MRGAN L. FITCH. JR.
`F Nels A. EVEN
`J LIUS TABIN
`JHN F. FLANNERY
`RI BERT B. JONES
`J ES J. SCHUMANN
`J Es J. HAMILL
`TI OTHY E. LEVSTIK
`JEPH E. SHIPLEY
`K
`NETH H. SAMPLES
`P ILIP T. PETTI
`JEF'H T. NABOR
`sIr VEN c. SCHROER
`RI HARD A. KABA'
`K L R. FINK
`M ‘ RK W- HETZLER
`JA as p, KRUEGER
`TI OTHY P. MALONEY
`5»? PHEN 5- FAVAKEH
`RI HARD E. WAWRZYNIAK"
`ST VEN G. PARMELEE’
`TH MAS F, LEBENS»
`BR CE R. MANSFIELD
`.
`KE DREW H. COLTON
`SféLEEGsEihzo'
`sd: TT J. MENGHINI"
`.
`N ' ' MAN N. KUN'TZ
`RU Y KRATZ
`RA ON R. "OCH.
`JO N D. BAUERSFELD'
`GA Y D. MANN'
`
`FITCH, EVEN, TABIN & FLANNERY
`ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW
`,
`,
`Esmbl‘Shed'"1859
`SUITE I600 - I20 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET
`_
`CH'CAGO’ ILLINOIS 60603 3406
`TELEPHONE (3'2) 577_7OOO
`FACSIMILE (3|?) 577-7007
`
`
`CAUFORN'A OFF'CES
`SUITE 250-9276 SCRANTON ROAD, SAN DIEGO, CA 92l2|
`TELEPHONE (858) 552 I3”
`WARNER CENTER TOWERS. SUITE 780, ZIBOO OXNARD ST., WOODLAND HILLS, CA 9|367
`
`TELEPHONE (BIB) 75.7025
`
`WASHINGTON, D.C. OFFICE
`SUITE 4OIL - |80| K STREET, Nw, WASHINGTON, D.C. aoooe-IEOI
`
`TELEPHONE (202) «97000
`
`COLORADO OFFICE
`SUITE 2I3 - l942 BROADWAY, BOULDER. COLORADO 80302
`
`TELEPHONE (303) 402 6966
`
`May 3,
`
`EDWARD E. CLAIR
`JON A. BIRMINGHAM
`JOHN E. LYHUS
`STEVEN M. FREELAND'
`DONNA E. BECKER
`BRIAN 5. CLISE
`MARTIN R. BADER'
`MARK A. BORSOS
`TIMOTHY R. BAUMANN
`JEFFREY A. CHELSTROM
`NICHOLAS T. PETERS
`KENNETH E. PLOCHINSKI
`GRACE LAW O‘BRIEN
`CHRISTINE A. ABUEL
`
`TARA M, REEDY
`
`g
`
`PATENT AGENTS
`“"3 -" WH'TESELL
`L'L'A " 5AF°N°V
`NADA J- ARDELEANU
`JULIE A. HOPPER
`—
`OF COUNSEL
`GEORGE W. SPELLMIRE, JR.
`
`LISA M~ SOMMER
`GEORGE H. SPENCER. P.C.'
`
`TECHNICAL ADVISOR
`JOHN M. BRONK. PH.D.
`
`.NOT ADMITTED T0 ILLINOIS BAR
`
`Hon. Commissioner of Patents
`
`and Trademarks
`PO. Box 1451
`Alexandria, VA 223134451
`
`Re:
`
`Transmittal of Revised Redacted Motion for Summary Judgment
`The Chamberlain Group, Inc. V. Lynx Industries, Inc.
`Opposition No. 91/160,673
`Our File No. 634182876
`
`Dear Commissioner:
`
`Enclosed please find Opposer’s Revised Redacted Motion for Summary Judgment.
`Subsequent to the filing of Opposer’s Original Briefunder Seal and redacted copies on April 12, 2005
`Opposer received Applicant’s designations of confidential information disclosed in the Deposition
`Transcript of Mark Schram in accordance with the Protective Order.
`In the April 12, 2005
`submission, the entire transcript of Mr. Schram’s testimony and any references thereto in the body
`of the brief were redacted pursuant to the Protective Order. Therefore, we are hereby submitting
`a Revised Redacted Motion for Summary judgement in which only Applicant’s designated
`information has been redacted.
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`
`
`FITCH, EVEN, TABIN 6g FLANNERY
`120 South LaSalle Street, Suite 1600
`
`jTN:ddc
`Enclosure
`
`cc:
`
`A. Blair Hughes, Esq.
`Via hand/delivery W/enclosure
`
`Chicago, Illinois 60603/3406
`
`05-05-2005
`US. mm a, TMOIc/TM Mail ncptm- 4'72
`
`

`

`In the Matter of Application Serial No. 78/281,660
`Published April 27, 2004 in the Official Gazettc
`Trademark: LYNX MASTER
`
`THECHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC,
`OPPOSER,
`
`I herebycertifythat thispaperisbangdeposited with
`g theUnitedStatesPostalServiceasfirstclassmailinan
`envelope addressed to:
`‘
`
`'
`
`V.
`
`LYNX INDUSTRIES, INC.
`
`APPLICANT.
`
`Commissioner for Trademarks
`PO. Box 1451
`Alexandria, Virginia 223134451
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`REVISED
`
`REDACTED
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`“JELLO.-
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`THE STATUS OE THIS OPPOSITION .
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`. 1
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`II.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND .
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`III.
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`SUMMARYJUDGMENT SUSTAINING THE OPPOSITION IS APPROPRIATE
`IN THIS CASE .
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`A.
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`B.
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`The Summary judgment Standard .
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`Likelihood of Confusion Exists Between
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`The Marks as a Matter of Law .
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`C.
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`The Parties’ Respective Goods Are Identical and Are Likely to Be Viewed
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`. 7
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`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`The Marks At Issue Are Confusineg Similar .
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`The LIFTMASTER Mark Has Achieved Fame Through Chamberlain’s
`Extensive Sales, Advertising and Length of Use .
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`The Similarity of the Parties‘ Respective Trade Channels Increase the
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`Likelihood of Confusion Between Chamberlain and Lynx .
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`The Preditory Intent of Lynx Industries .
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`G.
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`Public Protection Against Confusion Requires Refusal of the Lynx
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`Chamberlain Has Priority in its Mark over Lynx’s Mark .
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`Any Doubts Regarding the Likelihood of Confusion must Be Resolved
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`I.
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`J.
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION .
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`EXHIBITS Ar]
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`VI
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`VII.
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`VIII.
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`DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF MARK SCHRAM
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`DECLARATION OF SARAH S. ANDERSON
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`DECLARATION OF MARK B. TONE
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`

`

`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US; 106 S.Ct. (1986)
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`Application ofE.I. DuPont Denemours (’7 Co., 476 F.2d (C.C.P.A. 1973) .
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`Carlisle Chemical Works, Inc. v. Harman (’9' Holden, Ltd, 434 F. 2d 1403,
`168 U.S.P.Q. 110 (C.C.P.A. I970) .
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`Century 21 Real Estate Corporation v. Century Life ofAmerica, 970 F.2d 874, 876;
`23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .
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`Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto, Co., 948 F.2d (Fed. Cir. 1991)
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`Electronic Water Conditioners v. Turbomag Corp, 221 USPQ 162 (ITAB 1984) .
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`First National Bank v. Cities Services Co., 391 US. 253, 290 (1968)
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`Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Company, 314 F.2d 149, 161 (9th Cir. 1963) .
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`In re Concordia International Forwarding Corp, 222 U.S.P.Q. 355 (TIAB 1983) .
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`In re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .
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`In re Southern Belle Frozen Foods, Inc, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1849 (T.T.A.B. 1998)
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`].C. Hall Company v. Hallmark Cards, Incorporated, 340 F.2d 960, 963,
`144 U.S.P.Q. 435, 438 (C.C.P.A. 1965) .
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`Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942 (6th Cir. 1987) .
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`Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 350,
`22 U.S.P.Q.2d1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .
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`. 8,18
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`

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`Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp, 818 F.2d 254, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1677, 1681 (2nd Cir. 1987) .
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`Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntax (USA), Inc, 739 F.2d (Fed. Cir. 1984)
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`7
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`Safety/Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc, 518 F.2d 1399, 1404,
`186 U.S.P.Q. 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975) .
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`WE. Kautenberg Co. v. Ekco Products Company, 251 F.2d 628, 631, 116 U.S.P.Q. 417, 419
`(C.C.P.A. 1958) .
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`Weiss Associates, Inc. v. HRE Associates, Inc, 902 F.2d (Fed. Cir. 1990)
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`
`OPPOSER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY |UDGMENT
`
`Opposer, The Chamberlain Group, Inc. (“Chamberlain”), hereby moves the Trademark Trial
`
`and Appeal Board (the Board) for entry of Summaryjudgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 on its
`
`Opposition filed against Application Serial No. 78/281,660 for the mark LYNX MASTER.
`
`Chamberlain is entitled to Summary Judgement because there is no issue of material fact and the
`
`undisputed evidence establishes that there is a likelihood of confusion between the Opposer’s use
`
`ofits LIFTMASTER mark and Applicant’s asserted LYNX MASTER mark. Therefore, Chamberlain
`
`respectfully requests the entry of Summary Judgment sustaining its Opposition on the basis of
`
`Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.
`
`I.
`
`THE STATUS OF THIS OPPOSITION
`
`Lynx Industries, Inc. (“Lynx”), a Canadian Corporation, filed its Application Serial No.
`
`78/281,660 for the mark LYNX MASTER onjuly 31, 2003, for use in connection with “electric door
`
`openers; electric garage door openers; remote controls for garage doors” in International Class 9 on
`
`the basis of its intent to use and no Amendment to Allege Use has been filed. The application was
`
`published on April 27, 2004, and Chamberlain filed a timely opposition against the application on
`
`the grounds that Lynx Industries’ mark is confusingly similar to Chamberlain’s marks. Lynx
`
`Industries filed an Answer generally denying the allegations. Discovery is presently set to close on
`
`
`
`April 12, 2005.
`
`ll.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`Lynx Industries, Inc. is a Canadian corporation having a principal place of business in
`
`Archbold, Ohio. Lynx Industries is in the business of manufacturing, distributing, and marketing
`
`commercial and residential garage doors and garage door openers (Schram Transcript pg. 20). Lynx
`
`Industries is the owner of certain trademarks registered before the US. Patent and Trademark Office
`
`which are limited to the marks AMBASSADOR and AMBASS’A/DOR.
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`This substantial goodwill has resulted in the further evolution of other, related marks for
`
`additional goods and services. For example, Chamberlain is the owner of Registration No.1,401,035
`
`for the mark GARAGE MASTER on “electric garage door openers.” (Two Certified Copies of this
`
`Registration showing title and status are attached as Exhibit B). The LIFT/MASTER mark
`
`(Registration No.1,781,236) is used in connection with “electrical door openers and structural parts
`
`,2,
`
`Chamberlain is a Connecticut corporation having a principal place of business in Elmhurst,
`
`Illinois. Chamberlain is a leader in the garage door opener industry being the world’s largest
`
`manufacturer of residential garage door openers and commercial operators. Chamberlain also
`
`manufacturers gate operators and various accessories such as door control products and remote
`
`control products which bear Chamberlain trademarks, including the LIETMASTER mark.
`
`(Declaration of Sarah S. Anderson, Para. 2) Chamberlain is a global company with offices
`
`throughout the United States and oversees in Germany, The United Kingdom, Norway, The
`
`Netherlands, France, Poland, Italy, Singapore, and China. Chamberlain is a member of nearly every
`
`major association in the garage door industry. (Declaration of Sarah Anderson, Para. 3)
`
`On June 21, 1967, Chamberlain filed an application with the Patent and Trademark Office
`
`(PTO) to register the mark LIFTMASTER. OnJanuary 14, 1969, this application resulted in the
`
`issuance of Registration No. 863,447 wherein the goods are specified as “residential electrical garage
`
`door controllers.” This Registration is still valid and subsisting and is now incontestible. (Two
`
`Certified Copies of this Registration showing title and status are attached as Exhibit A). Since
`
`Chamberlain‘s first use of the mark, Which occurred at least as early as Mayl7, 1967, the mark has
`
`been consistently used by Chamberlain both as its trademark and, to some extent, as the trade name
`
`by which it has come to be known among end users. As one of the leading garage door operator top
`
`manufacturers in the world, the LIETMASTER mark and trade name have generated substantial
`
`goodwill associated with the mark.
`
`

