Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
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`ESTTA Tracking number:
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`ESTTA1020484
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`Filing date:
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`12/05/2019
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`Proceeding
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`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91233731
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`Plaintiff
`Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust
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`AARON J MOSS
`GREENBERG GLUSKER FIELDS
`CLAMAN & MACHTINGER LLP, 1900 AVE OF THE STARS 21ST FL
`LOS ANGELES, CA 90067
`UNITED STATES
`amoss@ggfirm.com, esbardellati@ggfirm.com, ipmail@ggfirm.com
`310-553-3610
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`Submission
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`Filer's Name
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`Filer's email
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`Signature
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`Date
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`Plaintiff's Notice of Reliance
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`Elizabeth Sbardellati
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`esbardellati@greenbergglusker.com
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`/elizabeth sbardellati/
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`12/05/2019
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`Attachments
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`Notice of Reliance on Official Records.pdf(6201321 bytes )
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`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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`Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust,
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`Opposer,
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`v.
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`Ranbir Singh Bhai,
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`Defendant.
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`Opposition No. 91233731 (parent)
`Opposition No. 91233732
`Opposition No. 91233733
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`OPPOSER’S NOTICE OF RELIANCE
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`ON OFFICIAL RECORDS
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`OPPOSER’S NOTICE OF RELIANCE ON
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`OFFICIAL RECORDS
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`Opposer Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust hereby makes of record and notifies
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`Applicant Ranbir Singh Bhai of its reliance on the following official records submitted pursuant
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`to Rule 2.122(e) of the Trademark Rules of Practice, 37 C.F.R. § 21.122(e), TBMP § 704.07 and
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`Fed. R. Evid. 401, and authenticated pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 902(4).
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`1.
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`Decision filed August 8, 2012 in the matter Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa v. Inderjit Kaur
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`Puri, Case No. D-101-CV-2007-02431, State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, First Judicial
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`District Court. A true and copy of the Decision, certified by the District Court Clerk for the First
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`Judicial District Court of the State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, is attached hereto as
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`Exhibit YB 7. See pages 1-3; 10-16; 22-23.
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`2.
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`Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed October 16, 2012 in the matter
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`Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa v. Inderjit Kaur Puri, Case No. D-101-CV-2007-02431, State of New
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`Mexico, County of Santa Fe, First Judicial District Court. A true and correct copy of the
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`Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, certified by the District Court Clerk for the First
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`Judicial District Court of the State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, is attached hereto as
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`Exhibit YB 8. See pages 1 at paragraphs 1-2; 2 at paragraphs 10-12; 3-4 at paragraphs 17-19; 7-
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`12 at paragraphs 34-59; 19-20 at paragraphs 105-110; 21-26 at paragraphs 120-159 and 164; 27-
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`28 at paragraph 171-179; 30-33 at paragraphs K-L, R-S, U-Z, AA-MM.
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`3.
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`Judgment filed on November 10, 2012 in the matter Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa v.
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`Inderjit Kaur Puri, Case No. D-101-CV-2007-02431, State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe,
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`First Judicial District Court. A true and correct copy of the Judgment, certified by the District
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`Court Clerk for the First Judicial District Court of the State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe,
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`is attached hereto as Exhibit YB 9.
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`4.
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`Opinion of The Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico Filed on November
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`19, 2014 in the matter of Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa v. Inderjit Kaur Puri, No. 32,600, State of New
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`Mexico Court of Appeals, 2015-NMCA-027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014). A true and correct copy of
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`the Opinion, certified by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of the State of New Mexico, is
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`attached hereto as Exhibit YB 10. See pages 1; 4:3-9; 7:7-8:11; 11:6-21:16; 41:16-17; 42.
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`5.
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`Order of the Supreme Court of New Mexico denying petition for writ of certiorari
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`dated January 14, 2015 in the matter of Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa v. Inderjit Kaur Puri, No. 35,043,
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`Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico, 2015-NMSC-xxx (January 14, 2015). A true and
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`correct copy of the Order, certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, is
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`attached hereto as Exhibit YB 11.
