Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. httgj/estta.usQto.gov
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`91209272
`
`Defendant
`
`Raphael Lauria
`KUSCHA HATAMI
`RAJ ABHYANKER PC
`1580 W EL CAMINO REAL, SUITE 8
`MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94040-2462
`UNITED STATES
`
`trademarks@rajpatent.com, kuscha@|ega|force|aw.com,
`micheI|e@|ega|force|aw.com
`
`Opposition/Response to Motion
`Kuscha Hatami
`
`
`
`kuscha@|ega|force|aw.com, kristen.watson@|ega|force|aw.com
`/Kuscha Hatamil
`
`06/24/2013
`
`Summary J Response PUPA FinaI.pdf(5347972 bytes)
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA544800
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`06/24/2013
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91209272
`Defendant
`Raphael Lauria
`KUSCHA HATAMI
`RAJ ABHYANKER PC
`1580 W EL CAMINO REAL, SUITE 8
`MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94040-2462
`UNITED STATES
`trademarks@rajpatent.com, kuscha@legalforcelaw.com,
`michelle@legalforcelaw.com
`Opposition/Response to Motion
`Kuscha Hatami
`kuscha@legalforcelaw.com, kristen.watson@legalforcelaw.com
`/Kuscha Hatami/
`06/24/2013
`Summary J Response PUPA Final.pdf(5347972 bytes )
`
`Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`

`
`IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  PATENT  AND  TRADEMARK  OFFICE  
`TRADEMARK  TRIAL  AND  APPEAL  BOARD  
`
`  
`  
`Opposition  No.  91209272  
`Serial  No.  85696589  
`Published:  01/15/2013  
`
`Mark(s):    MISSPUPA  
`
`Micys  Company  S.p.A.  
`
`  
`Opposer,  
`v.  
`Raphael  Lauria  Applicant.  
`  
`
`APPLICANT’S  OPPOSITION  TO  OPPOSER’S    
`MOTION  FOR  SUMMARY  JUDGMENT  
`  
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION  
`
`  
`Applicant  Raphael  Lauria  (“Applicant”),  by  and  through  it’s  undersigned  counsel,  
`  
`submits  its  Opposition  to  Opposer  Micys  Company  S.p.A.’s  (“Opposer”  or  “Micys”)  Motion  
`for  Summary  Judgment.  
`  
`In  its  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment,  Micys  asserts  priority  of  use  and  a  likelihood  
`of  confusion  between  Applicant’s  mark  and  Opposer’s  marks.    Micys’  Motion  must  be  
`denied  for  the  following  reasons:  
`  
`First,  Micys  has  misapplied  the  legal  standard  for  summary  judgment  in  trademark  
`proceedings.    Summary  judgment  is  only  proper  in  the  absence  of  any  genuine  issue  of  
`material  fact.    In  the  instant  matter,  we  will  show  that  several  genuine  issues  of  material  
`
`1  
`
`  
`
`

`
`fact  exist.    Further,  since  all  factual  assertions  must  be  viewed  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  
`the  non-­‐moving  party,  Micys  cannot  prevail  in  a  request  for  summary  judgment.      
`  
`Second,  the  
`mark  in  question  poses  no  likelihood  of  confusion  
`amongst  the  consuming  public.    Micys  claims  a  likelihood  of  confusion  between  its  Pupa  
`marks  and  Applicant’s  
`mark  is  “undisputable.”    However,  after  a  careful  
`analysis  of  each  of  the  Du  Pont  factors  referenced  by  Micys,  it  is  clear  that  no  likelihood  of  
`confusion  exists  and  that  Applicant  has  a  legitimate  intent  in  using  its  
`  mark  
`in  commerce  for  the  goods  and  services  listed  in  its  Application.        
`  
`For  these  and  other  reasons  discussed  in  more  detail  infra,  Applicant  respectfully  
`requests  that  Micys’  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment,  be  denied.    
`  
`On  or  about  August  6,  2012,  Applicant  filed  with  the  U.S.  Patent  and  Trademark  
`Office  an  intent-­‐to-­‐use  application  to  register  
`(design)  for  clothing,  namely,  
`tops,  bottoms,  combinations,  shoes,  belts,  hats,  gloves,  shirts,  pants,  shorts,  skirts,  
`underwear,  coats,  jackets,  sweaters,  sweatshirts,  scarves,  socks,  stockings  in  international  
`class  025.    See  Declaration  of  Raphael  Lauria(“Lauria  Decl.”),  Exhibit  1  (Applicant  
`Declaration),  ¶  3;    See  Exhibit  2  (TSDR  records  for  
`  (Serial  No.  85696589).    
