throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
`P.O. Box 1451
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
`
`
`
`
`
`BUTLER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Mailed: August 18, 2011
`
`
`
`
`
`Opposition No. 91197240
`
`FGN USA, INC.
`
`
`v.
`
`
`TRANS RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL TRUST
`LIMITED
`
`
`
`
`Before Bucher, Kuhlke and Taylor, Administrative Trademark
`Judges.
`
`By the Board:
`
`
`
`Applicant seeks to register the mark TPR 20 for "topical
`
`pain relief medication; topical pain relief cream; anti-
`
`inflammatory cream."1
`
`
`
`In an order dated March 24, 2011, the Board considered
`
`applicant's then-pending motion to dismiss and opposer's proposed
`
`amended pleaded. The Board considered opposer's amended pleaded
`
`to ascertain whether it stated a claim upon which relief may be
`
`granted. On page 4 of the order, the Board expressly stated that
`
`opposer asserted sufficient claims of fraud and likelihood of
`
`confusion.
`
`
`1 Application Serial No. 85027022, filed on April 30, 2010, and
`claiming a date of first use anywhere of January 1, 2009 and a date of
`first use in commerce of May 1, 2009.
`
`
`

`
`Opposition No. 91197240
`
`
`
`Notwithstanding this express determination, applicant, on
`
`April 15, 2011, filed a second motion to dismiss directed to the
`
`claims of priority and likelihood of confusion and fraud.
`
`Although opposer has not responded to applicant's motion, the
`
`Board will consider the motion on its merits rather than treat it
`
`as conceded.2
`
`
`
`A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
`
`relief can be granted is a test solely of the legal sufficiency
`
`of a complaint. In order to withstand such a motion, a complaint
`
`need only allege such facts as would, if proved, establish that
`
`the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought, that is, that (1)
`
`the plaintiff has standing to maintain the proceeding, and (2) a
`
`valid ground exists for denying the registration sought (in the
`
`case of an opposition. To survive a motion to dismiss, a
`
`complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
`
`face." See TBMP § 503.02 (3d ed. 2011).
`
`1. Priority of use and likelihood of confusion
`
`
`
`According to applicant, this claim is insufficiently pled
`
`because opposer did not assert that it has priority.
`
`
`2 Opposer is representing itself and, as such, should familiarize
`itself with the rules and procedures governing this proceeding. In
`its March 24, 2011 order, the Board provided opposer with general
`information about Board proceedings and urged that opposer obtain an
`attorney for purposes of this litigation. Opposer was so advised
`because strict compliance with the Trademark Rules and all other
`applicable rules is expected of all parties, even those representing
`themselves. The Board may elect to treat a motion as conceded if no
`response is filed. See Trademark Rule 2.127(a); and TBMP § 502.04 (3d
`ed. 2011). Without attorney representation to guide it, opposer risks
`future inaction or other missteps which may result in dismissal of
`this proceeding.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`
`Opposition No. 91197240
`
`
`
`In paragraph No. 1 of the amended notice of opposition,
`
`opposer alleges that it "… has a USPTO Trade Mark Registration
`
`No. 3819519 with a Word Mark APR 15 and Design …." Trademark Act
`
`§ 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) provides that an applicant can
`
`register a mark, unless its mark is likely to cause confusion
`
`with a mark "… registered in the Patent Office or * * *
`
`previously used…." See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen,
`
`Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974). There is a
`
`statutory distinction between a registered mark and a previously-
`
`used-but-unregistered mark. Id. In reading the pleading as a
`
`whole, here the assertion of opposer's registration is sufficient
`
`for purposes of priority. Thus, should opposer introduce
`
`evidence that its pleaded registration is owned by opposer and is
`
`valid and subsisting, and there is no counterclaim to cancel such
`
`registration, priority is not at issue. Id.
`
`
`
`Accordingly, applicant's motion to dismiss opposer's
`
`likelihood of confusion claim because opposer did not plead the
`
`element of priority is denied.
`
`
`
`Although pleading ownership of the registration is adequate
`
`to state a sufficient likelihood of confusion claim, the Board
`
`notes in passing that opposer has not asserted common law use
`
`prior to applicant's asserted date of first use, use analogous to
`
`trademark use prior to applicant's asserted date of first use, or
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`
`Opposition No. 91197240
`
`that applicant is not entitled to the dates of use claimed in its
`
`application.3
`
`
`
`In view thereof, opposer is allowed time, set later in this
`
`order, to amend its pleading to assert common law rights of
`
`priority, prior use analogous to trademark use, or that applicant
`
`is not entitled to the dates of use claimed in its application,
`
`failing which, the December 8, 2010 amended notice of opposition
`
`will be opposer's operative pleading for this case.
`
`2. Fraud
`
`
`
`Applicant argues that opposer's fraud claim is
`
`insufficiently pled because did not assert allegations concerning
`
`the element of materiality and because the claim was not pled
`
`with particularity. However, the Board considered this claim
`
`previously and found that it was sufficiently pled (that is, pled
`
`with particularity). While opposer did not use the word
`
`"material," it is clear that opposer's allegations address a
`
`matter material to registration of the mark in connection with
`
`applicant's declaration. As the Board observed in the earlier
`
`order, opposer alleges that applicant's statement that no other
`
`entity was entitled to use the mark in commerce was false because
`
`applicant had knowledge of opposer's use of its mark as a result
`
`
`3 Thus, based on this pleading, the earliest date upon which opposer
`may rely to establish priority is opposer's constructive use date,
`based on the April 30, 2009 filing date of the underlying application
`which matured into Registration No. 3819519. Applicant's application
`was filed one year later, on April 30, 2010. Applicant asserts,
`however, a date of first use anywhere of January 1, 2009, which, if
`proven, predates opposer's constructive use date.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`
`Opposition No. 91197240
`
`of the former employment with opposer (from 2002-2007) of at
`
`least one of the individuals associated with applicant (and
`
`identified as the signatory to the application).
`
`
`
`Accordingly, applicant's motion to dismiss opposer's fraud
`
`claim is denied.
`
`
`
`Proceedings are resumed and dates are reset as follows:
`
`Amended notice of opposition, if
`any, is due
`Time to Answer (either anticipated
`amended notice of opposition, if
`filed, or December 8, 2010 amended
`notice of opposition if no newly
`filed pleading)
`Deadline for Discovery Conference
`Discovery Opens
`Initial Disclosures Due
`Expert Disclosures Due
`Discovery Closes
`Plaintiff's Pretrial Disclosures
`Plaintiff's 30-day Trial Period
`Ends
`Defendant's Pretrial Disclosures
`Defendant's 30-day Trial Period
`Ends
`Plaintiff's Rebuttal Disclosures
`Plaintiff's 15-day Rebuttal Period
`Ends
`
` 9/16/2011
`
`10/16/2011
`11/15/2011
`11/15/2011
`12/15/2011
`4/13/2012
`5/13/2012
`6/27/2012
`
`8/11/2012
`8/26/2012
`
`10/10/2012
`10/25/2012
`
`11/24/2012
`
`In each instance, a copy of the transcript of testimony,
`
`
`
`together with copies of documentary exhibits, must be served on
`
`the adverse party within thirty days after completion of the
`
`taking of testimony. Trademark Rule 2.l25.
`
`
`
`Briefs shall be filed in accordance with Trademark Rules
`
`2.l28(a) and (b). An oral hearing will be set only upon request
`
`filed as provided by Trademark Rule 2.l29.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`
`Opposition No. 91197240
`
`***
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket