Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA829576
`06/27/2017
`
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`
`Filing date:
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Proceeding
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`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`91230351
`
`Defendant
`Cigar Bella
`
`MICHAEL B LEE
`MICHAEL B LEE PC
`1820 E SAHARA AVE STE 110
`LAS VEGAS, NV 89104
`UNITED STATES
`Email: mike@mblnv.com
`
`Submission
`
`Motion for Summary Judgment
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`Filer's Name
`
`Filer's email
`
`Signature
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`Date
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`Attachments
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`Yes, the Filer previously made its initial disclosures pursuant to Trademark Rule
`2.120(a); OR the motion for summary judgment is based on claim or issue pre-
`clusion, or lack of jurisdiction.
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`The deadline for pretrial disclosures for the first testimony period as originally set
`or reset: 10/13/2017
`
`Michael B. Lee
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`jmyers@dickinsonwright.com, mike@mblnv.com
`
`/Michael B. Lee/
`
`06/27/2017
`
`Motion for Summary Judgment - CIGAR BELLA Ser. No. 86861405.pdf(97512
`bytes )
`Exhibit 1 - Cigar Bella LLC NV SOS.pdf(76968 bytes )
`Exhibit 2 OR-
`DR_Order_Vacating_Plaintiff_s_Application_For_Temporary_Restraining_Order
`__Denying__In.pdf(139799 bytes )
`Exhibit A - Declaration of K. Kelley - CIGAR BELLA.PDF(151418 bytes )
`Exhibit B - Translation of CIGAR BELLA.pdf(85022 bytes )
`Exhibit C - Beautiful Define Beautiful at Dictionarycom.pdf(239712 bytes )
`Exhibit E - History of the Cigar Girl.pdf(233586 bytes )
`Exhibit F - CIGAR Marks.pdf(4527118 bytes )
`Exhibit D - Girl Synonyms Girl Antonyms Thesauruscom.pdf(280966 bytes )
`
`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`CF Dominicana Cigars, Inc.; Royal Flush
`Events, Inc., dba CIGAR DOLLS,
`
`
`
`
`
`Cigar Bella LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91230351
`Application Serial No.: 86861405
`Mark: CIGAR BELLA (Stylized)
`
`Filed Pursuant to FRCP 56
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposer,
`
`Applicant.
`
`
`APPLICANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
`AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW
`
`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.127 and 2.116 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
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`56, Applicant, Cigar Bella LLC (“Applicant”), through Counsel Michael B. Lee, PC, hereby
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`moves for final summary judgment of the Notice of Opposition filed by CF Dominicana Cigars,
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`Inc. (“Opposer”) because, as a matter of law and fact, there is no likelihood of confusion
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`between the Applicant’s mark and the Opposer’s mark.
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`This Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) is based on (1) the attached
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`Memorandum of Points and Authorities, (2) the Declaration of Katrina Kelley, and all exhibits
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`attached thereto, (2) all pleadings and papers on file herein and (6) upon any other evidence that
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`the Board may consider.
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`
`
`
`
`Dated: June 26, 2017
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MICHAEL B. LEE, PC
`
`
`
`
`
`/Michael B. Lee/
`Michael B. Lee, Esq.
`1820 E. Sahara Ave. Suite 110
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
`(702) 477-7030 (phone)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`
`The Parties
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`Applicant Cigar Bella, LLC is a small, entrepreneurial company organized under the laws
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`I.
`
`
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`of the State of Nevada on November 29, 2015. See Declaration of Katrina Kelley ¶ 1
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`(hereinafter, “Kelley Decl.”), attached hereto as Exhibit A. Applicant provides live cigar rolling
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`services throughout the United States, including, but not limited to, live cigar demonstrations,
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`live cigar rolling for weddings and special events, hand-rolled cigars, and custom cigar and
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`wine/food pairings. Kelley Decl. ¶ 2. Applicant’s principal and employees are professionally
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`trained cigar rollers, which have been practicing their craft for more than fifteen years. Id. ¶ 3.
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`
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`On or around April 27, 2012, over three years before Applicant’s incorporation,
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`Applicant’s principal, Katrina Kelley, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement
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`(“Agreement”) with Opposer. Id. ¶ 4. In the Agreement, Ms. Kelley agreed to provide Opposer
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`with cigar rolling services in exchange for compensation. Due to Opposer’s abusive behavior
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`towards Ms. Kelley, Ms. Kelley ended her professional relationship under the Agreement on or
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`around spring 2014. Id. ¶ 5. In retaliation for Ms. Kelley’s termination of the Agreement, on
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`September 24, 2015, Opposer filed a Complaint against Ms. Kelley in the District Court of
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`Nevada. Id. ¶ 6. On or about March 24, 2015, the Complaint was dismissed in its entirety. Id. ¶
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`7. Contrary to Opposer’s false statements to the contrary, at no time has any court action been
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`filed against Applicant Cigar Bella, LLC. Id. ¶ 8.
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`
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`On December 30, 2015, Applicant, after due diligence and in good faith, filed an
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`application for registration of the unique mark CIGAR BELLA (Ser. No. 86861405) in Class 41
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`for “[a]rranging and conducting special events for social entertainment purposes; [c]onducting
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`entertainment exhibitions in the nature of live cigar rolling demonstrations held at special
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`

