL 4354131 (TTAB
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`2018). Accordingly, while Applicant would like to cherry pick its factors, all du Pont factors,
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`where applicable, must be considered.
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`7
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`Here, Applicant already concedes factors 3-5 (related goods, overlap of trade channels
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`and consumers and lack of sophistication of parties’ consumers (SUMF No. 26-28)), in favor of
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`finding likelihood of confusion. ((Dkt. 6, MSJ brief, pgs. 14-15). The remaining factors are: the
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`renown of the LUSH mark; the virtual identity of the parties’ marks; and third-party registration
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`of similar marks.
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`1.
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`Applicant Wrongly Conflates Third-Party Registration with Third-Party Use.
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`a.
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`Opposer is the Lone Holder of a “LUSH” Registration.
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`A search of the TEAS reveals only one registration for the mark LUSH in connection with
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`clothing, Reg. No. 3816441, which belongs solely to Opposer. (Dwight Dec., Par. 7; Opposer also
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`requests Judicial Notice of TEAS search). A search for marks containing the word LUSH for Class
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`25 goods on TESS revealed only three (3) live entries (excluding Opposer’s):
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`Refine Search
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`lush[bi,ti] not dead[ld] and 025[ic] and `RN
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`Submit
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`Current
`Search:
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`lush[bi,ti] not dead[ld] and 025[ic] and `RN >
`"0"
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`docs: 4 occ:
`12
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` Serial Number Reg. Number
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`Word Mark
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`Check Status Live/Dead
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`1 87034681
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`5351383
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`CUDDLE LUSH
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`TSDR
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`2 85511673
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`4203892
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`LIVE THE LUSH LIFE TSDR
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`3 77733582
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`3816441
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`LUSH
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`4 76696317
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`3697378
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`NECKLUSH
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`TSDR
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`TSDR
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`LIVE
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`LIVE
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`LIVE
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`LIVE
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`(Dwight Dec., Par. 8).
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`8
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`First, Serial Nos. 87034681, 85511673, and 76696317 (entries 1, 2 and 4) are for goods
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`different from Opposer’s goods. (Dwight Dec., Par. 8). Moreover, the marks are not confusingly
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`similar to the LUSH mark in sight, sound, or meaning. For instance, a comparison is as follows:
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` LUSH v. CUDDLE LUSH for foldable robes that convert to pillows
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` LUSH v. LIVE THE LUSH LIFE for blazers; Hats; Jeans; Shoes; Shorts; T-shirts;
`Track suits); and
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` LUSH v. NECKLUSH for scarves, mufflers, wraps and shawls.
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`Second, Serial No. 855116732 (entry 2) was not timely renewed and is expected to be
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`canceled in the near future. (Id.). “[A]n expired or cancelled registration … is not evidence of
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`anything except that the registration issued; it is not evidence of any presently existing rights in
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`the mark shown in the registration, or that the mark was ever used.” TBMP § 704.03(b)(1)(A);
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`see also The United States Shoe Corp. v. Kiddie Kobbler Ltd., 231 USPQ 815, 818 n. 7 (TTAB 20
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`WAI-3129049v3 1986). Nor does an expired registration affect the strength of opposer's mark.
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`Seaboard Corp. v. R&R Turf Supply Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1826, 1832 n. 13 (TTAB 2012).
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`In sum, there is no evidence of a crowded field of live registrations of LUSH word marks.
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`b.
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`Third-Party Use is Irrelevant in the Du Pont Analysis.
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`Applicant rests the remainder of its motion on the alleged “saturated” market of “lush”
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`derivative marks and designs. First, Applicant’s attempt to paint the scene that it too would be
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`another derivative mark should be rejected because “LVN LVSH” is not a derivative mark but
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`the identical mark to Opposer’s LVSH Mark modified by an adverb. Second, evidence of third-
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`party websites is entitled to no or little probative weight because it does not establish that
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`2 This entry was registered on the Supplemental Register, which Opposer did not have notice of or an opportunity
`to oppose this mark. (Dwight Dec., Par. 8).
