Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Electronic Filing System. http://estta.uspto.gov
`ESTTA310339
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`10/07/2009
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91176066
`Plaintiff
`Grimbsy Holdings, LLC
`Grimbsy Holdings, LLC
`Law Office of Barry P. Miller
`22 Woodedge Drive
`Dix Hills, NY 11746
`UNITED STATES
`bpmiller@optonline.net
`Other Motions/Papers
`Barry P. Miller
`bpmiller@optonline.net
`/Barry P. Miller/
`10/07/2009
`Response 9-27-2009 Order Part 2.pdf ( 47 pages )(331265 bytes )
`
`Proceeding
`Party
`
`Correspondence
`Address
`
`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 18 Filed 08/14/09 Page 6 of 11
`
`a case, can never be forfeited or waived.’ ” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
`
`500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).
`
`“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be
`
`raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation,
`
`even after trial and the entry of judgment.” Id. at 506. When a federal court
`
`determines that no subject matter jurisdiction exists, a complaint must be
`
`dismissed in its entirety. Id. at 514.
`
`B.
`
`The Requirement of a Case or Controversy
`
`Pursuant to the United States Constitution:
`
`The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
`arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
`Treaties made or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to
`Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - - to
`Controversies between two or more States ; - - between a State and
`Citizens of another State; - - between Citizens of different States; .
`. .
`Article III, Section 2. Accordingly, the “exercise of judicial power under Art. III
`
`of the Constitution depends on the existence of a case or controversy.” Preiser v.
`
`Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). A “federal court has neither the power to
`
`render advisory opinions nor ‘to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
`
`litigants in the case before them.’ ” Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.
`
`244, 246 (1971)). The dispute “must be a real and substantial controversy
`
`admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
`
`distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
`
`hypothetical state of facts.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
`
`-6-
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 18 Filed 08/14/09 Page 7 of 11
`
`241 (1937).
`
`Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), the Declaratory Judgment Act, provides
`
`that in the “case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the
`
`United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
`
`party seeking such declaration . . . .” The United States Supreme Court has held
`
`that in light of the statute’s limitation to “cases of actual controversy,” the Act is
`
`“operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional
`
`sense.” Aetna Life Insurance Co., 300 U.S. at 239-40. “Basically, the question in
`
`each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there
`
`is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
`
`sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
`
`judgment.” Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
`
`(1941). The Act “ ‘confers a discretion on the courts’ to grant or deny declaratory
`
`relief ‘rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.’ ” Beacon Construction Co.,
`
`Inc. v. Matco Electric Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Public
`
`Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952)). Moreover, it is
`
`“well-settled that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not expand the jurisdiction
`
`of the federal courts.” Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 594 (2d Cir.
`
`1996). Thus, in order for a federal court to have jurisdiction over an “actual
`
`controversy,” a federal question “arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
`
`the United States” must be at issue. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
`
`Where a declaratory judgment is sought in a case involving trademarks, an
`
`-7-
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 18 Filed 08/14/09 Page 8 of 11
`
`actual case or controversy exists when (1) defendant’s conduct creates a real and
`
`reasonable apprehension of liability on the part of plaintiff, and (2) plaintiff
`
`engages in a course of conduct which brings it into adversarial conflict with
`
`defendant. Starter Corp., 84 F.3d at 595. A plaintiff seeking a declaratory
`
`judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that subject-matter jurisdiction
`
`existed at the time the complaint was filed. Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics,
`
`Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`
`C.
`
`Jurisdictional Analysis of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
`
`In the trademark-related patent field, the Second Circuit has held “that a
`
`justiciable controversy exists if the defendant has charged the plaintiff with
`
`infringement, or has threatened the plaintiff with an infringement suit either
`
`directly or indirectly.” Progressive Apparel Group, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
`
`No. 95CIV2794, 1996 WL 50227, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. February 8, 1996) (citing
`
`Muller v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1968)).
