Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`
`ESTTA944580
`
`Filing date:
`
`12/31/2018
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Proceeding
`
`91223018
`
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Defendant
`Great Management Group, LLC
`
`LISEL M FERGUSON
`PROCOPIO CORY HARGREAVES & SAVITCH LLP
`525 B ST STE 2200
`SAN DIEGO, CA 92101-4474
`UNITED STATES
`lisel.ferguson@procopio.com, calendaring@procopio.com, docket-
`ing@procopio.com, diane.trus@procopio.com, jamie.quient@procopio.com,
`michele.fuger@procopio.com, matthew.sheilds@procopio.com,
`mlf@procopio.com, liz.bojorquez@procopio.com
`619-238-1900
`
`Submission
`
`Filer's Name
`
`Filer's email
`
`Brief on Merits for Defendant
`
`Lisel M. Ferguson
`
`Lisel.Ferguson@procopio.com, calendaring@procopio.com,
`Michele.fuger@procopio.com, matthew.shields@procopio.com
`
`Signature
`
`Date
`
`/Lisel M. Ferguson/
`
`12/31/2018
`
`Attachments
`
`GMGs_and_GCs_Brief_on_the_Merits_of_the_Case.PDF(139936 bytes )
`
`

`

`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Opposition No. 91223018 (parent)
`Cancellation No. 92061951
`
`
`Serial Nos. 86-434,445
`
`86-434,461
`
`
`Marks: DANTANNA’S
` DANTANNA’S TAVERN
`
`) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
`
`
`
`
`
`CHUTTER, INC.,
`
`Opposer,
`
`v.
`
`GREAT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC,
`
`Applicant.
`
`
`
`CHUTTER, INC.,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`GREAT CONCEPTS, LLC,
`
`Registrant.
`
`GREAT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC’S AND GREAT CONCEPTS, LLC’S
`
`BRIEF ON THE MERITS
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`II.
`
`DESCRIPTION OF THE RECORD .................................................................................. 3
`
`III.
`
`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES........................................................................................ 4
`
`IV. RECITATION OF THE FACTS ........................................................................................ 5
`
`V.
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 10
`
`A.
`
`The Board Should Deny Chutter’s Petition to Cancel the Registration,
`Because Chutter Has Failed to Show that GC Knowingly Made a False,
`Material Representation with the Willful Intent to Deceive the USPTO in
`Order to Obtain or Maintain its Registration. ....................................................... 10
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Chutter Has Presented No Evidence to Show That Registrant
`“Knowingly” Made the Inaccurate Statement in the Declaration “with
`Intent to Deceive.” .................................................................................... 11
`
`Chutter Misguidedly Asks the Board to Establish New Law by
`Deciding that Fraudulent Intent Includes Either “Willful Blindness”
`or “Reckless Disregard for the Truth,” Despite the Lack of Any
`Evidence Here to Support Either Theory. ................................................. 14
`
`Chutter’s Claims for Cancellation Based on Unpleaded and
`Undisclosed Allegations of “Fraudulent Retention of Benefits of the
`Declaration” and “Invalidity Due to Violation of USPTO Signature
`Rules” ........................................................................................................ 17
`
`Even if Chutter Had Presented Sufficient Evidence of a Willful Intent
`to Deceive the USPTO, the Inaccurate Statement Was Plainly Not
`Material to GC’s Obtaining or Maintaining Its Registration of the
`Mark. ......................................................................................................... 21
`
`B.
`
`The Board Should Deny Chutter’s Opposition to the Application Because It
`Has Failed to Either Establish a Likelihood of Confusion or a False
`Suggestion of Connection to Mr. Tana ................................................................. 25
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Chutter Fails to Show Any Likelihood of Confusion within the
`Meaning of Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act Because of the Marks’
`Dissimilar Geographic and Marketing Channels and Because of the
`Lack of Any Actual Confusion ................................................................. 25
`
`Chutter Also Once Again Fails to Establish the Existence of Any
`False Suggestion of a Connection to Mr. Tana within the Meaning of
`section 2(a) of the Lanham Act ................................................................. 28
`
`VI.
`
`SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... 30
`
`-i-
`
`