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`9
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`consumers have grown so accustomed to seeing the term LUSH in association with that clothing
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`that they can distinguish between such marks on the basis of minor differences. See Safer Inc.
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`v. OMS Investments Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031, 1039 (TTAB 2010) (Websites, standing alone without
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`any corroborating evidence relating to extent of use, number of views, etc., are extremely
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`limited in their probative value in the likelihood of confusion analysis); Angos Tropical Cafe, Llc
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`V. Paradise Restaurant Group, Inc. Of St Augustine, 2014 WL 3427348 (TTAB 2014); Universal
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`Furniture International, Inc. V. Welcome Industrial Corporation, 2012 WL 8254586 (TTAB 2012).
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`Third, this evidence does not prove how long the various designs and derivative marks
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`have been in use, the volume of sales under those design/marks, their number of customers or
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`trading areas, or the level of exposure to the relevant purchasing public. See Coach/Braunsdorf
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`Affinity, Inc. v. 12 Interactive, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1458, 1476 (TTAB 2014). Respondent's Internet
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`evidence relating to LUSH-formative designations for clothing is admissible only for what it
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`shows on its face and does not prove the truth of any matter stated therein. See, e.g., 7-Eleven
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`Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1717 n.2 (TTAB 2007). Thus, the websites are probative
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`evidence that the websites exist and that the public may have been exposed to them, but does
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`not establish the existence of any apparel referenced. See Mag Instrument Inc. v. Brinkmann
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`Corp., 96 USPQ2d 1701, 1708 (TTAB 2010), aff'd unpublished, No. 11-1052, 11-1053 (Fed. Cir.
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`Nov. 9, 2011); Life Zone Inc. v. Middleman Group Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1953, 1956 n.5 (TTAB 2008).
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`Moreover, Opposer has refuted many of Respondent's purported third-party uses of
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`LUSH-formative marks for clothing with Internet evidence indicating on its face that such
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`businesses have closed, are located outside the U.S., or are no longer selling items under any
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`confusingly similar names. (Dwight Dec., Par. 9). Thus, Applicant’s alleged “evidence” merits
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`10
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`little to no probative value, especially in the absence of any evidence of use of these alleged
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`similar third party marks, and does not detract from the demonstrated strength of Opposer’s
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`well known mark discussed in Section 2 discussed immediately below.
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`Being the only one registered with the USPTO, Opposer’s LUSH Mark Is Strong
`2.
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`and Well Known.
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`As Applicant concedes, Opposer’s use of its Lush® Mark precedes Applicant’s use of its
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`LVN LVSH Mark. “[F]ame of the prior mark, when present, plays a ‘dominant’ role in the
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`process of balancing the Du Pont factors….Famous marks thus enjoy a wide latitude of legal
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`protection.” Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
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`(Vacating dismissal of opposition where Board improperly discounted the fame of the prior
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`mark). The Federal Circuit has stated repeatedly that there is no excuse for even approaching
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`the well-known trademark of a competitor inasmuch as “[a] strong mark . . . casts a long
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`shadow which competitors must avoid.’” Id. quoting Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art
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`Industries, Inc., 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). “Famous marks are accorded more
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`protection because they are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind
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`than a weaker mark.” Id.
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`Factors the Board considers in measuring the fame of a mark include “volume of sales
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`and advertising expenditures of the goods travelling under the mark, and … length of time
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`those indicia of commercial awareness have been evident.” Bose v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.,
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`293 F.3d 1367, 1371, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In addition, media attention that
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`references a mark has a significant impact on the fame analysis. See Id. at 1307
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`In this case, Opposer has sold apparel under the LUSH® trademark for over 15 years.
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`(SUMF No. 24; Kim Dec., Par. 2). Since at least as early as 2003, Opposer has continuously
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`11
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`operated a website with the URL lushclothing.com to promote its LUSH® branded products. Id.
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`LUSH® branded products are sold in independent boutiques and major retail stores throughout
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`the U.S. and on the Internet including Nordstrom, Stitch Fix, TJ Maxx, Ross, and Bloomingdales.
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`(Id.). Between 2003 and 2016, Opposer’s sales of LUSH® branded products increased by over
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`61