Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
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`ESTTA Tracking number:
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`ESTTA752604
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`Filing date:
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`06/15/2016
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`Proceeding
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`91221522
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`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
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`Filer's Name
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`Filer's e-mail
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`Defendant
`Savage Companies
`
`KELLY J FLINT
`SAVAGE SERVICES
`901 W LEGACY CENTER WAY
`MIDVALE, UT 84047-5765
`UNITED STATES
`kellyf@savageservices.com, benbates@savageservices.com,
`steven.klein@stoel.com, bethkearsley@savageservices.com
`
`Response to Board Order/Inquiry
`
`Steven E. Klein
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`kellyf@savageservices.com, benbates@savageservices.com,
`steven.klein@stoel.com, bethkearsley@savageservices.com, dock-
`etclerk@stoel.com
`
`Signature
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`Date
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`/s Steven E. Klein/
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`06/15/2016
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`Attachments
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`Opp. No. 91221522-App Resp to Bd Inquiry (3).pdf(3330113 bytes )
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`

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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`OPPOSITION NO. 91221522
`
`In the Matter of Trademark Application
`No. 86/435,730
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`Published: April 14, 2015
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`Mark: SAVAGE LOGISTICS
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`SAVAGE LOGISTICS, LLC.,
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`Opposer,
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`v.
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`SAVAGE COMPANIES.,
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`Applicant.
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`RESPONSE TO BOARD INQUIRY
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`Applicant Savage Companies hereby submits this response to the Board’s May 16, 2016
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`inquiry regarding the status of the civil action captioned Savage Logistics, LLC v. Savage
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`Services Corporation and Savage Companies, Case No. 15-cv-5015-SAB, filed by Opposer in
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`the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (the “Washington Action”).
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`
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`The Opposer’s complaint in the Washington Action has twice been dismissed for lack of
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`personal jurisdiction, most recently on June 14, 2016. (See Order, dated June 14, 2016, attached
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`hereto as Exhibit 1). However, the Washington Action remains pending as no final order
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`disposing of the matter has yet been entered and Opposer has been given the option to either file
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`an amended pleading or consent to transfer of the action to the U.S. District Court for the District
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`of Utah.
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`
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`Since the Board entered its May 13, 2015 Order suspending proceedings, Applicant has
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`commenced a separate civil action against captioned Savage Companies v. Savage Logistics,
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`LLC, Case No. 2:16-cv-00265-JNP, in the District of Utah (the “Utah Action”). A copy of
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`Applicant’s Complaint in the Utah Action is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. Applicant believes the
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`86811894.1 0033901-00030.001
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`1
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`

`

`Utah Action is also a civil action which may have a bearing on this proceeding and merits
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`suspension of this proceeding pending a final determination. See Trademark Rule 2.117.
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`
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`Accordingly, Applicant requests that suspension of this proceeding be maintained
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`pending a final determination in both the Washington Action and the Utah Action.
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`Dated: June 15, 2016
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`Respectfully submitted.
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`STOEL RIVES LLP
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`
`
`/s Steven E. Klein/
`by: Steven E. Klein, OSB #051165
`760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000
`Portland, Oregon 97205
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`
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`Attorneys for Applicant
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`
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`
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`86811894.1 0033901-00030.001
`
`2
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`

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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`
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`I hereby certify that I served the foregoing RESPONSE TO BOARD INQUIRY
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`on the following named persons on the date indicated below by:
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`X mailing with postage prepaid
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`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
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`hand delivery
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`facsimile transmission
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`overnight delivery
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`e-mail attachment in PDF format
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`to said persons a true copy thereof, contained in a sealed envelope, addressed to said persons
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`at their last-known address indicated below.
`
`FRANCES M JAGLA
`LANE POWELL PC
`601 SW SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2100
`PORTLAND, OR 97204
`
`Attorneys for Opposer
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`DATED: June 15, 2016.
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`
`
`
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`
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`
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`/s Steven E. Klein/
`Steven E. Klein
`
`
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`86811894.1 0033901-00030.001
`
`3
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`

