`ESTTA325105
`ESTTA Tracking number:
`01/04/2010
`
`Filing date:
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`91169312
`Plaintiff
`Swatch AG
`JESS M. COLLEN
`COLLEN IP
`The Holyoke-Manhattan Bldg., 80 South Highland Avenue
`Ossining, NY 10562
`UNITED STATES
`Reply in Support of Motion
`Thomas P. Gulick
`tgulick@collenip.com, pgreen@collenip.com, docket@collenip.com
`/Thomas P. Gulick/
`01/04/2010
`98885_PDF_OPPOSER-S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
`STRIKE_100104.PDF ( 17 pages )(815905 bytes )
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`Proceeding
`Party
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`Correspondence
`Address
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`Submission
`Filer's Name
`Filer's e-mail
`Signature
`Date
`Attachments
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`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. 98885
`
`SWATCH S.A.,
`
`Opposer,
`
`v.
`
`AMY T. BERNARD and
`BEEHIVE WHOLESALE, L.L.c.,
`
`Applicant.
`
`Mark: SWAP
`Opp. No.: 91169312
`Serial No.: 78/459,527
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`OPPOSER'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STRIKE
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`Opposer Swatch S.A. ("Opposer") hereby submits its reply in support of its Motion To
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`Strke those portions of Applicant's Notice of Reliance which relate to the discovery deposition
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`of a non-party witness.
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`1. APPLICANT HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT A THIRD
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`PARTY, THE SWATCH GROUP (U.S.) INC., OR ITS PRESIDENT, IS A MANAGING
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`AGENT OF THE OPPOSER.
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`Applicant, as the pary seeking discovery, is the party that carres the burden to prove the
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`managing agent status. Proseus v. Anchor Line Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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`Nearly all of the cases determining a proper managing agent involve whether an
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`employee or former employee of a corporation should be a managing agent. See Founding
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`Church of Scientology v. Webster, 802 F.2d 1448, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1986) citing, 4A J. Moore,
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`Moore's Federal Practice para. 30.55 at 30-72 n. 15 (2d ed. 1984).
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`Every case cited by Applicant on the issue of "managing agent" involve employees or
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`former employees of the party in an action, and not the status of third parties. See In re Honda
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`Am. Motor Co. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. 535, 541 (D. Md. 1996) (proposed
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`deponent was the General Manager of Public Relations for defendant; the court also denied
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`deposition of a former employee); Rubin v. General Tire & Rubber Co.,18 F.R.D. 51, 55
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`(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (all three proposed deponents were employees of defendant); Kolb v. A.H Bull
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`s.s. Co., 31 F.R.D. 252, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (proposed deponent was Vice President of
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`Operations for defendant; the court also denied deposition of a former employee.); Sugarhil
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`Records Ltd. v. Motown Record Corp., 105 F.R.D. 166, 170 (proposed deponent was Director of
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`Creative Administration of defendant); and Boston Diagnostics Devel. Corp. Inc. v. Kollsman
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`Mfg. Co., 123 F.R.D. 415, 415 (D. Mass. 1988) (proposed deponent was an employee of one of
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`the defendants); see also Proseus v. Bay Ridge Operating Co., 26 F.R.D. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y.
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`1960) (a pier superintendent not employed by third party plaintiff does not qualifY as an officer
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`or managing agent).
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`In general, a managing agent is a person who:
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`1. Acts with superior authority and is invested with general powers to exercise his
`judgment and discretion in dealing with his principal's affairs;
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`2. Can be depended upon to carr out his principal's directions to give testimony at the
`demand of a party engaged in litigation with his principals; and
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`3. Can be expected to identifY himself
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`with the interests of
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`his principal rather than those
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`the other party.
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`of
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`See Luther v. Kia Alotors, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 53494, *6-*7 (W.D. Pa. June 18,
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`2009). Most tellng in this definition are the references to the principaL. Ms. Faivet and The
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`2
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`Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. are not employees of
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`Opposer. They do not control Opposer. Opposer
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`reminds the Board that although the business names of both companies contain the word
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`"Swatch", the Opposer, Swatch S.A. is not a subsidiary of
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`The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc., or vice
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`versa. The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc., is a Delaware corporation which distributes many brands
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`of watches in this country, including OMEGA, RADO, LONGINES, BREGUET, TISSOT,
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`HAMILTON, SWATCH and others. Swatch S.A. is a Swiss company and a subsidiary of
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`The
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`Swatch Group S.A. of Biel, Swtzerland. Swatch S.A. is a manufacturer and designer of
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`wristwatches, jewelry and other goods. Its management is completely different from that of the
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`Delaware corporation. There is no evidence submitted by Applicant to contradict this nor which
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`would tend to show that Ms. Faivet or The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. can be considered
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`managing agents of Opposer Swatch S.A.for any purpose.
