Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA698398
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`09/25/2015
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91223663
`Defendant
`Vincent Giovannetti
`ANTHONY M VERNA III
`VERNA LAW PC
`445 HAMILTON AVE, SUITE 1102
`WHITE PLAINS, NY 10601
`UNITED STATES
`Vgiovannetti@live.com, anthony@vernalaw.com
`Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)
`Anthony M. Verna III
`anthony@vernalaw.com
`/s Anthony M. Verna III s/
`09/25/2015
`motion to dismiss Giovannetti.pdf(611063 bytes )
`
`Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`

`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`Opposition No.: 91223663
`
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`Salt Life, LLC
`
`
`vs.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`Giovannetti, Vincent
`
`
`
`Defendant
`
`
`
`
`
`MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`Defendant Vincent Giovannetti, (“Defendant” or “Applicant”), through his attorney,
`
`Anthony M. Verna III, hereby files this Motion to Dismiss based upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for a
`
`failure to state a claim against the Notice of Opposition that Salt Life, LLC (“Plaintiff” or
`
`“Opposer”) filed against Defendant’s trademark application, U.S. Serial No. 86592650, SALT
`
`PRO.
`
`
`
`
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 1 of 13
`
`

`
`Table of Contents
`
`Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2
`
`I.
`
`Facts..................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
`
`II. The Standard of a Motion to Dismiss ..................................................................................................................... 4
`
`III.
`
`Plaintiff/Opposer has not met its burden ....................................................................................................... 5
`
`a. Likelihood of Confusion .............................................................................................................................................. 6
`
`b. Trademark Dilution ...................................................................................................................................................... 9
`
`IV.
`
`Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 11
`
`
`
`
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 2 of 13
`
`

`
`Table of Authorities
`
`Cases
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) ......................................................................... 4, 8
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) ................................................................................ 4, 5, 7
`Coach Services Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1723-24 (Fed. Cir.
`2012) ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
`Doyle v. Al Johnson's Swedish Restaurant & Butik, Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1780, 1782 (TTAB 2012) ............... 4
`Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) ........... 8
`I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 USPQ2d 1225, 1239 (1st Cir. 1998) .......................... 9
`In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) .......................... 7, 8
`In re MajesticDistilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............... 8
`King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974) ..................... 5
`King Candy Co., Inc. v. Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974) ........... 7
`Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 187 (CCPA 1982) ............... 4
`Solid Host v. Namecheap, 652 F.Supp.2d at 1099 (CD Cal 2009) ............................................................................ 8
`Top Tobacco, LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir.2007) .................................................... 10
`Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 USPQ2d 1164 at 1170 (TTAB 2001) ....................................................... 9, 10, 11
`TotesIsotoner Corp. v. U.S., 594 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 5
`Wella Corp. v. Clairol, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. 190 (T.T.A.B. 1971) ............................................................................... 6
`Young v. AGB Corp., 152 F.3d 1377, 47 USPQ2d 1752, 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1998) .................................................. 4
`Zirco Corp. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 21 USPQ2d 1542 (TTAB 1991)............................... 5
`
`Statutes
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) .............................................................................................................................................................. 5, 7
`15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) .................................................................................................................................................................. 5
`15 U.S.C. § 1067 ....................................................................................................................................................................... 5
`15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) ........................................................................................................................................................... 9, 10
`TBMP § 503.02 (3d ed. rev. 2012) ...................................................................................................................................... 4
`
`Other Authorities
`
`J. T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.8 (2004) 6
`
`Rules
`
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ........................................................................................................................................................... 5, 8
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ................................................................................................................................................................. 8
`
`
`Page 3 of 13
`
`
`
`
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`