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`events” in the stylized text as shown below:
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`II.
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`Opposer’s Notice of Opposition and False Statements of Fact
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`On September 28, 2016, Opposer filed a Notice of Opposition (“Notice”) to the
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`registration of the CIGAR BELLA Mark. The Notice claims Applicant’s mark CIGAR BELLA
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`“is confusingly similar to Opposer’s CIGAR DOLLS Marks and CIGAR CHICAS Mark.”
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`However, Opposer’s opposition does not allege how or why Applicant’s use of its CIGAR
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`BELLA mark creates a likelihood of confusion. As demonstrated below, there is no genuine
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`dispute as to any material fact because the Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark is not confusingly
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`similar to Opponent’s CIGAR DOLLS and CIGAR CHICAS marks. As such, Applicant is
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`entitled to judgement as matter of law.
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`
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`As a preliminary matter, it is important to bring to the Board’s attention the false
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`statements of fact presented by Opposer in its Notice. First, Opposer asserts that Applicant
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`entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement with Opposer. (Doc. 1 ¶ 29.) As evidence,
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`Opposer attaches the Independent Contractor Agreement, which is dated May 27, 2012. (Doc. 1
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`¶ 30.) Applicant did not exist in 2012 and, in fact, was not incorporated until September 2015—
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`over three years after the Independent Contractor Agreement was signed. Therefore, Applicant
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`and could not have legally entered into any agreement with Opposer. Kelley Decl. ¶ 1.
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`Additionally, all allegations contained in Opposer’s Notice related to any relationship between
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`the Applicant and Opposer are false as evidenced by Opposer’s own Exhibits attached thereto,
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`which do not name Applicant. Applicant was not a party to the Independent Contract
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`