`

`
`
`electronic security systems and centralized automation systems; Providing research and design
`
`thereof. (Two Certified Copies of this Registration showing title and status are attached as Exhibit
`
`C). ACCESSMASTER (Registration No. 2,034,080) is used on “radio receiver units, radio
`
`transmitter units, keypads car readers, control panels, and for controlling electronic door and gate
`
`openers, and parts therefore.” (Two Certified Copies of this Registration showing title and status
`
`are attached as Exhibit D). In its Answer to the Notice of Opposition, Lynx Industries admits that
`
`each of the foregoing were issued by the US. Patent and Trademark Office, that each are currently
`
`owned by Chamberlain and that each, except for Registration No. 2,724,638, are incontestible.
`
`Last, Chamberlain owns Registration No. 2,724,638 for the mark LIFTMASTER. The goods
`
`in the ‘638 Registration are specified as “electric motors for doors, ages and shutters; tubular electric
`
`motors for doors, gates and shutters; central vacuum system for residential use, comprised of central
`
`vacuum units, tubing and fittings; remote control systems and components thereof~namely radio
`
`controls for garage and warehouse entrance doors or gates, automatic garage door openers, lights
`
`motors, antennas, transmitters, receivers and controllers responding thereto and used in such
`
`systems; electrical safety equipment; namely, an electric eye for sensing obstructions and controlling
`
`doors; electronic security devices, namely, electronic controls for granting access and egress through
`
`doors or gates; radio receiver units, radio transmitter units, keypads and card readers; a centralized
`
`automated system comprising a programmable controller, power line carrier modules, and one or
`
`more control modules or control receptacles, for controlling audio equipment, lighting, and other
`
`appliances in a residence; Providing technical advices and information in the maintenance and repair
`
`in the field of garage door opener installation, remote control systems, electrical safety equipment,
`
`services for other enterprises regarding consumer, industrial, military and construction projects in
`
`the field ofgarage door openers, remote control systems, rolling shutters, awnings, telephone access
`
`

`

`
`
`systems, intercoms, electrical safety equipment, electronic security and centralized automation
`
`systems.” (Two Certified Copies of this Registration showing title and status are attached as
`
`Exhibit E).
`
`The Board should grant Opposer’s motion for summaryjudgment and sustain this opposition
`
`because there is no issue of triable fact. In this case, the parties cannot reasonably dispute the
`
`marks, goods, and channels of commerce. The appearance, sound, connotation of the marks and the
`
`services and channels of trade are so similar between Applicant’s and Opposer’s marks that there
`
`is simply a clear likelihood of confusion between the marks as a matter of law.
`
`In May 2004, Chamberlain and Lynx Industries were attendees at the International Door
`
`Association Trade Show in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Lynx Industries trade show booth displayed
`
`approximately two or three residential garage door operators bearing the LYNX MASTER mark.
`
`(Schram Transcript pg. 62). Lynx Industries also displayed a poster approximately 20 x 30 inches
`
`large depicting its residential garage door opener bearing the LYNX MASTER mark.
`
`(Schram
`
`Transcript pg. 93/94). Additionally, Lynx Industries distributed approximately 1,000 to 1,5000
`
`informational brochures “thanking” customers for visiting the Lynx Industries booth. - These
`
`brochures also displayed the LYNX MASTER mark in connection with Lynx Industries’ residential
`
`garage door opener. (Schram Transcript pg. 91/92) Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a photocopy of
`
`this brochure in which the mark is shown as one word.
`
`Shortly after Chamberlain learned of Lynx Industries‘ intentions to use the LYNX MASTER
`
`mark, it filed this opposition proceeding claiming that Lynx Industries‘ use of the LYNX MASTER
`
`trademark constituted trademark infringement and diluted Chamberlain’s LIETMASTER mark.
`
`Based upon the undisputed facts, there is a clear likelihood of consumer confusion.
`
`III.
`
`SUMMARYJUDGMENT SUSTAINING THE OPPOSITION Is APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`A.
`
`The Summaryjudgment Standard
`
`Summaryjudgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant
`
`is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US.
`
`242, 247; 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509/10 (1986); Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto, Co., 948 F.2d1264,
`
`1265 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A factual issue is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
`
`finder could return a verdict for the non/moving party under the applicable substantive evidentiary
`
`standard. Anderson, supra, at 254. Accordingly, it is the obligation of the non/moving party to “set
`
`forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The mere
`
`identification of a dispute of fact will not necessarily defeat a motion for summary judgment if the
`
`fact disputed is not essential to the determination sought by the summary judgment motion; a
`
`factual dispute is material only if resolution of the dispute would affect the decision on the legal
`
`issue. Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (USA), Inc., 739 F.2d 624, 636 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Moreover, Summary
`
`judgment should not be denied “merely to satisfy a litigant’s speculative hope of finding some
`
`evidence that might tend to support a complaint.” Pure Gold, 739 F.2d at 627. (Citing First National
`
`Bank v. Cities Services Co., 391 US. 253, 290 (1968)).
`
`
`
`The Federal Circuit has held that likelihood of confusion is a question of law to be decided
`
`by the Board. Weiss Associates, Inc. v. HRE Associates, Inc, 902 F.2d 1546, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also
`
`Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (USA), Inc, 739 F.2d 624, 636 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(likelihood of confusion is an
`
`issue well/suited for summary judgment). Moreover, 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(a) makes Fed.R.Civ.P. 56
`
`applicable to all interpartes proceedings before the Board.
`
`Priority is not at issue in the Opposition. In its Answer to the Notice of Opposition, Lynx
`
`Industries admits that is application to register this mark was filed onjuly 31, 2003, and that it did
`
`not use this mark prior to that date. (See Answer Para. 13). In contrast, each of the aforementioned
`
`Registrations by Chamberlain were issued prior to that date and the earliest date of first use recited
`
`,5,
`
`

