This Opinion is a
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`Precedent of the TTAB
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`
`
`Hearing: November 15, 2022
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`Mailed: May 4, 2023
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`_____
`
`Rebecca Curtin
`
`v.
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`United Trademark Holdings, Inc.
`___
`
`Opposition No. 91241083
`___
`
`
`John C. Stringham and Matthew A. Barlow of Workman Nydegger
` for Rebecca Curtin.
`
`Erik M. Pelton of Erik M. Pelton & Associates PLLC
` for United Trademark Holdings, Inc.
`______
`
`
`Before Adlin, Lynch and Dunn, Administrative Trademark Judges.
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`Opinion by Adlin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
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`The Board, sua sponte, bifurcated this case into “two separate trial phases.” 49
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`TTABVUE 6-7.1 The first trial phase concerned, and this decision addresses, only
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`“Opposer’s entitlement to a statutory cause of action.” Id.
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`
`1 Citations to the record are to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. Specifically,
`the number preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number(s), and any
`number(s) following “TTABVUE” refer to the page number(s) of the docket entry where the
`cited materials appear.
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`

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`Opposition No. 91241083
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`More specifically, we address a single, threshold question: is Opposer Rebecca
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`Curtin, as a purchaser of goods bearing the challenged mark, entitled to oppose the
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`mark’s registration under Section 13 of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1063, when
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`she alleges the proposed mark is both invalid and the subject of a fraudulent
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`application? Because our answer to this question is “no,” we dismiss the opposition
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`and do not reach the second (merits) trial phase.
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`I. The Pleadings
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`Applicant United Trademark Holdings, Inc. seeks registration of RAPUNZEL, in
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`standard characters, for “dolls; toy figures,” in International Class 28.2 In her second
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`amended notice of opposition (“NOO”), Opposer alleges that RAPUNZEL is
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`“synonymous with the name of a well-known childhood fairytale character,” and that
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`consumers will recognize it as such. 14 TTABVUE 2, 3 (NOO ¶¶ 2, 6). As grounds for
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`opposition, Opposer alleges that RAPUNZEL not only fails to function as a
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`trademark, but also is generic for and merely descriptive of the identified goods, and
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`that Applicant committed fraud. Id. at 3, 5, 8 (NOO ¶¶ 8, 13, 20-24).3 In its answer,
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`Applicant denies the salient allegations in the second amended notice of opposition,
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`and asserts “affirmative defenses” that merely amplify its denials.
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`2 Application Serial No. 87690863, filed November 20, 2017 under Section 1(a) of the Act,
`based on first use dates of August 2017.
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`3 Opposer also alleges that Applicant’s mark is “functional under section 2(e)(5) of the
`Trademark Act,” even though this claim was previously dismissed. 14 TTABVUE 5 (NOO
`¶ 15); 12 TTABVUE 10; 13 TTABVUE 10 n.1. Opposer claims that she reasserted this
`dismissed claim “to preserve the right to appeal at a later date the dismissal.” 13 TTABVUE
`10 n.1.
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`2
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`

