Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA614393
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`07/08/2014
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91204850
`Defendant
`Owen Roe, LLC
`HILLARY A BROOKS
`MARGER JOHNSON & MCCOLLOM PC
`210 SW MORRISON ST , STE 400
`PORTLAND, OR 97204-3189
`UNITED STATES
`litigationdocketing@techlaw.com, lisa.riley@techlaw.com, hillary@techlaw.com,
`delfina.homen@techlaw.com, amandabernardy@techlaw.com
`Opposition/Response to Motion
`Delfina S. Homen
`delfina.homen@techlaw.com, hillary.brooks@techlaw.com, litigationdocket-
`ing@techlaw.com
`/Delfina S. Homen/
`07/08/2014
`2014_07_08 FINAL Applicant's Opposition to Opposer's Motion to Extend Time
`to Reply to Motion to Quash (7007-0029).pdf(44351 bytes )
`2014_07_08 FINAL Homen Dec ISO Applicant's Opposition to Opposer's Motion
`to Extend Time to Reply to Motion to Quash (7007-0029).pdf(15412 bytes )
`2014_07_08 Exhibit 1 to Homen Dec ISO Applicant's Opposition to Opposer's
`Motion to Extend Time to Respond.pdf(794970 bytes )
`2014_07_08 Exhibit 2 to Homen Dec ISO Applicant's Opposition to Opposer's
`Motion to Extend Time to Respond.pdf(813694 bytes )
`2014_07_08 Exhibit 3 to Homen Dec ISO Applicant's Opposition to Opposer's
`Motion to Extend Time to Respond.pdf(800063 bytes )
`2014_07_08 Exhibit 4 to Homen Dec ISO Applicant's Opposition to Opposer's
`Motion to Extend Time to Respond.pdf(770304 bytes )
`2014_07_08 Exhibit 5 to Homen Dec ISO Applicant's Opposition to Opposer's
`Motion to Extend Time to Respond.pdf(765331 bytes )
`
`

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` IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
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`FRANCISCAN VINEYARDS, INC.
`
`Opposer,
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`v.
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`OWEN ROE, LLC,
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`
`
`
`Applicant.
`
`)
`Opposition No. 91204850
`)
`)
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`)
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`)
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`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND ITS TIME TO RESPOND
`TO APPLICANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND QUASH
`
`Applicant Owen Roe, LLC (“Applicant”) hereby opposes Opposer Franciscan Vineyards, Inc.’s
`
`
`
`
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`(“Opposer”) Motion to Extend Its Time (By 5 Days) to Respond to Applicant’s Motion to Strike
`
`Opposer’s Pretrial Disclosures and Quash Deposition of Opposer’s Witnesses (38 TTABVUE)
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`(hereinafter “Motion to Extend”).
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`
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`Opposer’s Motion to Extend, filed on the last day for Opposer to reply to Applicant’s pending
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`Motion to Strike and Quash (see 36 TTABVUE), claims Opposer needs an additional five days to reply to
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`Applicant’s Motion because 1) the signing attorney, Mr. Rannells, was out of the office for approximately
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`one week prior to the reply due date for a family medical issue, and 2) Mr. Rannells allegedly “has
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`primary responsibility for the case and is the only attorney in the office with sufficient knowledge of the
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`case to properly respond.” (38 TTABVUE at 1.)
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`
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`Applicant is sympathetic to Mr. Rannells’ family medical issue and, if this were the first time
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`Opposer had sought an extension of time—or were even the second or third time—Applicant might not
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`have opposed the request. However, this is not the first, second, or even third time Opposer has sought an
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`extension; it is the seventh requested extension and, indeed, there is now an eighth request1 pending as
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`well. (See 40 TTABVUE at 7 (chart of Opposer’s requested extensions).) The extension opposed herein
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`1 In the form of a request to reopen discovery and trial dates that is really an untimely motion for reconsideration of
`a Board order, see 39 TTABVUE, which is separately opposed.
`
`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 1
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
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`