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`Agreement. (Doc. 1, Ex. B.) Applicant was not a party to the Complaint Opposer attached to its
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`Notice. (Doc. 1, Ex. E.) Moreover, Ms. Kelly ended her professional relationship with Opposer
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`in the Spring of 2014, over a year before Applicant was incorporated. Kelley Dec. ¶ 5.
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`
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`Opposer also blatantly attempts to mislead the Board by misquoting the vacated
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`preliminary injunction. Opposer falsely states that it had been granted a preliminary injunction
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`against Applicant. (Doc. 1 ¶ 37.) The preliminary injunction attached to Opposer’s Notice dated
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`April 5, 2016 does not name Applicant. (Doc. 1, Ex. F.) Opposer falsely inserted Applicant’s
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`name, knowing full well that Applicant’s name did not appear in the order and that Applicant
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`was not even a party to that lawsuit. (Doc. 1 ¶ 38.) Moreover, at the time Opposer filed its
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`Notice on September 28, 2016, the preliminary injunction described in and attached to Opposer’s
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`Notice had been vacated for over four months. Kelley Decl. ¶ 7.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Summary Judgment Standard
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`Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), “[t]he Board shall grant summary judgment if the movant
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`I.
`
`
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`shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
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`judgment as a matter of law.” The Federal Circuit has stated that, “[t]he basic purpose of
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`summary judgment procedure is…to save the time and expense of a full trial when it is
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`unnecessary because the essential facts necessary to decision of the issue can be adequately
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`developed by less costly procedures…” See Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc., 222 USPQ
`
`741, 743 (Fed. Cit. 1984). In the context of an opposition proceeding, the determination of
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`likelihood of confusion is “unquestionably” appropriate issues for summary judgment. See
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`Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 4 USPQ2d 1973 (Fed. Cir. 1987). To dispute a
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`material fact, the non-moving party must offer more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence; the
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`

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`evidence must be such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict” for the non-moving party.
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`See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
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`
`
`
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`In the instant case, there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the likelihood of
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`confusion between Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark and Opposer’s CIGAR DOLLS and
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`CIGAR CHICA marks.
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`
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`II.
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`Likelihood of Confusion Standard.
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`
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`Determination of the existence of a likelihood of confusion is based on an analysis of the
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`probative facts relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re E. I. Du Pont
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`DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). In determining whether a likelihood of
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`confusion exists, however, the Board need not consider every factor. Id. (citing Han Beauty Inc.
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`v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“While it must consider each factor
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`for which it has evidence, the [b]oard may focus its analysis on dispositive factors, such as
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`similarity of the marks...”) (emphasis added)).
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`
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`Moreover, the Board may dismiss an opposition based on a determination of the first Du
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`Pont factor alone. See Champagne Louis Roederer, S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373,
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`1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming the TTAB’s dismissal of opposition action where it “treated
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`the dissimilarity of the marks with respect to appearance sound, significance, and commercial
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`impression as the dispositive Du Pont factor, concluding that this dissimilarity alone precluded
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`any reasonable likelihood of confusion.”); Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enterprises, Inc., 951 F.2d
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`330 (Fed. Cir. 1991) affirming TTAB decision finding no likelihood of confusion based on the
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`first Du Pont factor alone). As conclusively shown below, the first Du Pont factor by itself —
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`dissimilarity of the marks—is dispositive of this case.
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`/ / /
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`

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`III. The Marks are Distinguishable.
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`
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`In this case, Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA Mark is dissimilar from Opposer’s CIGAR
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`CHICA and CIGAR DOLLS marks in sight, sound, meaning, and overall commercial impression
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`such that consumer confusion is unlikely. Specifically, the respective marks look different, have
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`different sounds when spoken, and marks’ dominant terms, namely, BELLA, DOLLS, and
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`CHICAS, have significantly different meanings.
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`
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`Marks are found to be confusingly similar when they are the same in appearance, sound
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`and meaning. Horn’s, Inc. v. Sanofi Beaute, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing
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`Revlon, Inc. v. Jerell, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The mere identification of
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`common elements between two marks does not mean that a likelihood of confusion exists.
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`Source Srv. Corp. v. Chicagoland JobSource Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1048 (N.D.Ill. 1986). Rather,
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`the addition or deletion of words to a mark may avoid a likelihood of consumer confusion if the
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`marks in their entireties convey different commercial impressions. See TMEP § 1207.01(b)(iii);
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`see also Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Institute of Technology, 181 U.S.P.Q. 277
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`(C.C.P.A. 1974).
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`
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`In fact, “the use of identical, even dominant words in common does not automatically
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`mean that the two marks are similar.” General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442,
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`1445 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no confusing similarity between the marks OATMEAL RAISIN
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`CRISP and APPLE RAISIN CRISP for breakfast cereal). “Rather, a court must look to the
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`overall impression created by the marks and not merely compare individual features.” Id.
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`Additions or deletions to marks are sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if: (1) the marks
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`in their entireties convey significantly different commercial impressions; or (2) the matter
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`common to the marks is not likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source
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`