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`Opposition No. 91241083
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`At this initial stage of this bifurcated case, we need not address the ultimate
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`merits of Opposer’s claims, except to the extent those claims may bear on Opposer’s
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`entitlement to oppose the involved mark. We thus turn to Opposer’s allegations in
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`the second amended notice of opposition intended to support her claim of entitlement
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`to a statutory cause of action.
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`Opposer alleges that she “is a professor of law teaching trademark law, and is also
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`a consumer who participates amongst other consumers in the marketplace for dolls
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`and toy figures of fairytale characters, including Rapunzel.” 14 TTABVUE 6 (NOO
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`¶ 16). She claims that she and “other consumers will be denied access to healthy
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`marketplace competition” for “products that represent” Rapunzel if private
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`companies are allowed “to trademark the name of a famous fairy tale character in the
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`public domain.” Id. Opposer further alleges that she “and other consumers will also
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`likely face an increased cost of goods associated with Rapunzel merchandise, given
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`the lack of competition.” Id. According to Opposer, “more than 171 petition
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`signatures” support her claims of damage. Id. (NOO ¶ 17). To determine whether
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`Opposer proved these allegations of entitlement, we turn to the evidentiary record.4
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`4 Over four years ago, in the pleading phase of this case, the Board issued a decision denying
`Applicant’s motion to dismiss, stating that Opposer “sufficiently alleged that she has a direct
`and personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding and that her belief of damage has a
`reasonable basis in fact.” 12 TTABVUE 7. The order was based in large part, 12 TTABVUE
`9, on Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1999), a case that
`addressed a section of the Trademark Act barring registration of “immoral” or “scandalous”
`matter. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Six months after the Board’s decision on the motion to dismiss
`issued, the Supreme Court found the bar on registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” matter
`unconstitutional. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 2294, 2019 USPQ2d 232043 (2019). Two years
`after Brunetti was decided, and following updates to the “standard for determining whether
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`3
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`

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`Opposition No. 91241083
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`II. The Record
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`The record consists of the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
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`37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b), the file of Applicant’s involved application. In addition, Opposer
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`introduced her own declaration, with exhibits (“Curtin Dec.”). 53 TTABVUE.
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`Applicant chose to not introduce any testimony or other evidence. 54 TTABVUE.
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`III. Entitlement-Related Facts of Record
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`Since 2015 Opposer has purchased “dolls, doll fashions, toys, books, e-books, and
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`other fairytale themed items” for her daughter, “including Rapunzel dolls and toys.”
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`53 TTABVUE 2-3, 11-59, 84 (Curtin Dec. ¶¶ 3-6 and Exs. 1-35, 37). Opposer often
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`purchases these products online, finding them by typing “‘Rapunzel’ into the online
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`search box.” Id. at 3 (Curtin Dec. ¶ 9). Similarly, “[w]hen shopping in person [Opposer
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`looks] for the Rapunzel name or image to locate products,” or asks for “Rapunzel”
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`dolls. Id. (Curtin Dec. ¶¶ 10, 11).
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`Opposer “believes” that if Applicant registers RAPUNZEL she “and other
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`consumers will be denied access to healthy marketplace competition for products that
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`represent the well-known fictional character.” Id. at 8 (Curtin Dec. ¶ 48). She also
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`contends that she and “other consumers” will “also likely face an increased cost of
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`goods associated with Rapunzel merchandise, given the lack of competition.” Id.
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`(Curtin Dec. ¶ 49).
`
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`a party is eligible to bring a statutory cause of action,” the Board denied Opposer’s motion for
`summary judgment on her entitlement to bring a statutory cause of action, and bifurcated
`this case requiring that Opposer’s entitlement be tried first, before the merits. 49 TTABVUE
`5-7.
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`4
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`

`

`Opposition No. 91241083
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`Furthermore, Opposer “believes” that registration of Applicant’s mark “could chill
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`the creation of new dolls and toys by fans of the Rapunzel fairytale, crowding out the
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`substantial social benefit of having diverse interpreters of the fairy tale’s legacy,” and
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`deny Opposer and “other consumers” of “access to classic, already existing, Rapunzel
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`merchandise.” Id. at 9 (Curtin Dec. ¶¶ 50, 51). Opposer introduced a petition with
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`432 signatures from people who share Opposer’s “belief that registration of
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`[Applicant’s proposed mark] would adversely impact a consumer’s ability to find dolls
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`depicting the Rapunzel character, and would also harm marketplace competition for
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`dolls personifying the Rapunzel character.” Id. at 9, 61-83 (Curtin Dec. ¶ 52 and Ex.
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`36).
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`IV. Is Opposer Entitled to a Statutory Cause of Action?
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`Entitlement to the statutory cause of action invoked (e.g., opposition or
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`cancellation) is a requirement in every inter partes case. Australian Therapeutic
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`Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837, at *3 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 82 (2021) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
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`Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26, 109 USPQ2d 2061 (2014)). A plaintiff may
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`oppose registration of a mark when doing so is within the zone of interests protected
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`by the statute and she has a reasonable belief in damage that would be proximately
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`caused by registration of the mark. Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298,
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`2020 USPQ2d 11277, at * 6-7 (Fed. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2671 (2021)
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`(holding that the test in Lexmark is met by demonstrating a real interest in opposing
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`or cancelling a registration of a mark, which satisfies the zone-of-interests
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`requirement, and a reasonable belief in damage by the registration of a mark, which
`5
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`