`

`EXHIBIT 1
`EXHIBIT 1
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`

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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
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`SAVAGE LOGISTICS, LLC, a
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`No. 4:15-cv-05015-SAB
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`ORDER GRANTING
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
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`Washington limited liability company,
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` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`SAVAGE COMPANIES, a Utah
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`Corporation, SAVAGE SERVICES
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`DISMISS, IN PART
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`CORP., a Utah Corporation,
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` Defendants.
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`Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
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`Complaint, or, in the Alternative, to Transfer, ECF No. 60; Defendant’s Request
`for Judicial Notice and Notice by Incorporation, ECF No. 63; and Plaintiff’s
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`Request for Judicial Notice and Notice of Incorporation, ECF No. 67. A hearing
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`on the motions was held on June 1, 2016, in Richland, Washington. Plaintiff was
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`represented Bruce P. Babbitt; and Defendants were represented by Steven E.
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`Klein.
`Previously, Judge Shea granted Defendant Savage Services Corporation’s
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`Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 49. Judge Shea
`noted that Plaintiff had conceded that the FAC’s factual allegations were
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`insufficient to support a finding of personal jurisdiction against Defendant.
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 1
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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`Plaintiff did not oppose the dismissal of the FAC so long as it was permitted to file
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`its proposed Second Amended Complaint. Id. Judge Shea granted Plaintiff leave to
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`file a Second Amended Complaint. Id.
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`In the SAC, Plaintiff added Savage Companies as a Defendant and asserted
`facts that it believed supported personal jurisdiction over both companies—
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`Savage Services Corporation and Savage Companies. It is seeking declaratory
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`judgment of non-infringement of trademark. Plaintiff is also asking the Court to
`instruct the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to refuse Defendants’
`Trademark Application, in which they seek to register the mark “SAVAGE
`LOGISTICS,” and is asserting a claim for False Description, Dilution, and
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`Cyberpiracy under 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Finally, Plaintiff is bringing state law claims
`under Wash. Rev. Code § 19.77.010 (trademark registration – threatening to
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`imitate registered trademark) and Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.010 (unfair trade
`practices – taking actions to wrongfully appropriate Plaintiff’s trademark).
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`Defendants now move to dismiss the SAC, or in the alternative, transfer the
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`case to the District of Utah, for lack of personal jurisdiction over them and move
`to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 and the state law claims for
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`failure to state a claim. In addition, both parties ask the Court to take judicial
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`notice and notice by incorporation of certain documents submitted in support and
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`in response to the Motion to Dismiss.
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`1.
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`Request for Judicial Notice and Notice by Incorporation
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`MOTIONS STANDARD
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`
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`Fed. R. Evid. 201 permits a court to judicially notice a fact that is not
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`subject to reasonable dispute where it: (1) is generally known within the trial
`court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from
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`sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
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`A district court may, but is not required to, incorporate documents by
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`reference. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 2
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`

`

`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`2012). Under the “incorporation by reference” doctrine, a court may look beyond
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`the pleadings without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary
`judgment. Id. at 1160. Specifically, courts may consider “documents whose
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`contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but
`which are not physically attached to the plaintiff’s pleadings.” Id. (citations
`omitted). A court “may treat such a document as part of the complaint, and thus
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`may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under
`Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. (citation omitted).
`2. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
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`Fed. Rule Civ. P. 12(b)(2) governs the dismissal of an action based on lack
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`of personal jurisdiction. When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack
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`of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that
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`jurisdiction is appropriate. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d
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`797, 799 (9th Cir. 2004). In ruling on a 12(b)(2) motion, the court may, in its
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`discretion, order discovery, hold an evidentiary hearing, or rely only on the written
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`submissions. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d. 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). If the
`motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, “the
`plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” Id. A prima
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`facie showing means the plaintiff has produced admissible evidence, which if
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`believed, is sufficient to establish the existence of personal jurisdiction. Ballard v.
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`Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995).
`Although the plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its
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`complaint and must come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting
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`personal jurisdiction, uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as
`true.” Amba Marketing Sys. Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.
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`1977). Conflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be
`resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
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`Assertions of jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations must comply with
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 3
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`