`The  application  did  not  include  a  request  to  register  the  mark  for  Travel  bags,  make-­‐up  
`bags  sold  empty,  vanity  cases  sold  empty,  umbrellas,  overnight  bags,  suitcases,  handbags,  
`pocket  wallets,  purses,  cases,  namely,  leather  cases,  imitation  leather  cases,  key  cases,  
`backpacks,  belt  bags  in  international  class  018  nor  Soaps;  deodorants  for  personal  use;  
`
`STATEMENT  OF  FACTS  
`
`II.
`
`2  
`
`  
`
`

`
`perfumery;  essential  oils,  cosmetics,  hair  lotions,  dentifrices;  Make-­‐up  products,  namely,  
`eye,  face  and  body  glitter,  mascara,  creamy  eye  shadow,  eye  shadow  compact,  eye  shadow  
`power,  blusher,  compact  powder,  loose  powder,  bronzing  powder,  lipstick,  lip  gloss,  lip  
`pencils,  pencils  for  making  up  eyes  and  eye  lashes,  foundation,  cream  foundation,  cream-­‐
`powder  foundation,  kajal  eye  pencil,  concealer  stick,  colored  cream  for  the  face  and  body,  
`eye  liner;  perfumes,  namely,  eau  de  toilette,  eau  de  parfum,  eau  de  cologne;  nail  polish,  nail  
`enamel,  nail  polish  remover,  kits  containing  make-­‐up  products,  namely,  lipstick,  lip  pencil,  
`eye  shadow,  eye  pencil,  nail  polish,  nail  polish  remover,  foundation  cream,  blusher  and  eau  
`de  toilette  in  international  class  003.  
`  
`Applicant  intends  to  use  its  mark  for  Clothing,  namely,  tops,  bottoms,  combinations,  
`shoes,  belts,  hats,  gloves,  shirts,  pants,  shorts,  skirts,  underwear,  coats,  jackets,  sweaters,  
`sweatshirts,  scarves,  socks,  stockings,  See  Exhibit  1  (Applicant  Declaration),  ¶  3.      
`Applicant’s  goods  will  be  sold  in  a  variety  of  boutique  clothing,  department,  and  online  
`stores.  
`  
`Opposer  owns  Registration  No.  3431506  for  PUPA,  which  was  filed  on  a  Section  
`66(a)  basis,  See  Exhibit  3  (TSDR  records).    However,  although  Opposer’s  registration  
`includes  international  class  025  for  clothing,  Opposer’s  website  clearly  demonstrates  that  
`Opposer  does  not  offer  any  clothing  items  in  commerce  in  the  United  States  or  elsewhere,  
`See  Exhibit  4  (website).    It  should  also  be  noted  that  non  of  Opposer’s  specimen,  provided  
`to  the  USPTO,  include  a  sampling  of  Opposer  offering  clothing  in  commerce  in  the  United  
`States  or  elsewhere.    Opposer  contends  that  the  goods  identified  in  Applicant’s  Application  
`for  clothing  are  related  or  substantially  the  same,  but  Opposer  has  provided  no  evidence  
`outside  of  a  declaration  signed  by  Micys’  President  of  the  Board  of  Directors,  Angelo  Gatti,  
`
`3  
`
`  
`
`

`
`Exhibit  5  (Opposer  Declaration),  ¶  5,  in  support  of  its  assertion.    Applicant  contends  that  
`Opposer  is  not  in  the  clothing  industry  and  is  only  asserting  that  it  may  enter  the  clothing  
`industry  as  admitted  in  Opposer’s  Declaration  of  Angelo  Gatti,  where  Opposer  states  “Given  
`Micys’  roots  in  the  fashion  and  design  industry,  its  product  expansion,  and  its  plans  to  
`continue  expansion  of  the  PUPA  brand,  including  offering  clothing  in  the  United  States”,  id  
`¶  7.      