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`6.
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`Order of the United States District Court for Central District of California re
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`Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication filed October 30,
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`2015 in the matter of Bibiji Inderjit Kaur Puri v. Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust, et al., Case
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`No. 2:11-cv-009503 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015). A true and correct copy of the Order, certified by
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`the Clerk of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, is attached hereto as
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`Exhibit YB 12. See pages 1:21-5:11; 6:8-7:12; 11:14-17:3; 24:4-17.
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`The above referenced official records are all relevant to show that Applicant is not, and
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`was not at the time the application at issue was filed, the rightful exclusive owner of the YOGI
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`trademark.
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`Dated: December 5, 2019
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By:_/Elizabeth Sbardellati/________
`Aaron J. Moss
`Elizabeth Sbardellati
`GREENBERG, GLUSKER, FIELDS,
`CLAMAN & MACHTINGER LLP
`1900 Avenue of the Stars, 21st Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90067
`Telephone: (310) 553-3610
`Facsimile: (310) 553-0687
`E-mail: amoss@ggfirm.com;
`esbardellati@ggfirm.com;
`ipmail@ggfirm.com
`Attorneys for Opposer
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`

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`EXHIBIT YB 7
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`EXHIBIT YB 7
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`FILED IN MY OFFICE
`DISTRICT COURT CLERK
`81812012 9:29:46 AM
`STEPHEN T. PACHECO
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`lmp
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`STATE OF NEW MEXICO
`COUNTY OF SANTA FE
`FIRST .TUDICIAL DISTRIET COURT
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`No. D- 1.01- CY -2007 -02431
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`SOPURKH KAUR KHALSA,
`SHAKTI PARWHA KAUR KHALSA, and
`EK ONG KAR KAUR KHALSA,
`Trustees of the Yogi Bhqian Administrative
`Trust,
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`Plaintiffs- Counterdefendants,
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`vs
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`INDERTIT KAUR PURI,
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`Defendant-Counterclaimant.
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`Decisio4
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`This case went to trial on the counterclaims asserted by Inderjit Kaur Puri (referred to
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`throughout as "Bibiji") against the Trustees of the Yogi Bhajan Administrative Trust: Sopurkh
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`Kaur Khalsa ("Sopurkh"), Shakti Parwha Kaur Khalsa ("Shakti") and Ek Ong Kar Kaur Khalsa
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`('Ek Ong Kar") for breach of fiduciary duty as successor Trustees to the Harbhajan Singh
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`Khalsa Yogiji (referred to throughout as "Yogi Bhajan") and lnderjit Kaur Puri Living Trust
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`('Living Trust") and of the Administrative Trust. This case arises out of the trust(s) created for
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`estate planning purposes by Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji. After hearing the evidence and reading the
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`closing arguments of counsel, the Court renders its decision.
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`Backsround
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`fogr Bhajan was a spiritual and religious leader, a yoga master and teacher, an
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`lnspirational speaker, an artist, an author, an enffepreneur and a skilled manager. Yogi Bhajan
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`I
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`

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`moved to the United States in 1969 and lived in California until about 1979, when he made New
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`Mexico his primary residence.
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`Yoei Bhaian and Bibiii were married in 1953 and livpd as husband and wife until Yos,
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`Bhajan died on October 6,2Q04. In 1987, Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji created the Living Trust which
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`was amended and restated at various times. Kate Clair Freeland ("Freeland'), attorney at law,
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`began representing Yogl Bhajan and Bibiji in 1979; she prepared the original Living Trust
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`agreement executed in 1980, the Restated and Amended Living Trust executed in 1987, and the
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`Last Will and Testament of Yogi Bhajan executed on February 21,198'l . In 1991, Froeland
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`proposed an amendment to assure that Bibiji would receive half the intellectual property ("P')
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`interests on Yogi Bhajan's death. Freeland recommended that Bibiji retain independent counsel
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`to advise her. Bibiji finally retained Robert Worchester in 7994 as her separate estate counsel.
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`After many years of stalled activity, negotiations oyer a restatement were renewed. Drafts of a
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`one page amendment were exchanged and executed in 1994. Under this amendment, in addition
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`to other property, Bibiji would receive one-half of Yogi Bhajan's IP interests upon his death.
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`The Living Trust provided that Yogi Bhajan would serve as the sole tnrstee for the Living
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`Irusr untii his death. The powers confbrred on Yogi Bhajan were very broad with no limitations
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`expressly stated. Since 1987, when the Living Trust was executed, and until his death, Yogi
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`thajan managed the affairs of the marital estate. The Uving Trust, as amended, provided that
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`upon Yogi Bhajan's death, the successor Co-Trustees shall be Shakti, Sopurkh, and Kamatjit
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`Kaur Kohli (Yogi Bhajan and Bibiji's daughter), (After the withdrawal of Kamaljit Kaur as a
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`trustee, Ek Ong Kar accepted an appointment as Successor Co-Trustee of the Administrative
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`Trust by Co-Trustees Shakti and Sopurkh.)
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`2
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`

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`On Yogi Bhajan's death, the assets of the Living Trust were transferred to the
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`Administrative Trust or directly to the InderjitKaur Puri Survivor's Trust ("Survivor's Trusf'),
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`The assets of the Living Trust were to be distributed as follows: (l) Bibiji's separate property,
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`her community property share and certain specific bequests were to be disributed to Bibiji via
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`the Survivor's Trust; (2) certain identified assets were be distributed to identified persons; and
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`13) the residual community properfy share dishibuted to an entity formed as "Staff Endowment
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`LLC."
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`Shakti and Sopurkh are members of Staff Endowment, LLC, and, as such, are entitled to
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`a fractional share in the eventual distributions from the Administrative Trust to Staff
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`Endowment,LLC.
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`The issues raised in this matter deal with the treatment of a variety of assets that were
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`community property or acquired with community funds. Those issues will be discussed as
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`follows: (1) Gifts to third persons and oharitable donations made with community funds during
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`Yogi Bhajan's lifetime, (2) Treatment of the Golden Temple of Oregon ("GTO") licenses, (3)
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`Other IP Assets, (4) Disposition of assets including jewehy, collections and IP, and (5)
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`Attorney's Fees.
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`Discussion of Issugg
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`1. Gifts to third persons and charitable donations made
`with community funds during Yogi Bhajan's lifetime.
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`a. l,egal Discussion
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`Bibijit claims that during his lifetime Yogi Bhajan made gifts and charitable contributions
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`using community funds without her consent. Bibijit relies on Roselli v. Rio Communities Service
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`Station,Inc.,l09 N.M.509,787P.2d428 ( 1990),forthepropositionthatbecauseshedidnot
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`consent to the gifts of charitable donations, she should be reimbursed for her half of the
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`3
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`community funds used to make the gifts and donations from Yogi Bhajan's share of the
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`community property, which otherwise eventually would go to Staff Endowment. Bibiji's request
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`seeks application of the general rule:
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`It one spouse unilaterally attempts to give away community property during the life of
`the grantor, the nonconsenting spouse may set aside the gift in its entirety except that,
`following the death of the grantor spouse, the gift may be avoided only to the extent of
`the nonconsenting spouse's one-half interest. Absent intervening equities, a gift of
`substantial community propsrty to a third person without the other spouse's consent may
`be revoked and set aside for the benefit of the aggrieved spouse. If a spouse does not act
`for the benefit of the community and does not have the other spouse's express or implied
`consent, the acting spouse may be separately liable for gifts arising out of community
`property.
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`158 Am. Jur.2d Community Property $ 85 (2012). Bibiji does not seek to set aside the gifts, but
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`rather she seeks to receive one-half the value of the gifts from Yogi Bhajan's share of the
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`community property.