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`because it is merely descriptive or diluted. TMEP § 1207.01(b)(iii).
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`
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`In numerous cases, the Board has held that no likelihood of confusion existed between
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`two marks for the same or related goods, despite the fact that one mark contained the whole of
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`the other. See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 167 U.S.P.Q. 529 (C.C.P.A.
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`1970) (PEAK PERIOD not confusingly similar to PEAK); Lever Bros. Co. v. Barcolene Co., 174
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`U.S.P.Q. 392 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (ALL CLEAR not confusingly similar to ALL); In re Farm Fresh
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`Catfish Co., 231 USPQ 495 (CATFISH BOBBERS not confusingly similar to BOBBER); In re
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`Ferrero, 178 U.S.P.Q. 167 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (TIC TAC not confusingly similar to TIC TAC
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`TOE); Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Miss Quality, Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 422 (C.C.P.A. 19 75)
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`(COUNTRY VOGUES not confusingly similar to VOGUE); In re Merchan dising Motivation,
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`Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 364 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (MMI MENSWEAR not confusingly similar to MEN'S
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`WEAR); Plus Products v. General Mills, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 520 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (PROTEIN
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`PLUS and PLUS not confusingly similar). “It is the impression which the mark as a whole
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`creates on the average reasonably prudent buyer and not the parts thereof, which is important.”
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`Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1944-5
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`(6th Cir. 1987) citing Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, in Trademarks and Unfair Competition
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`23:15 (2d ed. 1984) also found in 23:41 (4th ed. 1996).
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`
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`Furthermore, when comparing marks in a likelihood of confusion analysis, the “Anti-
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`Dissection Rule” dictates that marks are not to be dissected, but rather are to be considered as a
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`whole. See TMEP § 1207.01 (citing In re National Data Corp., 224 U.S.P.Q. 749, 750-51 (Fed.
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`Cir. 1985)); 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:41 (4th ed.). Stated
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`differently, “[t]he fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of
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`differences in the essential characteristics … and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods,
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`

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`Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976).
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`A.
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`The Marks Are Different in Appearance.
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` A prominent design feature and differing term can sufficiently distinguish marks. See,
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`e.g., In re White Rock Distilleries, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1282, 1284 (TTAB 2009) (no confusion
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`between VOLTA and TERZA VOLTA); Steve's Ice Cream v. Steve's Famous Hot Dogs, 3
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`USPQ2d 1477, 1478 - 79 (TTAB 1987) (no confusion between mark STEVE’S and design and
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`STEVE’S in block letter form for selling ice cream).
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`
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`In this case, Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA is sufficiently distinguishable in visual
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`appearance from each of Opposer’s claimed marks.
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`
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`First, Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA (Stylized) mark and Opponent’s CIGAR DOLLS
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`design mark are sufficiently distinguishable in visual appearance to avoid consumer confusion.
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`Applicant’s Mark
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`Opposer’s Marks
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`As shown above, Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA (Stylized) mark consists of two terms,
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`CIGAR and BELLA, in a highly distinctive typeface and color, namely, a high-end,
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`sophisticated, gold cursive. In contrast, Opponent’s CIGAR DOLLS mark is comprised of the
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`term CIGAR in a dissimilar typeface conjoined with the term DOLLS, in Broadway-style flashy
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`light bulb, of the type commonly seen in theater marquis signs. Given the visual differences
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`between these two marks, consumers will not be confused as to the origin of Applicant’s
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`services.
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`Second, Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA (Stylized) mark is visually distinct from Opposer’s
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`

