`ESTTA161042
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`09/06/2007
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91173838
`Defendant
`Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
`JEFFREY J. LOOK
`LOOK LAW FIRM PLLC
`P.O. BOX 364
`EURDORA, AR 71640
`UNITED STATES
`jefflook@trademarkguru.biz
`Opposition/Response to Motion
`Jeffrey J. Look
`jefflook@trademarkguru.biz
`/jeffreyjlook/
`09/06/2007
`haliburton responsetomotion to extend.pdf ( 9 pages )(33974 bytes )
`Jeff Look declaration.pdf ( 3 pages )(23601 bytes )
`
`Proceeding
`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
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`
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`EAZYPOWER CORP.,
`
`Opposer,
`
`V.
`
`HALLIBURTON ENERGY
`
`SERVICES, INC.
`
`Applicant.
`
`\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/
`
`Opposition No. 91173838
`
`RESPONSE TO OPPOSER’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME PERIODS
`
`SET FORTH IN SCHEDULING ORDER
`
`TO THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD:
`
`Pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.1 16(a), 37 C.F.R. Section 2.1 16(a), Applicant
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`Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (hereinafter Applicant or Halliburton) files this
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`Response To Opposer’s Motion For Extension Of Time Periods Set Forth In Scheduling
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`Order.
`
`I.
`
`Factual Background
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`On November 8, 2006 this Board entered a scheduling order for this case which
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`set out discovery and testimony periods. As originally set, Opposer’s testimony period
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`was to expire on August 25, 2007. On August 1, 2007, after the opening of Opposer’s
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`testimony period, Opposer’s president, Burton Kozak, contacted the undersigned attorney
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`directly1 and made a settlement proposal. Opposer further stated that he was going to be
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`1Mr. Kozak personally called the undersigned attorney without his counsel of record on the call. Mr.
`Kozak stated that his attorneys knew he would be calling the undersigned directly. Upon conclusion of the
`call the undersigned contacted Mr. Kozak’s attorneys and informed them of the substance of the call and
`Mr. Kozak’s counsel of record confirmed that they were aware that Mr. Kozak intended to make the call
`directly and without their participation in the call.
`
`
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`leaVing the country in 48 hours and wanted an answer to the proposal before he left. The
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`offer was passed on to Applicant’s in—house legal counsel the same day, but Applicant
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`could not respond during Opposer’s time frame. See the Declaration of Jeffrey J. Look
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`attached as Exhibit 1 hereto.
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`On August 3, 2007, Szymon Gurda, counsel for Opposer contacted the
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`undersigned seeking a stipulated extension of time to reset the testimony periods.
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`Opposer’s counsel initially requested 60—days largely due to Mr. Kozak’s absence from
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`the country during half of the scheduled testimony period. At no time during this
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`conversation was Mr. Kozak’s adVanced age, religious holiday obserVances or other
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`litigation cases mentioned. The undersigned contacted Applicant’s in—house counsel who
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`indicated that Applicant had not made a decision on the settlement proposal but that
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`While they were agreeable to some extension of time, they were not agreeable to 60—days.
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`Applicant did authorize an extension of the testimony periods by approximately 20 days
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`so as to allow for the 2 weeks Mr. Kozak would be out of the country as well as the
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`upcoming Labor Day holiday. The stipulated motion was filed and the Board granted the
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`resetting of the testimony dates. See the Declaration of Jeffrey J. Look, Exhibit 1.
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`On or about August 6, Applicant formally rejected Opposer’s settlement proposal
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`and this information was passed on to Opposer’s counsel. No communication was
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`receiVed from Opposer until August 24 when Opposer’s counsel, Mr. Gurda, called to
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`inform the undersigned that Opposer was filing a motion to reset the testimony dates for
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`reasons not specified other than Mr. Kozak was haVing scheduling conflicts. The
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`undersigned informed Mr. Gurda that Applicant would oppose a motion to extend the
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`testimony periods as currently set. See the Declaration of Jeffrey J. Look, Exhibit 1.