`  
`Asides  from  the  fact  that  Opposer  does  not  use  its  marks  in  association  with  clothing  
`(and  likely  has  not  intent  to  in  light  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  them  intending  to  
`sell  goods),  the  marks  themselves  have  distinguishing  features.    Applicant’s  mark  contains  
`the  additional  letters  MI  followed  by  a  stylized  image  of  a  heart.    Consumers  viewing  
`Applicant  and  Opposer’s  marks  will  not  associate  the  two  with  each  other.    Applicant’s  
`mark  is  clearly  different  in  look,  sound,  connotation,  and  commercial  impression.    Further,  
`the  degree  of  care  and  sophistication  likely  to  be  exercised  by  consumers  will  negate  any  
`claim  of  confusion.      Because  of  this  and  actual  disputes  over  material  facts,  summary  
`judgment  is  improper  and  Opposer’s  Motion  must  be  denied.      
`  
`The  Trademark  Trial  and  Appeal  Board  (“TTAB”)  follows  the  same  standards  for  
`summary  judgment  as  the  federal  courts.    See  Spraying  Systems  Co.  v.  Delavin,  Inc.,  975  F.2d  
`387,  392  (7th  Cir.  1992).    “[T]he  party  moving  for  summary  judgment,  bears  the  initial  
`burden  of  demonstrating  the  absence  of  any  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  and  that  it  is  
`entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.”    See  Hornblower  &  Weeks,  Inc.  v.  Hornblower  &  
`Weeks,  Inc.,  60  USPQ2d  1733,  1735  (TTAB  2001).    “If  Opposer  meets  this  burden,  then  
`
`A. The  Summary  Judgment  Standard  
`
`4  
`
`  
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL  ARGUMENT  
`
`

`
`applicant,  to  avoid  entry  of  an  adverse  judgment,  must  present  sufficient  evidence  to  show  
`an  evidentiary  conflict  as  to  one  or  more  material  facts  in  issue.”  See  id.    Of  course,  as  in  any  
`summary  judgment  evaluation,  “the  evidence  must  be  viewed  in  a  light  most  favorable  
`to…the  non-­‐movant,  and  all  justifiable  inferences  are  to  be  drawn  in  the  non-­‐movant’s  
`favor.    See  id.  
`  
`If  a  party  brings  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  in  a  trademark  proceeding  based  
`upon  prior  use  and  likelihood  of  confusion  it  “must  establish  that  there  is  no  genuine  
`dispute  as  to  (1)  its  priority  of  use  and  (2)  that  contemporaneous  use  of  the  [marks]  by  the  
`parties,  for  their  respective  services,  would  be  likely  to  cause  confusion,  mistake  or  to  
`deceive  consumers.”    See  id.    Under  this  standard,  Micys  has  the  burden  of  establishing  that  
`there  is  no  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  as  to  (1)  its  priority  of  use  of  the  PUPA  marks  for  
`similar  services;  (2)  the  similarity  or  dissimilarity  of  the  PUPA  marks  in  question;  and  (3)  
`Applicant  and  Opposer’s  contemporaneous  use  of  the  marks  containing  the  term  “pupa”  is  
`likely  to  cause  confusion.    See  id.    Micys  cannot  establish  any  of  these  factors.    Thus,  
`summary  judgment  is  not  appropriate  and  Micys’  Motion  must  be  denied.    
`  
`In  any  summary  judgment  proceeding,  “[t]he  non-­‐moving  party  is  required  to  
`introduce  evidence  beyond  the  mere  pleadings  to  show  that  there  is  an  issue  of  material  
`fact  concerning  ‘an  element  essential  to  that  party’s  case,  and  on  which  that  party  will  bear  
`the  burden  of  proof  at  trial.”    Nordco  A.S.  v.  Ledes,  44  USPQ2d  1120,  1122  (SDNY  1997).      
`Numerous  issues  of  material  fact  exist  in  the  instant  matter,  and  Applicant  possesses  
`copious  evidence  demonstrating  that  the  marks  in  question  are  not  likely  to  cause  
`confusion.    Applicant’s  and  Opposer’s  marks  are  clearly  distinguished  from  each  other,  and  
`
`B. Issues  of  Fact  Exist  in  the  instant  Matter  
`
`5  
`
`  
`
`

`
`Micys  has  never  used  its  alleged  PUPA  marks  for  clothing.    There  are,  therefore,  issues  of  
`material  fact  concerning  “elements  essential  to  [Micys’]  case,”  specifically  whether  
`Applicant’s  use  of  the  
`mark  is  likely  to  cause  confusion  among  the  
`consuming  public  when  considered  against  Opposer’s  marks.      