`
`Hard bargaining and demanding concessions and monetary payments are not the
`
`equivalent of threatening a lawsuit. American Pioneer Tours, Inc. v. Suntrek
`
`Tours, Ltd., No. 97CIV6220, 1998 WL 60944, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. February 13,
`
`1998). On the other hand, a justiciable controversy exists when a party expressly
`
`accuses another party of infringing its patent and threatens to take legal action.
`
`See Broadview Chemical Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 417 F.2d 998, 999 (2d Cir.
`
`1969).
`
`Plaintiff contends that the following demonstrate that defendant directly or
`
`-8-
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 18 Filed 08/14/09 Page 9 of 11
`
`indirectly threatened to bring an infringement suit against plaintiff:
`
`(1) an electronic mail dated December 8, 2004 from defendant’s then-
`
`Executive Director, Rob Killion, addressed to plaintiff, which states in its entirety:
`
`Dear Mr. Miller,Would you be interested in discussing a payment
`in return for transferring the domain “commonapplication.com” to
`my organization? We have a trademark on the “Common
`Application” name and own the other Internet domains using the
`that (sic) phrase, so we’re concerned people trying to find our site
`may be confused or delayed. Please let me know your thoughts on
`this. Thanks so much.
`
`(2) an electronic mail dated December 17, 2004 from Mr. Killion to
`
`plaintiff, which states in its entirety:
`
`Hi Mr. Miller, Just wanted to follow-up again and see if you’d be
`interested in discussing this.
`
`(3) an excerpt from defendant’s filing before the TTAB dated July 10,
`
`2007 in support of defendant’s motion to compel wherein defendant stated:
`
`Grimsby’s proposed Stipulated Protective Order states that a l l
`Confidential Information shall not be used for “any other purpose
`[other than to protect its confidentiality] of any kind, included but
`not limited to any commercial use or any other legal proceedings. .
`. . 2
`
`2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint contains additional allegations of threats of an infringement suit
`which occurred after plaintiff filed its original complaint. It is well-settled, however, that subject-
`matter jurisdiction must exist at the time a complaint is filed. See Benitec Australia, Ltd. v.
`Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The burden is on the party claiming
`declaratory judgment jurisdiction to establish that such jurisdiction existed at the time the claim for
`declaratory relief was filed and that it has continued since.”); GAF Building Materials Corp. v. Elk
`Corp. of Dallas, 90 F.3d 479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“ ‘Later events may not create jurisdiction
`where none existed at the time of filing.’ ”) (quoting Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., Inc.,
`940 F.2d 631, 635 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
`
`-9-
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 18 Filed 08/14/09 Page 10 of 11
`
`The foregoing events simply do not give rise to justiciable controversy
`
`because defendant’s conduct may not be said to create a real and reasonable
`
`apprehension of liability on the part of the plaintiff. Rather, the Court is satisfied
`
`that neither of Mr. Killion’s benign requests to discuss the purchase of plaintiff’s
`
`domain name commonapplication.com constitute an indirect or direct threat to sue
`
`plaintiff for infringement of defendant’s mark. Furthermore, when read within the
`
`context of the electronic note to plaintiff, Mr. Killion’s use of the word
`
`“confused” does not give rise to a threat of an infringement lawsuit particularly
`
`when read in concert with the word “delayed.”
`
`Additionally, when viewed in the context of defendant’s entire motion
`
`made to the TTAB to compel plaintiff to cooperate in discovery in that action,
`
`defendant’s above quoted statement is not evidence of a controversy in the
`
`constitutional sense. Rather, defendant was merely protecting its rights in its
`
`trademark and was unwilling to waive the possibility of any future legal
`
`proceedings by signing the Protective Order drafted by plaintiff.
`
`Accordingly, the first prong of the test for subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e.,
`
`whether defendant’s conduct creates a real and reasonable apprehension of
`
`liability on the part of the plaintiff, is not met. There having been no subject-
`
`matter jurisdiction at the time this suit was filed, defendant’s motion to dismiss is
`
`granted and plaintiff’s amended complaint must be and hereby is dismissed in its
`
`entirety.