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`In Roselli Husband took out insurance policies using community funds to pay the
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`premiums and, without Wife's consent, and named Husband's son by a former marriage as the
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`beneficiary. After Husband's death, Wife sued to recover the proceeds paid under the policies.
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`The Court determined that there were material issues of fact on the issue of consent which
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`precluded summary judgment. In so doing, the Court determined that either party may manage
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`and dispose of the community property but such power to manage is subject to a fiduciary duty
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`totheotherspouse. Id.at5l4,787P.2dat433. Inadoptingthisrule,theCourtlookedto
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`Washington and Texas in its discussion of fiduciary duty. Thus this Court has also looked to
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`those states for guidance in determining what would amount to a breach of fiduciary duty which
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`would allow Bibiii to recover her share of the communitv interpst that was siven awav,
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`Roselli cited a Washington statute as bei.g similar to New Mexico's law. In relevant
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`part, that statute provides: "Neither person shall give community property without the express or
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`4
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`implied consent of the other." Wash. Rev. Code $ 26.16.030 (2) (2008). While the Washing5ton
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`statute appears to establish an absolute prohibition, it is doubtful if that represents a coffect
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`statement of the law in New Mexico. Such doubt is cast by the Roselli reference to fiduciary
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`duty irnmediately following the reference to the statute. Thus a gift without implied or express
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`consent is voidable only if the gift amounts to a breach of fiduciary duty. This position is further
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`strengthened by the citation to Texas law which applies consftuctive trust analysis to the issue.
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`The Texas rule has been summarized:
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`It is not necessary that one spouse approve or agree with the dispositions made by
`the other spouse of that other spouse's special community property. . . . However.
`a relationship of trust and confidence exists between husband and wife which
`requires that a spouse's disposition of his special community property [i.e., ttrar
`community property which he controlsl be fair to the other spouse. . . . The
`rnanaging spouse has the burden to show that his disposition of the property was
`fair. . . .
`The court will consider three primary factors of "fairness" in reviewing one
`spouse's claim of constructive fraud against the other. . . . The factors to be
`considered are the size of the property disposed of in relation to the total size of
`the community estate; the adequacy of the estate remaining to support the other
`spouse after the disposition; and the relationship of the parties involved in the
`transaction or, in the case of a gift, of the donor to the donee.
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`Massev v. Massev.807 S,W.2d 391.402 (Tex. eiv. App, 1991) (cifatiqns omittedi.
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`In appiying this rule, Texas has developed some criteria to review, which are set forth below in
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`the form of a question
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`Was the gift a reasonable one for a just cause? Kemp v. Metropolitan Lifu Insurance
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`Co.,2O5F.2d857,863 (5th Cir. 1953), states the rule, "Texas recognizes the right of the
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`husband to make rnoderate gifts for just causes . . . ." One commentator has stated that Roselli
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`indicates that New Mexico follows the reasonable gift rule and thus would require consent only
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`if the gift were of an unreasonable amount. J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community
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`Estate During an Intact Marriage,56 Lew & Cowrnvp. PRonl-e[4s 99, 138, n.240 (1993)
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`5
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`("Oldham"). Reasonableness of the gifts depends on "the identity of the donee. the economic
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`position of the spouses, and whether the gifts substantially depleted the marital estate or
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`negatively affected the ability of the spouses to be economically self-sufficient." Id. at l4t.
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`Was the property given excessive when compared to the community estate as a
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`whole? Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,33l F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1964) (voiding a gift to
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`husband's mother that exceeded 98 percent of the community estate); Hartmanv. Crain,398
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`S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (voiding a gift to husband's sister that was more than doubie
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`the husband's share ofthe community estate), are examples of this criterion. Similarly, in
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`Brown v, Brown,282 S.W,2d 90 (Tex, Civ. App. 1955), ths equrt upheld a clft of aoproximatelv
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`one-eighth the value of the entire communityestate. Tabassiv.NBC Bank,737 SJff.2d612
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`(Tex. Ct. App. 1987), upheld gifts worth approximately 30 percent of the community estate.