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`is merely one more example of Opposer’s well-documented attempts to stall advance of this proceeding—
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`a proceeding that Opposer, not Applicant, instituted, and which has been pending for more than two
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`years.
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`Moreover, although Opposer provides some explanation for its failure to act for the last week of
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`its response period, Opposer provides no explanation whatsoever for its failure to act during the first two
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`weeks of its response period. Opposer also provides an inadequate explanation for why no other
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`attorneys in Mr. Rannells’ firm—all of whom hold themselves out as practicing trademark law—could
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`not have familiarized himself with the facts relevant to Applicant’s Motion to Strike and prepared and
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`filed a timely response when it became evident that Mr. Rannells would not be able to do so.
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`The real issue here appears to be that Opposer still does not know who two unnamed witnesses
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`are, and, knowing that it has missed its deadline for expert disclosures, missed its requested extension of
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`time for amended pretrial disclosures, and failed to timely correct deficiencies in its initial disclosures,
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`Opposer is doing anything that it can to keep alive the prospects of bringing in the two still unnamed
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`witnesses. Opposer’s tactics cannot be countenanced, particularly where, as here, Opposer has failed to
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`provide sufficient facts to constitute good cause for the requested extension, an extension that is
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`demonstrably necessitated by Opposer’s own lack of diligence and unreasonable delay.2
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`ARGUMENT
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`Motions to extend time “must set forth with particularity the facts said to constitute good cause
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`for the requested extension; mere conclusory allegations lacking in factual detail are not sufficient.”
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`TBMP 509.01(a). “[A] party moving to extend time must demonstrate that the requested extension of
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`time is not necessitated by the party’s own lack of diligence or unreasonable delay in taking the required
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`2 There are currently four separate pending motions for extensions of time that have been filed by Opposer. See 34
`TTABVUE (Opposer’s motion to extend by two weeks its time to serve supplemental pretrial disclosures, filed May
`16, 2014, which Applicant has already opposed, see 35 TTABVUE); 37 TTABVUE (Opposer’s motion to suspend
`and extend trial dates pending resolution of Applicant’s motion to strike and quash, filed June 5, 2014, which
`Applicant has already opposed, see 40 TTABVUE); 38 TTABVUE (Opposer’s motion to extend its time to respond
`to Applicant’s motion to strike and quash, filed June 18, 2014, to which the instant opposition is responsive); 39
`TTABVUE at 1-3 (Opposer’s motion to reopen and reset discovery and trial dates, filed June 23, 2014, to which
`Applicant is concurrently herewith filing an opposition). The instant Opposition is responsive to Opposer’s motion
`found at 38 TTABVUE.
`
`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 2
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
`
`

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`action during the time previously allotted therefor.” Id. The Board will “scrutinize carefully” motions for
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`extensions of time to determine whether good cause has been shown, including the diligence of the
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`moving party during period in question. See Luemme Inc. v. D.B. Plus Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1758, 1760
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`(TTAB 1999).
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`In its Motion to Extend, Opposer requests an additional five days to respond to Applicant’s
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`motion to strike and quash because Opposer’s attorney “has been occupied with a family medical issue
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`since this past Thursday and has not been to the office until today.” (38 TTABVUE at 1; 38 TTABVUE,
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`Rannels Decl. ¶ 4.) Notably, this statement only accounts for the period from June 12, 2014 (the “this
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`past Thursday” mentioned in Opposer’s motion) to June 18, 2014, the response due date and date
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`Opposer filed its Motion to Extend. However, Applicant’s Motion was filed on May 29, 2014, two weeks
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`before the alleged family medical issue. Opposer does not explain why no action was taken to prepare the
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`response in the first two weeks of the response period. Instead, it appears Opposer failed to act for the
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`majority of its response period, only seeking an extension of time on the last day to respond rather than,
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`for example, a week earlier when the family medical issue first arose.
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`In HKG Industries Inc. v. Perma-Pipe Inc., 49 USPQ2d 1156, 1157 (TTAB 1998), the movant
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`failed to establish good cause for reopening its testimony period by alleging the death of its attorney who
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`was “responsible for all aspects” of the proceeding. The attorney’s death would only constitute good
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`cause if it “occurred at a time relatively contemporaneous with the opening and closing of the plaintiff’s
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`testimony period.” Id. at 1158. Because the movant failed to provide any information about when the
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`attorney died, there was “no evidence of record that his death occurred at such a time as to prevent
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`petitioners from going forward with their testimony period.” Id. Accordingly, the Board denied the
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`motion to reopen the testimony period, and dismissed the proceeding for failure to prosecute. Id.
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`Here, too, Opposer fails to provide information indicating that its attorney’s family medical issue
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`was sufficiently contemporaneous with the opening and closing of Opposer’s time to respond to
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`Applicant’s Motion to Strike. To the contrary, Opposer’s information indicates the issue was not
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`contemporaneous with the opening and closing of Opposer’s response period by claiming the issue arose
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`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 3
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
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`