`
`-10-
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 18 Filed 08/14/09 Page 11 of 11
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff’s first four causes of action
`
`requesting declaratory relief are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s fifth
`
`cause of action seeking sanctions is also dismissed as a request for sanctions is not
`
`an independent federal cause of action. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to
`
`dismiss plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED and the Clerk of the
`
`Court is directed to close this case. Furthermore, given the procedural posture of
`
`this case, that portion of this Court’s Order dated February 10, 2009, which
`
`referred defendant’s request to correct the transcript dated October 10, 2008 to
`
`Magistrate Judge Michael L. Orenstein, is hereby VACATED (see footnote 1,
`
`supra).
`
`SO ORDERED.
`
`Dated: August 14, 2009
`Central Islip, New York
`
`
`Thomas C. Platt, U.S.D.J.
`
`-11-
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 1 of 2
`Case 2:08—cv—O0119—TCP—MLO Document 17
`Filed 02/17/2009
`Page 1 of2
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`GRIMSBY HOLDINGS, LLC,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`-against-
`
`Civil Action No. 08 CV 0119 (TCP) (MLO)
`
`THE COMMON APPLICATION, lNC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION
`
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that The Common Application, Inc. (“Common Application”)
`
`will move this Court for an Order dismissing Grimsby Holdings, LLC’s First Amended
`
`Complaint (“Amended Complaint”), dated December 18, 2008, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)
`
`and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or alternatively an Order striking portions
`
`of the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
`
`before the Honorable Judge Thomas C. Platt, at the United States District Court for the Eastern
`
`District of New York located at 1044 Federal Plaza, Central Islip, New York at a date and time
`
`to be determined by the Court. Common Application incorporates as though fully set forth
`
`herein the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant The Common Application, Inc.’s
`
`Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint, and supporting Declaration
`
`of Craig B. Whitney, including exhibits, which are being filed contemporaneously with this
`
`Notice of Motion, along with the supporting Declaration of John M. Vassiliades, previously filed
`
`on September 30, 2008.
`
`ny-852247
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 2 of 2
`Case 2:08—cv—00119—TCP—MLO Document 17
`Filed 02/17/2009
`Page 2 of 2
`
`Dated: New York, New York
`January 12, 2009
`
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`
`43 g
`
`,_.
`
`J. Alexander Lawre
`
`e
`
`Craig B. Whitney
`Shiri R. Bilik
`1290 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10104-0012
`Telephone: (212) 468-8000
`Facsimile: (212) 468-7900
`alawrence@mofo.com
`cwhitney@mofo.com
`sbi1ik@mofo.com
`
`Attorneys for The Common Application, Inc.
`
`ny-852247
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-8 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 1 of 1
`Case 2:08—cv—00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-8
`Filed 02/17/2009
`Page1 of1
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`’
`Civil Action No. 08 CV 0119 (TCP) (MLO)
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`
`
`GRIMSBY HOLDINGS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`-against-
`
`.
`THE COMMON APPLICATION, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`I, Gino C. Barbera, hereby certify that on Monday, February 9, 2009, true and correct
`
`copies of the Reply Brief In Further Support of Defendant The Common Application, Inc.’s
`
`Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint in the above captioned» ,
`
`proceeding were served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by UPS
`
`overnight delivery upon:
`
`Barry P. Miller, Esq.
`Law Offices of Barry P. Miller
`22 Woodedge Drive
`Dix Hills, NY 11746
`
`Dated: February 9, 2009
`New York, New York
`
`N & FOERSTER LLP
`
`
`
` Gino
`. Barbera (GBarbera@mofo.com)
`1290 Avenue of the Americas
`
`New York, NY 10104
`Telephone:
`(212) 336-4331
`Facsimile: (212)468-7900
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 1 of 22
`
`J. Alexander Lawrence
`Craig B. Whitney
`Shiri R. Bilik
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`1290 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10104-0050
`Telephone: (212) 468-8000
`Facsimile: (212) 468-7900
`alawrence@mofo.com
`cwhitney@mofo.com
`sbilik@mofo.com
`
`Attorneys for The Common Application, Inc.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`GRIMSBY HOLDINGS, LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Civil Action No. 08 CV 0119 (TCP) (MLO)
`
`-against-
`
`THE COMMON APPLICATION, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT THE COMMON
`APPLICATION, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST
`AMENDED COMPLAINT
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 2 of 22
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT........................................................................................ 1
`
`STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS .......................................................................... 2
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 3
`
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 4
`
`I.