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`Applicant impliedly admits that Ms. Faivet and The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. are not
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`managing agents of Opposer, as Applicant, recognized the need to subpoena the witness under
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. See Exhibit A to Applicant's Opposition to the Motion to Strke. If the
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`person to be deposed is an officer, director or managing agent, a subpoena is not required.
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`Luther, 2009 U.S. Dist LEXIS 53494 at *4. Otherwise, a subpoena is required. See id.
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`Applicant knew that it had to issue a subpoena to obtain the attendance of the witness. Applicant
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`deposed the third party witness pursuant to the subpoena, yet now seeks to use the deposition as
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`if it were the deposition of a party or a managing agent of the party. The subpoena commanded
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`the testimony of
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`"The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. by and through Caroline Faivet" It did not seek
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`testimony of Opposer, Swatch S.A.. See Exhibit A to Applicant's Opposition to the Motion to
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`Strike.
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`While The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. may be expected to have substantial information
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`3
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`regarding the sale of SWATCH brand products in the United States, as would any distrbutor,
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`this does not mean that the U.S. distributor is defacto a managing agent with power to bind, and
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`there is absolutely no evidence to the contrary provided by Applicant As explained previously,
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`and contrar to Applicant's assertion, The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. does not control Opposer
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`and Opposer does not control The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. Any assertion that The Swatch
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`Group (U.S.) Inc. is wholly owned by Opposer is false. See Applicant's Opposition at page 7.
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`If Applicant wanted the third parties, Ms. Faivet, or The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc., to
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`testifY for the purposes of trial, Applicant could have taken testimony during its testimony
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`period. Applicant does not allege that anything prevented Applicant from deposing The Swatch
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`Group (U.S.) or other third parties during its testimony period. Applicant further conceded that it
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`could have take Opposer's deposition on written questions, but declined to do so. See
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`Applicant's Opposition to the Motion To Strike at page 5. Applicant has provided no reason
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`why a third party discovery deposition should be used at trial in its Notice of Reliance and thus,
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`it should be stricken.
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`II. APPLICANT CANNOT RELY ON A MANAGING AGENT UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 4
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`FOR SERVICE TO FIT THE DEFINITION OF A MANAGING AGENT UNDER 37 C.F.R..§
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`2.120(j(l)
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`The cases cited by Applicant analogizing a managing agent for service of process under
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`F.R.C.P. 4(h)(l) are misguided. Applicant's citation to Allegue and Kristinius both involve cases
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`where the term "managing agent" is being defined under state law and not the Federal Rules.
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`See Allegue v. Gulf & South American s.s. Co., Inc. 103 F Supp. 34, 35 (S.D.N.Y.
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`i 952)( determining a managing agent for service of process based on New York Civil Practice
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`4
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`
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`Act) and Kritinius v. H Stern Com. E. Ind. S.A., 433 F. Supp. 303, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
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`(expressly recognizing that it is not determining the meaning of
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`the term "managing agent" under
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`the Federal Rules but under New York law). In New York iì1arine iì1anagers, Inc. v.
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`M. V Torpor-I, the term "managing agent" is not even mentioned and again the court specifically
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`reliesonN.Y. C.P.L.R. 311. 716F. Supp. 783, 786
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`(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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`The final case cited by Applicant is one involving service of a complaint under Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 4 upon a managing agent. In Del Sesto v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Plaintiffs sued
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`Defendant, an airline ("TWA"), for personal injuries due to negligence. 201 F. Supp. 879, 880
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`(D. R.I. 1962). The issue raised in that case was whether service on the ticket agent for
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`Defendant was proper. See id. at 880-882. Here, even if there were any evidence to support the
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`"managing agent" claim by Applicant (which there is not) this is not a case where adequacy of
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`service is being questioned.
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`IlL THE ORDER OF THE BOARD OF MARCH 3, 2008 DID NOT RULE THAT THE
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`DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT is ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL.
