throbber
.’A-
`
`‘
`
`Attorney Docket No. 020750-006310US
`
`TRADEMARK
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`In re Application Serial No. 78/095,506
`Mark:
`XPOD
`Filed:
`November 28, 2001
`Applicant:
`MediaFour Corporation
`
`B
`
`APPLE COMPUTER, INC.,
`
`Opposer,
`
`
`
`V-
`MEDIAFOUR CORPORATION,
`
`Applicant.
`
`Opposition No. 91/155,523
`
`0PPOSER’S MOTION
`FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION
`
`Please take notice that Opposer, Apple Computer, Inc., (“Opposer” or “Apple”) by this
`
`document and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and 37 C.F.R. § 2.127, moves the
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to grant summary judgment on the grounds of likelihood of
`
`confiision under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act‘ for the reasons set forth in the
`
`accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
`
`1 Opposer’s Notice of Opposition also contains a claim for relief for trademark dilution under 15
`U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), which is not the subject of the present motion. If the Board grants summary
`judgment on the present motion, registration of App1icant’s mark will be denied, thus rendering
`Apple’s dilution claim moot and making the Board’s decision dispositive of this Opposition.
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`Hllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
`
`1 1-08-2004
`U.S. Patent & TMOfcITM Mail Rcpt D1. #64
`
`.3
`
`___r..-....;.. -.s_-
`
`

`
`
`
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`This is a straightforward case of an applicant who has intentionally selected and applied
`
`for a mark confusingly similar to Apple’s famous IPOD® mark in order to capitalize on the
`
`fame and goodwill of Apple’s mark. Applicant’s obvious attempt to usurp Apple’s rights by
`
`selecting the XPOD mark is designed to unfairly target Apple’s customers for Applicant’s
`
`complementary product designed to be used solely with Apple’s IPOD product. As
`
`demonstrated below, the undisputed facts of this case support a finding of a likelihood of
`
`confusion with the IPOD mark. The Board should readily determine that summary judgment for
`
`Apple on its Section 2(d) grounds for opposition must be entered.
`
`II.
`
`FACTS
`
`A.
`
`Apple’s Famous IPOD Mark
`
`Apple is the creator of the IPOD portable handheld media player. Since its introduction
`
`on October 23, 2001, the IPOD product has become widely known and wildly popular
`
`throughout the world. In fact, after the product was first launched, over 125,000 players were
`
`sold in less than two months. Declaration of Thomas A. La Perle (“La Perle Decl.”), 113. The
`
`sales and popularity of the IPOD product have only increased over the past three years through
`
`each generation of the player. La Perle Decl., 114. By June 28, 2004, Apple had sold over 3.7
`
`million IPOD players. Id.
`
`In just the first half of 2004 alone, 2,400,000 players were shipped,
`
`returning revenue to Apple of over $760 million dollars. Id. From June to September of 2004,
`
`an additional 2,016,000 IPOD players were shipped, representing a 500 percent increase from
`
`the same period of 2003. Id.
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-2-
`
`

`
`
`
`Apple has expended significant resources .in the advertising and promotion of the IPOD
`
`product sufficient to support that volume of sales. Through Apple’s extensive marketing efforts,
`
`it has been immensely successful in developing a loyal customer following and valuable brand
`
`identity for its IPOD mark. La Perle Decl.,115. Apple has spent, on average, $200 million per
`
`year promoting its products. La Perle Decl., 116. The IPOD player has been featured in
`
`television commercials aired on cable and network television and in print publications and
`
`billboards across the country. La Perle Decl., 11117-9. Apple aggressively promotes its products
`
`through its public relations program and news releases. La Perle Decl., 1110 & Exhibit B thereto.
`
`The media regularly reports on Apple products and has specifically covered the IPOD player in
`
`various media. La Perle Decl., 1111 & Exhibit C thereto. Collectively, these non-paid
`
`promotions of the IPOD mark have resulted in hundreds of millions of impressions of the IPOD
`
`mark reaching consumers as a source identifier for Apple’s goods. La Perle Decl., 1111. In a
`
`very short time, Apple’s IPOD product has become one of the most recognizable and popular
`
`portable media players in the country. Id.
`
`The IPOD media player is sold nationwide at Apple’s 90+ retail stores, Apple’s online
`
`store at www. apple. com, and at major retail stores that sell computer and media equipment, such
`
`as CompUSA, Best Buy, Office Depot, Target, Fry’s Electronics, J&R Computerworld, CDW,
`
`Micro Center (which also have online stores), Amazon.com, Outpost.com, and at even
`
`Bloomingdales and Guitar Center. La Perle Decl., 111112-13. Apple also offers sofiware under
`
`the IPOD mark, which can be downloaded from Apple’s website. La Perle Decl., 1114.
`
`Apple’s exclusive ownership of the IPOD mark is evidenced by U.S. Trademark
`
`Registration No. 2,835,698, issued April 27, 2004. Declaration of Elizabeth R. Gosse (“Gosse
`
`Decl.”), Ex. A. The application was filed October 18, 2001 and claims first use on October 23,
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-3-
`
`