`
`MOTION TO DISMISS......................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Count I: The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Non-Infringement
`Claim Because No Justiciable Controversy Exists Between the
`Parties ......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Count II through Count IV: Plaintiff’s Cancellation Claims Cannot
`Be Maintained in Federal Court ............................................................... 11
`
`Count V: Sanctions Is Not an Independent Cause of Action and
`Does Not Provide a Basis for Federal Jurisdiction .................................. 13
`
`II.
`
`MOTION TO STRIKE......................................................................................... 14
`
`A.
`
`The Court Should Strike from the Amended Complaint Statements
`Made in the Context of Settlement Negotiations ..................................... 14
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 17
`
`-i-
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 3 of 22
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
`300 U.S. 227 (1937) .................................................................................................................. 4
`
`Am. Pioneer Tours, Inc. v. Suntrek Tours,
`No. 97 Civ. 6220, 1998 WL 60944 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1998) ........................................... 9, 12
`
`Austin v. Cornell Univ.,
`891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ......................................................................................... 16
`
`Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Reedhycalog UK, Ltd,
`No. 2:05-CV-931 TS, 2008 WL 345849 (D. Utah Feb. 6, 2008) ........................................... 10
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) .............................................................................................................. 4
`
`Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,
`495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................. 6
`
`Carbaljal-Ramirez v. Bland Farms, Inc.,
`234 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (S.D. Ga. 2001) .................................................................................... 13
`
`Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc.,
`528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................... 5
`
`Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P.,
`949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1991)........................................................................................................ 4
`
`Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell,
`922 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1990)................................................................................................ 13, 14
`
`Durett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc.,
`678 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 1982)................................................................................................. 13
`
`Englishtown Sportswear Ltd. v. Tuttle,
`547 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).......................................................................................... 11
`
`Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co.,
`544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).................................................................................................... 3
`
`Foster v. WNYC-TV,
`No. 88 CIV. 4584 (JFK), 1989 WL 146277 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1989) ................................. 16
`
`ii
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 4 of 22
`
`GAF Building Materials Corp., v. Elk Corp. of Dallas,
`90 F.3d 479 (Fed. Cir. 1996)................................................................................................. 6, 9
`
`Goya Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc.,
`846 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1988).................................................................................................... 12
`
`Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P.,
`541 U.S. 567 (2004) .................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Handeen v. Lemaire,
`112 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1997)................................................................................................. 14
`
`Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,
`Civ. Action. No. 07-589-SLR-LPS, 2008 WL 2746960 (D. Del. July 14, 2008)............... 9, 10
`
`Kelly v. L.L. Cool J.,
`145 F.R.D. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) .............................................................................................. 16
`
`Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
`511 U.S. 375 (1994) .................................................................................................................. 3
`
`L.A. Gold Clothing Co. v. L.A. Gear Inc.,
`954 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Pa. 1996) .......................................................................................... 9
`
`Luckett v. Bure,
`290 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2002)...................................................................................................... 3
`
`MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
`549 U.S. 118 (2007) .............................................................................................................. 5, 8
`
`Pierce v. P.F. Tripler & Co.,
`955 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1992).................................................................................................... 15
`
`Progressive Apparel Group v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
`No. 95 CIV. 2794, 1996 WL 50227 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1996) .......................................... 4, 7, 8
`
`Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co.