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`Was the gift in discharge of a legal, moral or civic obligation? Gifts which discharge
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`moral obligations have been treated sympathetic ally. See, e.g., Kemp v. Metropolitan Life
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`Insuranee Co.,220F.2d952 (5th Cir. 1955). See generally Brown.
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`These criteria are helpful guidelines to determine whether a fiduciary duty was breached
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`in this case. In addition, there is the additional issue of whether Bibiji gave express or implied
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`consent to these gifts. There is not much case law in the area of implied consent to the gifting of
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`community assets from which to draw guidance. Affirmative consent is obviously suff,rcient
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`evidence of consent. SomE commentators have suggested that signing a jointly filed tax reruilr
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`might suffice to constitute consent. Otdham at l{i , .
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`b. Challenged Gifts
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`Exhibit 5054 contains a list of the challenged gifts made by Yogi Bhajan from 1993 to
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`2004. The evidence shows that the list was developed by Bibiji's accountant in consultation with
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`6
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`Bibiji's attorney and was not based on conversations with Bibiji herself.l The evidence aiso
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`shows that the list was taken from an accounting entry that was used to show non-deductible .
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`disbursements and some of the items mav not havo been eifts but non-deductibls personai
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`expenses, such as payments for services. The Trustees produced a single chart titled "Gifts
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`(other than charitable)" on August 30, 2005. [Sea Ex. 140] Nevertheless, Bibiji has altered her
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`posrdon the gifts, without explanation for her position. A comparison demonstrates that the
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`contested gift totals presented by Bibiji vary through the years: in 2Ol2 and 201l, unapproved
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`gifts total $576260; in 2009, unapproved gifts total $582,183; in2OAT,unapproved gifts total
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`$324946.40.[Ex.505A:2All Reportatp.3;2009ReportatExhibit 1;Ex. 177 atp.21i
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`Bibiji did not testify. No evidence was offered to show that Bibiji objected to any
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`particular gift. The failure to provide specific evidence is not surprising as some of the
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`expenciitures were for a trip that Bibiji took to Africa, payments to support Bibiji and Yogi
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`Bhajan's daughter's clothing line, payments to family members, expenditures for visits from
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`Indian guests, or payments to ailing members of the Sikh community. In addition some of the
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`"gtfts" were payment for Yogi Bhajan's care by a doctor, payments for religious services, and
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`paymenrs to tndian Sikhs. (Ex. 140) Many of the gifts are small in comparison to the
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`community estate. Even in the aggregate, the gifts do not approach the types of gifts that were
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`held to violate the non-giving spouse's rights. Absent a specific showing that a particular gift
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`was a breach of Yogi Bhajan's fiduciary duty, this claim is rejected,
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`c. The Charitable Contributions
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`No evidence was present about specific donations to which Bibiji objected. Again, Bibiji
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`did not testify. Bibiji claims that all charitable contributions exceeding 15 percent of the
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`I ln general, the evidence as to these gifts presented by Counterclaimant was lsss than convincing. The claims
`changed without explanation; the witness deleted back-up infor .mation, and the witness denied knowledge of a list of
`gifts he was supposed to have prepared.
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`7
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`couple's annual income for the years l98lto 2OA4 were unauthorized. The amount she claims
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`was unauthorized is $2,860,677, of which she seeks one-half from Yogi Bhaian's share of the
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`communify estate. The approach taken by Bibiji's accountant was merely to compare the annuai
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`income to the annual charitable contributions. Where the contributions exceeded 15 percent, the
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`overage was claimed as an unauthorized contribution. No credit was given for years in which
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`rhe contributions were less than 15 percent; those years were simply excluded from
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`consideration. Similarly, even as to contributions which Bibiji expressly approved, the amounts
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`of those contributions were included in the calculation of the overage.' The Court finds thrs
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`approach to be inconsistent and unfair.