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`
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`On August 24, 2007, Opposer filed the instant Motion For Extension Of Time
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`Periods Set Forth In Scheduling Order on a Variety of grounds which amounted to, in
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`essence, that Opposer’s president, Burton Kozak, is simply too busy to attend to this
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`opposition matter. As grounds, Opposer has stated in its motion that Mr. Kozak has at
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`least two patent infringement lawsuits and a couple of breach of contract cases and other
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`unspecified litigation pending in other jurisdictions. Opposer also states that Mr. Kozak
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`must traVel to numerous trade shows oVer the coming months, many of which conflict
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`directly with each other; that Mr. Kozak, who is a member of the Jewish faith, intends to
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`obserVe seVeral Jewish holidays during this same time frame; that Mr. Kozak is 76 years
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`old and that his age should factor into the matter for unspecified reasons and that
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`Applicant itself shares some blame because it asked for a 45-day extension of time to
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`answer discoVery oVer four months ago. None of these facts were Verified by an affidavit
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`or declaration.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Applicant is opposing Opposer’s Motion For Extension Of Time Periods for the
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`reason that Opposer has failed to establish “good cause” for the second extension of
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`time. In recent years, the Board has started making an effort to tighten up on its good
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`cause standard in support of motions to extend. See e. g., Procyon Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
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`v. Procyon Biopharma, Inc., 61 USPQ2d 1542 (TTAB 2001); Societa Per Azioni Chianti
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`Rafiino Esportazione Vinicola Toscana v. C0lli Spolentini Spoletodacale SCRL, 59
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`USPQ2d 1383 (TTAB 2001); Baron Philippe de Rothschild SA v. Styl—Rite Optical Mfg.
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`Co., 55 USPQ2d 1848 (TTAB 2000), TBMP Section 509.01. Further, the Board will
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`
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`“scrutinize carefully” any motion to extend time to determine whether the requisite good
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`cause has been shown. TBMP Section 509.01.
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`In this particular case, Applicant submits that Opposer has “sandbagged”
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`Applicant with his shotgun approach at establishing “good cause.” At no time until the
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`Opposer’s motion was filed in writing with the Board was any mention of other litigation
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`going on that would necessitate postponement of Opposer’s testimony period. Indeed,
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`eVen in Opposer’s motion itself, there is no indication that there is anything pending in
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`any of the cited lawsuits which shows that there are conflicting time settings. For
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`example, there is no mention of depositions being scheduled, discoVery deadlines,
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`hearing or trial settings in any of the cases that would prevent Mr. Kozak from attending
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`or taking any depositions in this case. Secondly, the fact that Mr. Kozak is essentially the
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`only person inVolVed in the decision making process for these other litigation matters is
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`his burden to bear. He is essentially the Plaintiff in this proceeding, and he was fully
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`aware of his litigation schedule when this proceeding was filed. Mr. Kozak must factor
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`in the deadlines in this case and be prepared to comply with them the same as in any
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`other case.
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`Opposer has not specified in his Motion For Extension who he plans to depose in
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`his testimony period who is otherwise unavailable to testify. Presumably Opposer means
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`Mr. Kozak. Aside from Mr. Kozak, there is no indication that anyone else will be
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`deposed. Assuming only one deposition will be taken by Opposer, there should be no
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`reason why Mr. Kozak could not make himself aVailable for a few hours during the 30-
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`day testimony period. Applicant cooperated by allowing Mr. Kozak an initial 20-day
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`extension of time to accommodate his traVel schedule during his testimony phase as
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`
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`originally set. However, Applicant was never informed of Mr. Kozak’s unavailability
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`until after his testimony period commenced and then was given 48—hours notice that he
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`would not be available for 2—weeks. Surely Mr. Kozak, who was going to Europe on
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`vacation, knew well in advance of his testimony period that he would be unavailable for
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`the first 2 weeks in August.
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`As for Mr. Kozak’s business travel schedule, Applicant notes that several of the
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`trade shows he plans to attend are going to be held at the same time in cities that are
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`hundreds, if not thousands, of miles apart. Further there are trade shows on schedule
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`nearly every week from September to November and two unspecified shows in Vietnam
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`and India in November and December. While Applicant appreciates the fact that Mr.
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`Kozak as a small business owner must travel to trade shows, there is no guarantee that if
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`Mr. Kozak’s requested l00—day extension is granted he won’t come up with several more
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`shows in December that will prevent him from participating in this case.
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`Mr. Kozak has also cited religious holidays that conflict with his current
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`testimony schedule. As listed in Opposer’s motion, the only holiday that currently
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`conflicts is Rosh Hashanah. Again, Mr. Kozak knew of these holidays when the initial
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`extension was granted, yet nothing was said to Applicant to indicate that he was Jewish
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`or that this holiday would interfere with his ability to complete his testimony period.
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`Applicant would show further that several of the trade shows Opposer plans to attend are
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`going to be held during Mr. Kozak’s faith’s religious holidays. See e. g., Monroe
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`Hardware Fall Show to be held during Rosh Hashanah and Fast of Gedaliah; Blish—Mize
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`Fall Customer Buying Market and Jensen Distributor Show to be held during Yom
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`Kippur. It would appear that if Opposer can attend trade shows during major religious
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`
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`holidays, he should be able to attend to prosecuting this Opposition period just as well.
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`Again, if Opposer’s requested extension is granted, its next testimony period will include
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`the Jewish holiday period of Hanukah as well as the non—secular Thanksgiving holiday.