`
`I.
`
`Facts
`
`Applicant Vincent Giovannetti is an individual who filed SALT PRO on April 9,
`
`2015. SALT PRO represents goods/services of “Board shorts; Hats; Sweaters; T-shirts; Tank
`
`tops” in International Class 25.
`
`Opposer Salt Life, LLC owns various trademark registrations, such as SALT LIFE, in
`
`word and stylized format, for varying goods/services, filed at various different times.
`
`
`
`II.
`
`The Standard of a Motion to Dismiss
`
`A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is a test of the sufficiency of a
`
`complaint. See TBMP Section 503.01 (3d ed. 2011). To survive such a motion, a plaintiff need
`
`only allege sufficient factual matter as would, if proved, establish that (1) the plaintiff has
`
`standing to maintain the proceeding, and (2) a valid ground exists for opposing or cancelling the
`
`mark. Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 187 (CCPA
`
`1982). Also see Young v. AGB Corp., 152 F.3d 1377, 47 USPQ2d 1752, 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
`
`TBMP § 503.02 (3d ed. rev. 2012).
`
`Specifically, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
`
`a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
`
`contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
`
`face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic
`
`Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain
`
`statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specifically a complaint, or
`
`counterclaim, “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
`
`that is plausible on its face.’” Doyle v. Al Johnson's Swedish Restaurant & Butik, Inc., 101
`
`USPQ2d 1780, 1782 (TTAB 2012) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbalat 678.
`
`Page 4 of 13
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`

`
`Any defendant to a complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim may move to dismiss under
`
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The party
`
`moving for dismissal has the burden of showing that no claim has been stated.
`
`During this threshold review, [t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
`
`but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.
`
`In the context of inter partes proceedings before the Board, a claim has facial plausibility
`
`when the opposer or petitioner pleads factual content that allows the Board to draw a reasonable
`
`inference that the opposer or petitioner has standing and that a valid ground for the opposition or
`
`cancellation exists. Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1955.
`
`In particular, a plaintiff need only allege "enough factual matter … to suggest that [a
`
`claim is plausible]" and "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." TotesIsotoner Corp. v.
`
`U.S., 594 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`
`Moreover, if the opposer has provided notice pleading of a claim under Trademark Act
`
`Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), by alleging (1) priority, based on its ownership of pleaded
`
`registrations and pending applications filed prior to the filing date of the defendant’s involved
`
`application; and (2) likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue, then the opposer has
`
`done enough. See Trademark Act Section 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c); King Candy Co. v. Eunice
`
`King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA 1974); Zirco Corp. v. American
`
`Telephone and Telegraph Co., 21 USPQ2d 1542 (TTAB 1991).
`
`
`
`
`III.
`
`Plaintiff/Opposer has not met its burden
`
`The power of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board comes from 15 U.S.C. § 1067
`
`(Section 17 of the Lanham Act). Specifically, 15 USC § 1067(a) states “In every case of
`
`interference, opposition to registration, application to register as a lawful concurrent user, or
`
`application to cancel the registration of a mark, the Director shall give notice to all parties and
`Page 5 of 13
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`

`
`shall direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to determine and decide the respective rights of
`
`registration.”
`
`The Plaintiff in this particular proceeding has not met its burden in writing a Notice of
`
`Opposition.
`
`The Plaintiff appears to have two legal theories: 1) Likelihood of Confusion and 2)
`
`Trademark Dilution.
`
`a. Likelihood of Confusion
`
`The Plaintiff has alleged adjectives of “famous” and “significant goodwill” ¶6 of the
`
`Notice of Opposition. However, these are but conclusory expressions as Plaintiff has not
`
`attempted to identify with appropriate and necessary detail the characteristics of what is
`
`“famous” or how there’s “significant goodwill” about the SALT LIFE marks.
`
`To summarily declare its marks “famous” or with “significant goodwill” is admittedly an
`
`attribute that is permitted a registered trademark owner, but in this instance it comes with little
`
`explanation in the pleading.
`
`The plaintiff also pleads that common-law rights exist. ¶5 of the Notice of Opposition.
`
`In order to properly allege superior proprietary rights for a plaintiff relying on common law
`
`rights, the plaintiff must also plead priority of use or “use analogous to trademark use” Wella
`
`Corp. v. Clairol, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. 190 (T.T.A.B. 1971) and either the inherent or acquired
`
`distinctiveness of its mark. In the case of acquired distinctiveness, the opposer must allege facts
`
`sufficient to show, if proven, that the ordinary consumer associates the mark with a “single,
`
`though anonymous source.” See J. T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
`
`UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.8 (2004).
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 6 of 13
`
`