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`Applicant sought to compel the deposition of Caroline Faivet before the Board. Before
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`the Board had ruled, the Court had already ordered the deposition of Caroline Faivet. This is
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`why the Board deemed the motion to compel moot. The Board's order specifically recognized
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`that the deposition was taken pursuant to a District Court order. The District Court had been
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`asked to determine that validity of a subpoena such as whether a subpoena addressed to "The
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`Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc. by and through Caroline Faivet" was deficient because: (1) it fàiled to
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`list topics under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); (2) if meant for Caroline Faivet as an individual,
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`Applicant failed to properly serve the individual witness; and (3) notice given on August 30,
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`5
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`
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`2006 for a deposition on September 5, 2006 was unreasonably short under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
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`See The Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc.'s Motion to Quash the Subpoena at page 2, attached hereto as
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`Exhibit 1.
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`The District Court decision did not speak to the admissibility of the deposition. It simply
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`decided that the Court would not quash the subpoena on grounds related to facial defects in
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`service and short notice. It did not decide anything about the status of
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`The Swatch Group (U.S.)
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`Inc., as a third party, including whether it even could be deposed to bind Opposer, Swatch S.A.
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`The court order specifically deferred the question of admissibility of the deposition to the
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`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. See Exhibit B to Applicant's Opposition to Motion to Stirke
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`and Exhibit A to Opposer's Motion to Strike at pages 2-3. Applicant did not thereafter move the
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`Board to rule on the admissibility, and the Board has never so ruled. The only time the issue was
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`before it, the Board deemed moot the question of permitting a deposition to go forward, since by
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`that time, the deposition already had occurred.
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`iv. CONCLUSION
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`Applicant has failed to meet its burden. It has no proof for its claim that Ms. Faivet or
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`The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc., third parties to the opposition proceeding, have any status as
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`managing agents for the purposes of binding testimony on Opposer, a separate entity, and has
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`failed to show under 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(j)(1) and (2) that the deposition testimony should be
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`admitted under a Notice of Reliance. Opposer requests that the Board strike the portion of the
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`Applicant's Notice of Reliance relating to the deposition of "The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. by
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`and through Caroline Faivet."
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`6
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`
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`Respectfully submitted for
`Opposer SWATCH S.A.
`
`By:
`
`Jess M. Collen
`Thomas P. Gulick
`COLLEN IP
`The Holyoke-Manhattan Building
`80 South Highland Avenue
`Ossining, Westchester County
`NEW YORK 10562
`(914) 941- 5668
`
`Town of
`
`JMCITPG
`
`DATED: January 4,2010
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`SHOULD ANY OTHER FEE BE REQUIRED, THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`is HEREBY REQUESTED TO CHARGE SUCH FEE TO OUR DEPOSIT ACCOUNT 03-
`2465.
`
`I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS CORRESPONDENCE IS BEING FILED
`ELECTRONICALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE.
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`Dated: January 4, 2010
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`7
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`
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I, Patti Green, hereby certifY that I caused true and correct copy of the following:
`Reliance to
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`its Motion to Strike Portions of Applicant's Notice of
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`Opposer's Reply in Support of
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`be served upon:
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`William J. Utermohlen
`OLIFF & BERRIDGE, PLC
`277 South Washington Street
`Alexandria, VA 22314
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`Via first-class mail, postage pre-paid.
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`Said service having taken place this 4th Day of January, 2010.
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`8
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`
`
`EXHIBIT
`EXHIBIT
`
`1
`
`
`
`UNTED STATES DISTRCT COURT
`IN THE MA ITER OF: DISTRCT OF NEW JERSEY
`
`APPLICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 45 OF
`THE SWATCH GROUP (U.S.), INC. TO QUASH Civil Action No.
`A SUBPOENA ISSUED IN THE NAM OF THE
`DISTRICT COURT BY WILLIA J.
`UTERMOHLEN, ESQUIRE, ON BEHALF OF
`AMY T. BERNARD IN CONNECTION WITH
`TH MA TIER OF SWATCH A.G. v. AMY T.
`BERNAR, OPPOSITION NUBER: 91169312,
`CURRTL Y PENDING BEFORE TH
`TRAEMA TRL AN APPEAL BOAR, MOTION DATE: October 10,2006
`AND COMMING APPEARCE AT A
`DEPOSITION TO BE HELD ON SEPTEMBER ORAL ARGUMNT REQUESTED
`5,2006.
`
`BRIEF ON BEHALF OF MOVANT, THE SWATCH GROUP (U.S.), INC.,
`IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
`
`DILLON, BITAR & LUTHR, L.L.C.