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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`due process and “traditional notes of fair play and substantial justice.”
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`International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Where there is
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`no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the district court
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`applies the law of the state in which the district court sits. Daimler AG v. Bauman,
`__ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 746, 753 (2014). Washington’s long-arm statute authorizes
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`personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants to the broadest reach that the
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`United States Constitution permits. Byron Nelson Co. v. Orchard Mgmt. Corp., 95
`Wash.App. 462, 465 (1999). Thus, the question is whether this court’s exercise of
`jurisdiction over Defendants “comports with the limits imposed by federal due
`process.” Daimler AG, 134 S.Ct. at 753.
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`Case law has differentiated between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and
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`specific or case-linked jurisdiction. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
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`Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
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`a. General or All-Purpose Jurisdiction
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`A court may assert general jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation
`when the corporations’ “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
`systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. General
`jurisdiction is present in “instances in which the continuous corporate operations
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`with a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
`causes of action arising from dealing entirely distinct from those activities.”
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`International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317.
`This is an exacting standard, because, as the Ninth Circuit explains, “a
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`finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the
`forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.” Brand v.
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`Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Domile,
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`place of incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm bases for the
`exercise of general jurisdiction. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924. “Only in an
`‘exceptional case’ will general jurisdiction be available anywhere else.” Ranza v.
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 4
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`

`

`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Martinez v. Aero
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`Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014)).
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`b. Specific or Case-Linked Jurisdiction
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`A court may assert specific or case-linked jurisdiction over an out-of-state
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`corporation if the plaintiff can show that (1) the non-resident defendant
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`purposefully directed its activities or consummated some transaction with the
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`forum or resident thereof; or performed some act by which it purposefully availed
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`itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the
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`benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the
`defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports
`with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.1 Picot v. Weston,
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`780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). [S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to
`adjudication of “issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
`established jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Stated another way, specific
`jurisdiction is present when the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s
`contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n.8 (1984). It is
`“specific” to the case before the Court. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068.
`“[M]ere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the
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`forum. Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally
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`relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the
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`forum State. The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular
`injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in
`a meaningful way.” Walden v. Fiore, __ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
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`1 If the plaintiff satisfies the first two prongs, then the defendant must come
`forward with a “a compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be
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`reasonable. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th
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`Cir. 2011).
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 5
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`

`

`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`“When a plaintiff relies on specific jurisdiction, he must establish that
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`jurisdiction is proper for each claim asserted against a defendant.” Picot, 780 F.3d
`at 1212. “If personal jurisdiction exists over one claim, but not others, the district
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`court may exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over any remaining claims that
`arise out of the same “common nucleus of operative facts” as the claim for which
`jurisdiction exists.” Id.
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`BACKGROUND FACTS
`The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint, as well as from
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`judicial noticeable documents and documents incorporated by reference:
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`Plaintiff Savage Logistics is a Washington limited liability company with its
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`headquarters in Richland, Washington. Plaintiff specializes in transporting and
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`trucking hazardous and radioactive materials, and remedial services. The
`company’s trucking fleet operates throughout the continental United States and
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`Canada. On March 15, 2007, Plaintiff registered the domain name
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`savagelogistics.com.
`Defendant Savage Services, Corp. (“SS”) is a Utah corporation with its
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`headquarters in Midvale, Utah. SS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Savage
`Companies (“SC”), also a Utah corporation with its headquarters in Midvale,
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`Utah. Defendant SS specializes in environmental material transport trucking
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`services, as well as general cargo categories, such as building materials and
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`oilfield equipment.
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`On October 28, 2014, counsel for Defendant SC sent Plaintiff a letter that
`identified certain trademark registrations; asserted that Plaintiff’s use of the marks
`“SAVAGE” and “SAVAGE LOGISTICS” constitutes trademark infringement and
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`a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; and demanded that Plaintiff
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`immediately cease all use of the mark and anything else that is confusingly similar.
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`SC demanded that Plaintiff remove its logo from its entire fleet of trucks, as well
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`as its business signs, letter head, website, and social medial sites and cease the use
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 6
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`