`

`Opposition No. 91241083
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`demonstrates damage proximately caused by registration of the mark). Meenaxi
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`Enter., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 38 F.4th 1067, 2022 USPQ2d 602, at *3-4 (Fed. Cir.
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`2022) (“While the zone-of-interest test is not especially demanding … it nonetheless
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`imposes a critical requirement.”) (cleaned up).
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`Here, Opposer has failed to prove she is entitled to the statutory cause of action
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`she invoked – opposing registration of Applicant’s mark. The essential problem is that
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`mere consumers such as Opposer are generally not statutorily entitled to oppose
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`registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1063.
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`A. The Statute Does Not Entitle Opposer to Oppose Registration Unless
`Her “Real Interest” Is Commercial
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`In Lexmark, the Supreme Court pointed out that “[w]hether a plaintiff comes
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`within the ‘zone of interests’ is an issue that requires us to determine, using
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`traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause
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`of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at 2067.
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`Thus we turn, as Lexmark did, to the statute conferring the cause of action in
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`question, in our case 15 U.S.C. § 1063, which entitles “[a]ny person who believes that
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`[she] would be damaged by the registration of a mark” to oppose it.5
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`While that language is quite broad, and might seemingly apply to “all factually
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`injured plaintiffs,” it does not, and 15 U.S.C. § 1063 “should not get such an expansive
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`reading.” See Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at 2067 (addressing similar language in 15
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`5 Lexmark involved a false advertising counterclaim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), pursuant to
`which “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” is entitled to the
`cause of action.
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`6
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`

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`Opposition No. 91241083
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`U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) and quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503
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`U.S. 258, 266 (1992)). Rather, “a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs
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`whose interests ‘fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked,’” in
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`this case, as in Lexmark, the Trademark Act. Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at 2068 (quoting
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`Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
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`“Identifying the interests protected by” the Trademark Act “requires no
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`guesswork,” Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at 2068, because the Act itself identifies those
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`interests in Section 45, which states the Act’s purpose:
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`The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce
`within the control of Congress by making actionable
`the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such
`commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
`commerce from interference by State, or territorial
`legislation; to protect persons engaged in such
`commerce against unfair competition; to prevent
`fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
`reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations
`of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies
`stipulated by
`treaties and conventions respecting
`trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered
`into between the United States and foreign nations.
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`15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added). Thus, the Trademark Act regulates commerce
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`and protects plaintiffs with commercial interests.6
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`6 Unlike the plaintiff’s ground for opposition in Ritchie, 50 USPQ2d at 1023, Opposer’s
`grounds for opposition in this case arise out of the Trademark Act’s “intent” to “protect
`persons engaged in … commerce against unfair competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See generally
`In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 217 (CCPA 1978) (a “major reason” for
`not protecting merely descriptive marks is “to prevent the owner of a [merely descriptive]
`mark from inhibiting competition”).
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`7
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`