`53 Maple Avenue
`P.O. Box 398
`Morrstown, New Jersey 07963-0398
`(973) 539-3100
`
`COLLEN IP, P.C.
`The Holyoke-Manatt Building
`80 South Highland A venue
`Ossing-on- Hudson
`Westchester County, New York 10562
`(914) 941-5668
`
`Attorneys for Movant,
`The Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc.
`
`THOMAS P. GULICK
`PETER E. MORAN
`On the Brief
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................ ii
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.................................................................... 1
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`LEGAL ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 3
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`POIN
`
`I
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`THE SUBPOENA AND TH SERVICE THEREOF
`ARE DEFICIENT UNER RULE 45 AND/OR
`RULE 30 (B)(6), THUS, THE SUBPOENA SHOULD
`BE QUASHED............................................................... 3
`
`CONCLUSION........................................................................................ . 5
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Cases
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`Page
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`In re Johnson & Johnson, 59 F.R.D. 174 (D. DeL. 1973)........................................ 2
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`Lloyd Lifestyle Ltd. v. Soaring Helmet Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16539
`(W.D. Wash. March 23,2006)............................................................
`
`Norwch Pharmacal Co. v. Chas. Peizer & Co., Inc., 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8899,
`165 U.S.P.Q. 619 (N.D. N.Y. March 30,1967)... ................... ................... 2
`
`Taub et al v. Rausser et aI, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8859, 159 U.S.P.Q. 220
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`(D.N.J. June 21, 1968)........................... ........................... ............... 2
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`StatuteslRegulations
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`35 U.S.C.S. § 24 ................................................................................. ....
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`37 C.F.R. § 2.120 (b) .......................................... .....................................
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`Other
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`F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) .......................................... ....................................... 4
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`F.R.C.P. 45 .......................................................................................... passim
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`11
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`
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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`The Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc. ("Swatch U.S.") moves, pursuant to Rule 45 of Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order quashing the deposition subpoena which was served on or
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`about August 30, 2006 and issued in the name of this Court by Wiliam 1. Utermohlen, Esquire,
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`on behalf of Amy T. Bernard to compel a deposition noticed for Septembe 5, 2006 in
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`Hackensack, New Jersey. This subpoena was issued in connection with a on-going discovery
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`proceeding pending before the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("the Board")
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`concerning Ms. Bernard's attempt to register the mark "SWAP" to be used in connection with
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`her marketing of a brand of
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`wrst watches. Swatch A.G. is opposing Ms. Bernard's registrtion
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`of this mark before the Board.
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`The subpoena at issue in this matter was addressed to "The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc., by
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`and through Caroline Faivet." It is important to note that because the Board does not have the
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`power to compel the attendance of non-par at a deposition, paries must issue a subpoena from
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`a distct Court in order to secure attendance. Specifically, 35 U.S.C.S. § 24 and 37 C.F.R. §
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`2.120 (b) essentially provide that such a subpoena must be issued from the United States distrct
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`court in the Federal judicial distrct where the deponent resides or is regularly employed. Swatch
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`U.S. has a place of business located in Weehawken, New Jersey and Ms. Faivet, an employee,
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`also works from the Weehawken location. Thus, both Swatch U.S. and/or Ms. Faivet are
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`properly before this Cour to contest the subpoena.
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`For puroses of determining this motion to quash, "the provisions of the Federal Rules of
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`Civil Procedure relating to the attendance of witnesses... shall apply to contested cases in the
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`Patent and Trademark Offce." 35 U.S.C.S. § 24; see also, Lloyd Lifestyle Ltd. v. Soarng
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`Helmet Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16539 (W.D. Wash. March 23,2006) (detennining motion
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`
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`to quash a deposition subpoena under Rules 26 and 45 in connection with a consolidated
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`opposition and cancellation proceeding before the Trademark Tnal and Appeal Board); accord,
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`In re Johnson & Johnson, 59 F.R.D. 174 (D. DeL. 1973) (motion to quash subpoena issued in
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`connection with trademark opposition proceeding); Norwch Pharmacal Co. v. Chas. Peizer &
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`Co., Inc., 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8899, 165 U.S.P.Q. 619 (N.D. N.Y. March 30, 1967); Taub et
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`al v. Rausser et al, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8859, 159 U.S.P.Q. 220 (D.N.J. June 21, 1968)
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`(motion to quash deposition subpoena related to an interference proceeding before the U.S.