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`fhe Court, like the Trustees, has trouble crediting this claim. It would appear that Bibiji
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`did not know the exact amount of the charitable contributions that Yogi Bhajan was making.
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`(See Ex. 469,474) That in itself is not a breach of fiduciary duty since Bibiji had agreed that
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`Yogi Bhajan would have sole management of the trust which held the community assets during
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`their lifetimes,
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`Many of the donations were to non-profit organizations that were involved in the
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`couDle's spiritual mission.3 (Flx.92) Bibiji has served on the boards of many of these non-profit
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`organizations and has represented Sikh Dharma at gatherings around the world. (See Ex.92) It
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`also appears that giving is part of the Sikh religion and is embodied in a pracfice known as
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`Dasvandh, which is comparable to tithing (the practice of giving one-tenth of one's income,
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`particularly to a religious organization). Initially, Bibiji objected to everything over 10 percent
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`The fallacy of this method of computation is best illusuated by the gift of the Ranch in Espanola to which Bibiji
`admitted she consented. Nevertheless. the value of this gift was included by the accountant in his calculations. The
`value of this gift significantly increases the percentage of income gifted in the year of the gift and in the aggregate.
`' Bibiji serves as the Bhai Sahiba for Sikh Dharma, which means she is the chief minister on religious practices for
`the Sikh religion. (In addition to her spirirual title, Bibiji also hold a Ph.D.) Yogi Bhajan was the Siri Singh Sahib
`of Sikh Dharma, a title which reflects Yogi Bhajan's role in teaching the practice of the Sikh religion.
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`It
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`of income, but subsequently she changed her objection point to the 15 percent mark. No clear
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`explanation of this change was provided. (C/. Ex. 177,p. fi54) In fact, it may be that the
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`obligation to give charity has no maximum percentage. Bibiji wrote: "As ministers we are
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`reachers. We must give ourselves as an example and everyone must understand that they should
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`give one-tenth because we are giving our all." (Ex. 142 (emphasis added).) In a letter to the
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`Sikh community Bibiji stated: "My husband and I have built the organization and given millions
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`of dollars of contribution over the years. More than money, we have dedicated our lives to these
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`organizations. My husband and I donated the Ranch in Espanola and several other properties we
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`own to Sikh Dharma." (Ex 143)
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`The above recited facts constitute circumstantial evidence of consent, and lead the Court
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`to find that there was an implied, if not express, consent to the charitable contributions. ,See
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`generally State v.Templeton,20O7-NMCA-108, J 14,142 N.M.369, 165 P.3d 1145
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`(recognizing that consent may be shown by circumstantial evidence). When viewed from the
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`context of the course of conduct of the marital communityns life, consent has been shown. Cf ,
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`McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc.,l l0 N.M. 1,4-5,791 P.2d 452,455-56 (1990) (stating that "[aJn
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`implied contract is an agreement in which parties by a course of conduct [and custom and usage]
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`have shown an intention to be bound by such agreement") (citation omitted and brackets in
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`original).
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`Further. the Court finds that under ttre criteria cited above. there was no breach of
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`fiduciary duty by Yogi Bhajan in making the gifts. The donations, while sizeable. were
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`reasonable in light of the communiW's life mission and for iust causes: the donations were Dart
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`of a moral and ethical obligarion, and the donations were not excessive compared to the
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`community estate. The donations did not leave Bibiji without the means to sustain herself. Ex.
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`q
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`341, Schedule I shows Bibiji received $3,69223I.87 upon the death of Yogi Bhajan; Bibiii i*
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`also entitled to receive one-half of the future royalties from all of Yogi Bhajan's IP.