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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`of the domain name savagelogistics.com. It indicated that unless Plaintiff
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`complied with its demands, it would pursue all available legal remedies.
`In a letter dated November 6, 2014, Plaintiff contested Defendant’s
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`allegations of infringement because, among other things, (1) Savage Logistics
`does not and has not used the word “SAVAGE” alone as a brand or source
`identifier on its trucks, marketing materials, or elsewhere; (2) Savage Logistics’
`use of “SAVAGE LOGISTICS” or “SAVAGE LOGISTICS LLC” is not likely to
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`cause confusion; and (3) there has been at least seven years of concurrent use of
`“SAVAGE LOGISTICS” and “SAVAGE LOGISTICS, LLC” where SC and SS
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`did not seek to enforce its rights.
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`Shortly before sending the letter, Defendant SC attempted to register the
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`name Savage Logistics with the Patent and Trademark Office and Defendant SS
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`registered the domain name savagelogistics.net.
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`ANALYSIS
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`Plaintiff is asserting claims against two separate entities: Savage Company
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`(SC) and Savage Services Corporation (SS). Plaintiff maintains that because both
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`SC and SS are present and doing business in the State of Washington, it is fair that
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`they respond to a suit brought in this state.
`Plaintiff’s theory is that Defendants created intentional acts directed at
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`Washington citizens and “expressly aimed” its demands at Plaintiff, known to be a
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`resident of Washington State. ECF No. 50, ¶ 37, 40. Defendants knew that the
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`effect of its demands contained in the cease and desist letter would be to damage
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`Plaintiff in its trade and business and to misappropriate the licenses, permits,
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`certifications, approvals and goodwill that Plaintiff had established. ¶ 40.
`Defendants’ demands would cause Plaintiff to have to physically re-label and re-
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`brand all its equipment (over 100 motor vehicles and trailers), apparel, advertising,
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`marketing, business cards, pamphlets and handouts, trade show displays, and
`building signs at great cost. ¶ 42. Defendant’s demands impact various permits,
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 7
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`