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`in the final week of the period. (See 38 TTABVUE at 1.) Opposer does not explain why it failed to act in
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`the first two weeks of its response period. “[M]ere unexplained delay in initiating action in an affected
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`time period does not constitute good cause.” Procyon Pharma. Inc. v. Procyon Biopharma Inc., 61
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`USPQ2d 1542, 1543 (TTAB 2001). Under these circumstances, the family medical issue does not
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`provide good cause for an extension. See, e.g., HKG Indust., 49 USPQ2d at 1157-58 (denying motion for
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`extension where attorney’s death did not occur contemporaneously with the opening and closing of the
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`period).
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`Opposer’s claim that Mr. Rannells “has primary responsibility for the case and is the only
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`attorney in the office with sufficient knowledge of the case to properly respond” (38 TTABVUE at 1)
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`likewise does not provide good cause for the requested extension. In HKG Industries, in addition to
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`failing to provide sufficient information concerning the responsible attorney’s death, the movant failed to
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`provide a sufficient explanation as to why other attorneys in the deceased attorney’s office could not have
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`assumed responsibility for the case. HKG Indus., 49 USPQ2d at 1158. The movant’s claim that the
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`deceased attorney “was responsible for all aspects” of the proceeding was insufficient in light of the fact
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`that there were several other attorneys who could have taken the matter over. See id. at 1157-58; see also
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`FirstHealth of the Carolinas Inc. v. CareFirst of Maryland Inc., 81 USPQ2d 1919, 1922 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
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`(affirming Board’s denial of motion to reopen where movant failed to explain why another attorney in the
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`firm did not assume responsibility for the case when the responsible attorney had a family medical
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`emergency).
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`Here, too, there are several other attorneys who could have taken the response over when Mr.
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`Rannells became indisposed. Review of Opposer’s attorney’s firm website shows that there are at least
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`five other attorneys who practice trademark law in the firm. (See Homen Decl. Ex. A-E.) Opposer
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`provides no explanation as to why one of these five attorneys could not have responded to the Motion to
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`Strike. Tellingly, Opposer refers to Mr. Rannells as having “primary responsibility,” indicating that
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`another attorney is involved in the matter.
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`The Motion to Strike is on a discrete set of facts. An attorney need not have knowledge of every
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`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 4
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
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`