`

`
`
`FEDERAL CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`American Paging, Inc. v. American Mobilphone, Inc.
`13 U.S.P.Q.2D 2036 (TTAB 1989) ...................................................................................27, 28
`
`American Speech-Language-Hearing Association v. National Hearing Aid Society
`224 USPQ 798 (TTAB 1984) ..................................................................................................30
`
`Boyd’s Collection, Ltd. v. Herrington & Co.
`65 USPQ2d 2017 (TTAB 2003) ..............................................................................................20
`
`Buffett v. Chi-Chi’S, Inc.
`226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) ¶ 428 (P.T.O. June 13, 1985) .................................................................29
`
`Canovas v. Venezia
`80 S.R.L., 220 USPQ 660 (TTAB 1983) .................................................................................30
`
`Cerveceria India, Inc. v. Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A.
`10 USPQ2d 1064 (TTAB 1989) ..............................................................................................20
`
`Conwood Corporation v. Loew’s Theatres, Inc.
`173 U.S.P.Q. 829 (TTAB 1972) ..............................................................................................24
`
`Crown Wallcovering Corp. v. Wall Paper Manufacturers Ltd.
`188 USPQ 141 (TTAB 1975) ............................................................................................23, 24
`
`Duffy-Mott Co. v. Cumberland Packing Co.
`424 F.2d 1095 (C.C.P.A. 1970) .........................................................................................23, 24
`
`G. B. Kent & Sons Ltd. v. Colonial Chemical Corporation
`162 U.S.P.Q. 557 (TTAB 1969) ..............................................................................................24
`
`Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.
`131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011) ..............................................................................................................15
`
`In re Bose Corp.
`580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009)................................................................1, 2, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17
`
`In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
`476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973) .........................................................................25
`
`In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.
`315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .................................................................26
`
`-ii-
`
`

`

`Kemin Indus., Inc. v. Waltkins Prods., Inc.
`192 USPQ 327 (T.T.A.B. 1976) ..............................................................................................14
`
`Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc.
`963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ...................................................................26
`
`King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc.
`496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ...............................................................................................28
`
`Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.
`863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988)..................................................................................................14
`
`L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc.
`192 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999)................................................................................................11
`
`McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. National Data Corp.
`228 USPQ 45 (TTAB 1985) ....................................................................................................29
`
`Mecanicos Unidos S.A. v. Victorio, LLC,
`2016 WL 6833508 at *7, Cancellation No. 92058060 (TTAB 2016) .....................................16
`
`Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Network Inc.
`104 F.3d 336 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..................................................................................................11
`
`Miller Brewing Co. v. Anheiser Busch Inc.
`27 USPQ2d 1711 (TTAB 1993) ..............................................................................................28
`
`Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co.
`407 F.2d 881 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ...........................................................................................21, 23
`
`Royal Hawaiian Perfumes, Ltd. v. Diamond Head Products of Hawaii, Inc.
`204 U.S.P.Q. 144 (T.T.A.B. 1979) ..............................................................................23, 24, 25
`
`Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Olin Corp.
`209 USPQ 1033 (T.T.A.B. 1981) ..........................................................................10, 14, 17, 21
`
`Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
`464 U.S. 417 (1984) .................................................................................................................15
`
`Sovereign Mil. Hospitaller Or. of St. John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta v.
`Fla. Priory of Knights Hospitallers of Sovereign Or. of St. John of Jerusalem,
`Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Or.
`702 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................................15
`
`Standard Knitting, Ltd. v. Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha
`77 USPQ2d 1917 (TTAB 2006) ..............................................................................................16
`
`-iii-
`
`

`

`Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.
`935 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................................13
`
`Torres v. Cantine Torresella S.r.l.
`808 F.2d 46 (Fed. Cir. 1986)....................................................................................................23
`
`United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.
`248 U.S. 90 (1918) ...................................................................................................................15
`
`United States Olympic Committee v. Olymp-Herrenwaschefabriken Bezner GmbH
`& Co.
`224 USPQ 497 (TTAB 1984) ..................................................................................................30
`
`University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., Inc.
`703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983) .....................................................................29
`
`Van Dyne-Crotty Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp.
`926 F.2d 1156, 17 USPQ2d 1866 (Fed. Cir. 1991) .................................................................27
`
`Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Advance Welding and Mfg. Corp.
`184 U.S.P.Q. 367 (TTAB 1974) ..............................................................................................24
`
`W.D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co.
`377 F.2d 1001 (1967) ...............................................................................................................10
`
`Zanella Ltd. v. Nordstrom, Inc.,
`2009 WL 4073487, Opposition No. 91177858 (TTAB 2009).................................................16
`
`FEDERAL STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND RULES
`
`15 U.S.C.
`§ 1052(a) ..................................................................................................................................28
`§ 1052(d) ..................................................................................................................................25
`§ 1058.......................................................................................................................................24
`§ 1058(a) ..................................................................................................................................23
`§ 1064(3) ............................................................................................................................22, 25
`§ 1065.......................................................................................................................................24
`§ 1115(b)(1) .......................................................................................................................22, 25
`
`Code of Federal Regulations, Title 37
`§ 2.128(a)(1) ............................................................................................................................10
`
`
`
`-iv-
`
`

`

`Applicant GREAT MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC (“GMG”) and Registrant GREAT
`
`CONCEPTS, LLC (“GC”) submit the following Brief on the Merits in response to Opposer and
`
`Petitioner CHUTTER, INC.’s (“Chutter”) Brief on the Case.
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Over 12 years after previously trying to cancel GC’s Registration No. 2,929,764 (the
`
`“Registration”) for the mark “DANTANNA’S” due to an alleged likelihood of confusion,
`
`Chutter now lacks any evidence to support its new petition to cancel based on GC’s alleged
`
`fraud. Chutter carries the burden of proving that GC knowingly made a false material statement
`
`with the willful intent to deceive USPTO for purposes of obtaining or maintaining the
`
`Registration. But there is no evidence – let alone clear and convincing evidence – that GC’s
`
`submission of a Combined Declaration of Use and Incontestability under sections 8 and 15 (“the
`
`Declaration”) instead of a Section 8 declaration of continuing use was the result of anything
`
`other than an inadvertent mistake. At most, the evidence shows that GC’s counsel should have
`
`reviewed the Declaration more closely to notice that the form Declaration prepared by his
`
`paralegal inaccurately stated that there were no proceedings pending at the time of the
`
`Declaration which involved the rights to the Registration. But as stated in the Federal Circuit’s
`
`seminal decision in In re Bose Corp., “[s]ubjective intent to deceive, however difficult it may be
`
`to prove, is an indispensable element in the analysis.” 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To
`
`be sure, Chutter has presented no evidence showing that GC knowingly submitted the
`
`Declaration with the subjective willful intent to deceive the USPTO.
`
`Faced with this lack of evidence, Chutter is now retreating to more tenuous bases to
`
`cancel the Registration. Specifically, Chutter requests the Board to expand the law into new
`
`territory and decide that “willful blindness” and “reckless disregard for the truth” constitute
`
`-1-
`
`

`

`fraudulent intent, despite the fact (as Chutter acknowledges) that no Board decisions have ever
`
`found either of these to be sufficient to show fraudulent intent since the Federal Circuit’s Bose
`
`decision. Even if these were valid legal bases, this certainly would not be an appropriate factual
`
`case for the Board to expand the body of law. The undisputed evidence shows that GC’s counsel
`
`reviewed the Declaration but merely overlooked some of its content. This cannot support a
`
`finding of either “willful blindness” or “reckless disregard for the truth.”
`
`As a last resort, Chutter also tries to establish fraudulent intent by contending that GC
`
`either “fraudulently retained the benefits of the Declaration,” or it “violated the USPTO’s rules
`
`governing e-signatures.” Chutter recently tried to add these two bases as new causes of action in
`
`a motion for leave to amend the pleadings that it filed on the day before its Opening Brief on the
`
`Merits was initially due on June 7, 2018, but the Board ultimately denied Chutter’s motion for
`
`leave to amend. The Board agreed with GC that Chutter unduly delayed in seeking leave to
`
`amend and that GC would be prejudiced by having no opportunity to present evidence or
`
`otherwise address Chutter’s proposed new claims. Undaunted by the Board’s ruling, Chutter is
`
`now trying to shoehorn these new claims into its original fraud claim, even though Chutter never
`
`once suggested in its pleadings or its contention interrogatory responses that it would be seeking
`
`to rely on either of these bases. Accordingly, just as the Board previously denied Chutter’s
`
`attempt to add these new causes of action on the eve of trial, the Board should again reject
`
`Chutter’s current attempt to ambush GC with these contentions at the final briefing stage.
`
`Further, even if there were evidence of fraudulent intent, the inaccurate statement in the
`
`Declaration could not be material to GC’s “obtaining” or “maintaining” the Registration, as is
`
`required. Rather, the statement related only to the portion of the affidavit’s particular
`
`requirement under section 15 relating to the Registration’s right of incontestability, which had no
`
`-2-
`
`

`

`bearing GC’s right to maintain the Registration through continued use. While inaccurately
`
`declaring that there are no proceedings pending could have impacted the Registration’s
`
`incontestable status, no statutory or case law authority exists for cancelling a Registration on that
`
`basis.
`
`Finally, the Board should also deny Chutter’s Opposition to GMG’s Applications.
`
`Chutter has failed to demonstrate any likelihood of confusion between its localized notoriety in
`
`Hollywood and any of the marks associated with Dantanna’s in Georgia. Nor has Chutter shown
`
`any indication that GMG’s applications falsely suggest a connection to Dan Tana’s purported
`
`fame as a Las Vegas detective on a TV show. Accordingly, the Opposition has no merit.
`
`II. DESCRIPTION OF THE RECORD
`
`The evidence of record consists of:
`
`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`the USPTO file histories of GC’s Registration;
`
`the USPTO file histories of GMG’s Applications;
`
`certain USPTO records relating to a registration and applications owned by Chutter;
`
`- Chutter’s Petition for Cancellation of the Registration;
`
`- Chutter’s Opposition to the Applications;
`
`- Chutter’s answers to GC’s and GMG’s interrogatories;
`
`- GC’s and GMG’s answers to Chutter’s interrogatories;
`
`-
`
`-
`
`the discovery deposition of GC’s attorney Frederick Taylor with certain exhibits
`
`marked at his deposition;
`
`the discovery deposition of Mr. Taylor’s paralegal Leo Modelo with certain exhibits
`
`marked at his deposition;
`
`-3-
`
`

`

`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`-
`
`the discovery deposition of GC’s principal David Clapp with certain exhibits marked
`
`at his deposition;
`
`the testimony declaration from Chutter’s principal Sonja Perencevic;
`
`certain USPTO records bearing Mr. Taylor’s signature; and
`
`certain USPTO records bearing the signature of a different Frederick Taylor with no
`
`apparent connection to this matter.
`
`III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
`
`The following are the issues to be decided in these consolidated proceedings:
`
`1.
`
`Has Chutter met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that GC
`
`knowingly made a false statement with the willful intent to deceive the USPTO
`
`when it filed an inaccurate Combined Section 8 & 15 Declaration instead of a
`
`Section 8 Declaration?
`
`2.
`
`Has Chutter met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
`
`inaccurate statement in the Combined Section 8 & 15 Declaration was material to
`
`GC’s obtaining or maintaining its Registration, as opposed to its right of
`
`incontestability?
`
`3.
`
`Has Chutter met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
`
`the DANTANNA’S TAVERN mark and the DANTANNA’S Class 30 mark
`
`sought to be registered by GMG so resemble Chutter’s DAN TANA’S marks for
`
`restaurant services and pasta sauce as to be likely, when used in connection with
`
`GMG’s services and goods, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
`
`within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act?
`
`-4-
`
`

`

`4.
`
`Has Chutter met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
`
`the DANTANNA’S TAVERN mark and the DANTANNA’S Class 30 mark
`
`sought to be registered by GMG falsely suggest a connection with Mr. Tana
`
`within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act?
`
`IV. RECITATION OF THE FACTS
`
`The USPTO issued the Registration to GC for the mark DANTANNA’S on March 1,
`
`2005. 1 TTABVUE (92061951)1 5 at ¶ 9. On June 6, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for
`
`cancellation of the Registration (the “Prior Cancellation Proceeding”) before the Trademark Trial
`
`and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or the “Board”). 1 TTABVUE (92061951) 4 at ¶ 1, 5 at ¶ 10. On
`
`March 13, 2008, Petitioner filed a civil action for infringement against Registrant in the United
`
`States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (the “Civil Action”). 1 TTABVUE
`
`(92061951) 5 at ¶ 10. A few months later, the TTAB suspended the Prior Cancellation
`
`Proceeding on December 31, 2008, pending disposition of the Civil Action. 1 TTABVUE
`
`(92061951) 6 at ¶ 12. The court in the Civil Action subsequently entered an order granting
`
`Registrant’s motion for summary judgment on September 15, 2009. 1 TTABVUE (92061951) 6
`
`at ¶ 13. Following entry of the judgment by the District Court in the Civil Action, Petitioner
`
`appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 1 TTABVUE (92061951) at
`
`¶ 14. The Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion on July 15, 2010 affirming the district court’s
`
`judgment in favor of Registrant. 1 TTABVUE (92061951) 6 at ¶ 15. The TTAB subsequently
`
`entered an order terminating the Petitioner’s Prior Cancellation Proceeding as a result of
`
`
`1 Consistent with the practice in Chutter’s Opening Brief on the Case, citations and references
`herein to “TTABVUE,” without a further identifying proceeding number, will be to the
`TTABVUE docket in Opposition 91223018, which the September 27, 2016 order designated as
`the parent case. References to the TTABVUE docket in Cancellation 92061951 will be in the
`form “TTABVUE (92061951).” Likewise, references to the TTABVUE docket in the Prior
`Cancellation Proceeding 92045947 will be in the form “TTABVUE (92045947).”
`-5-
`
`

`

`Petitioner’s default. 1 TTABVUE (92061951) 6 at ¶ 19; 45 TTABVUE (92045947). After the
`
`TTAB entered this Order, there were no longer any pending proceedings involving GC’s rights
`
`in the Registration.
`
`Approximately five years after the Registration was issued, Registrant asked its attorney,
`
`Mr. Frederick Taylor, to handle the filing of a “continuing use” declaration. 32 TTABVUE 73-
`
`74 (Clapp Tr. 71:22-72:13); 30 TTABVUE 36 (Taylor Tr. 33:8-15), 54 (Taylor Tr. 51:4-14).
`
`Registrant wanted to file a “continuing use” declaration to satisfy the requirements for keeping
`
`the Registration in effect. 32 TTABVUE 69-70 (Clapp Tr. 66:23-67:19); 30 TTABVUE 54
`
`(Taylor Tr. 51:4-14). Attorney Taylor, in turn, asked one of the paralegals at his firm, Mr. Leo
`
`Modelo, to handle the declaration’s filing. 30 TTABVUE 36-37 (Taylor Tr. 33:22-34:3); 46
`
`(Taylor Tr. 43:16-20); 31 TTABVUE 22 (Modelo Tr. 19:2-7). Paralegal Modelo was not
`
`familiar with the Registration before Mr. Taylor came to him with the assignment. 31
`
`TTABVUE 23 (Modelo Tr. 20:20-25). Although Attorney Taylor mentioned the existence of the
`
`litigation to Paralegal Modelo at that time, he does not recall telling Paralegal Modelo whether or
`
`not the litigation was still pending. 30 TTABVUE 37 (Taylor Tr. 34:7-13), 53-54 (Taylor Tr.
`
`50:24-51:3). In fact, when Attorney Taylor went to Paralegal Modelo for assistance with the
`
`“continuing use” declaration, he did not even have a declaration of incontestability under section
`
`15 in mind. 30 TTABVUE 52 (Taylor Tr. 49:6-19), 82 (Taylor Tr. 79:7-12), 87 (Taylor Tr.
`
`84:8-24). At the time, Attorney Taylor was not aware of what the legal requirements were for
`
`filing a section 15 declaration. 30 TTABVUE 47 (Taylor Tr. at 43:12-15).
`
`On March 8, 2010, Paralegal Modelo filed the Declaration with Attorney Taylor’s
`
`signature. 31 TTABVUE 81-83 (Exhibit 7 to Modelo Dep.). The Declaration inaccurately
`
`stated that there were no pending proceedings involving the Registration, when in fact, the Prior
`
`-6-
`
`