`344 U.S. 237 (1952) .................................................................................................................. 4
`
`Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd.,
`497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................. 5
`
`Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc.,
`84 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1996).................................................................................................... 4, 5
`
`St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Brother Intern. Corp.,
`Civil No. 06-2759 (FLW), 2007 WL 2571960 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2007) ................................. 16
`
`iii
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 5 of 22
`
`Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
`314 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963)...................................................................................................... 8
`
`United States v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters,
`948 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1991).................................................................................................. 13
`
`Universal Sewing Machine Co. v. Standard Sewing Equip. Corp.,
`185 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)...................................................................................... 8, 11
`
`Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
`688 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ........................................................................................... 13
`
`Wilson v. Bush,
`No. Civ. A. 5:04 CV 141, 2006 WL 692305 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2006) ................................ 13
`
`Wyly v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP,
`No. 05 Civ. 3832 (GBD), 2005 WL 1606034 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005).................................. 14
`
`RULES & STATUTES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)................................................................................................................ 1, 3, 4
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) .................................................................................................................. 1, 14
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 408..................................................................................................................... 14, 15
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1927 ....................................................................................................................... 2, 13
`
`iv
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 6 of 22
`
`Defendant The Common Application, Inc. (“Common Application”), through its
`
`undersigned counsel, respectfully moves the Court for an order dismissing Plaintiff Grimsby
`
`Holdings, LLC’s (“Grimsby”) First Amended Complaint without leave to amend, pursuant to
`
`Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the alternative, Common
`
`Application respectfully moves the Court to strike portions of Grimsby’s First Amended
`
`Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(f).
`
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
`
`Grimsby’s Amended Complaint suffers the same jurisdictional defect as the Original
`
`Complaint—failure to establish an actual case or controversy sufficient to bestow subject matter
`
`jurisdiction upon the Court. The only additional allegations in the Amended Complaint, with
`
`which Grimsby attempts to establish jurisdiction, relate to events occurring after the filing of this
`
`action. Such post-filing justifications for subject matter jurisdiction are insufficient to establish
`
`jurisdiction. It is black-letter law that subject matter jurisdiction must have existed at the time
`
`the Original Complaint was filed. Defendant’s counsel’s post-filing actions—including
`
`Defendant’s offers to settle this case to avoid protracted and unnecessary litigation—cannot be
`
`used to establish jurisdiction. In addition, Grimsby’s reference to attorney settlement discussions
`
`and settlement proposals in its Amended Complaint violates Federal Rule of Evidence 408.
`
`As discussed in Common Application’s original Motion to Dismiss, filed on September
`
`30, 2008, Grimsby has been attempting since 2007 to cancel Common Application’s registered
`
`and allowed COMMON APPLICATION trademarks in proceedings before the Trademark Trial
`
`and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), which are still ongoing. Nonetheless, Grimsby decided to file this
`
`action concurrently, piggybacking a claim for trademark cancellation on an impermissible claim
`
`for declaratory judgment of non-infringement. Because no actual justiciable controversy exists
`
`with regard to Grimsby’s declaratory judgment of non-infringement claim, the Court does not
`
`1
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 7 of 22
`
`have subject matter jurisdiction over such claim, and it must be dismissed. Plaintiff’s remaining
`
`claims for trademark cancellation—Counts II through IV—should be dismissed as well, because
`
`the TTAB is the proper forum to adjudicate such requests, and Grimsby has already initiated and
`
`is pursuing this relief before the TTAB. That action is currently suspended pending a ruling by
`
`this Court. Finally, Grimsby has added a new cause of action in Count V of the Amended
`
`Complaint for “Sanctions for Improper Conduct and Violation of Rules,” purportedly pursuant to
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1927. No independent cause of action exists, however, for such a claim, and
`
`accordingly Grimsby’s “sanctions” claim must also be dismissed.
`
`STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
`
`For jurisdiction to exist, it must have existed at the time of the initial filing of this action,
`
`and continue throughout. Common Application is the owner of the registered trademark,
`
`COMMON APPLICATION (Reg. No. 3,172,809) for “downloadable college admissions forms”
`
`and “printed college admissions forms.” In its Original Complaint, Grimsby, which on
`
`information and belief does not own any trademark rights relevant to this action, states that it
`
`“provides, by licensing the use of the Internet domain ‘commonapplication.com,’ and by
`
`providing information and other content at the web site located at ‘commonapplication.com,’ a
`
`service allowing trademark owners to obtain assistance preparing a common application for
`
`multi-country trademark registration and protection, as well as recordation with U.S. Customs
`
`and Border Protection for border enforcement and protection against the importation of
`
`infringing and gray market goods.” Compl. ¶ 6. For subject matter jurisdiction to exist with
`
`regard to Grimsby’s declaratory judgment of non-infringement claim, Grimsby must show that,
`
`as of the filing of this action, there was an actual case or controversy between Common
`
`Application and Grimsby with regard to any alleged infringement by Grimsby of the COMMON
`
`APPLICATION mark.