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`fact of the case to prepare a timely response; basic familiarity with trademark law and TTAB practice
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`should suffice.3 Opposer does not explain why one of the five other attorneys could not have reviewed
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`Applicant’s Motion and formulated a timely response. Indeed, one of the other attorneys, Stephen Baker,
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`apparently has extensive TTAB experience, and in fact was the attorney who first filed this Opposition.4
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`Opposer’s claim that Mr. Rannells is “the only attorney in the office with sufficient knowledge of the case
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`to properly respond” is as insufficient as was the movant’s similar claim in HKG Industries.5
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`Nor does Mr. Rannells’ claim in his declaration that he is “working to catch up on numerous
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`matters” (38 TTABVUE, Rannells Decl. ¶ 4) constitute good cause for the requested extension. An
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`attorney’s duties to other clients do not relieve him of his obligations in a Board proceeding. See Baron
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`Philippe de Rothschilde S.A. v. Styl-Rite-Optical Mfg. Co., 55 USPQ2d 1848, 1853 (TTAB 2000)
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`(denying several motions to extend and reopen for a lack of good cause). This should particularly be so
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`where, as here, there are evidently other attorneys who could have prepared a timely response.
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`Opposer also fails to demonstrate how its requested extension is not necessitated by its own lack
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`of diligence and unreasonable delay prior to Mr. Rannells’ family medical issue. As discussed in detail in
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`Applicant’s pending opposition to Opposer’s June 5th motion for an extension of time (see 40 TTABVUE
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`at 3-7), the issue underlying all of the pending briefs is Opposer’s failure to identify two unnamed
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`witnesses—witnesses that were never identified in expert or initial disclosures, and still were not
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`identified in Opposer’s pretrial disclosures. It is Opposer’s failure to disclose these individuals for
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`approximately a year now that necessitated Applicant’s Motion to Strike and Quash, which in turn
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`necessitated Opposer’s motion opposed herein. It is, therefore, Opposer’s own lack of diligence and
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`3 And, in any event, Opposer does not explain why one of these other attorneys could not have reviewed the file and
`familiarized himself enough with the case to respond
`4 Mr. Baker’s biography states that he has “successfully prosecuted and defended hundreds of oppositions and
`cancellations proceeding in the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office.” (Homen Decl. Ex. A.) Mr. Baker was listed as
`an attorney for Opposer on at least the Notice of Opposition (1 TTABVUE at 11) and the Amended Notice of
`Opposition (6 TTABVUE at 9), and himself filed the Notice of Opposition (1 TTABVUE at 5).
`5 In HKG Industries, the other attorneys were listed in a formal power of attorney filed with the Board. HKG Indus.,
`49 USPQ2d at 1158. However, a formal power of attorney is not the only way for an attorney to appear on behalf of
`a party in a TTAB proceeding: “An attorney . . . will be accepted as a representative of a party in a proceeding
`before the Board if the attorney . . . signs a document that is filed with the Office on behalf of the party and
`satisfactorily identifies himself or herself as an attorney.” TBMP 114.03. At least Mr. Baker, an experienced TTAB
`practitioner, has already appeared for Opposer in this proceeding. See n. 4, supra.
`
`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 5
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
`
`

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`unreasonable delay that necessitated Opposer’s request for an extension of time. In such circumstances,
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`requests for extension should be denied. See, e.g., Fairline Boats plc v. New Howmar Boats Corp., 59
`
`USPQ2d 1479, 1480 (TTAB 2000) (denying motion to extend testimony period where movant failed to
`
`timely identify witnesses; movant “brought this cancellation proceeding . . . and thus, carries the burden
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`of going forward in a timely manner”).
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`Further, as also previously discussed, the Board’s liberality in granting extensions of time only
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`extends where “the moving party has not been guilty of negligence or bad faith and the privilege of
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`extensions is not abused.” Nat’l Football League v. DNH Mgmt. LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1852, 1854 (TTAB
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`2008). Here, Opposer has at the very least been negligent in pinning down the unnamed witnesses,
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`negligence that required Applicant to file its Motion to Strike.6 Moreover, Opposer has requested eight
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`extensions of time, missing four of the new deadlines that Opposer itself requested:
`
`Requested Extension
`July 22, 2013: motion to extend closing date for
`expert disclosures and all trial dates thereafter (20
`TTABVUE)
`to extend
`first motion
`December 2, 2013:
`Opposer’s time to respond to Applicant’s motion
`for summary
`judgment by
`three weeks (25
`TTABVUE)
`to extend
`January 3, 2014: second motion
`Opposer’s time to respond to Applicant’s motion
`for
`summary
`judgment by one week
`(26
`TTABVUE)
`February 19, 2014: retroactive third motion to
`extend Opposer’s time to respond to Applicant’s
`motion for summary judgment by three days (31
`TTABVUE)
`May 16, 2014: motion to extend time to serve
`supplemental pretrial disclosures by two weeks (34
`TTABVUE)
`June 5, 2014: motion to suspend and extend trial
`dates pending resolution of Applicant’s motion to
`strike and quash (37 TTABVUE)
`June 18, 2014: motion to extend time to respond to
`Applicant’s motion to strike and quash by five days
`(38 TTABVUE)
`
`Outcome
` New deadline for expert
`Extension granted.
`disclosures not met by Opposer. No expert
`disclosures ever served by Opposer.
`Extension granted.
` Opposer, unable to meet
`deadline, filed second motion to extend.
`
`Extension granted. Opposer, filed response three
`days past requested extension date, then, claiming
`technical difficulties, filed a retroactive motion for
`an additional three days to file the response.
`Extension granted.
`
`two week
` Requested
`Motion still pending.
`extension now past; no supplemental pretrial
`disclosures were ever served.
`Motion still pending; opposition on file.
`
`still pending;
`Motion
`responsive.
`
`instant opposition
`
`is
`
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`6 And, of course, Opposer has been negligent in failing to timely disclose certain topics and documents that have
`now been disclosed in its pretrial disclosures.
`
`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 6
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
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`