`

`Cancellation Proceeding and the Civil Action were still pending when the Declaration was filed.
`
`30 TTABVUE 58-59 (Taylor Tr. 55:17-56:4). However, Paralegal Modelo was not aware at the
`
`time of filing the Declaration that the proceedings involving the Registration in the trademark
`
`office and the courts were pending. 31 TTABVUE 41 (Modelo Tr. 38:11-20), 65 (Modelo Tr.
`
`62:20-25). It was not Paralegal Modelo’s practice to check to see if there were any proceedings
`
`pending in the TTAB or in the courts before preparing and filing a combined section 8 and 15
`
`declaration. 31 TTABVUE 60-61 (Modelo Tr. 57:23-58:19), 66-67 (Modelo Tr. 63:10-64:5).
`
`Rather, Paralegal Modelo’s practice (and the practice of his firm) was to have a process by which
`
`the attorney would review and then sign the filled out form. 31 TTABVUE 33 (Modelo Tr.
`
`30:16-21). Paralegal Modelo testified that he did not think it was possible that he would have
`
`signed the Declaration on Attorney Taylor’s behalf and then reported to him that it was filed. 31
`
`TTABVUE 37 (Modelo Tr. 34:8-13).
`
`Tellingly, none of the email correspondence produced in this case indicates no awareness
`
`that there was an inaccurate statement or that there was any intent to deceive the USPTO. See,
`
`generally, 31 TTABVUE 76-93 (Exhibits 2-11
`
`to Modelo Dep.). For
`
`instance,
`
`the
`
`correspondence between Registrant’s attorneys after the filing does not show any intention to
`
`obtain the right of incontestability or awareness that such a declaration was filed. 31 TTABVUE
`
`92-93 (Exhibit 11 to Modelo Dep.). To the contrary, the email correspondence from Paralegal
`
`Modelo to Attorney Taylor immediately after the Declaration was filed indicates that Attorney
`
`Taylor specifically requested only a Declaration of Use (or “DOU”) and that Paralegal Modelo
`
`understood the assignment to be only for a Declaration of Use. 31 TTABVUE 81 (Exhibit 7 to
`
`Modelo Dep.) (“Per your request I filed the DOU (sections 8 & 15)…”).
`
`-7-
`
`