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`Finally, it seems clear that the donations were made in part to obtain tax benefits. which
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`were substantial. (Ex. 92) A calculation of the tax benefits, which the Court credits as an
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`estimate.a showed that the federal tax benefits were equal to $1,118,892 and the state tax benefits
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`were equal to$220,543. (Ex. 343,344) The Counterclaimant's failure to account in any way for
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`the tax benefits reeeived by the communitj on account of the donations causes the Court to re.iect
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`Counterclaimant' s calculations,
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`Counterclaimant's position throughout has been that the Trustees breaohed a fiduciarv
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`duty because they failed to make a Roselli reallocation upon her counsel's demand for such
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`reallocation. This position mistakes the duties of the Trustees.s They had cluties to the
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`beneficiaries of Staff Endowment as well as to Bibiji. By statute the Trustees were to administer
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`the trust "as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional
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`requirements and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall
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`exercise reasonable care, skill and caution ." See NMSA 1978, $ 46A-8-804 (2003). The
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`Trustees carried out these duties.
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`2. Trustees' Handling of the IP Licensed to GTO
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`An important source of income for the Living Trust was the license of certain IP rights to
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`Golden Temple of Oregon, LLC ("GTO") and the 1996licensing agreement with Amalgamated
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`covering Europe. (Ex . 10, 'll , 12) GTO had a license to use the likeness of Yogi Bhajan to
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`4 The objection to the estimate is that it is impossible to know how to value the tax advantages because it ts
`impossible to know what would have been done with the money if it had not be donated. Because a large
`rnotivarion tbr the donations was to gain tax advantages for the community, it is fairer to recognize the advantage to
`fte community rather than to ignore it the way Counterclaimant's accountant did.
`) At various times in her argument brief Bibiji complains of actions two of the Trustees and the bookkeeper took
`before Yogi Bhajan's death. This argument ignores the fact that before Yogi Bhajan's death, these women were not
`trustees or agents of the Trust; they were employees of Yogi Bhajan, who was the sole trustee with discretion to
`inanage rhe Living Trust property. The women owed no fiduciary duty to Bibiji prior to the death of Yogi Bhajan.
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`lo
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`market teas and other products. Following Yogi Bhajan's death, the ownership of this IP was
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`divided. By the end of 2004 one-half of these interests were distributed to Bibiji and one-half to
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`the Administrative Trust. In May 2005 Freeland suggested that management agreements be
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`drafted between Bibiji representatives and the Administrative Trust to deal with the jointly held
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`IP assets. (Ex. 120) This was not done.
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`In 2008 GTO notified the Trustees that it intended to stop using the Yogi Bhajan IP, and
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`it ceased royalty payments to the Administrative Trust. After a notice of default was sent rc
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`GTO, royalty payments were resumed. Later in 2008 GTO ceased to make royalty payments to
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`both the Administrative Trusr and to Bibiji. Bibiji initiated an arbitration action against Golden
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`Temple. Meanwhile the Trustees of the Adminisffative Trust continued to negotiate with GTO,
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`and they reached an Interim Licensing Agreement ("ILA"). The ILA contemplated an eventual
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`sale of a portion of the IP but such sale has not been finalized. Further, the sale was to be
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`approved by the Court and any interested party could object. While Bibiji was not copied on the
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`written communications about the sale, the negotiations were not secret. Bibiji also declined to
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`participate in the negotiationr.c
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`in addition to the ILA, the Trustees also entered into a tolling agreement with GTO
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`related to the Amalgamated European sales contract. The Trustees negotiated this agleement to
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`avoid incurring litigation expenses which would be engendered were they to pursue the claim
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`regarding this royalty contract. This agreement preserved the rights of the Trustees to sue GTO
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`at a later date, Eventually, these royalty disputes were made part of the ILA. Ex. 14.
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`Some of the terms in the ILA are of import to the issues being decided, In part the ILA
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`states that "[n]othing in this agreement purports, or is intended to affect Bibiji's co-ownership in
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`6 It appears that Bibiji was taking the position that Administrative Trust (or the ultimate beneficiaries) had no
`ownership interest in the Yogi Bhajan trademarks. (Ex'212)
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`any intellectual property;" and "[i]f this agreement is not terminated . . . by December 31, 201 l,
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`GTO agrees that on the first business day thereafter, it will offer substantially the same material
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`terms and conditions of this agreement to Bibiji Inderjit Kaur Puri ("Bibiji") which will include *
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`rcn (10) day period within which to accept or reject the offer." (Exh. 14). The offer is not
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`insubstantial.