`
`2
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 8 of 22
`
`As the basis for establishing that an actual case or controversy existed, Grimsby’s
`
`Amended Complaint alleges six instances where Common Application allegedly “threatened
`
`suit” against Grimsby. Am. Compl. ¶ 4 n.1. The first two instances were the same two instances
`
`already addressed in Common Application’s motion to dismiss the Original Complaint. Namely,
`
`(1) an email sent from Common Application’s then-Executive Director over four years ago
`
`requesting to purchase Grimsby’s domain name, and (2) a single sentence in Common
`
`Application’s motion to compel brief before the TTAB (which the TTAB granted) that some of
`
`the atypical provisions insisted on by Grimsby for a protective order “would in effect insulate
`
`Grimsby from any future trademark infringement liability arising from [Common Application’s]
`
`marks.” See id., Ex. 4 at 11. The remaining four instances are all actions taken by Common
`
`Application’s counsel (albeit misconstrued in the Amended Complaint) after the filing of this
`
`action—including Common Application’s offer to settle this matter. These are not valid bases
`
`for demonstrating that jurisdiction existed prior to filing this action, and all references to such
`
`discussions violate Federal Rule of Evidence 408.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction
`
`to hear the action. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Luckett v.
`
`Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2002). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`
`12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction either
`
`on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence for the Court’s consideration.
`
`Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (2d Cir. 1976). A
`
`party may also move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
`
`3
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 9 of 22
`
`Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
`
`is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).1
`
`In addition, a “court may strike from a pleading … any redundant, immaterial,
`
`impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
`
`I.
`
`MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Count I: The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over the Non-Infringement
`Claim Because No Justiciable Controversy Exists Between the Parties
`
`This Court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory
`
`judgment of non-infringement. As in any federal case, an action under the Declaratory Judgment
`
`Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, must be based on “cases of actual controversy” within the meaning
`
`of Article III of the Constitution. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
`
`The controversy “must not be nebulous or contingent but must have taken on fixed and final
`
`shape” so that the Court can have an adequate opportunity to evaluate the legal issues and
`
`potential effects of its decision. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff Co. 344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952).
`
`For Grimsby’s declaratory judgment of non-infringement claim, this involves a showing that
`
`Common Application “has charged the plaintiff with infringement, or has threatened the plaintiff
`
`with an infringement suit either directly or indirectly.” Progressive Apparel Group v. Anheuser-
`
`Busch, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 2794, 1996 WL 50227, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1996) (citing Muller v.
`
`Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 404 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1968)). According to the Second
`
`Circuit, Common Application’s conduct must have “created a real and reasonable apprehension
`
`of liability” on Grimsby’s part. Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1996).
`
`1 Common Application has cited to facts outside of the Amended Complaint in support of its motion to dismiss
`pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). To the extent that this motion is also being construed alternatively under Rule 12(b)(6),
`the Court may consider documents that Plaintiff chose not to attach to the Amended Complaint, such as Common
`Application’s 2004 email to Grimsby, when Plaintiff relies on such documents and they are integral to the Amended
`Complaint. See, e.g., Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991).
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case 2:08-cv-00119-TCP-MLO Document 17-3 Filed 02/17/2009 Page 10 of 22
`
`Recently, the Supreme Court addressed the standard for jurisdiction under the
`
`Declaratory Judgment Act in the context of patent infringement in MedImmune, Inc. v.
`
`Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).2 The Court stated that jurisdiction over a declaratory
`
`judgment action requires a dispute that is:
`
`definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
`interests; and that it be real and substantial and admit of specific relief through a
`decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
`the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. … Basically, the question in
`each case is whether the facts alle