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`It is highly likely that if Mr. Kozak is allegedly too busy to tend to this case now, he will
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`be equally too busy in November and December. Applicant has no power to set religious
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`or governmental holidays. There are holidays of some sort almost every month during
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`the year. If Mr. Kozak intends to observe such holidays, then he is perfectly free to do
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`so, however, he must factor these time periods in his schedule and tend to the business of
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`this case the same as he tends to any other matter connected with his business.
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`Opposer further alleges that its requested extension will not be burdensome to
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`Applicant because Applicant has not filed an allegation of use or made any attempt to
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`commence use of the mark. Applicant disagrees. First of all, Applicant is “blacked out”
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`from filing any allegation of use during the pendency of this Opposition Proceeding.
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`Secondly, Applicant has been reluctant to proceed further with marketing plans involving
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`this mark pending the resolution of this Opposition. By delaying the course of these
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`proceedings, Applicant is put at a commercial disadvantage in that it is reluctant to invest
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`significant marketing costs in the present mark until it has some decision on the merits of
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`Opposer’s alleged likelihood of confusion claim. Every day that Opposer delays this case
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`delays Applicant’s ultimate release of the product. Applicant believes this is the real
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`reason for the requested extension by Mr. Kozak. Opposer was upset that Applicant
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`rejected his settlement offer and now seeks to delay this case as long as possible to keep
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`Applicant from releasing its product under the ACHIEVER mark.
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`
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`Opposer’s claim that Applicant previously asked for and received a 45-day
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`extension of time to respond to discovery requests earlier in the year has contributed to
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`the scheduling problem is without merit. The extended deadline for Applicant to respond
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`to Opposer’s discovery was April 2, 2007. Applicant in fact complied with the deadline.
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`This was almost two months before the expiration of the original discovery deadline of
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`May 27, 2007, and it did not necessitate the resetting of any discovery or testimony
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`periods. There is no rational reason why Opposer would be prevented from complying
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`with its currently extended testimony period because of the previous mutually agreed
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`upon discovery response deadline.
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`III.
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`Conclusion
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`Applicant would show that Opposer’s Motion should be denied. As this Board
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`has noted litigants should no longer assume that motions to extend which are subject to a
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`“good cause” standard will be routinely granted. TBMP Section 509.01. Applicant has
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`shown in this response that good cause has not been established by Opposer. First, the
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`factual allegations in the motion are unverified or supported. Secondly, Opposer has
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`offered several unspecific and often inconsistent reasons why an extension should be
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`granted. While Opposer has indicated that the “press of other litigation” prevents his
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`material participation in this case, he has not specifically stated why or how the other
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`litigation interferes with any deadlines set in this case. Secondly, Opposer has cited
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`numerous conflicting trade shows that he plans to attend. Trade shows that not only
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`conflict with each other, but with the observance of his faith’s religious holidays.
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`Furthermore, Opposer has incorrectly stated that he has not abused the privilege
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`of seeking extensions of time as this is his first request. In point of fact, it is his second
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`request. His first request was a stipulated motion which Applicant agreed to despite not
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`being contacted about the need for an extension until after his originally scheduled
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`testimony period opened and then was told that Opposer would be unavailable for
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`roughly half the time due to a previously scheduled vacation. After Opposer returned
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`from vacation and was apparently informed of Applicant’s rejection of its settlement
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`offer, Opposer filed the instant motion notwithstanding the fact that at the time, Opposer
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`had three weeks to complete his testimony period.
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`Applicant will suffer prejudice from Opposer’s continued delay of this case.
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`Applicant cannot continue to develop its marketing plans for its ACHIEVER product
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`until a decision on the merits of this case is issued by the Board. This effectively delays
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`the introduction of the product to the market. Opposer appears to be using delay as a
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`strategy to force Applicant to agree to settlement on his terms. This is abusive and
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`smacks of bad faith. Applicant respectfully submits that this Board should deny
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`Opposer’s motion in its entirety. In the alternative, if the Board should find “good cause”
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`for granting Opposer an extension, Applicant submits that 100 days as requested by
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`Opposer is unreasonable. In the Azioni Chianti case, 61 USPQ2d 1383 (TTAB 2001) this
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`Board rejected the movant’s 60-day extension request and granted 30—days and warned
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`the movant that further extensions would not be granted without consent or without a
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`showing of extraordinary circumstances. Applicant submits that if any extension is
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`granted that it should be for no more than 30 days, and that Opposer should be warned
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`that further extensions will not be granted without consent or a showing of extraordinary
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`circumstances and that trade show travel scheduling, religious or public holidays or other
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`
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`litigation matters are not extraordinary circumstances. Opposer’s delay tactics should not
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`be condoned by this Board.
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`September 6, 2007.
