BULKY DOCUMENTS
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`(exceeds 300 pages)
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`Proceeding] Serial No: 9 1 1 63475
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`Filed: 06- 12-2006
`
`Title: Opposer’s Filing of Transcript Testimony;
`Testimony Deposition of Robert A. Ruscitto; and
`Exhibits
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`Part 2 of 3
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`

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`"'"""‘!w’u
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`l I
`
`introduction
`
`he actions of government officials must be permissible under the United States
`Constitution. Any state or local legislation which allows government officials to act
`outside of the boundaries set by the Constitution can be challenged in a court of law and
`found invalid. The building official. like his or her colleagues in other areas of governmental
`service. must understand the principles of constitutional law which may affect the building
`official’s work. This chapter will discuss some ways in which federal constitutional law
`impacts the day-to—day work of a building official. It is possible, for example, that what an
`official considers to be a simple inspection of a building. can be found to be a violation of the
`Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The overview of search and seizure lawas it relates
`to building officials will provide some guidelines regarding how. when or whether or not it is
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`legal to enter and inspect a premises.
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`This chapter will also define and discuss substantive due process, a concept that requires that
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`any legislation — including the building code —— bear some rational relationship to a
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`legitimate public objective. A code that does not bear such a relationship will be vulnerable
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`to legal attacks.
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`Finally, there will be a brief examination of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
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`Amendment of the Constitution and its relationship to code enforcement. Even a building
`code, which looks on its face to bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public objective,
`can be challenged if it is being enforced arbitrarily or in a manner which discriminates
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`against a certain group of protected people. This discussion will strive to impress how
`extremely important it is for anyone enforcing a code to enforce it consistently.
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`Search and Seizure
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`he Fourth Amendment to the Constitution generally prohibits the search or seizure of
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`any property unless 21 warrant has been issued. The amendment guarantees:
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`The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
`fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. shall not be violated, and
`no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
`firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
`sons or things to be seized.
`
`The United States Supreme Court has held that a search is per se unreasonable if it takes
`place without a warrant having been issued.' There are exceptions to this general rule of law,
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`but in the area of building code enforcement, the Court has steadfastly applied that principle
`since 1967.
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`For building officials around the country, routine periodic inspections are one of the most
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`effective methods of code enforcement. Because it is the building official who decides
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`whether or not to obtain a search warrant before inspecting a building. it is very important for
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`he or she to understand the Constitutional limits. If a building official acts in violation of the
`Fourth Amendment, that action could result in the exclusion of evidence of code violations
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`that a building department might bring in any court proceeding in order to enforce the code.
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`60
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`llCC-TO 000238
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`

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`Model Code Provisions and Camara
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`onapter 8 Constitutional Law
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`the building code can never authorize an
`A building official must understand that
`unconstitutional inspection. In spite ofthe fact that virtually every housing and building code
`enacted across this country contains a provision permitting inspections to be carried out in
`the line of duty, these provisions do not allow the building official to inspect someone’s
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`premises; and 2) an occupant who does not consent to an inspection cannot be prosecuted for
`a violation ofa law requiring obedience to the orders ofthe municipal officials. In Camara, a
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`determined that the occupancy permit did not allow residential use of that floor and
`demanded that the lessee consent to an inspection. The lessee refused. claiming that the
`inspector did not have a search warrant.
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`A few days later. the inspectorreturned to the apartment without a warrant and asked again to
`be permitted entry in order to inspect the ground floor. The inspector cited a provision ofthe
`city code:
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`Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as
`may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presenta-
`tion of proper credentials. have the right to enter. at reasonable times, any
`building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed
`upon them by the Municipal code.
`
`Although this provision clearly gave the inspector the right to search Camara’s apartment, he
`nonetheless refused to permit an inspection without a warrant. A short time thereafter,
`Camara was criminal]y charged with refusing to permit a lawful inspection and was arrested.
`The trial court sided with the city against Camara by finding that the mandatory inspection
`provision of the San Francisco city code was not contrary to the Fourth Amendment. This
`decision was affirmed by a California appellate court. Camara once again appealed the
`decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
`The Court began its analysis by stating the fundamental premise that a search of private
`property is unreasonable unless consented to or authorized by a search warrant. It then
`addressed each of the city's three arguments in favor of carving out an exception to that rule
`in the case of municipal health and safety codes.