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`to reopen and reset
`June 23, 2014: motion
`discovery and trial dates (39 TTABVUE)
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`These eight extensions of time all tie back in to Opposer’s apparent inability to track down the unnamed
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`Motion still pending; opposition being filed
`concurrently herewith.
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`witnesses that Opposer is still, at this late hour, attempting to bring in to the case. Opposer has repeatedly
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`abused the privilege of extensions in this proceeding, making a denial of Opposer’s motion for an
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`extension eminently proper. 7
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`The fact that a denial of Opposer’s motion for an extension of time to respond to Applicant’s
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`Motion would render Opposer’s subsequently filed response (see 39 TTABVUE) untimely is not
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`sufficient grounds to grant the motion. As the CCPA explained in affirming a Board decision denying a
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`motion for an extension of time that resulted in a subsequently filed response to a motion for summary
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`judgment being untimely and therefore not considered,
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`Litigation is run by rules designed to assure orderly conduct of the proceedings. One of those
`rules is the timely submission of briefs unless an extension of time has been granted. An attorney
`has no right to assume that extensions of time will always be granted automatically . . . .
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`Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 205 USPQ 888, 891-92 (CCPA 1980) (emphasis in original).
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`The Board can properly deny Opposer’s motion, even though doing so would result in Opposer’s
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`response to Applicant’s Motion to Strike being rendered untimely. See, e.g., Baron Philippe, 55 USPQ2d
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`at 1853 (giving no consideration to movant’s response to cross-motion for summary judgment where,
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`after denial of movant’s motion for an extension of time, the response was untimely); see also Nat’l
`
`Football League v. DNH Mgmt. LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1852, 1855 (TTAB 2008) (stating that in view of the
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`denial of the movant’s motion to extend discovery, “discovery dates remain as originally set and as a
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`result, the discovery period is closed”); Luemme Inc. v. D.B. Plus Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1758, (TTAB 1999)
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`(denying motion to extend discovery period, which had run during the period of briefing on movant’s
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`motion to extend such that discovery was, at the time of the Board’s decision, already closed).
`
`
`7 In a June 20th to June 23rd email exchange between Mr. Rannells and the undersigned, the parties discussed the
`possibility of agreeing to certain additional extension requests by Opposer. However, the parties did not reach any
`agreement, as is evident on the face of the email exchange, but also in the fact that no stipulated requests have been
`filed. This email exchanges is being filed concurrently herewith as Exhibit 3 to the Homen Declaration in Support
`of Applicant’s Opposition to Opposer’s Motion to Reopen and Reset Discovery and Trial Dates.
`
`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 7
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
`
`