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`Patent Offce). Thus, the Cour is to determine this motion under the same standards it would
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`use in deciding a typical motion to quash in connection with a pending cour action.
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`Within this procedural setting, the subpoena at issue here must be quashed because: (l)
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`service was not proper and/or not properly effectuated upon Caroline Faivet, an individual, as
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`she was not personally served; (2) the subpoena is defective under Rule 45 as the notice given is
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`unreasonable; and/or (3) to the extent that the subpoena was issued for Swatch U.S., the
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`subpoena did not comply with Rule 30 (b) (6) because it did not descnbe with reasonable
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`particulanty the matter on which examination was requested.
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`For the foregoing reasons, The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc.'s motion to quash the subpoena
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`should be granted.
`
`2
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`
`
`LEGAL ARGUMENT
`
`I. THE SUBPOENA AND THE SERVICE THEREOF AR DEFICIENT
`UNDER RULE 45 AND/OR RULE 30 (B)(6), THUS, TH SUBPOENA
`SHOULD BE QUASHED.
`
`The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. hereby moves to quash the subpoena of Caroline Faivet
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`served on August 30, 2006 on the Corporation Service Company, a servce agent for The Swatch
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`Group (U.S.) Inc. Amy T. Bernard's ("Applicant") subpoena calls for a deposition on September
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`5,2006. A copy of
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`the subpoena is attached to the Declaration of
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`Thomas P. Gulick, Esq. ("Dec1
`
`of TPG") at Exhibit A This subpoena is in connection with a discovery proceeding pending
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`before the United States Patent and Trademark Offce. Ms. Faivet is a non-pary, and here, the
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`Board lacks authority to issue process. As a result, Applicant must issue a subpoena to compel
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`attendance of a non-pary witness.
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`First the service of the subpoena is improper. Applicant Amy T. Bernard's attempt to
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`serve an individual, Caroline Faivet, is not proper. Ms. Faivet is an individual and she has not
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`been personally served. Service was made on the Corporation Service Company, a service agent
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`for the company, The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. (Ms. Faivets employer). Rule 45 (b) (1)
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`requires personal service upon an individual.
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`Second, the subpoena was served on August 30, 2006 for an appearance on September 5,
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`2006. This is just 3 business days before the appearance. This is patently uneasonable and does
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`not give proper notice for a third par subpoena F.R.C.P.45(c)(3)(A)(i). Whle the Applicant
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`may wish to take the deposition prior to the close of discovery on September 10, 2006, it is not
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`entitled to shorten the reasonable period for notice simply as a result of its own delay in noticing
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`this witness. Discovery has been open in ths matter since March 14, 2006. See copy of the
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`3
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`
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`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Order, dated, Februar 22, 2006, attached to the Decl ofTPG
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`at Exhibit B.
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`Third, to the extent that Defendant would now seek to justify the subpoena (apar from
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`the deficient notice above) as being directed toward a corporation, it is woefully defective under
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`F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6). There was no subject matter enumerated for the corporation to be able to
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`designate a proper corporate representative under F.R.C.P. 30(b)(6). Furter, the Rules do not
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`pennit the noticing part to designate a corporate witness and command attendance by the
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`individual representative it wishes to depose.
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`The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc. seeks costs and fees associated with being forced to quash
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`a defective subpoena so because that Applicant had been put on notice about said defects. See
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`correspondence of August 30, 2006 and September 1,2006 from Thomas P. Gulick, attorneys for
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`Plaintiff Swatch AG and William 1. Utennohlen, attorney for Defendant Amy T. Bernard,
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`attached to the Decl. ofTPG at Exhibit C.
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`For the foregoing reasons, The Swatch Group (U.S.) Inc.'s motion to quash should be
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`granted.
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`4
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`
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, The Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc.'s Motion to Quash the
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`Subpoena should be granted.
`
`Respectflly submitted,~~Peter E. Mora, Esq.
`
`DILLON, BITAR & LUTHER, L.L.c.
`53 Maple Avenue
`P.O. Box 398
`Morrstown, New Jersey 07963-0398
`(973) 539-3100
`
`-and-
`
`Thomas P. Gulick, Esq.
`COLLEN IP, P.C.
`The Holyoke-Manhatt Building
`80 South Highland A venue
`Ossing-on- Hudson
`Westchester County, New York 10562
`(914) 941-5668
`
`Attorneys for Movant,
`The Swatch Group (U.S.), Inc.
`
`DATED: September 4, 2006
`Morrstown, New Jersey
`
`5