`
`To the city’s first argument that municipal inspections are not a substantial intrusion into
`personal privacy, the Court acknowledged that “routine inspection of the physical condition
`of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the fruits
`and instrumentalities ofcrime." but felt that any official disruption ofthe sanctity ofthe home
`gave rise to Fourth Amendment protection. Furthermore, inasmuch as the codes are enforced
`by criminal processes. the property owner possibly faced much more severe intrusions by his
`refusal to comply. In fact. imprisonment was permitted under one of the code sections.
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`ICC-TO 000239
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`61
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`
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`The Court likewise rejected the city’s second argument that municipal health and safety
`inspections are filled with safeguards which protect occupants against unreasonable
`searches by inspectors. The Court, however, felt that the practical effect of this argument
`would be to leave each decision to the discretion of the official in the field: “This is precisely
`the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a
`requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search.”
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`The Court also rejected the City’s final argument that:
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`...the health and safety of entire urban populations is dependent upon en-
`forcement of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards and that the
`only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine systematized in-
`spection of all physical structures.
`
`The City reasoned that the decision to inspect an entire municipal geographical area is based
`upon administrative policies concerning such factors as the age and condition of the majority
`of the structures. According to the City, a judicial magistrate — a neutral officer of the court
`charged with issuing warrants — would have grave difficulties in assessing such policies.
`The Court responded by holding that such policies can be accommodated by reducing the
`burden of obtaining the warrant. That is, when obtaining a warrant for municipal inspections,
`some lesser standard would apply than if a criminal search were being authorized. The Court
`indicated that an inspector need not possess probable cause to believe that a structure
`contains violations of the code in order to obtain a warrant. This conclusion was based upon
`the important governmental interests involved, such as prevention of fires, epidemics,
`unsightly conditions and depression of economic values of real property. It further justified
`its decision not
`to apply the probable cause requirement
`to noncriminal residential
`inspections by noting that routine periodic inspection is the only effective way to ensure
`compliance.
`
`The Court finished on a practical note by suggesting standards for the issuance of warrants.
`Probable cause “must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards are satisfied
`with respect to a particular dwelling.” For example, a magistrate might look to the passage of
`time since previous inspections, the nature of the structure, or the condition of the entire area.
`Specific knowledge of the condition of a particular structure is not necessary. It then
`concluded that “warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there
`has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate
`entry.”
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`Inspectors should always ask for consent before seeking a warrant. Seeking a warrant should
`be a last resort. When consent cannot be obtained, there may be exceptions to the warrant
`requirement, but these exceptions should be exercised cautiously. They include violations in
`plain view, emergency situations, heavily regulated businesses and abandoned buildings,
`and are described on the next several pages.
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`62
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`ICC-TO 000240
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`Consent
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`‘
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`Both before and after Camara, the easiest way for a building official to conduct a lawful
`inspection of a building is to obtain the consent of the proper person. In general, this is not
`difficult. Building officials should make contact with an occupant of the structure, identify
`themselves, and inquire as to the identity ofthe occupant and his relationship to the property
`Frequently. the occupant is either the sole or the joint owner of the property. When this is the
`case. a building official may enter the property without violating the Constitution Simply by
`obtaining the occupant—owner’s consent.
`
`There may be a problem. however, if the occupant is a tenant. If the owner is an absentee
`landlord, his or her consent may not be obtainable. In general, the owner’s permission need
`not be obtained if the tenant gives his or her consent. As the occupant of a building, house,
`apartment or land that is owned by someone else, a tenant typically pays an agreed upon
`price for the right to occupy the property. The specified period of time the tenant may occupy
`the property as well as other rights and responsibilities of the tenant are usually spelled out in
`a legal agreement known as a lease.
`
`In the Tennessee case ofJackson v. Dai-'is,‘"‘ two co-owners sued. among other defendants, two
`“building inspection officials” for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. Specifically, the
`tenants of the residential structure, fearing that their electrical wiring was faulty, asked for an
`inspection of the electrical system. After examining the premises. the inspectors found a
`defective wiring system that made the residence unsafe and “dangerous to human life.” After
`the tenants moved out. the inspectors had the electricity disconnected. The trial court found
`that the inspector’s search of the property was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It
`reasoned that once the premises had been rented to tenants. those tenants were the only
`people who had an expectation of privacy. This expectation lasts for the duration of the
`tenant‘s lease. During that time period, the tenants were the only parties who had a legitimate
`expectation of privacy in the property. By requesting the inspection of the electrical system,
`the tenants had given their consent and thereby waived their Fourth Amendment rights.