`  
`“Because  of  the  factual  nature  of  trademark  disputes,  summary  judgment  is  
`generally  disfavored  in  the  trademark  arena.”  KP  Permanent  Make-­‐Up,  Inc.  v.  Lasting  
`Impression  I,  Inc.,  408  F.3d  596,  602  (9th  Cir.2005).    Moreover,  “[s]ummary  judgment  will  
`not  like  if  the  dispute  about  a  material  fact  is  ‘genuine,’  that  is,  if  the  evidence  is  such  that  a  
`reasonable  jury  could  return  a  verdict  for  the  non-­‐moving  party.”    Anderson  v.  Liberty  
`Lobby,  Inc.,  477  U.S.  242,  242-­‐43  (1986).    In  this  case,  the  dispute  about  material  facts,  
`specifically  perceived  consumer  confusion  and  priority  of  use,  is  genuine.    A  reasonable  
`jury  could  easily  find  that  the  issues  of  fact  presented  fall  in  favor  of  Applicant.    As  such,  
`summary  judgment  is  inappropriate  and  Opposer’s  Motion  should  be  denied.    
`    
`Applicant  filed  its  
`mark  on  August  6,  2012,  on  an  intent  to  use  basis  
`for  clothing,  namely,  tops,  bottoms,  combinations,  shoes,  belts,  hats,  gloves,  shirts,  shorts,  
`skirts,  underwear,  coats,  jackets,  sweaters,  sweatshirts,  scarves,  socks,  stockings  in  
`international  class  025,  See  Exhibit  2.    Applicant  does  not  offer  goods  in  international  class  
`003  nor  018.    Opposer’s  website  evidences  that  it  does  not  sell  any  goods  in  international  
`class  025  for  clothing,  See  Exhibit  4.      
`  
`In  its  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment,  Opposer  asserts  without  support  that  “Over  
`the  past  three  decades,  Micys  expanded  its  product  offering  to  also  include  a  wide  range  of  
`
`1. Opposer  Does  Not  Have  Priority  of  Use  in  Any  Mark  Containing  the  
`term  “PUPA”  for  clothing  in  international  class  025  
`
`6  
`
`  
`
`

`
`make-­‐up  lines,  nail  kits,  fragrances,  perfumes,  toiletries  and  clothing  items  offered  in  
`connection  with  the  mark  PUPA  and  related  PUPA-­‐formative  marks,  such  as  Miss  Pupa,  See  
`Exhibit  6  (Opposer  Motion),  ¶  1.    This  assertion  lacks  merit,  as  Opposer  has  never  offered  
`clothing  under  its  PUPA  marks.    By  its  own  admission,  Opposer  has  yet  to  offer  clothing  in  
`connection  with  its  PUPA  marks  by  specifically  stating:  “In  addition  to  Opposer’s  foreign  
`registrations  and  trademark  rights,  the  PUPA  marks  are  used  in  the  United  States  in  
`connection  with  the  sale  of  various  make-­‐up  lines,  nail  kits,  fragrances,  perfumes,  and  
`toiletries,  and  Opposer  intends  to  offer  clothing  items  in  connection  with  its  PUPA  marks.  
`Id  at  ¶  5.    In  addition,  Opposer’s  own  attorney  in  his  declaration,  included  in  its  motion  for  
`summary  judgment,  provided  the  board  with  several  Exhibits  and  screenshots  from  the  
`internet  that  do  not  include  any  clothing  items.    Id  at  Declaration  of  Jason  A.  Cody  and  
`Annexed  Exhibits  (Opposer’s  Motion).    Opposer  is  relying  on  its  foreign  applications  as  
`evidence  of  offering  clothing  in  international  class  025,  when  in  fact  this  assertion  is  false.    
`Therefore,  Opposer,  acquired  its  US  registration  based  on  fraudulent  statements  before  the  
`USPTO,  and  by  virtue  of  its  intentional  false  statements,  Opposer  cannot  establish  priority  
`of  use  in  any  mark  containing  the  term  PUPA  for  the  clothing  goods  listed  in  Applicant’s  
`Mark  application.    