`

`
`
`therein is at least as early as May 17, 1967. Lynx Industries has not challenged those Registrations.
`
`Therefore, the only issue for determination is the existence of a likelihood of confusion.
`
`B.
`
`Likelihood of Confusion Exists Between the Marks as a Matter of Law
`
`The standard for the likelihood of confusion in an opposition proceeding before the Board
`
`is well established as set forth in ApplicationofEl. DuPontDencmours 0C0, 476 F.2d1357, 177USPQ 563
`
`(C.C.P.A. 1973) and recently affirmed in In re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc, 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ
`
`2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In the Du Pont case, the Court identified the availability of 13 evidentiary
`
`factors that should be evaluated in determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists. The
`
`evidentiary elements listed in DuPont are not listed in order of merit. Moreover, the significance of
`
`each factor and its relevance to subsequent cases varies from case to case. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 567.
`
`As such, discussed below are the factors most relevant to this case. An evaluation of the relevant
`
`DuPont factors shows as a matter of law that likelihood of confusion exists between Chamberlain’s
`
`LIFTMASTER mark and Lynx Industries’ LYNX MASTER mark.
`
`In the present case, several factors identified in DuPont and other cases lead the Board to a
`
`legal conclusion that likelihood of confusion clearly exists. Therefore, Chamberlain should prevail
`
`and this opposition should be sustained by summary judgment. These factors are: (l) the similarity
`
`of the marks as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression; (2) the similarity of
`
`the goods specified in the application with those of Chamberlain (3)the similarity of established,
`
`likely/to/continue trade channels and (4) The fame of the LIFTMASTER mark in terms of sales,
`
`advertising and length of use. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 177 USPQ at 567.
`
`C.
`
`The Parties’ Respective Goods Are Identical and Are Likely to Be Viewed as
`Emanating from the Same Source
`
`The similarity or dissimilarity of the parties’ respective services is one of the primary factors
`
`in determining whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion. DuPont, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d at 567. See
`
`,5,
`
`