`
`In spite of this decision, the building official should still exercise caution when entering a
`building without a warrant. In the Jackson case. the court found that the tenants “had the
`exclusive right of occupancy and use of the building.” In some situations. however. a tenant
`may not have such rights to the entire building. The building code official should always
`question the occupant in a detailed fashion about his or her rights to the property. Even if it
`seems clear that the occupant has total control over the entire premises. it is always better to
`err on the side of caution.
`
`In Cramvell v. Mesecf a 1995 Washington case, the court agreed with the Jackson decision
`and extended its holding to allow a tenant to consent to a search of the common areas of an
`apartment building such as the laundry room. the hallways and the entryway. Cranwell also
`stated that a tenant’s consent to search both his or her private apartment and the common
`areas of the apartment structure will override any explicit written refusal of consent on the
`part of the owner.
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`1cc—ro 000241
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`63
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`

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`In spite of the preceding cases, if a tenant claims to possess the rights to the entire building,
`but there are reasonable indications that this claim is untrue, the building official should find
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`the owner or get a warrant. For example, if the occupant claims the right to use an entire
`structure, but certain portions of it are padlocked and the occupant cannot readily produce a
`key, a reasonable person might have second thoughts about the accuracy of the information.
`Ordinarily, if the story is not too far-fetched, the building official will be protected from
`liability because of this reliance on the tenant’s misinformation. Because of the time and cost
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`that must be expended when a code official assumes incorrectly that the property is in the
`entire control of the occupant, however, it is advisable to contact the owner. If that is not
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`possible. the code official should get a warrant if there is any doubt as to the extent of the
`0ccupant’s control over the building.
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`There are other kinds of occupants besides those who have rights under a lease. Sometimes,
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`in the case of unmarried couples, only one of the parties signs the lease agreement. In this
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`situation, the party who has not signed the lease can consent to a search. Where two persons
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`have equal rights to the use or occupation of premises, either one may give consent to a
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`search. Furthermore, the evidence thus disclosed can be used against either party. It is
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`important to note, however, that the person giving consent must have “equal rights” in the '
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`property. For example, if two college students share a two—bedroom house. one cannot give
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`consent to search the other’s bedroom. That student may, of course. consent to an inspection
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`of both common areas and the private areas under his or her control. The other party assumes
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`the risk that the co—tenant may consent to a search of the common areas. There are certain
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`parties that cannot consent to a search such as a landlord (unless the lease provides for it), a
`housekeeper or a hotel clerk.
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`The United States Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Rodriguez‘ that an officer may rely on a
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`person who acts like he or she has authority to consent to the search. but in fact does not. In
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`that case. a defendant’s girlfriend consented to the search of “their“ apartment, even though
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`she has already moved out. The evidence seized was not suppressed because the officer’s
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`belief that the girlfriend had authority was reasonable.
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`Parents may consent to a search of their minor child’s room. as they normally have authority
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`over all of the rooms in their home. Because minor children are essentially dependent upon
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`their parents. however. it would not be reasonable for a building official to rely upon a child’s
`consent to a search.
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`Trespassers may also occupy buildings without a lease, or indeed without any other kind of
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`authority. The building official should nonetheless obtain permission before entering. In this
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`situation. it would also be wise to check with the owner. Although a trespasser possesses very
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`little protection under the law, both the trespasser and the owner may have a reasonable
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`expectation of privacy in some states.