`
`
`
`2001. The registration for the IPOD mark covers “portable and handheld digital electronic
`
`devices for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating, and reviewing audio files;
`
`computer software for use in organizing, transmitting, manipulating, and reviewing audio files
`
`on portable and handheld digital electronic devices” in International Class 9.
`
`Apple also has a family of “X” marks for use in connection with its computers, including
`
`XSERVE®, which is registered (Reg. No. 2,697,680), XGRIDTM, XSANTM, and XCODETM.
`
`La Perle Decl., 1ll5. Further, Apple has used the mark MACX® since at least 1998 as a mark for
`
`its multi-platform integration software, which is registered (Reg. No. 1,878,518), and has used
`
`MAC OS XTM since at least March 2001 for its operating software for personal computers. Id.;
`
`see also Applicant’s Responses to Opposer’s Request for Admission No. 6, attached as Exhibit B
`
`to Gosse Decl. In fact, the MAC OS X operating system is the default operating system on all
`
`new Apple computers. La Perle Decl., 1[l5.
`
`As a result of Apple’s aggressive product marketing and the overwhelmingly positive
`
`response from industry and consumers alike to Apple’s innovation in player design and digital
`
`media technology, the IPOD player has become one of the most popular portable media players
`
`in the world.
`
`B.
`
`MediaFour’s XPOD Mark
`
`On November 28, 2001, a little over one month after Apple armounced its IPOD player,
`
`Applicant MediaFour Corporation (“Applicant” or “MediaFour”) filed an intent-to—use
`
`application to register the mark XPOD for “software for cross-platforrn sharing of files on
`
`portable digital electronic devices; sofiware for cross-platform representation and manipulation
`
`of multimedia files; sofiware for sharing of files on portable digital electronic devices; software
`
`for representation and manipulation of multimedia files.”
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`I
`
`-4-
`
`

`
`
`
`MediaFour has developed its business around Apple by creating software designed solely
`
`to allow consumers to “cross-platform” between Apple’s operating system and Microsoft’s
`
`Windows operating systems. Gosse Decl., Ex. C. The XPOD product is no exception. Taking
`
`advantage of the sensation that Apple’s IPOD product created, MediaFour announced its plans
`
`to offer a complementary product to the IPOD player that would allow one to use his or her
`
`Apple IPOD product on a Windows-based computer. Id. Thus, the similarity of the XPOD
`
`mark to the IPOD mark was no coincidence. At the time of the armouncement of the XPOD
`
`product, MediaFour’s president, Brian Landwehr, was quoted as praising the IPOD product and
`
`Apple:
`
`“The Apple iPod may well be the coolest consumer electronics device I’ve ever held,”
`Landwehr said. “When I first touched it, I knew that Windows users would want it, too.”
`“I’ve personally been a big fan of Apple for more than twenty years, and continue to
`imagine a positive future for the company.”
`
`Id. Thus, by its own admission, MediaFour was clearly aware of Apple’s IPOD mark and
`
`product prior to filing its XPOD application. See Applicant’s Responses to Opposer’s First Set
`
`of Interrogatories at p. 7, attached as Exhibit D to Gosse Decl. (“Applicant first became aware of
`
`the Opposer’s iPod device, including Opposer’s use of the term iPod during or about the week
`
`following the October 23, 2001 announcement by Opposer that it would release its iPod device
`
`in November 2001.”).
`
`MediaFour has made no use of the mark. See Applicant’s Supplemental Responses to
`
`Opposer’s First Set of Interrogatories (provided in response to the Board’s Order, dated August
`
`5, 2004, compelling Applicant’s production of relevant information), attached as Exhibit E to
`
`Gosse Decl.. In fact, Mr. Landwehr has been quoted as saying that the XP1ay product was
`
`originally to be named XPOD, but the name was changed because of this dispute. Gosse Decl.,
`
`Ex. C:
`
`MOTION FOR SUMIVIARY JUDGMENT
`
`-5-
`
`