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`CIGAR DOLLS and CIGAR CHICAS marks in plain text. Again, Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA
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`(Stylized) mark is visually distinct from CIGAR DOLLS and CIGAR CHICAS. Moreover,
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`while all three marks share the generic term CIGAR, each differs in the second term—BELLA,
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`DOLLS, and CHICAS—respectively.
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`
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`Such differences distinguish the Applicant’s mark from the Opposer’s marks such that
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`there can be no likelihood of consumer confusion.
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`B.
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`The Marks Sound Different
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`Similarity in sound is another factor to be considered in determining whether two marks
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`are confusingly similar. TMEP § 1207.01(b)(iv). Where the literal portions of two marks
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`contain different terms, the marks are deemed distinguishable. See e.g., In re White Rock
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`Distilleries, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1282, 1284 (TTAB 2009) (VOLTA for vodka not confusingly
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`similar to TERZA VOLTA for wine).
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`In this case, when spoken aloud, Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark does not sound
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`similar to Opposer’s CIGAR DOLLS or CIGAR CHICAS marks. The marks are made up of
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`different terms, thus, when spoken aloud, Applicant’s and Opposer’s marks necessarily sound
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`different. Applicant’s mark is aurally distinct and consumers can easily differentiate between it
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`and the Opposer’s marks.
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`Due to the lack of aural similarity between the Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark and
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`Opponent’s CIGAR DOLLS and CIGAR CHICAS marks, there is no likelihood of confusion
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`among consumers who hear the marks.
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`C.
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`The Marks Have Different Meanings and Overall Commercial Impressions.
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`Notably, even where marks are visually and phonetically similar, which in this case they
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`are not, confusion may be prevented by the different meanings and suggestive connotations of
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`

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`the marks. See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:28 (4th ed.); see also
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`Revlon, Inc. v. Jerell, Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1612, 1616 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Such differences of
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`connotation and meaning are key factors in determining the likelihood of confusion. Different
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`connotations themselves can be determinative, even where identical words with identical
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`meanings are used.”). Moreover, the meaning to the target market is significant in a likelihood
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`of confusion analysis. See 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:28 (2000).
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`Where a word has different meanings in different contexts, use of the same words will not be
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`likely to cause confusion. See id. Further, the focus is on the recollection of the average
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`purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of a trademark. See
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`e.g., In re White Rock Distilleries, Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1282, 1284 (TTAB 2009)
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`
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`In this case, the Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark has a significantly different meaning
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`than Opposer’s CIGAR DOLLS and CIGAR CHICAS. Specifically, the Applicant’s CIGAR
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`BELLA mark, translates from Italian to English as “BEAUTIFUL CIGAR.” Kelley Decl. ¶ 8;
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`see also a true and correct copy of the online translation for CIGAR BELLA is attached hereto as
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`Exhibit B. In Applicant’s Mark, BEAUTIFUL is an adjective that connotes “having beauty;
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`possessing qualities that give great pleasure or satisfaction to see, hear, think about etc.;
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`delighting the senses or mind;” “excellent of its kind” and “wonderful; very pleasing or
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`satisfying.” A true and correct copy of the definition of BEAUTIFUL is attached hereto as
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`Exhibit C. As used in Applicant’s Mark, the term BELLA/BEAUTIFUL describes the noun
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`CIGAR, conveying to consumers the idea of an excellent and pleasing cigar.
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`
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`In contrast, Opposer’s CIGAR CHICAS mark translates from Spanish to English as
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`“CIGAR GIRLS,” as reflected on Opposer’s application for the CIGAR CHICAS mark (Ser. No.
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`86465049). Notably, the terms GIRLS and DOLLS are synonyms, with both terms identifying
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`