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`Finally, the consent of the occupant must be given voluntarily. This problem will rarely come
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`up in building code enforcement. It is appropriate for the building official to ask the occupant
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`for permission to enter the premises. If permission is refused, an administrative search
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`warrant may be sought. The official should not threaten the owner that the inspector will get a
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`search warrant if permission is denied because that may lead to suppression of the consent
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`search on the basis that the defendants consent was not given voluntarily. To go any further
`and threaten the occupant may jeopardize use of the evidence obtained in the search. In
`particular. if an inspection is refused, to threaten to prosecute more actively known code
`violations, may result in forfeiture of the evidence. The better route is to accept the decision
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`ICC-TO 000242
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`

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`of the occupant courteously. If the inspection is refused, other options should be considered,
`including the issuance of a warrant. Furthermore. always make sure that the occupant clearly
`understands that he or she is giving consent. If uncertainty exists concerning whether or not
`the occupant has consented. the building official must ask again until it is certain that consent
`has been obtained.
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`
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`If the owner or occupant will sign a written consent. the building official should obtain one. A
`written consent is powerful evidence in court if the defendant contests the search.
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`The Plain View Doctrine
`
`The plain view doctrine is another exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
`requirement. While consent is required to inspect a building or property. this doctrine holds
`that if an inspector observes a violation while at a location where he or she is legally entitled
`to be. no violation of the Fourth Amendment results. In other words. if the alleged violation is
`observable from a place where any member of the public may be. the privacy interest of the
`owner must be considered insubstantial. Therefore, no warrant is required.
`
`This exception is vitally important to the building official. Many violations are visible from
`the exterior of a building. An official may discover a number of code violations merely by
`standing on the sidewalk or other public right—of—way and observing the exterior of a
`structure. This exception also allows the building official to look through windows to
`discover any violations which may be present “within plain view.” Naturally. if the occupant
`objects to a further inspection. the building official should immediately depart. An inspector
`should not attempt to inspect the rear of any property under this exception unless it backs up
`on a public alley.
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`
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`Frequently, someone who is upset about a problem on his or her neighbors property will
`allow the building official to view it from his or her home. Anything the inspector sees may
`be used as evidence. even if the building official stands at a second story window or in the
`backyard. Using a ladder to peer over a fence. however.
`is not permissible. The area
`surrounding a house.
`the curtilage,
`is an area in which a defendant has a reasonable
`expectation of privacy and is not subject to a general search.
`
`The rules for commercial property are somewhat different. Those portions ofa business open
`to the public are considered public area and are open to visual inspection without the consent
`of the owner. Anything observed from an airplane flying over this type of land may be used in
`court.
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`An inspector who finds a violation under the plain view exception must still get a warrant in
`order to search other areas which are not in plain view and for which the occupanthas refused
`consent. Citing one violation is not grounds to undertake a more thorough inspection, at least
`not without a warrant. In a case involving a health inspector. the failure of the inspector to
`secure a warrant before entering a number of units in an apartment complex led the court to
`reverse a dismissal of a civil rights lawsuit by a lower court. The inspector argued that the
`units were open and completely unsecured and therefore not reasonably within the owner’s
`expectation of privacy. The court disagreed. Merely because the units were open and
`unsecured did not necessarily mean that the owner had no privacy interest in them:
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`ICC-TO 000243
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`

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`The fact that members of the public could have discovered these alleged vi-
`olations by affirmatively trespassing upon [the] properties, of course, fails
`to legitimize an otherwise invalid search, and the fact that portions of the in-
`teriors may have been visible to tenants and their guests and invitees does
`not mean that [the owner] necessarily “threw open” the interiors of his pre-
`mises to general public scrutiny.6
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`In short, the inspector’s failure to recognize and respect the owner’s Fourth Amendment
`rights gave rise to a valid cause of action against the inspector for a violation of the owner’s
`civil rights. Out in the field, the building official must guard against the temptation of
`carrying an inspection further than the law will allow. Code violations that are “in plain
`view” do not give the building official any authority to explore the premises searching for
`other violations.
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`Emergencies
`
`Emergency situations constitute another exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general
`warrant requirement. While the privacy interests of the landowner may be substantial. the
`nature of an emergency outweighs privacy interests. In the Jackson case discussed earlier. a
`faulty wiring system was unsafe. Although the occupant consented to an inspection, if the
`building official had reason to believe that an emergency existed, he or she could have
`lawfully inspected the premises without consent or a warrant; however, the building official
`should rely on this exception only in very limited circumstances. Even if a building official
`has a reasonable belief that there is an emergency, consent should still be sought. If. after a
`building official explains the basis for believing that an emergency exists. consent is still not
`given, the official should proceed immediately to get a warrant. Only if the building official
`believes that there is an immediate danger to human life should the warrant requirement be
`ignored. These situations of extreme danger will certainly be few and far between. If in
`doubt, the warrant should be sought.