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`While the Trustees were negotiating with GTO to continue use of the trademark, Bibiji's
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`representative was trying to negotiate with others. While the parties disagree over the <iegree to
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`which the Trustees were invited to participate in these efforts, the Court finds that the details of
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`these negotiations were not shared with the Trustees.? Further, Bibiji's representatives have
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`iiegoriated an agreement with an entiry that has little or no market presence in the tea business
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`and has little or no history of manufacturing or marketing teas. This entity does not seem to
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`meet the basic licensee requirements being sought by Bibiji's representatives.
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`The Court credits the testimony that the reason the Trust did not participate in the
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`arbitration was to avoid additional legal expenses so as to preserve the Trust's assets. The Court
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`also credits the testimony that the Trustees entered the ILA to keep the trademark in the inarket,
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`which preserved the hademark's value. The Trustees entered into the ILA with the company that
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`had the market and had they not done so, GTO would have rebranded its product without the
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`YOGI mark. (See generallyEx.219.) Such removal of the mark from the market would have
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`adversely affected its value. This decision was fiscally prudent. The Court also believes the
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`Trustees' decision that it was prudent to consider a sale of the mark and to seek indemnity was a
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`result of the continued litigation against the Trust by Bibiii"
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`7 As to the Wai Lana and Hearthside negotiations, the Court credits the Trustees claim that they were never
`sut'ficientlyinformedofthesenegotiationstoparticipate.See,e.9.,Ex.222,225,229,231.
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`T2
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`Bibiji appears to object to aspects of an offer that may have been made to the
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`Administrative Trust. One communication from the lawyer for GTO to the lawyer for the
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`Administrative Trust states:
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`indeed, GTO continues to believe that the litigatlon between BBG and YB Trusts is not
`nnly unfortunate but also squanders assets and undermines the good name of YB. GTO
`plans to make the following offer to BBG: If BBG drops all litigation against the YB trust
`(and waives and agrees not to assert any other claims arising out of the marriage to YB,
`YB's will or the royalty agreement(s), then GTO will consider making gifts to BBG in an
`amount to be determined. The YB trust would, of course, also need to drop any claims
`that it may have. The parties would need to provide assurances that they would not
`disparage each other, YB or GTO or its direct and indirect owners.
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`(Ex. 188) This concept appears to have been incorporated into a draft proposal, which included
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`payments to Bibiji and to the beneficiaries of the Staff Endowment Trust. (Ex. 191) The final
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`version of the offer was transmitted to Bibiji's representative on March L6,2009. (Ex. 193) The
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`Trustees never agreed to this offer.
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`The first step in the analysis of this issue is to determine the relationship of the parties.
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`Bibiji's position appears to be that since she may acquire something more than one-half of the IP
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`rights, the Trustees owe her afiduciary duty.8 The Court disagrees with this logic. Bibiji was
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`entitled to one-half of the trademark and that was distributed to her. Her "entitlement" to more
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`than half is a contingent claim that depends on her succeeding in her claim to an equitable
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`reallocation of Yogi Bhajan's half of the community estate and a further determination that such
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`equitable reallocation should be made by transferring some portion of the Administrative Trusf
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`interest in the trademark to Bibi.ii. As such the Trustees do not hold one-half of the IP interests
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`in the trademarks in a fiduciary capacity vis-l-vis Bibiji. any more than any other potontial
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`r
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`Prior to the transfer to Bibiji of her one-half interest in the IP rights, the Trustees did hold that intere$t in trust for
`Bibiji, but that interest was transferred in December 2004. Once that transfer was accomplished, the Trustees'
`fiduciary duties as to that interest ended.
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`l3
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`judgment debtor holds property that might be used to satisfy a judgment in trust for his potential
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`judgment creditors.
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