`  
`Micys  simply  cannot  establish  priority  for  use  of  any  mark  containing  the  term  
`“PUPA”  for  clothing  and  related  goods  and  services.    In  fact,  it  admittedly  has  never  used  its  
`PUPA  marks  to  offer  those  goods  to  the  consuming  public,  and  only  has  intent  to  offer  
`clothing  under  its  marks.    Micys  cannot  demonstrate  priority  of  use,  and  Applicant  
`respectfully  requests  that  the  instant  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment  be  denied.    
`
`7  
`
`  
`
`

`
`2. There  Is  No  Likelihood  of  Confusion  Between  Applicant’s  and  
`Opposer’s  Marks  
`
`Micys  incorrectly  argues  that  a  likelihood  of  consumer  confusion  exists  between  its  
`    
`alleged  PUPA  marks  and  Applicant’s  
`mark  based  upon  the  Du  Pont  Factors,  
`See  Exhibit  6  (Opposer  Motion),  ¶  IV.    At  the  commencement  of  its  argument,  Micys  boldly  
`(but  incorrectly)  asserts  “The  undisputed  material  facts  demonstrate  that  concurrent  use  of  
`Opposer  mark  PUPA  and  the  Oppose  PUPA  mark  is  likely  to  cause  consumer  confusion,  id  
`(Opposer  Motion  –  Preliminary  Statement)(emphasis  added).    Something  does  not  become  
`“true”  or  “undisputed”  because  it  has  been  aggressively  asserted.    Applicant  disputes  any  
`likelihood  of  confusion  between  its  
`mark  and  Opposer’s  alleged  “PUPA”  
`marks  and  can  provide  clear  evidence  at  trial  supporting  the  dissimilarity  of  the  marks.      
`Opposer  gives  a  cursory,  incomplete,  and  inadequate  analysis  of  the  DuPont  factors  to  
`support  any  likelihood  of  confusion,  let  alone  the  “undisputed”  likelihood  of  confusion  
`necessary  for  summary  judgment.    In  fact,  it  only  discusses  three  of  the  thirteen  DuPont  
`factors,  and,  despite  its  arguments  to  the  contrary,  each  of  these  three  factors  actually  
`weigh  in  favor  of  Applicant  Lauria.    Lauria  can  successfully  demonstrate  that  each  of  the  
`applicable  factors  weigh  in  favor  of  denial  of  the  instant  Motion.    
`  
`It  is  well  established  that  in  comparing  two  trademarks  for  confusing  similarity,  the  
`Board  must  compare  the  marks  for  resemblances  in  appearance  and  meaning  or  
`connotation.    In  re  E.I.  DuPont  de  Nemours  &  Co.,  476  F.2d  1357,  177  U.S.P.Q.  563  (C.C.P.A.  
`1973).  Similarity  of  the  marks  in  one  respect  –  sight,  sound,  or  meaning  –  will  not  
`
`a. Similarity  or  Dissimilarity  as  to  Appearance,  Connotation,  and  
`
`Commercial  Impression  
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`8  
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`automatically  result  in  a  finding  of  likelihood  of  confusion,  even  if  the  services  are  identical  
`or  closely  related.  TMEP  §1207.01(b)(i).  It  is  also  accepted  that  the  use  of  identical,  even  
`dominant,  words  in  common  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  two  marks  are  similar.  See  
`General  Mills,  Inc.  v.  Kellogg  Co.,  824  F.2d  622,  687  (8th  Cir.  1987)  (holding  defendant’s  
`OATMEAL  RAISIN  CRISP  did  not  infringe  plaintiff’s  APPLE  RAISIN  CRISP  trademark).  This  
`is  because  marks  must  be  considered  in  their  entireties.  See,  e.g.,  TMEP  §1207.01.  