`
`
`
`Apple doesn’t think we have the right to use the “XPod” name we originally announced.
`We respectfully disagree, but have decided to concentrate on the software, rather than the
`naming, as our customers have made it clear that they want this software as soon as
`humanly possible. Therefore, we have chosen to simply change the name to XPlay.
`
`Id. Thus, MediaFour’s intent with respect to the XPOD mark can be inferred from its actions
`
`with regard to its XPlay product. Further, in its response to interrogatories, MediaFour states
`
`that “the software offered under the XPOD mark will either be similar or identical to the
`
`software currently offered by Applicant under its XPlay mark or will be a feature limited version
`
`of the XPlay software.” Applicant’s Supplemental Responses to Opposer’s First Set of
`
`Interrogatories at p. 2.
`
`The XPOD product, now sold as XPlay, was designed explicitly for use only with
`
`Apple’s IPOD product. As MediaFour states:
`
`Applicant’s XPlay software is software designed specifically to work with Opposer’s
`iPod portable music device. Sofiware features currently offered in the XPlay software
`include the ability to mount both PC formatted and Mac formatted iPods on a Windows
`PC, including Windows 98SE and Window Me-based PC systems; a unique Windows—
`Explorer integrated user interface allowing the user to View the contents of an iPod
`portable music player, including the ability to View the contents by albums, artists,
`genres, composers, playlists and songs; the ability to make and edit playlists; the ability
`to use a Mac formatted iPod as an external hard drive on a Windows PC; the ability to
`add and delete songs on the iPod ; the ability to list to songs stored on the iPod on the
`PC; the ability to edit song information (mp3 tag information) on song files on the iPod;
`the ability to use an iPod portable music player with other third-party music management
`software; and the ability of users to transcode WMA formatted song files in to MP3
`formatted song files such that the users can effectively add WMA songs on an iPod.
`
`Id. Further, the XPlay software system requirements state that an IPOD player is required.
`
`Gosse Decl., Ex. F. MediaFour currently sells its XPlay product on its website and at retailers
`
`such as CompUSA, CDW, Outpost.com, J&R Computerworld, Amazon.com, Micro Center, and
`
`Fry’s Electronics. Gosse Decl., Ex. G. Further, the XPlay sofiware packaging displays a photo
`
`of Apple’s IPOD product. Gosse Decl., Ex. H. If the XPOD software replaces or becomes a
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-6-
`
`

`
`
`
`feature of the XPlay software, as Applicant predicts, then it is likely that the same or similar
`
`photo of Apple’s product would appear on the XPOD packaging.
`
`By Applicant’s admission, the XPOD product will be software directed to Apple ’s
`
`customers to be used in conjunction with Apple ’s IPOD product: “Applicant anticipates that the
`
`software will permit users of an HFS+ formatted (MAC formatted) iPod portable music device
`
`on a Windows PC system.
`
`XPod software will remain only compatible with the iPod music
`
`device.” Id. at p. 2. Applicant expects that its XPOD sofiware will travel in “normal and typical
`
`Windows PC software charmels” through “normal and typical Windows PC software manners of
`
`distribution.” Id. at p. 3. “Additionally, and more specifically, Applicant intends to sell the
`
`software directly to end users through its web—based store. . ..” Id.
`
`III.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Summary Judgment is Warranted In This Case
`
`The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to proceedings before the
`
`Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.1 l6(a). Therefore, on a motion for
`
`summary judgment, the Board may render judgment for the moving party if there is no genuine
`
`issue as to any material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Further, a party may move for summary
`
`judgment in its favor regarding all asserted claims, or any part thereof. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
`
`In Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc., 739 F.2d 624, 222 U.S.P.Q. 741 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the
`
`Federal Circuit affirrned the Board’s grant of summary judgment in an opposition proceeding.
`
`The court explained that the “basic purpose of summary judgment is one ofjudicial economy.”
`
`Id. at 743 (citing Exxon Corp. v. National Food Line Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q. 407, 408 (C.C.P.A.
`
`1978)). It is against public interest to conduct urmecessary trials, and where the time and
`
`expense of a full trial can be avoided by the summary judgment procedure, such action is
`
`MOTION FOR SUNHVIARY JUDGMENT
`
`-7-
`
`