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`
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`Further, under Trademark Rule 2.127(a),
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`[A] brief in response to a motion shall be filed within fifteen days8 from the date of service of the
`motion unless . . . the time is extended . . . upon motion granted by the Board . . . . If a motion for
`an extension is denied, the time for responding to the motion remains as specified under this
`section, unless otherwise ordered. . . . When a party fails to file a brief in response to a motion,
`the Board may treat the motion as conceded.
`
`
`Opposer was on notice of Trademark Rule 2.127, yet chose to wait until the last day of its response period
`
`to request an extension, providing only insufficient reasons for the extension. The requested extension is
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`not warranted under such circumstances. Procyon Pharma., 61 USPQ2d at 1544 (denying request for
`
`extension of testimony period where movant provided only insufficient information regarding a
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`laboratory move alleged to have occupied its witness during the testimony period because, among other
`
`reasons, movant was “on notice of the provisions of” a similar rule pertaining to denials of motions to
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`extend testimony periods).
`
`
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`The United States Patent and Trademark Office has a “mandate to decide the registrability of
`
`marks without undue delay.” Procyon Pharma., 61 USPQ2d at 1544. Trademark Rule 2.127(a)
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`specifically states that if a motion for an extension of time to respond is denied, the time for responding to
`
`the motion will remain as originally set under the rule unless otherwise ordered. Rules such as these are
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`intended to “alert parties to the potential consequences if a motion to extend does not show good cause,
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`and [to] put them on notice that the Board will not tolerate abuses of the rules.” See Notice of Final
`
`Rulemaking, 63 Fed. Reg. 48081, 48091 (Sept. 9, 1998).9
`
`
`8 Because Applicant’s Motion was served by mail, Opposer had a total of 20 days within which to file its response.
`See 37 CFR 2.119(c) (five additional days allowed after service by mail).
`9 The cited portion of the Notice of Final Rulemaking pertains to a provision, added to Trademark Rule 2.121(c), “to
`specify that if a motion to extend the testimony period is denied, ‘the testimony periods may remain as set.’” This
`new provision closely parallels Trademark Rule 2.127(a), which states that if a motion to extend the time to respond
`to a motion is denied, “the time for responding to the motion remains as specified under this section, unless
`otherwise ordered.” With respect to Trademark Rule 2.121(c), the PTO stated in the Notice:
`There is a concern that, if testimony periods had to be reset to provide the amount of time which was remaining
`at the time a motion to extend was filed, a party might file a motion for extension as a strategic measure to
`obtain a delay until the Board decides the motion, even if the motion is ultimately denied. The Board has
`always had the discretion, if it denied a motion for an extension, to leave the testimony periods as set. It is
`hoped that specifically stating this fact in this section, as well as in § 2.121(a)(1), will alert the parties to the
`potential consequences if a motion to extend does not show good cause, and will put them on notice that the
`Board will not tolerate abuses of the rules.
`
`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 8
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
`
`

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`Because of this proceeding, Applicant’s mark has been in limbo for over two years, with Opposer
`
`repeatedly attempting to delay and forestall its duty to disclose two still unnamed witnesses. Opposer’s
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`well-documented dilatory behavior and abuses of the privilege of extension in this proceeding counsel
`
`against granting Opposer’s motion to extend its time to respond to Applicant’s Motion to Strike.
`
`Opposer’s motion should be denied, its untimely response to Applicant’s Motion to Strike should be
`
`given no consideration, and Applicant’s Motion to Strike should be granted as conceded. See 37 CFR
`
`2.127(a).
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`
`
`For the reasons set forth above, Applicant requests that Opposer’s June 18, 2014 motion to extend
`
`Opposer’s time to respond to Applicant’s motion to strike and quash (38 TTABVUE) be denied.
`
`Dated this 8th day of July, 2014.
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`MARGER JOHNSON & McCOLLOM, P.C.
`
`/Hillary A. Brooks/
`Hillary A. Brooks
`Registration No. 45,817
`Attorney for Opposer
`
`
`
`MARGER JOHNSON & McCOLLOM, P.C.
`210 SW Morrison Street, Suite 400
`Portland, OR 97204
`(503) 222-3613
`
`
`
`
`
`
`63 Fed. Reg. at 48091. The same concerns appear to apply equally to Trademark Rule 2.127(a), which was amended
`at the same time as Trademark Rule 2.121(c) to provide that if a motion for an extension was denied, the time for
`responding may remain as previously set. See id. at 48093.
`
`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
`
`PAGE 9
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
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`