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`young women. A true and correct copy of a thesaurus for GIRL and DOLL is attached hereto as
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`Exhibit D. Thus, in both of Opposer’s marks – CIGAR CHICAS/GIRLS and CIGAR
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`DOLLS—the adjective
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`is CIGAR. Stated differently,
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`the
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`term CIGAR describes
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`CHICAS/GIRLS and DOLLS and conveys a specific meaning to consumers, namely, women
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`that sell or distribute cigars. This meaning is reinforced in the minds of consumers because cigar
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`girls are well-known classic features of bars and lounges of the early twentieth century. See a
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`true and correct copy of Cigar Advisor Magazine’s article titled “History of a Cigar Girl”
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`attached hereto as Exhibit E.
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`
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`As demonstrated, the Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark has a significantly different
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`meaning than Opposer’s CIGAR DOLLS and CIGAR CHICAS and consumer will not be
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`confused as to the source of Applicant’s services.
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`D.
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`The Opponent’s Marks Are Weak and Should Be Entitled to Narrow
`Protection.
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`A comparison of Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark and the Opposer’s CIGAR DOLLS
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`and CIGAR CHICAS marks must also take into consideration the impact other third-party
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`registrations have on the strength of the Opposer’s marks. TMEP § 1207.01. Such third-party
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`registrations are relevant to show that a mark (or term therein) is so commonly used that the
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`public will look to other elements to distinguish the source of goods. TMEP § 1207.01(d)(iii).
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`In other words, where there are several similar marks owned by unrelated parties (aka a
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`“crowded field”), the extent of each mark’s distinctiveness may be limited on one hand, yet
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`consumers are likely to be able to carefully distinguish between them on the other. See 2 J.
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`Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:85, at 11-163 (4th
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`ed. 2004).
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`
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`For example, the T.T.A.B. has determined that where there is a crowded field, similar
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`

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`marks with minor distinctions can be registered. See In re Broadway Chicken, Inc., 38 USPQ2d
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`1559, 1565-66 (T.T.A.B. 1996) (held BROADWAY PIZZA, BROADWAY CARRYOUT and
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`BROADWAY DELI can co-exist on the Principal Register—“evidence of widespread use, in a
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`particular field of marks containing a certain shared term is competent to suggest that purchasers
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`have been conditioned to look to other elements of the marks as a means of distinguishing the
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`source of goods or services in the field”). “[I]n a ‘crowded’ field of similar marks, each member
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`of the crowd, is relatively ‘weak’ in its ability to prevent use by others in the crowd.” J. Thomas
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`McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 11:85 at 11-163 (4th Ed. 2001).
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`
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`Applying the same reasoning as In re Broadway Chicken to the instant case, there is no
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`indication that purchasers would not be able to differentiate between the numerous co-existing
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`marks that include the term “CIGAR” for cigar-related goods. The weakness of Opposer’s
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`marks is evidenced by the fact there are currently over four hundred (400) third-party live
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`registered marks and pending applications for CIGAR-formative marks in Classes 34 and 41, and
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`over for six hundred (600) across all Classes, for cigars and cigar rolling-related goods and
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`services, including, to name just a few:
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`• CIGAR DAVE (Reg. No. 3503873) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR ADVISOR (Reg. No. 4772218) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR AFICIONADO (Reg. No. 3614669) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR EXPO (Reg. No. 4622729) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR NATION (Reg. No. 4172768) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR CAMP (Reg. No. 3414323) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR INSIDER (Reg. No. 3508337) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR SENSE (Reg. No. 4770255) in Class 41;
`• CIGAR MAN (Reg. No. 4559161) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR KING (Reg. No. 2312984) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR BORE (Reg. No. 4896595) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR CANNON (Reg. No. 4852185) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR ART (Reg. No. 4789315) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR OASIS (Reg. No. 3703929) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR CADDY (Reg. No. 3843366) in Class 34;
`
`