`
`
`
`favored. See Pure Gold, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 743. The court encouraged the disposition of matters
`
`before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board by summary judgment:
`
`The practice of the U.S. Claims Court and of the former U.S. Court of Claims in
`routinely disposing of numerous cases on the basis of cross—motions for summary
`judgment has much to commend it. The adoption of a similar practice is to be
`encouraged in inter partes cases before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
`which seem particularly suitable to this type of disposition. Too often we see
`voluminous records which would be appropriate to an infringement or unfair
`competition suit but are wholly unnecessary to resolution of the issue of
`registrability of a mark.
`
`739 F.2d at 627 n.2. See also Sweats Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co. Inc., 833 F.2d 1560
`
`1562, 4 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1793, 1795 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (lauding the use of summaryjudgment to
`
`resolve Board proceedings).
`
`The burden of a party moving for summary judgment is met by showing “that there is an
`
`absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US.
`
`317, 325 (1986). When the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
`
`the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings.” Fed.
`
`R. Civ. P. 56(e). It must respond, setting “forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
`
`factual issue for trial.” Id. A factual dispute is genuine only if, on the evidence of record, a
`
`reasonable fact finder could resolve the matter in favor of the nonmoving party. See Lloyd ’s
`
`Food Products, Inc. v. Eli ’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766, 767, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
`
`Here, based on Apple’s strong rights in the famous IPOD mark and on MediaFour’s own
`
`undisputed admissions, there are no remaining issues of material fact. “Whether a likelihood of
`
`confusion exists is a question of law, based on underlying factual determinations.” Packard
`
`Press, Inc. v. Hewlett—Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Sweats
`
`Fashions, Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1793 (Fed. Cir. 1987)(“The
`
`uniform precedent of this court is that the issue of a likelihood of confusion is one of law.”).
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-8-
`
`

`
`
`
`Thus, the determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the IPOD and
`
`XPOD marks is a question of law and wholly appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.
`
`B.
`
`Applicant’s XPOD Mark is Likely to Cause Confusion with Apple’s IPOD
`Mark
`
`Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act provides that registration of a trademark should be
`
`refused if the mark “so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a
`
`mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be
`
`likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, to
`
`cause mistake, or to deceive ....” 15 U.S.C. § l052(d). The registration of Applicant’s XPOD
`
`mark, and any subsequent use of XPOD by Applicant, is likely to cause confusion, to cause
`
`mistake, or to deceive, particularly as to the source or origin of the goods with which Applicant
`
`uses its mark. Further, registration or use of the XPOD mark may induce purchasers to believe
`
`that Applicant’s goods are Apple’s, or are endorsed by, or in some way affiliated or associated
`
`with Apple.
`
`The court in In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. 563
`
`(C.C.P.A 1973), listed a number of factors which may be considered when testing for a
`
`likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). These factors include:
`
`Similarity of the marks;
`
`Similarity of the goods;
`Similarity of the trade channels;
`Conditions under which consumers purchase the goods;
`
`Strength of the prior mark;
`Number and nature of similar marks used on similar goods;
`Nature and extent of actual confusion;
`
`Length of time and conditions under which concurrent use has not produced actual
`confusion;
`
`Variety of goods on which a mark is used (e.g., “family” mark);
`0 Market interface between applicant and owner of a prior mark;
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-9-
`
`