`

`
`
`also].C. HallCompanyv. Hallmark Cards, Incorporated, 340 F.2d 960, 963,144 U.S.P.Q. 435, 438 (C.C.P.A.
`
`1965). It is not necessary for the goods of Chamberlain and Lynx Industries to be identical for a
`
`likelihood of confusion to exist. Safety~Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc, 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186
`
`U.S.P.Q. 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); WE. Kautenberg Co. v. Ekco Products Company, 251 F.2d 628, 631, 116
`
`U.S.P.Q. 417, 419 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (ECKO as applied to kitchen utensils held confusingly similar to
`
`WECKO as applied to mops and related products). As it happens though, the respective goods are
`
`more than just similar. Here, the identification of goods in the subject application of Lynx Industries
`
`arem to the goods set forth in Chamberlain’s Registration Nos. 863,447; 1,781,236; 2,034,080;
`
`1,401,035; and 2,724,638. Chamberlain adopted and began using the LIFTMASTER mark on
`
`electrical garage door controllers in 1967 throughout the United States. Now, Lynx Industries is
`
`seeking to register its mark for use in connection with “electric door openers; electric garage door
`
`openers; and remote controls for garage doors." As such, there is entirely no contrast between Lynx’s
`
`goods and those of Chamberlain. During his deposition on behalf of Lynx Industries under Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 30(b) (6), Mark Schram, Vice President and General Manger of Lynx Industries, testified that
`
`Chamberlain is a competitor for the goods specified in the subject Application.
`
`(See Schram
`
`Transcript, pgs. 3744.) These are essentially the very same goods specified in each of the
`
`Registrations owned by Chamberlain.
`
`D.
`
`The Marks at Issue Are Confusingly Similar
`
`Not only are the goods at issue identical but the marks at issue are substantially similar.
`
`“When marks would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the degree of similarity to
`
`support a conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life ofAmerica,
`
`23 USPQ 2d. 1698, 1700 (Fed. Civ. 1992). Here there is an undeniable similarity in the marks
`
`LIFTMASTER and LYNX MASTER. Not only does Lynx Industries incorporate Chamberlain’s
`
`“Master” term into its mark, but it uses the phonetically and visually similar formative element
`
`
`
`,7,
`
`

`

`
`
`Additionally, the similarity in the sound and pronunciation of trademarks is a factor in
`
`determining a likelihood of confusion. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; Kenner Parker Toys, 1nc.v. Rose Art
`
`Industries, Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In KennerParker, the Federal
`
`Circuit concluded that given the similarity in the sounds of the respective marks, the marks were
`
`confusingly similar. See Kenner Parker, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1457. In that case, the Federal Circuit held
`
`that identical pronunciation of the single/syllable suffixes DOH (“Play/Dob”) and DOUGH
`
`(“Fundough”) led to the “graphic confusability” of the two terms. Kenner Parker, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at
`
`1457. Likewise, in the present case, there can be no dispute that the terms “Master” are pronounced
`
`the same way for both marks in issue. Further, both marks incorporate phonetically similar four
`
`,8,
`
`“Lynx” in place of Chamberlain’s “Lift” term. In evaluating whether marks are confusingly similar,
`
`the Board looks at the entirety of the marks and compares the marks’ respective appearance, sound,
`
`connotation and commercial impression. Century 21 Real Estate Corporationv. Century LifeofAmerica, 970
`
`F.2d 874, 876; 23 U.S.P.Q.2d1698 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Given the strong similarity in appearance, sound,
`
`connotation and commercial impression of both marks when used on identical goods, there is a high
`
`likelihood of consumer confusion. “Cases where a defendant uses an identical mark on competitive
`
`goods hardly ever find their way into the appellate reports. Such cases are ‘open and shut’ and do
`
`not involve protracted litigation to determine liability for trademark infringement.” McCarthy,
`
`Trademarks and Unfair Competition §23z20. As the LIFTMASTER and LYNX MASTER marks are
`
`sufficiently similar and used in connection with identical goods, consumer confusion is likely.
`
`It is undisputed that the mark LIFTMASTER as shown in Registration No.863,447 and
`
`LIFT—MASTER as shown in Registration No. 1,781,236 are incontestible and have a substantially
`
`similar appearance, order and form as the LYNX MASTER mark. Thus, Lynx Industries has adopted
`
`its mark in its standard character, form in this intent to use application.
`
`