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`Opposition No. 91241083
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`The Supreme Court’s review of this statement of purpose led it to hold, in
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`Lexmark, that “to come within the zone of interests in a suit” under Section 43(a)(1)
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`of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) – which, similar to Section 13, may be
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`invoked only by a plaintiff “who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged”
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`by the challenged act − “a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial
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`interest in reputation or sales.” Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at 2069 (emphasis added).
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`The Court specifically stated that while consumers “may well have an injury-in-fact”
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`caused by violations of the Trademark Act, they “cannot invoke the protection” of the
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`statute based solely on injuries suffered as consumers, “a conclusion reached by every
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`Circuit to consider the question.” Id. (“Even a business misled by a supplier into
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`purchasing an inferior product is, like consumers generally, not under the Act’s
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`aegis.”).7 See also Meenaxi, 2022 USPQ2d 602, at *7 (“Coca-Cola failed to explain how
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`its supposed reputational injury adversely affected its commercial interests other
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`than to speculate that a consumer dissatisfied with Meenaxi’s products might blame
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`Coca-Cola.”); Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at * 7 (a plaintiff “can satisfy the real-
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`interest test by demonstrating a commercial interest”); Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco
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`v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding
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`entitlement to the statutory cause of action of cancellation because “Cubatabaco has
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`7 Lexmark cites the following circuit court decisions under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) that reveal
`unanimity among “every Circuit to consider the question”: Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v.
`McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1170 (11th Cir. 2007); Made in the USA Foundation v.
`Phillips Foods, Inc., 365 F. 3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2004); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp.,
`242 F. 3d 539, 563-564 (5th Cir. 2001); Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F. 3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995);
`Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F. 3d 1163, 1177 (3rd Cir. 1993); Colligan v. Activities Club of
`N. Y., Ltd., 442 F. 2d 686, 691-692 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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`8
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`

`

`Opposition No. 91241083
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`a legitimate commercial interest in the COHIBA mark”). Cf. POM Wonderful LLC v.
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`Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 110 USPQ2d 1877, 1880 (2014) (stating, in the context
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`of a false advertising claim, that “[t]hough in the end consumers also benefit from the
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`Act’s proper enforcement, the cause of action [for unfair competition through
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`misleading advertising or labeling] is for competitors, not consumers”). Over 40 years
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`ago, the Board foreshadowed these holdings, finding it “evident that a petitioner must
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`establish a viable commercial interest in the subject matter of cancellation.”
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`Miller v. B & H Foods, Inc., 209 USPQ 357, 360 (TTAB 1981) (emphasis added).8 Cf.
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`Ahal Al-Sara Grp. for Trading v. American Flash, Inc., 2023 USPQ2d 79, at *7-9
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`(TTAB 2023) (“a foreign plaintiff cannot establish entitlement to an abandonment or
`
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`8 Throughout her Trial Brief, Opposer analogizes entitlement to a Trademark Act cause of
`action to “standing” under the Clayton Antitrust Act, arguing that consumers have standing
`under the Clayton Act, and should therefore also be entitled to Trademark Act causes of
`action. 55 TTABVUE 13, 15, 17. We are not persuaded by the analogy or the argument. The
`analogy is untenable because even if we found the statutes similar or analogous, which we
`do not, in Lexmark the Supreme Court instructs us to focus on the Trademark Act, including
`15 U.S.C. §§ 1063 and 1127, in assessing entitlement to a Trademark Act cause of action.
`Moreover, Opposer’s argument is at best overstated, and it is not clear that Opposer would
`be entitled to a Clayton Act cause of action. In fact, in Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,
`Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529 (1983), the Supreme Court
`recognized that Section 4 of the Clayton Act, read literally, is “broad enough to encompass
`every harm that can be attributed directly or indirectly to the consequences of an antitrust
`violation.” Nonetheless, the Court went on to analyze whether the claimed injury “was of a
`type that Congress sought to address.” Id. at 538; see also Philanthropist.com, Inc. v. The
`General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 2021 USPQ2d 643, at *16 (TTAB 2021)
`(considering whether it can be “assumed Congress intended to authorize a party in
`Petitioner’s circumstances to bring and maintain these cancellation proceedings”) (citing
`Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at *7), aff’d, 2022 WL 3147202 (Fed. Cir. 2022). To answer
`this question, the Supreme Court in Associated Gen. Contractors specifically considered, inter
`alia, “the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury,” 459 U.S. at 540, and whether the
`claimed damages were “highly speculative.” Id. at 542. Here, as explained below, even if
`Opposer’s alleged injury is “direct” (despite being merely anticipated, rather than existing),
`her specific claims of harm are “highly speculative” and unsupported by evidence.
`
`9
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`