`

`• CIGAR SAVOR (Reg. No. 2414999) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR KEEPER (Reg. No. 3543216) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR-JAK (Reg. No. 4182940) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR FAMILY (Reg. No. 3125955) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR FAMILY (Reg. No. 3578353) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR SCIENCES (Reg. No. 4012204) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR HARVEST (Reg. No. 4682694) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR FEDERATION (Reg. No. 4557478) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR MARVELS (Ser. No. 86468230) (allowed) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR MARVELS (Ser. No. 86468236) (allowed) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR STONE (Ser. No. 86964621) (allowed) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR STANDARD (Ser. No. 86468246) (allowed) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR STANDARD (Ser. No. 86468214) (allowed) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR CLASSICS (Ser. No. 87169556) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR MOB (Ser. No. 87132186) in Class 34;
`• CIGAR SECTOR (Ser. No. 87185896) in Class 34);
`• VEGAS STRIP CIGARS (Reg. No. 3930205) in Class 34; and
`• DOS CABALLOS CIGARS (Reg. No. 4640396) in Class 34.
`
`A true and correct copy of the USPTO Registration Certificates or TDSR Records for the
`
`
`
`foregoing marks are attached hereto as Exhibit F.
`
`
`
`In light of the foregoing evidence that numerous entities use CIGAR-based marks in
`
`connection with identical and/or highly related goods in Classes 34 and 41, the Opposer’s
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`CIGAR DOLLS and CIGAR CHICAS are weak marks. Accordingly, Opposer’s marks should
`
`be given a narrow scope of protection, barring registration of only virtually identical marks.
`
`
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
`
`

`

`IV. CONCLUSION.
`
`
`
`As demonstrated above, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact because the
`
`Applicant’s CIGAR BELLA mark is distinguishable from Opposer’s marks in sight, sound,
`
`meaning, and overall commercial impression, particularly in light of the crowded field of
`
`CIGAR-formative marks, such that consumer confusion is not likely. Accordingly, Applicant is
`
`entitled to judgement as matter of law. Applicant respectfully requests that summary judgment
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`be entered in favor of Applicant, the Notice dismissed with prejudice, and Applicant’s mark be
`
`allowed to proceed to registration.
`
`
`
`Dated this 27th day of June 2017.
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`MICHAEL B. LEE, PC
`
`/s/Michael B. Lee
`MICHAEL B. LEE
`mike@mblnv.com
`2000 S. Eastern Avenue
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
`(702) 477-7030 (phone)
`(702) 477-0096 (fax)
`
`Attorneys for Applicant
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`
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`I hereby certify that, on June 27, 2017, a true and complete copy of the foregoing
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`APPLICANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND SUPPORTING
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`MEMORANDUM OF LAW has been served by United States mail, first class postage prepaid,
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`on the Applicant and his Attorney of Record to:
`
`
`CF Dominicana Cigars, Inc.
`800 E. Charleston Blvd.
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
`
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`
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`
`
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`
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`By:
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`
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`/Michael B. Lee/
`Michael B. Lee
`
`
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`
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`____________
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`

`Entity Details - Secretary of State, Nevada
`
`Page 1 of 2
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`CIGAR BELLA LLC
`
`Business Entity Information
`
`Status: Active
`
`File Date: 11/29/2015
`
`Type:
`
` Domestic Limited-Liability
`
`Company
`
`Entity Number: E0555202015-5
`
`Qualifying State: NV
`
`List of Officers Due: 11/30/2017
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`Managed By: Managing Members
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`Expiration Date:
`
`NV Business ID: NV20151703701
`
`Business License Exp: 11/30/2017
`
`Additional Information
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`Central Index Key:
`
`Registered Agent Information
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`Name: KATRINA KELLEY
`
`Address 1: 9624 ROYAL LAMB DRIVE
`
`Address 2:
`
`State: NV
`
`Phone:
`
`City: LAS VEGAS
`
`Zip Code: 89145
`
`Fax:
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`Mailing Address 1: 9624 ROYAL LAMB DRIVE
`
`Mailing Address 2:
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`Mailing City: LAS VEGAS
`
`Mailing State: NV
`
`Mailing Zip Code: 89145
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`Agent Type: Noncommercial Registered Agent
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`Financial Information
`
`No Par Share Count: 0
`
`No stock records found for this company
`
`− Officers
`
` Managing Member - KATRINA KELLEY
`
`Capital Amount: $ 0
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` Include Inactive Officers
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`Address 1: 9624 ROYAL LAMB DRIVE
`
`Address 2:
`
`City: LAS VEGAS
`
`Zip Code: 89145
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`Status: Active
`
`− Actions\Amendments
`
`Action Type: Articles of Organization
`
`Document Number: 20150519038-64
`
`File Date: 11/29/2015
`
`(No notes for this action)
`
`Action Type: Initial List
`
`State: NV
`
`Country: USA
`
`Email:
`
`# of Pages: 2
`
`Effective Date:
`
`http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/PrintCorp.aspx?lx8nvq=M%252fjFVwDWFyWpnSWlaxvvUg%253d%253d
`
`6/9/2017
`
`