`

`
`
`the advertisements are promoting LYNX MASTER products is likely to believe that they originate
`
`letter terms as formative elements to the marks at issue. Chamberlain uses the term ‘Lift” which is
`
`a one syllable, four letter word composed of one vowel in the second character of the term. Similarly,
`
`Lynx Industries uses the term “Lynx” which is also a one syllable four letter word composed of three
`
`consonants and a vowel as the second character.
`
`It follows that such substantially similar
`
`pronunciations would lead to the same confusability and likelihood of confusion found in the Kenner
`
`with, are sponsored by, or are associated with Chamberlain. The nearly indistinguishable sound
`
`of the LIFTMASTER and LYNX MASTER marks is sufficient to cause likely confusion as to the
`
`source or origin of the goods at issue.
`
`Parker case.
`
`In this case, the phonetic similarity between the LIFTMASTER and LYNX MASTER marks
`
`is particularly troublesome. Not only does Chamberlain advertise its LIFTMASTER products in
`
`trade journals, magazines, and other print media, but it also advertises its LIFTMASTER products
`
`on radio and television commercials and commentaries. (Declaration of Sarah S. Anderson Para. 4).
`
`In such advertisements when a relatively short period time is available to discuss a product and the
`
`product and associated trade marks are not visually available to consumers, it is important that the
`
`mark used in connection with the product is clearly heard by consumers. When 30 or 60 second
`
`commercial spots are used to promote Chamberlain’s LIFTMASTER mark on goods identical to
`
`those of Lynx Industries, consumers are likely to be confused as to the trademark involved, and thus
`
`confused as to the source or origin of the goods. Moreover, a consumer that mistakenly believes that
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`E. The LIFTMASTER Mark is Famous and Therefore Entitled to a Broad Scope
`of Protection
`
`
`
`The LIFTMASTER mark has achieved fame through Chamberlain’s extensive sales,
`
`advertising and length of use of its mark in commerce for over thirty~seven (37) years. Since at least
`
`1967 Chamberlain has continuously and extensively used its mark in interstate commerce in
`
`connection with electrical garage door openers. Chamberlain sells its products bearing the
`
`LIETMASTER mark to garage door dealers, garage door installers, and garage door distributors.
`
`(Declaration of Sarah Anderson Para. 7). Purchasers of Chamberlain’s LIFTMASTER products
`
`represent not only all 50 states, Puerto Rico and US. Territories, but Germany, France, the United
`
`Kingdom, Scandinavia, the Benelux, Southern and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South Africa,
`
`Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Central and South America and Asia as well.
`
`(Declaration of
`
`Sarah S. Anderson Para. 8).
`
`In the year 2004 alone, Petitioner’s sale of garage door opener products in the United States
`was well in excess_This was in part due to Chamberlain’s extensive advertising
`
`and marketing campaign. Chamberlain allots a significant portion of its marketing budget to
`
`advertise LIFTMASTER garage door products. For example, the annual budget for advertising
`
`Chamberlain‘s goods bearing the LIETMASTER mark was well in excess_
`
`(Declaration of Sarah S. Anderson Para. 9).
`
`The LIFTMASTER mark is advertised nationally on a cooperative basis through its
`
`customers. Chamberlain develops literature and mailings promoting LIFTMASTER products and
`
`uses search engine optimization and key word placement on the web. Chamberlain’s extensive
`
`advertising campaign also includes advertising at trade shows, in industry publications, the yellow
`
`pages directory and in major magazine publications such as Good Housekeeping.
`
`In addition
`
`Chamberlain advertises through video production, video news releases, and Video matte releases.
`
`Chamberlain has even advertised its LIFTMASTER mark in connection with its garage door
`
`,10,
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`openers in New York Times Square the last three fourth/quarter time~periods. (Declaration of Sarah
`
`S. Anderson Para. 10). Chamberlain has continuously and extensively used its mark, LIFTMASTER,
`
`for approximately thirty seven years. Therefore, Chamberlain’s LIFTMASTER mark is entitled to
`
`
`
`a broad scope of protection.
`
`In the world marketplace, Chamberlain has become the leading global supplier of garage
`
`door openers for the retail and professional markets. International sales are supported by multi/
`
`lingual literature and packaging in up to 16 languages for both the retail and professional markets.
`
`(Declaration of Sarah S. Anderson Para. 11). On an international level, Chamberlain owns numerous
`
`Registrations for the LIFTMASTER, LIFT MASTER, and LIFT/MASTER trademarks throughout
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`the world in connection with its garage door openers and accessories for residential and commercial
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`uses in the garage door industry. (Declaration of Mark B. Tone Para. 2.)
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`Chamberlain owns the following Registrations for the mark LIFTMASTER, in Puerto Rico,
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`Registration No. 57515; Russian Federation, Registration No. 260513; and in the United States of
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`America, Registration Nos. 863,447 and 2,724,638, for use in connection with garage door openers
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`and accessories for residential and commercial uses in the garage door industry. (Declaration of
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`Mark B. Tone Para. 3). Chamberlain owns the following Registrations for the mark LIFT MASTER
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`in Benelux, Registration No. 458,255; Canada, Registration No. 370675; Denmark, Registration No.
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`1836/1990; France, Registration No. 1,617,428; Italy, Registration No. 589,788;Japan, Registration
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`No. 2,393,