`  
`The  Board  is  required  to  look  at  the  overall  impression  created  by  the  marks,  rather  
`than  merely  comparing  individual  features.  Mead  Data  Cent.,  Inc.  v.  Toyota  Motor  Sales,  
`U.S.A.,  Inc.,  875  F.2d  1026,  1029,  10  USPQ2d  1961  (2d  Cir.  1989).  In  this  respect,  the  Board  
`must  determine  whether  the  total  effect  conveyed  by  the  two  marks  is  confusingly  similar,  
`not  simply  whether  the  marks  sound  alike  or  look  alike  First  Savings  Bank  F.S.B.  v.  First  
`Bank  System  Inc.,  101  F.3d  at  645,  653,  40  USPQ2d  1865,  1870  (10th  Cir.  1996)  
`(recognizing  that  while  the  dominant  portion  of  a  mark  is  given  greater  weight,  each  mark  
`still  must  be  considered  as  a  whole)  (citing  Universal  Money  Centers,  Inc.  v.  American  Tel.  &  
`Tel.  Co.,  22  F.3d  1527,  1531,  30  USPQ2d  1930  (10th  Cir.  1994)).  Even  the  use  of  identical  
`dominant  words  or  terms  does  not  automatically  mean  that  two  marks  are  similar.  Also,  in  
`First  Savings  Bank  F.S.B.  v.  First  bank  System  Inc.,  101  F.3d  at  645,  653,  40  USPQ2d  1865,  
`1874  (10th  Cit.  1996),  marks  for  "FirstBank"  and  for  "First  Bank  Kansas"  were  found  not  to  
`be  confusingly  similar.  Furthermore,  in  Luigino's  Inc.  v.  Stouffer  Corp.,  50  USPQ2d  1047,  the  
`mark  "Lean  Cuisine"  was  found  not  be  confusingly  similar  to  "Michelina's  Lean  'N  Tasty"  
`even  though  both  marks  use  the  word  "Lean"  and  are  in  the  same  class  of  goods,  namely,  
`low-­‐fat  frozen  food.  
`
`i. Appearance  
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`Concerning  the  respective  goods  with  which  the  marks  are  used,  the  nature  and  
`  
`scope  of  a  party's  goods  or  services  must  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  goods  or  
`services  recited  in  the  application  or  registration.  See  Hewlett-­‐Packard  Co.  v.  Packard  Press  
`Inc.,  281  F.3d  1261,  62  USPQ2d  1001  (Fed  Cir.  2002);  In  re  Shell  Oil  Co.,  992  F.2d  1204,  26  
`USPQ2d  1687,  1690  n.4  (Fed.  Cir.  1993);  J  &  J  Snack  Foods  Corp.  v.  McDonald's  Corp.,  932  
`F.2d  1460,  18  USPQ2d  1889  (Fed.  Cir.  1991);  Octocom  Systems  Inc.  v.  Houston  Computer  
`Services  Inc.,  918  F.2d  937.  16  USPQ2d  1783  (Fed.  Cir.  1990);  Canadian  Imperial  Bank  of  
`Commerce,  N.A.  v.  Wells  Fargo  Bank,  811  F.2d  1490,  1  USPQ2d  1813  (Fed.  Cir.  1987);  Paula  
`Payne  Products  co.  v.  Johnson  Publishing  Co.,  473  F.2d  901,  177  USPQ  76  (C.C.P.A.  1973).  See  
`generally  TMEP  §  1207.01(a)(iii).    
`  
`In  Estate  of  P.D.  Beckwith,  Inc.  v.  Commissioner  of  Patents,  252  U.S.  538,  the  Supreme  
`Court  laid  down  the  Anti-­‐Dissection  Rule  and  held  that  composite  conflicting  marks  are  to  
`be  compared  by  looking  at  them  as  a  whole  rather  than  breaking  the  marks  up  into  their  
`component  parts  for  comparison.  The  rationale  of  this  rule  is  that  the  commercial  
`impression  of  a  composite  trademark  on  an  ordinary  prospective  buyer  (customer)  is  
`created  by  the  mark  as  a  whole,  not  by  its  component  parts.  
`  
`Furthermore,  where  a  likelihood  of  confusion  analysis  is  made  between  a  standard  
`character  mark  and  a  stylized  form  mark,  "[t]here  is  no  general  rule  as  to  whether  letters  or  
`designs  will  dominate  in  composite  marks;  nor  is  the  dominance  of  letters  or  designs  
`dispositive  of  the  issue."  In  re  Electrolyte  Laboratories  Inc.,  929  F.2d  645,  647,  16  USPQ2d  
`1239,  1240  (Fed.  Cir.  1990)  (K+  and  design  for  dietary  potassium  supplement  held  not  
`likely  to  be  confused  with  K+EFF  (stylized)  for  dietary  potassium  supplement).  Again,  
`analysis  of  the  at-­‐issue  marks  must  be  done  on  a  case-­‐by-­‐case  basis  without  reliance  on  
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`mechanical  rules  of  construction.  See,  e.g.,  Spice  Islands,  Inc.  v.  The  Frank  Tea  &  Spice  Co.,  
`505  F.2d  1293,  184  USPQ  35  (C.C.P.A.  1974)  (SPICE  TREE  and  tree  design  held  not  
`confusingly  similar  to  SPICE  ISLANDS  and  tree  design,  both  for  spices).  