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`The undersigned hereby certifies that APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S
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`CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
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`MOTION TO EXTEND ITS TIME TO RESPOND TO APPLICANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
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`QUASH was electronically filed with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board on July 8, 2014.
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`/Delfina S. Homen/
`Delfina S. Homen
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPLICANT’S
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`OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND ITS TIME TO RESPOND TO
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`APPLICANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND QUASH was served upon Opposer on July 8, 2014, by
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`forwarding said copy via first class mail to counsel for Opposer at the following address:
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`John M. Rannells
`Baker & Rannells PA
`575 Route 28, Suite 102
`Raritan, NJ 08869
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`
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`/Lisa Davis/
`Lisa Davis
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`APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`TIME TO RESPOND TO MOTION TO STRIKE & QUASH
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`PAGE 10
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 7007-0029
`
`

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` IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`)
`Opposition No. 91204850
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`FRANCISCAN VINEYARDS, INC.
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`Opposer,
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`
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`v.
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`
`
`OWEN ROE, LLC,
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`
`
`
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`Applicant.
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`
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`DECLARATION OF DELFINA S. HOMEN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO
`OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND ITS TIME TO RESPOND TO APPLICANT’S MOTION TO
`STRIKE AND QUASH
`
`
`I, Delfina S. Homen, hereby declare as follows:
`
`1.
`
`I am an attorney for Applicant Owen Roe, LLC. I am personally knowledgeable
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`regarding the subject matter stated herein and make this declaration in support of Applicant’s Opposition
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`to Opposer’s Motion to Extend Its Time to Respond to Applicant’s Motion to Strike and Quash (38
`
`TTABVUE).
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`2.
`
`Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a PDF print of the webpage located at
`
`http://www.tmlawworldwide.com/attorney-profiles/stephen-l-baker.php, taken on June 30, 2014.
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`3.
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`Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a PDF print of the webpage located at
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`http://www.tmlawworldwide.com/attorney-profiles/neil-b-friedman.php, taken on June 30, 2014.
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`4.
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`Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of a PDF print of the webpage located at
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`http://www.tmlawworldwide.com/attorney-profiles/ryan-a-mcgonigle.php, taken on June 30, 2014.
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`5.
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`Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of a PDF print of the webpage located at
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`http://www.tmlawworldwide.com/attorney-profiles/jason-l-defrancesco.php, taken on June 30, 2014.
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`6.
`
`Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of a PDF print of the webpage located at
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`http://www.tmlawworldwide.com/attorney-profiles/pei-lun-chang.php, taken on June 30, 2014.
`
`HOMEN DEC ISO APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO
`OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`
`PAGE 1
`
`DKT. NO. 7007-0029
`
`

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`I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and all statements
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`made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with
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`the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment,
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`or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/Delfina S. Homen/
`Delfina S. Homen
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`
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`Dated: July 8, 2014
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`HOMEN DEC ISO APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO
`OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`
`PAGE 2
`
`DKT. NO. 7007-0029
`
`

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`
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`
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`The undersigned hereby certifies that DECLARATION OF DELFINA S. HOMEN IN
`
`CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
`
`SUPPORT OF APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND ITS
`
`TIME TO RESPOND TO APPLICANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND QUASH was electronically
`
`filed with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board on July 8, 2014.
`
`
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`
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`By: /Delfina S. Homen/
`Delfina S. Homen
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`OF DELFINA S. HOMEN IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO OPPOSER’S
`
`MOTION TO EXTEND ITS TIME TO RESPOND TO APPLICANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE
`
`AND QUASH was served upon Opposer on July 8, 2014, by forwarding said copy via first class mail to
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`counsel for Opposer at the following address:
`
`John M. Rannells
`Baker & Rannells, PA
`575 Route 28, Ste. 102
`Raritan, NJ 08869
`
`
`
`
`
`By: /Lisa Davis/
`Lisa Davis
`
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`HOMEN DEC ISO APPLICANT’S OPPOSITION TO
`OPPOSER’S MOTION TO EXTEND
`
`PAGE 3
`
`DKT. NO. 7007-0029
`
`

`
`
`
`EXHIBIT 1
`EXHIBIT 1
`
`

`
`6/30/14
`
`-->
`
`Stephen L. Baker | Baker & Rannells, PA
`
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