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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`authorization, and certifications acquired from numerous State and Federal
`agencies and organizations. ¶ 41. In addition, Defendants’ demands would force
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`Plaintiff to obtain new email addresses and business listings. ¶ 42. Plaintiff alleges
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`that the act of registering savaglogistics.net was part of a pattern and practice and
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`conduct by SC and SS of attempting to prevent Savage Logistics from using its
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`established trademark, of attempting to disrupt the business of Savage Logistics,
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`and to attract for commercial gain internet users to its website and create
`confusion with Plaintiff’s mark. ¶ 35.
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`In its SAC, Plaintiff asserts the following factual allegations in support of
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`personal jurisdiction:
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`Savage Companies
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`A.
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`1. SC has, as a sponsor of a joint venture with Tesoro Refining and
`Marking Company, pursued permitting and construction of a 360,000
`barrel per day, $75 Million Dollar crude oil uploading facility in
`Vancouver, Washington. ¶ 21.
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`2. SC has filed with the Washington Secretary of State and has
`appointed CT Corp. Sys., located in Olympia, Washington, as its
`registered agent for service within the state. ¶ 21.
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`3. SC wrote and sent a “Cease and Desist Letter” that demanded that
`Plaintiff take immediate action in Washington State to account for
`income from 2007 through 2014, repaint its equipment and to
`surrender its domain name, as well as threaten to sue if these steps
`were not implemented. ¶ 30.
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`4. The Cease and Desist Letter was a sham demand because SC had
`not in the past brought actions against claimed infringers and SC had
`no good faith objection to others using the name Savage. ¶ 31.
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`5. On October 8, 2014, SC attempted to register Savage Logistics
`with the Patent and Trademark Office. ¶ 43.
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`6. SC began using the domain name savagelogistics.net and have
`advertised on the web as Savage Logistics, which has confused and
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 8
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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`diluted Plaintiff’s web presence. ¶ 44.
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`B.
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`Savage Services Corporation
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`1. SS regularly and systematically does business with residents of the
`state of Washington and has appointed CT Corp. Sys., located in
`Olympia, Washington, as its registered agent for service within the
`state. ¶ 22.
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`2. SS knew the cease and desist letter was a sham demand. ¶ 31.
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`3. Representatives of SS, acting for and authorized by SC, on several
`occasions called to confer with Plaintiff’s representatives whom they
`knew to be located in Washington. ¶ 32.
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`4. SS registered the domain name savagelogistics.net as a domain
`name. SS falsely certified that savagelogistics.net would not infringe
`upon what it knew were Plaintiff’s rights. ¶ 34.
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`In determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, the
`Court does not consider the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Rather, it focuses solely
`on whether the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this
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`case comports with due process. After carefully reviewing the pleadings and
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`attachments, as well as recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue, the
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`Court concludes it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
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`As an initial matter, it is clear that general jurisdiction does not exist over
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`either Defendant. See Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1070. While it appears that Defendants
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`send employees and provides services into Washington and engages in
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`commercial transactions here, such business activity is not so pervasive as to
`render it “essentially at home” in Washington. Notably, Washington is neither
`Defendants’ place of incorporation nor their principal place of business.
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`Plaintiff asserts the Court has specific jurisdiction over both Defendants. In
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`conducting this analysis, the Court must look at the alleged conduct underlying the
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`claims to determine whether this conduct was directed at Washington. See Walden,
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`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 9
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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`134 S.Ct. at 1121. (“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific
`jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on the relationship among the
`defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ For a State to exercise jurisdiction
`consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a
`substantial connection with the forum State.”)(citations omitted).
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`In its briefing, Plaintiff attempts to establish personal jurisdiction by relying
`on the potential harm that it faces as a result of Defendant SC and SS’s actions to
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`establish personal jurisdiction. This is not the correct analysis. See id. at 1122.
`Rather, the focus must be on the contacts that the “defendant himself” creates with
`the forum State. Id. (emphasis in original). And it does not include the defendant’s
`contacts with persons who reside there. Id. Thus, even though Plaintiff’s contacts
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`with Washington state are significant, those contacts do not factor in when
`determining whether the defendant’s due process rights are violated. Id. Plaintiff
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`cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Id. Consequently,
`Plaintiff’s reliance on the harms that it will experience in Washington state are
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`misplaced. See id. (noting that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient
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`Here, Plaintiff alleges only two actions taken by Defendants that were
`directed at Washington State:2 (1) SC’s activities in relation to the joint venture on
`the west side of the state3; and (2) the sending of the cease and desist letter and
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`subsequent phone calls to Plaintiff, who is located in Washington state. None of
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`these actions are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. As Walden explained,
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`2 While Defendants’ actions in registering the trademark Savage Logistics, and
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`registering the domain name savagelogistic.net may expose them to potential
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`liability, this conduct did not take place in Washington state.
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`3 In its briefing, Defendants clarified that it is Savage Services Corporation that
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`conducts business in Washington State.
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 10