`
`The complaint should then set forth the basic facts supporting plaintiff’s claim of
`
`likelihood of confusion. These include, as applicable, allegations as to the similarity of the marks
`
`in sight, sound, and/or meaning; similarity of the goods and/or services; similarity of trade
`
`channels and classes of purchasers of the goods and/or services; the fame of plaintiff’s mark; the
`
`similarity of the conditions under which buyers encounter plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; and
`
`the nature and extent of any actual confusion. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
`
`1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
`
`The Notice of Opposition, besides not being in a short and plain statement and numbered
`
`paragraphs, tries to mention a few key points under the Lanham Act and the theory of a
`
`likelihood of confusion under §2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), but never truly spells out the theory or
`
`in the proper format.
`
`In this particular case, the Plaintiff ignores a key factor and only talks about the
`
`trademarks involved.
`
`In order to state properly a claim of likelihood of confusion, a plaintiff must plead that (1)
`
`the defendant's mark, as applied to its goods or services, so resembles the plaintiff's mark or
`
`trade name as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception; and (2) priority of use. See
`
`King Candy Co., Inc. v. Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108 (CCPA
`
`1974)
`
`This means that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board must speculate on the legal theory
`
`that the Plaintiff believes he will be harmed under. To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual
`
`allegations of a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
`
`and the complaining party must offer “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
`
`recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. at 555.
`
`Page 7 of 13
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`

`
`It would be nice if Plaintiff reached to that level. Alas, the Plaintiff did not do that at all.
`
`The Plaintiff does not allege even labels or conclusions. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
`
`permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
`
`— but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
`
`(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). (And in Iqbal, the Plaintiff had a well-pleaded facts section. The
`
`pleading in this proceeding is not adequate to cover any facts or legal theory.)
`
`In ruling upon a motion based upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court may also properly
`
`consider matters that can be judicially noted under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
`
`Solid Host v. Namecheap, 652 F.Supp.2d at 1099 (CD Cal 2009).
`
`A determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative facts in
`
`evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion. In re E. I.
`
`du Pont de Nemours & Co., at 567. See also In re MajesticDistilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d
`
`1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Therefore, an assessment of whether the Plaintiff
`
`has made a prima facie case for likelihood of confusion will consider the same factors. In any
`
`likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks
`
`and the similarities between the goods. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,
`
`544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d)
`
`goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
`
`differences in the marks.”).
`
`In this particular instance, the Plaintiff has pleaded that the marks are famous and that is
`
`likely to cause confusion. The Plaintiff failed to plead how the marks are famous. The Plaintiff
`
`has failed to plead how Applicant’s mark resembles the Plaintiff’s marks. The Plaintiff’s Notice
`
`of Opposition is completely conclusory.
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 8 of 13
`
`

`
`Plaintiff does not make any link between its registrations and the Applicant’s mark or the
`
`goods/services the various marks represent.
`
`b. Trademark Dilution
`
`In order to prove trademark dilution, the plaintiff must prove:
`
`(1) that plaintiff owns a famous mark that is distinctive;
`
`(2) the defendant is using a mark in commerce that allegedly dilutes the plaintiff's
`
`famous mark;
`
`(3) the defendant's use of its mark began after the plaintiff's mark became famous;
`
`and
`
`(4) the defendant's use of its mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring.
`
`Coach Services Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d
`
`1713, 1723-24 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`Opposer's assertion of dilution under Section 43(c) of the Trademark Act of 1946,
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) in the pleading is deficient in as much as opposer did not plead how
`
`its marks have become famous; how its marks are distinctive; and how blurring will take
`
`place.
`
`In fact, the plaintiff didn’t even plead that its marks are distinctive in any aspect.
`
`In addition, the fame that must attach to a mark for it to be eligible under the
`
`dilution provisions of the Trademark Act is greater than that which qualifies a mark as
`
`famous for the du Pont analysis of likelihood of confusion. Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61
`
`USPQ2d 1164 at 1170 (TTAB 2001), citing I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163
`
`F.3d 27, 47 USPQ2d 1225, 1239 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[T]he standard for fame and
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 9 of 13
`
`