`
`In 1978, the Supreme Court first addressed the emergency exception in depth with the case of
`Michigan v. 7fvlen7 In this case, fire and police officials. suspecting arson. conducted a
`number of searches both during and after the time a fire was being fought in a furniture
`showroom. All inspections were made without a warrant. The last inspection was made
`almost a full month after the fire had been extinguished. Tyler, the lessee of the property, was
`arrested and convicted of arson. The conviction was reversed by the highest court of the state
`of Michigan because of lack of a search warrant, and the case was appealed to the Supreme
`Court.
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`The Court broke its analysis down into three parts coinciding with the three phases of the
`investigation: during the fire itself; the period immediately after the fire; and a time remote
`from the day of the fire. It found that the fire constituted an emergency situation. Therefore,
`no warrant was needed to enter a premises that is on fire:
`
`A burning building clearly presents an emergency of sufficient proportions
`to render warrantless entry “reasonable.” Indeed, it would defy reason to
`suppose that firemen must secure a warrant or consent before entering a
`burning structure to put out the blaze. And once in a building for this pur-
`pose, fire fighters may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view.
`
`The holding in Camara is similar, but the burning furniture store in Ivler is a graphic
`illustration of the “emergency" exception to the general rule requiring warrants.
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`ICC-TO 000244
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`66
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`
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`
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`.-n-‘‘Il$..‘.;:)i
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`

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`The Court then held that inspections immediately following the fire can be made without a
`warrant. Fire officials are charged with determining the origins and causes of fire. It makes
`sense that they must be given a reasonable time after which a fire is extinguished to do their
`job and make those determinations. This rationale also justifies returning to the structure
`within a short time period if, for some reason, such as darkness or smoke, the determination
`could not be immediately made.
`
`In extraordinary circumstances, a building official could rely on the same reasoning. For
`example, if upon an external inspection of a structure, severe structural defects were
`discovered indicating the possibility of immediate collapse, the building official would be
`within his or her 11'ghts to demanding an immediate and thorough inspection of the premises,
`A building official, however, must use this rationale sparingly; the courts will strictly
`scrutinize any justifications offered for a warrantless inspection. The building official should
`never employ this rationale as a ruse for an otherwise invalid inspection. Aside from the fact
`that it is a violation of the landowner’s rights. the risk is great that the court will see through
`the ruse. Not only will that case be lost, but the building official’s credibility will be forever
`suspect in that court.
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`Finally, the Tvler Court addressed inspections made four, seven and almost 30 days after the
`fire had been extinguished. Warrantless intrusions in this situation were held
`unconstitutional. The emergency was over; the officials had ample time within which to
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`obtain a search warrant and failure to do so violated the Fourth Amendment. This would also
`be true in the area of code enforcement. As in the example above. if the building officja1
`believes that a structure is dangerous, but not of immediate concern. the failure to obtain a
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`search warrant would be a major mistake.
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`Michigan v. Tyler is still law. More recently, however, the Court refined one part of its holding
`with its decision in Michigan v. Cl1fi‘0z'd.8 Although the facts of the case are somewhat
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`different than in Tyler, this case is important for its discussion of the type of warrant that must
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`be sought. Arson inspectors entered the premises without consent or a warrant five hours
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`after a fire had been extinguished. They claimed that they could not enter earlier because the
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`condition of the premises was too dangerous. (This claim had helped the fire inspectors in
`Tyler to return to the scene of the fire without a warrant after it was extinguished.) In
`Michigan v. Clzfiord, however, the facts did not support such an explanation. Here, a work
`crew was on the premises during the time the arson inspectors claimed it was too dangerous
`to return. Furthermore. the Court recognized that the role of an arson investigator is limited to
`searching for signs of illegal activity. Because the investigator is not there to determine the
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`cause of the fire, but only to look for signs of criminal intent. the Court held that the
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`investigator needed a criminal search warrant and could not rely upon an administrative
`warrant.