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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`a defendant’s actions, taken in the non-forum state, do not create sufficient
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`contacts with the forum simply because it allegedly directed its conduct at the
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`plaintiff who it knew had connections in the forum state. Id.. at 1125. While
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`conducting commercial activities in Washington state is conduct that is directed at
`Washington state, this conduct is not related or linked to Plaintiff’s claims. The
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`remaining alleged actions do not have anything to do with state of Washington
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`itself. Id.
`Generally, “[a] cease and desist letter is not in and of itself sufficient to
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`establish personal jurisdiction over the sender of the letter.”4 Yahoo! v. La Ligue
`Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2006)
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`(citing Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361
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`(Fed. Cir. 1998). Courts have recognized an exception where the letter was
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`abusive, tortious or otherwise wrongful. Id. Although Plaintiff maintains the letter
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`sent by Defendants meets this exception, the Court is not convinced. In the letter
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`sent to Plaintiff, Defendant SC indicated it was willing to discuss an amicable
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`resolution, but also indicated that if certain steps were not taken, it may pursue all
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`available legal remedies. ECF No. 12, Ex. 3. While Plaintiff disagrees with
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`Defendants regarding the contents of the letter, there is nothing in the letter that
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`rises to the level of being abusive, tortious, or otherwise wrongful, as
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`contemplated by the Ninth Circuit. Notably, in Bancroft & Masters v. Augusta
`Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), one of the letters at issue in that case
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`4 As the Red Wing Shoe court noted:
`There are strong policy reasons to encourage cease and desist letters. They
`are normally used to warn of an alleged rights infringer that its conduct, if
`continued, will be challenged in a legal proceeding, and to facilitate
`resolution of a dispute without resort to litigation. If the price of sending a
`cease and desist letter is that the sender thereby subjects itself to jurisdiction
`in the forum of the alleged rights infringer, the rights holder will be strongly
`encouraged to file suit in its home forum without attempting first to resolve
`the dispute informally by means of a letter.” Id.
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 11
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`was sent to a company who was the sole registrar of domain names. Id. at 1088.
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`The Circuit concluded that the letters were intended to trigger the dispute
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`resolution procedures, which caused the plaintiff to choose between bringing suit
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`or losing the use of its website. Id. at 1088.
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`Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants have advertised on the web as Savage
`Logistics, which has confused and diluted Plaintiff’s web presence. This is not
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`enough to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See Cybersell, Inc. vl
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`Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that it would not
`comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” for Arizona
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`to exercise personal jurisdiction over an allegedly infringing Florida web site
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`advertiser who has no contacts with Arizona other than maintaining a home page
`that is accessible to Arizonans, and everyone else, over the Internet”). A passive
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`website that does little more than make information available to those who are
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`interested in it is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction over the website
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`owner.
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`Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction
`over Defendants. Defendants’ actions, i.e. sending the letter, filing the trademark
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`application, registering the website, and advertising on the web, did not connect
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`them with Washington in a way sufficient to support the assertion of personal
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`Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff has not established personal
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`jurisdiction over either Defendant, it is not necessary to address its argument that
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`Savage Services Company is the agent or alter ego of Savage Company, or vice
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`versa. That said, the SAC does not plead sufficient facts to satisfy the alter ego
`test. See Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1070-75.5
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`5 The Ranza court explained that the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship
`is insufficient, on its own, to justify imputing one entity’s contacts with a forum
`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, IN PART
`~ 12
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`

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`Case 4:15-cv-05015-SAB Document 74 Filed 06/14/16
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`REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND NOTICE BY INCORPORATION
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`Judge Shea, in his prior order, took judicial notice of the public-record
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`trademark registration numbers and applications and the public administrative
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`records from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Utah Department of
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`Commerce. He also considered, under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, a
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`letter from Stole Rives LLP, as this letter was referenced in the complaint and in
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`the response to the complaint, and neither party challenged its authenticity. Judge
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`Shea declined to take judicial notice of a press release regarding Savage
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`Companies because it is not a public record and the contents could be subject to
`dispute. The Court adopts Judge Shea’s reasoning.
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`Defendants ask the Court to incorporate by reference print-outs of pages
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`from the website maintained by Plaintiff at www.savagelogistics.com. In Knievel
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`v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit applied the rationale of
`the “incorporation by reference” doctrine to internet pages. The Court grants
`Defendants’ request.
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`Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit 2, which is a
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`company snapshot for Savage Services maintained by the U.S. Department of
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`Transportation and regulations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
`indicating what must be displayed on self-propelled CMV’s operated by both
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`Pl