`

`Entity Details - Secretary of State, Nevada
`
`Page 2 of 2
`
`Document Number: 20150519039-75
`
`File Date: 11/29/2015
`
`(No notes for this action)
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`Action Type: Annual List
`
`Document Number: 20170075862-68
`
`File Date: 2/22/2017
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`(No notes for this action)
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`# of Pages: 1
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`Effective Date:
`
`# of Pages: 1
`
`Effective Date:
`
`http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/PrintCorp.aspx?lx8nvq=M%252fjFVwDWFyWpnSWlaxvvUg%253d%253d
`
`6/9/2017
`
`

`

`MICHAEL B. LEE, ESQ.
`
`Nevada State Bar No. 10122
`
`MICHAEL B. LEE, RC.
`1820 E. Sahara Avenue, Suite 110
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89104
`Telephone:
`(702) 477.7030
`Facsimile:
`(702) 477.0096
`Attorneys for Defendant KATRINA KELLEY
`
`Electronically Filed
`05/27/2016 05:32:10 PM
`
`We. 11%
`
`CLERK OF THE COURT
`
`IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
`
`CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
`
`CF DOMINICANA CIGARS INC., a Nevada CASE NO.: A-15-715818—C
`Corporation; ROYAL FLUSH EVENTS, INC., DEPT. N0.: XVII
`a Delaware Corporation, dba CIGAR DOLLS,
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`ORDER VACATING PLAINTIFF’S
`APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY
`RESTRAINING ORDER, DENYING
`INJUNCTION, DENYING MOTION FOR
`CIGAR CHICAS LLC, a Nevada Domestic A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT AND
`Liabilty Company; KATRINA KELLEY an
`DENYING COUNTERMOTION TO
`individual; GUADALUPE
`PEREZ,
`and
`DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`individual, and DOES I through X,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Date of Hearing: May 11, 2016
`Time of Hearing: 9:00 am.
`
`Presently before this Honorable Court is Plaintiffs CF DOMINICANA CIGARS INC.
`
`(“CF”) and ROYAL FLUSH EVENTS, INC. dba CIGAR DOLLS (“Cigar Dolls”) (“CF” and
`
`“Cigar Dolls” are collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”) Application for Temporary Restraining
`
`Order and Injunction (“Application”), Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Permanent
`
`Injunction
`
`(“Injunction Motion”),
`
`and Defendant KATRINA KELLEY’s
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`(“Kelley”)
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`Countennotion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint, or in the Alternative for a More Definite
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`Statement (“Counter-Motion”). Plaintiff appeared by and through their attorney, LAW OFFICE OF
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`STEPHEN A. BOWERS, Ms. Kelley appeared by and through her attorney for record, MICHAEL B.
`
`LEE, P.C., but no appearance or Opposition to the Motion For Injunction was made by C0—
`
`Defendants CIGAR CHICAS, LLC (“Cigar Chicas”) or LUPE PEREZ (“Perez”) (“Kelley,”
`
`“Cigar Chicas,” and “Perez” are collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Based on the briefs,
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`arguments, and evidence attached in support of the briefs, this Honorable Court hereby issues the
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`following findings:
`
`Page 1 of 2
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