`  
`Applicant  respectfully  submits  that,  when  applicant's  mark,  viewed  as  a  whole,  and  
`taking  into  account  the  distinctive  design  elements  of  it’s  
`,  there  is  no  
`likelihood  of  confusion  with  the  cited  registration.  As  a  general  rule,  "the  basic  principal  in  
`determining  confusion  between  marks  is  that  the  marks  must  be  compared  in  their  
`entireties...  [and  a]  likelihood  of  confusion  cannot  be  predicated  on  dissection  of  a  mark."  In  
`re  National  Data  Corporation,  753  F.2d  1056  (Fed.  Cir.  1985).    However,  there  is  "nothing  
`improper  in  stating  that  .  .  .  more  or  less  weight  has  been  given  to  a  particular  feature  of  a  
`mark."    Id.    Furthermore,  "a  design  feature  of  a  mark  cannot  be  ignored."    F.D.C.  Wholesale  
`Corp.  v.  La  Cibeles,  Inc.,  Opposition  No.  104,891  (T.T.A.B.  Aug.  25,  1995)  (non-­‐precedential),  
`quoting  In  re  Appetito  Provisions  Co.,  3  U.S.P.Q.2d  1553  (T.T.A.B.  1987).    Accordingly,  when  
`viewed  in  its  entirety,  Applicant's  mark  is  not  confusingly  similar  to  the  prior  pending  
`mark.    
`  
`As  designs  are  viewed,  not  spoken,  a  stylized  design  cannot  be  treated  simply  as  a  
`word  mark.    In  re  Bundy  Corp.,  300  F.2d  938,  940  (C.C.P.A.  1962).    This  is  true  even  if  the  
`"letters  are  visually  prominent  .  .  .  [where]  they  also  serve  as  background  for  the  display  of  
`words  .  .  .  [and]  are  plainly  not  subordinate  matter."    In  Re  TSI  Brands,  Inc,  67  U.S.P.Q.2d  
`1657  (T.T.A.B.  2002)  (held  that  a  mark  with  highly  stylized  letters  surrounded  by  an  oval  
`or  circle  "as  a  vehicle  for  their  display"  was  not  dominant  matter).    Accordingly,  when  
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`viewed,  Applicant's  mark,  with  its  significant  distinguishing  design  elements,  is  not  
`confusingly  similar  to  Opposer’s  marks.  
`  
`Applying  present  jurisprudence,  it  must  be  noted  that  a  specifically  stylized  logo  
`trademark  derives  its  distinctiveness  not  from  its  words  alone,  but  more  particularly  from  
`its  configuration  and  design.  Applicant  stresses  that  the  literal  elements  in  Applicant’s  
`mark  consist  of  an  insignificant  portion  of  its  mark  in  relation  to  the  other  stylized  
`elements.      As  a  dominant  portion  of  its  mark,  Applicant  incorporates  a  unique  stylized  
`image  of  a  heart  in  the  shape  of  two  red  ribbons  flowing  together  in  order  to  form  a  heart.    
`This  image  of  the  two  red  ribbons  forming  into  a  wavy  heart  is  dominant  in  its  visual  effect  
`to  the  literal  elements,  and  is  featured  as  a  source  identifier  in  Applicant’s  mark,  and  is  the  
`first  thing  a  consumer  will  notice  prior  to  reading  the  literal  elements.    Opposer’s  marks  
`contain  no  such  depictions  or  any  identifiers  to  hearts  or  love.    Further,  the  two  red  wavy  
`ribbons  could  also  be  interpreted  as  looking  like  two  Ss  with  one  in  reverse  in  order  to  
`form  the  heart,  as  if  the  two  ribbons  are  coming  together  to  symbolize  love.    
`  
`In  addition,  a  visual  examination  of  the  literal  elements  reveals  cle