`
`distinctiveness required to obtain anti-dilution protection is more rigorous than that
`
`required to seek infringement protection.”).
`
`A mark is famous if it “is widely recognized by the general consuming public of
`
`the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's
`
`owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). By using the “general consuming public” as the
`
`benchmark, the TDRA eliminated the possibility of “niche fame,” which some courts had
`
`recognized under the previous version of the statute. See Top Tobacco, LP v. N. Atl.
`
`Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir.2007) (noting that the reference to the general
`
`public “eliminated any possibility of ‘niche fame,’ which some courts had recognized
`
`before the amendment”).
`
`In this case, ¶9 of the Notice of Opposition uses the word “dilution,” but doesn’t
`
`explain the term. The Plaintiff is, again, writing a Notice of Opposition to be vague. If
`
`the Plaintiff means that its marks are famous to the general consuming public, why
`
`doesn’t it say so? Probably because the marks are not. Neither does the Plaintiff assert
`
`exactly how its marks became famous. Regardless, the Plaintiff comes to a conclusion,
`
`hoping one sentence is sufficient, instead of pleading why the Plaintiff’s marks are
`
`famous.
`
`Those marks must be famous AND distinctive. Distinctiveness – or lack thereof –
`
`was discussed above. “To be vulnerable to dilution, a mark must be not only famous, but
`
`also so distinctive that the public would associate the term with the owner of the famous
`
`mark even when it encounters the term apart from the owner’s goods or services, i.e.,
`
`devoid of the trademark context.” Toro at 1177.
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 10 of 13
`
`

`
`An example of a mark that is famous but not very distinctive is CLUE: “[it] may
`
`have significant recognition and renown to the extent that purchasers of board games
`
`would be very familiar with it. But it was found not to be very distinctive in the
`
`marketplace in general.” Toro at 1177.
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposer’s trademarks are not well-known in the apparel industry.
`
`Trademark dilution must fail because the plaintiff has not pleaded how its marks
`
`became famous, what’s distinctive – if anything – about its marks,
`
`
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`The Plaintiff has a duty when filing pleadings to make allegations that rise beyond
`
`mere speculation. The plaintiff must state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
`
`Plaintiff’s Notice of Opposition fails to state any claim upon which relief may be granted.
`
`The Plaintiff does not link its goods/services to the Applicant’s goods/services. The
`
`Plaintiff does not fully plead how consumers would be confused if the Applicant’s mark
`
`on Applicant’s goods/services when compared to the Plaintiff’s marks on the Plaintiff’s
`
`goods/services. The Plaintiff also did not fully plead trademark dilution. The Plaintiff
`
`comes to the conclusion that the Plaintiff’s marks are famous, but does not plead how
`
`those marks are famous or distinctive. The Plaintiff also did not discuss how its marks
`
`would be blurred.
`
`For these reasons, the Board should grant the motion to dismiss; dismiss this
`
`opposition; and allow the Applicant’s mark, SALT PRO, to register.
`
`
`
`
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 11 of 13
`
`

`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Dated: September 25, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s Anthony M. Verna III
`Anthony M. Verna III, Esq.
`Verna Law, P.C.
`445 Hamilton Ave., Ste. 1102
`White Plains, NY 10601
`
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 12 of 13
`
`

`
`Anthony M. Verna III, Esq.
`Verna Law, P.C.
`445 Hamilton Ave., Ste. 1102
`White Plains, NY 10601
`
`IN THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Opposition No.: 91223663
`
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`Salt Life, LLC
`
`
`vs.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`Giovannetti, Vincent
`
`
`
`Defendant
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 25th day of September, 2015, a copy of the
`
`foregoing Motion was served via First Class Mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
`
`J. Parks Workman
`Dority & Manning, P.A.
`P.O. Box 1449
`Greenville, SC 29602-1449
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Dated this September 25, 2015
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s Anthony M. Verna III
`
`
`
`Anthony M. Verna III, Esq.
`Verna Law, P.C.
`445 Hamilton Ave., Ste. 1102
`White Plains, NY 10601
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Motion to Dismiss – Giovannetti
`
`
`
`Page 13 of 13