`

`Opposition No. 91241083
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`fraud claim based solely on its foreign rights, without any claim or interest
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`related to U.S. commerce”) (emphasis added).
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`There is no question that Lexmark’s holdings on entitlement to a statutory
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`(Trademark Act) cause of action apply to opposition proceedings such as this one.
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`Indeed, not only was Lexmark based on the Trademark Act’s statement of purpose,
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`but the Federal Circuit recently found “no principled reason why the analytical
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`framework articulated by the Court in Lexmark should not apply to [15 U.S.C.]
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`§ 1064,” Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at *6, a statute which concerns cancellation
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`proceedings and, like opposition proceedings under 15 U.S.C. § 1063, is limited to
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`persons “who believe[ ] that he is or will be damaged” by registration. See also
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`Spanishtown Ent., Inc. v. Transcend Resources, Inc., 2020 USPQ2d 11388, at *1-2
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`(TTAB 2020).
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`B. Opposer Has Not Established a Commercial Interest or Injury Merely
`By Virtue of Being a Consumer of RAPUNZEL Goods
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`All of the facts Opposer alleged, and all of the evidence she submitted, relate to
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`her being a consumer of fairytale-themed products. Nowhere has Opposer alleged or
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`established the requisite commercial interest or injury. Rather, Opposer has only
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`alleged and proved that she is a purchaser of goods related to the Rapunzel fairytale.
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`Lexmark makes clear, however, that “[e]ven a business” that buys goods or services
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`“is, like consumers generally, not under the Act’s aegis.” Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at
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`2069. A fortiori, a mere consumer that buys goods or services is not under the
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`Trademark Act’s aegis.
`
`10
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`

`

`Opposition No. 91241083
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`Put simply, the Trademark Act does not provide “consumer standing.” That is, it
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`does not entitle mere consumers to a statutory cause of action; a statutory cause of
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`action is reserved for those with commercial interests. Id. at 2071. See also Conte
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`Bros. Auto, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 49 USPQ2d 1321, 1327
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`(3d Cir. 1998) (Alito, J.) (Section 45 of the Trademark Act “makes clear that the focus
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`of the statute is on anti-competitive conduct in a commercial context. Conferring
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`standing to the full extent implied by the text of § 43(a) would give standing to
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`parties, such as consumers, having no competitive or commercial interests affected
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`by the conduct at issue. This would not only ignore the purpose of the Lanham Act as
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`expressed by §45, but would run contrary to our precedent ….”).9
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`C. Opposer’s Alleged Damage is Too Speculative and Remote to Invoke
`an Opposition Proceeding
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`It is not enough for Opposer to have alleged her belief in damage in her notice of
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`opposition. Rather, Opposer “must show economic or reputational injury flowing
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`directly from” Applicant’s registration of RAPUNZEL. Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at
`
`
`9 Opposer attempts to rely on two non-precedential decisions by a single interlocutory
`attorney in Flanders v. DiMarzio, Inc., Cancellation No. 92064181, but appears to have cited
`the wrong interlocutory decision in two places in her Trial Brief. 55 TTABVUE 11, 18. In any
`event, to the extent any non-precedential interlocutory decisions in Cancellation No.
`92064181 conflict with current Supreme Court or Federal Circuit caselaw, we decline to
`follow them. We are bound by Supreme Court and Federal Circuit authority, but not by non-
`precedential interlocutory decisions. Cf. TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF
`PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) § 518 (2022) (citing AS Holdings, Inc. v. H & C Milcor, Inc., 107
`USPQ2d 1829, 1832 (TTAB 2013) and Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231
`USPQ 857, 859 n.13 (TTAB 1986)). See also Domino’s Pizza Inc. v. Little Caesar Enters. Inc.,
`7 USPQ2d 1359, 1363 n.9 (TTAB 1988) (“Th[e] statement [that evidence of third-party uses
`were relevant], made over the signature of a single interlocutory Attorney-Examiner of the
`Board, is not binding on this three-member panel, and we find ourselves in disagreement
`with the statement.”).
`
`11
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`