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`Unlike obtaining an administrative search warrant. obtaining a criminal search warrant
`requires demonstration of probable cause to believe that relevant evidence will be found. The
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`general rule, then, is that the object of the search detemiines the type of warrant necessary. Of
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`course, if a fire inspector is lawfully on the property with an administrative search warrant
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`and notices evidence of criminal activity in plain view. that evidence can be used in a criminal
`proceeding against an arson suspect.
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`ICC—TO 000245
`
`67
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`

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`Heavily Regulated Businesses
`
`this may be the most important exception to the Fourth
`For the building official,
`Amendment’s general warrant requirement. As of yet, its parameters are still unclear, and
`have not become much clearer since publication of the 1984 edition of this book. In the
`future, this exception may dramatically affect the day—to-day operations of building
`departments. The Supreme Court has frequently observed that in particular types of
`industries, inspections without warrants are constitutionally acceptable. In determining if a
`warrantless search of a business is allowed, the court will consider whether the business has a
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`history of being closely regulated, whether there is a substantial interest by the State, whether
`the regulation serves a substantial interest. whether a warrantless search is necessary and
`whether the statute has an adequate substitute for a search warrant regarding notice and the
`scope of the search. Inspections based on OSHA regulations, however, are not exempt from
`the warrant‘ requirement?
`
`The Third Circuit Court has held that the construction industry is one such regulated
`enterprise. In Frey v. Panza,” a home builder sued the municipality and its building official,
`alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by their conducting random and
`warrantless inspections of houses under construction. The builder had no objection to
`“regularly scheduled inspections,” but objected to provisions of the building code which
`gives the building official authority to enter the structure at any reasonable hour to enforce
`the provisions of the code. The lower court held in favor of the building official; the Appellate
`court affirmed.
`
`In making its decision, the appellate court looked to the nature of the government regulation
`of the construction industry in the township:
`
`The record in this case shows that the construction industry in the township
`in all its phases is subject to detailed and exacting regulation by the munici-
`pality. The contractor must file plans before he begins work and he is held to
`the requirements of the code as his project proceeds. He is aware in advance
`that the work is subject to inspection without notice. The construction in-
`dustry has a long history of government supervision and oversight enforced
`by inspection. And the statute challenged here is directed specifically and
`exclusively at that one industry. We note also that the ordinance limits in-
`spections to the construction site. at reasonable hours. and for the purposes
`of enforcing compliance with the building code. These restrictions point to-
`ward the reasonableness of the inspection and counsel against requiring an
`administrative warrant.
`
`This is a strong statement in support of the right of a building official, under the appropriate
`provisions of the building code,
`to make impromptu inspections of building sites as
`construction progresses. This holding, however. is not universally applicable: there are some
`important qualifications.
`
`First, this is the only case that specifically deals with this issue. The Supreme Court. refused
`to hear this case on appeal. This means that the Supreme Court did not issue a writ of
`certiorari. In order to have the United States Supreme Court review a lower court ruling. the
`Supreme Court must issue a writ of certiorari. This allows the Supreme Court to control the
`number of cases it hears each year and to choose which cases it wants to hear. If the Supreme
`Court refuses to issue a writ of certiorari. the result is that a lower court in another circuit is
`free to reach a different conclusion if it so desires. So far, Frey has stood the test of time. No
`other circuits have ruled against it since it came down in 1980. Because there is very little
`
`68
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`llCC-TO 000246
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`

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`case law in this area, however, it is somewhat risk
`limited amount of authority.
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`3’ to P1308 much confidence on such a
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`finished and the structure is up to the standards of the building code
`and other codes. At this
`point, the developer’s privacy interest escalates considerably,
`a“d °°"e5P°"dingly. the
`govemment’s interest in enforcing its code provisions should be low. If the building is
`actually occupied, whether or not it is under the authority of a validly issued certificate, this
`exception clearly no longer applies and the usual rules surrounding gaining entry discussed
`earlier in the chapter must be obeyed. When there is unlawful occupancy, the building
`official should pursue whatever punitive measures are available against the contractor and
`not against the occupant. The ordinary layperson does not understand the code requirements.
`The contractor is charged with knowing, understanding and complying with code provisions
`and is liable when there is a violation.
`
`Abandoned Buildings
`
`Most building and housing codes provide authority for the demolition of buildings that are in
`a state of extreme deterioration. To determine whether a specific building is unfit for
`ha