`

`Attorney Taylor did not realize that a declaration of incontestability had also been filed
`
`along with the declaration of use until being informed by Petitioner’s counsel four years later in
`
`2014. 30 TTABVUE 47 (Taylor Tr. 43:21-25). When viewing the facts in retrospect, Attorney
`
`Taylor acknowledges that he perhaps “didn’t review [the Declaration] carefully enough to see
`
`that the statement is in [t]here incorrectly.” 30 TTABVUE 62 (Taylor Tr. at 59:16-21).
`
`Attorney Taylor further acknowledges that he “overlooked the fact that the Declaration stated
`
`that there was no pending actions because [he] clearly knew that there was a pending action.” 30
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`TTABVUE 89 (Taylor Tr. at 86:2-10). He stated in his deposition that the filing of the
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`Declaration was “an error” and “clearly a mistake.” 30 TTABVUE 60-61 (Taylor Tr. 57:11-
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`58:1). Attorney Taylor emphasizes, however, that “in no way did [he] intend to deceive the
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`trademark office,” because he would not “ever intend to deceive or mislead any judicial or quasi
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`judicial body.” 30 TTABVUE 59 (Taylor Tr. 56:6-12).
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`Four years after the Declaration was filed, Chutter met with GC in Atlanta, Georgia,
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`during which Chutter informed GC for the first time that the Declaration may have contained an
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`inaccurate statement when it was filed. 30 TTABVUE 109-110 (Taylor Tr. 106-7-107:3), 112
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`(Taylor Tr. 109:9-15). Over a year after the meeting, Chutter filed the Petition for Cancellation
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`and the Opposition in this consolidated action on July 29, 2015. 1 TTABVUE (92061951); 1
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`TTABVUE. Chutter’s Petition for Cancellation only asserted one basis for cancelling the
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`registration: that GC’s counsel, Attorney Taylor, allegedly filed a false declaration with the
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`intent to deceive the USPTO. See generally, 1 TTABVUE (92061951). The Petition for
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`Cancellation did not make any allegations that GC “fraudulently retained the benefits of the
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`Declaration with the intent to deceive the USPTO.” See generally, id. Nor did it make any
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`allegations that GC’s Registration should be “invalidated due to an alleged violation of the
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`USPTO’s e-signature rules”. See generally, id.
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`GC requested through interrogatories during discovery that Chutter state “the full factual
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`and legal basis” for several of the allegations in its Petition. Among these interrogatories, GC
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`requested Chutter to state the basis for its contentions that: (i) “Attorney Taylor knowingly made
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`the false statement in the Declaration with the intent that the USPTO would rely on it and to
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`induce the USPTO to accept the Declaration” (41 TTABVUE 38); (ii) “Attorney Taylor made
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`the false statement in the Declaration with intent to deceive the USPTO and to thereby obtain
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`benefits for Registrant to which Registrant was not entitled” (41 TTABVUE 43); (iii) “Attorney
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`Taylor made the false statement in the Declaration with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity
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`of the statement” (41 TTABVUE 44); (iv) “[t]he Declaration was material with respect to the
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`continued validity of the registration and its alleged incontestable status” (41 TTABVUE 42);
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`and (v) “Attorney Taylor’s actions in signing and filing the Declaration constitute fraud” (41
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`TTABVUE 45). Chutter’s responses to these interrogatories failed to set forth any specific facts
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`detailing Mr. Taylor’s actual knowledge about what was included in the Declaration or his actual
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`subjective intent in having the Declaration filed. See generally, 41 TTABVUE 36-47. The
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`responses also failed to set forth any reasons for why a declaration of incontestability could be
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`material to GC’s obtaining or maintaining the Registration. See generally, id. Notably, the
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`responses also contained no contentions at all relating to any newly-alleged “fraudulent retention
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`of benefits” or “violation of USPTO e-signature rules.”
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`Discovery in these consolidated actions closed on September 25, 2017. TTABVUE Dkt.
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`Nos. 28-29. The parties’ trial periods extended from November 24, 2017 through April 8, 2018.
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`Id. Chutter’s final brief on the case was initially due on June 7, 2018, but it instead to opted to
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`file a motion for leave to amend its pleadings on June 6, 2018 (the day before its brief on the
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`merits was due). 37 C.F.R. sec. 2.128(a)(1); 28 TTABVUE; 29 TTABVUE; 45 TTABVUE.
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`The Board ultimately denied Chutter’s motion, finding that it unduly delayed in seeking leave to
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`amend and that GC would be prejudiced without having an opportunity to present evidence or
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`otherwise address Chutter’s proposed amendments. 50 TTABVUE 3-4.
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`V. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`The Board Should Deny Chutter’s Petition to Cancel the Registration,
`Because Chutter Has Failed to Show that GC Knowingly Made a False,
`Material Representation with the Willful Intent to Deceive the USPTO in
`Order to Obtain or Maintain its Registration.
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`Under Federal Circuit law, a trademark is obtained or maintained fraudulently and can be
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`cancelled under the Lanham Act only if (1) the registrant made a false representation to the
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`USPTO; (2) the false representation is material to the registrability of the mark; (3) the defendant
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`had knowledge of the falsity of the representation; and (4) the defendant made the representation
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`with intent to deceive the USPTO. In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A
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`party seeking cancellation of a trademark registration for fraudulent procurement “bears a heavy
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`burden of proof.” Id. at 1243 (citing W.D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 377 F.2d
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`1001, 1004 (1967)). Indeed, “the very nature of the charge of fraud requires that it be proven ‘to
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`the hilt’ with clear and convincing evidence. There is no room for speculation, inference or
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`surmise and, obviously, any doubt must be resolved against the charging party.” Id. (quoting
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`Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 209 USPQ 1033, 1044 (T.T.A.B. 1981)).
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`In this case, Chutter fails to present any evidence – let alone clear and convincing
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`evidence – to support its speculation that the inaccurate statement in the Declaration was made
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`“knowingly” and with the “willful intent to deceive the PTO.” Nor has it presented any evidence
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`to show how the inaccurate statement could have been material to the registrability of the mark,
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`as opposed to the mark’s incontestability. Accordingly, Chutter cannot meet i