`

`Opposition No. 91241083
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`2069. However, “[t]hat showing is generally not made when” a defendant’s conduct
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`“produces injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the plaintiff. For
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`example, while a competitor who is forced out of business by a defendant’s false
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`advertising generally will be able to sue for its losses, the same is not true of the
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`competitor’s landlord, its electric company, and other commercial parties ….” Id. at
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`2069-70.
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`Here, Opposer’s limited evidence shows that the damage she believes she will
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`suffer is too remote from registration and is entirely speculative.
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`For example, Opposer merely assumes that registration of RAPUNZEL will harm
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`“healthy marketplace competition,” leading to an “increased cost of goods.” 53
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`TTABVUE 8 (Curtin Dec. ¶¶ 48, 49). Even if this assumption was an attempt to apply
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`an accepted economic theory, there is no evidence of record about any specific
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`economic theory, and even if there was, there is no evidence that particular markets,
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`much less the market for the fairytale-related products at issue, always perform
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`according to general economic theories.
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`Perhaps more importantly, Opposer merely assumes that, notwithstanding 15
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`U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) and other defenses and protections available to sellers of the
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`fairytale-related products at issue, Applicant will be so successful in enforcing its
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`asserted rights that it will reduce “marketplace competition,” “chill the creation of
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`new dolls and toys” and prevent “access to classic, already existing, Rapunzel
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`merchandise.” Id. at 9 (Curtin Dec. ¶¶ 50, 51). This type of speculation, unsupported
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`by any evidence, is not a basis upon which we can find that Opposer is entitled to a
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`12
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`

`

`Opposition No. 91241083
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`statutory cause of action.10 Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d
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`1797, 1799 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”)
`
`(quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284, 76 USPQ2d 1616,
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`1622 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re U.S. Tsubaki, Inc., 109 USPQ2d 2002, 2006 (TTAB 2014)
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`(finding that there was no proof to support the statements in the record by counsel).
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`See also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2210-12 (2021) (in context of
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`assessing standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, noting problems with
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`seeking relief for the risk of potential “future harm”); Meenaxi, 2022 USPQ2d 602 at
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`*7 (“Coca-Cola did present statements regarding future plans to market Thums Up
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`and Limca beverages more broadly in the United States, but nebulous future plans
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`for U.S. sales cannot be the basis for a Lanham Act claim.”). Opposer’s allegations of
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`damage are also too remote, because the alleged damage to Opposer depends first on
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`the alleged effect of registration on other commercial doll makers or sellers.
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`V. Conclusion
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`Opposer has not met her burden of proving that she is entitled to invoke the
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`statute authorizing opposition proceedings.
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`
`
`Decision: The opposition is dismissed.
`
`
`10 Registration would not necessarily prevent competitors from manufacturing or selling
`competing dolls based on Rapunzel, a character from an 1812 Brothers Grimm fairy tale,
`because a trademark registration has no direct effect on what types of products are available
`in the marketplace. Rather, it would at most preclude others from using RAPUNZEL as their
`own source indicator for such products, subject to defenses such as 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)
`(creating a defense to infringement where the “term or device … is descriptive of and used
`fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods and services of such party”).
`
`13
`
`