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/jeffreyjlook/
`Jeffrey J. Look
`LOOK LAW FIRM
`
`P.O. Box 364
`
`Eudora, AR 71640
`
`Phone: (469) 371-3082
`
`Attorney for Applicant
`Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned attorney for Applicant hereby certifies that one copy of the
`foregoing RESPONSE TO OPPOSER’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
`PERIODS SET FORTH IN SCHEDULING ORDER has been serVed on Opposer’s
`counsel of record, Michael J. CherskoV, CherskoV & Flaynik, The Civic Opera Building,
`20 N. Wacker DriVe, Ste. 1447, Chicago, IL 60606 Via first class mail, postage prepaid,
`and by fax: 312-621-0088, on this 6th day of September 2007.
`
`/j effreyj look
`Jeffrey J. Look
`
`CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING
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`I, Jeffrey J. Look, do hereby certify that the attached RESPONSE TO
`OPPOSER’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN
`
`SCHEDULING ORDER is being electronically filed with the Trademark Trial and
`Appeal Board through the PTO Website, www.uspto.goV, on this 6th Day of September,
`2007.
`
`/j effreyj look/
`Jeffrey J. Look
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`EAZYPOWER CORP.,
`
`Opposer,
`
`V.
`
`HALLIBURTON ENERGY
`
`SERVICES, INC.
`
`Applicant.
`
`\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/\:/
`
`Opposition No. 91173838
`
`DECLARATION OF ,|EFFREY ,I. LOOK IN SUPPORT OF HALLIBURTON
`
`ENERGEY SERVICES’ RESPONSE TO OPPOSER’S MOTION FOR
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`EXTENSION OF TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN SCHEDULING ORDER
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`1, Jeffrey J. Look, declare as follows:
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`1.
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`I am the attorney of record for Applicant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. in the
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`above referenced Opposition Proceeding.
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`I am over 18 and fully capable of executing
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`this document.
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`2.
`
`On November 8, 2006 this Board entered a scheduling order for this case which
`
`set out discovery and testimony periods. As originally set, Opposer’s testimony period
`
`was to expire on August 25, 2007. On August 1, 2007, after the opening of Opposer’s
`
`testimony period, Opposer’s president, Burton Kozak, contacted me directly1 and made a
`
`settlement proposal. Opposer further stated that he was going to be leaving the country in
`
`48 hours and wanted an answer to the proposal before he left. The offer was passed on to
`
`1Mr. Kozak personally called the undersigned attorney without his counsel of record on the call. Mr.
`Kozak stated that his attorneys knew he would be calling the undersigned directly. Upon conclusion of the
`call the undersigned contacted Mr. Kozak’s attorneys and informed them of the substance of the call and
`Mr. Kozak’s counsel of record confirmed that they were aware that Mr. Kozak intended to make the call
`directly and without their participation in the call.
`
`
`
`Applicant’s in—house legal counsel the same day, but Applicant could not respond during
`
`Opposer’s time frame.
`
`2.
`
`On August 3, 2007, Szymon Gurda, counsel for Opposer contacted me seeking a
`
`stipulated extension of time to reset the testimony periods. Opposer’s counsel initially
`
`requested 60—days largely due to Mr. Kozal<’s absence from the country during half of the
`
`scheduled testimony period. At no time during this conversation was Mr. Kozal<’s
`
`adVanced age, religious holiday obserVances or other litigation cases mentioned.
`
`I
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`contacted Applicant’s in—house counsel who indicated that Applicant had not made a
`
`decision on the settlement proposal but that while they were agreeable to some extension
`
`of time, they were not agreeable to 60—days. Applicant did authorize an extension of the
`
`testimony periods by approximately 20 days so as to allow for the 2 weeks Mr. Kozak
`
`would be out of the country as well as the upcoming Labor Day holiday. The stipulated
`
`motion was filed and the Board granted the resetting of the testimony dates.
`
`3.
`
`On or about August 6, Applicant formally rejected Opposer’s settlement proposal
`
`and this information was passed on by me to Opposer’s counsel. No communication was
`
`receiVed from Opposer until August 24 when Opposer’s counsel, Mr. Gurda, called to
`
`inform me that Opposer was filing a motion to reset the testimony dates for reasons not
`
`specified in detail other than Mr. Kozak was haVing scheduling conflicts.
`
`I informed Mr.
`
`Gurda that Applicant would oppose a motion to extend the testimony periods as currently
`
`set.
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`4.
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`All statements made herein by my own knowledge are true and those which are
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`made on information and belief are believed to be true.
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`I understand that willful false
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`
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`statements and the like are punishable by fine or imprisonment. or both. under 18 L.‘.S.C'.
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`Section 1001. and that such statements inay jeopardize the \'alid‘t_\' of this document.
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`September 6. 3007.
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`Respe7cti‘1y}' suhn}itted. /
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`/"If,
`K
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`P.O. Box 364
`
`Eudora. AR 71640
`
`Phone:
`
`(469) 371-3082
`
`Attorney for Applicant
`Halliburton Energ} Services. Inc.
`
`Lu