`
`
`
`0 Extent to which applicant has right to exclude others from use of its mark on its
`goods;
`
`0 Extent of potential confusion; and
`
`0 Any other fact probative of effect of use.
`
`Id. at 567. Since Applicant has not used the XPOD mark, the Board may not consider the nature
`
`and extent of actual confusion or the length of time and conditions under which concurrent use
`
`has not produced actual confusion. A review of the remaining DuPont factors reveals that a
`
`likelihood of confiision exists in this case and that registration of the XPOD mark should be
`
`denied.
`
`1.
`
`Apple’s and Applicant’s Marks are Similar
`
`Identity of marks is not required to support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
`
`“Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance despite the addition, deletion or substitution of
`
`letters or words.” T.M.E.P. § 1207.01(b)(ii). The standard for determining the similarity of
`
`marks involves evaluating the similarities in sight, sound and meaning. Similarities in any one
`
`of these three components may suffice for the marks to be deemed confusingly similar. In re
`
`Swan, Ltd., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1534, 1535 (T.T.A.B. 1988); In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1041,
`
`1042 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1987).
`
`Apple’s IPOD and Applicant’s XPOD marks are sufficiently similar in sight, sound, and
`
`meaning to warrant rejection of the XPOD application based on a finding that a likelihood of
`
`confusion exists under Section 2(d). First, MediaFour has simply taken Apple’s IPOD mark and
`
`combined it with the XP portion of Microsoft’s well-known WINDOWS XP mark for its
`
`operating system to capitalize on the goodwill of these marks. The combination of these two
`
`marks in XPOD describes the features of Applicant’s product to consumers, namely that it
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-10-
`
`

`
`
`
`allows one to use his or her IPOD player with a computer running on the WINDOWS XP
`
`operating system. As such, the XPOD mark instantly calls to mind Apple’s IPOD product.
`
`Further, the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark “POD” is identical in sound and
`
`virtually identical in appearance to Apple’s distinctive and fanciful IPOD mark. The use of the
`
`“X” prefix does not sufficiently change the sound or appearance of the mark, and a likelihood of
`
`confusion may be found notwithstanding this variation in the marks. In re Pierre Fabre S.A.,
`
`188 U.S.P.Q. 691 (T.T.A.B. 1975) (PEDI-RELAX for foot cream confusingly similar to
`
`RELAX for antiperspirant); Ilze Signal Companies, Inc. v. Southwestern Petroleum Corp., 181
`
`U.S.P.Q. 599 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (POLYSIGNAL R29 (and design) confiisingly similar to
`
`SIGNAL, for substantially the same goods). Apple itself has adopted the “X” prefix in
`
`conjunction with some of its marks, including its registered mark XSERVE, and its marks
`
`XGRID, XSAN, and XCODE. Further, Apple has used the mark MACX since at least 1998 as
`
`a mark for its multi-platform integration software and the mark MAC OS X for its operating
`
`soflware. Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that Applicant’s XPOD mark refers to a
`
`product manufactured by Apple.
`
`Finally, it is axiomatic under trademark law that the more related the goods, “the degree
`
`of similarity [between the marks] necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion
`
`declines.” ECI Division ofE-Systems Inc. v. Environmental Communications Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q.
`443 (T.T.A.B. 1980). Applicant has applied for use of the mark XPOD with “software for cross-
`
`platform sharing of files on portable digital electronic devices; software for cross-platform
`
`representation and manipulation of multimedia files; software for sharing of files on portable
`
`digital electronic devices; sofiware for representation and manipulation of multimedia files.” As
`
`Applicant admits, Applicant’s proposed software is designed solely to be used in connection with
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-l l-
`
`

`
`
`
`the IPOD media player and not with any other media player. Thus, the parties’ goods are
`
`identical, highly related, and designed by Applicant to interact directly with each other. Thus,
`
`the marks need not be identical for there to be a confusing similarity. Taken in combination, the
`
`relatedness of goods and the similarity of the marks yield the clear conclusion that a likelihood of
`
`confixsion exists with respect to the marks XPOD and IPOD.
`
`2.
`
`Applicant’s Goods are Designed to Be Used with Apple’s Goods
`
`The more similar or closely related the goods, the greater the likelihood of confusion.
`
`Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. ofHouston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505, 208 U.S.P.Q. 384, 388
`
`(5th Cir. 1980). Further, the more closely related the goods or services, the lesser of a showing is
`
`needed under the remaining likelihood of confusion factors. Banfif Ltd. v. Federated Dep ’t.
`
`Stores, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1187, 1192 (2d Cir. 1988). The test for proximity of the goods is only
`
`that they be “similar in use and fiinction.” AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 204
`
`U.S.P.Q. 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1979). Further, “[i]f a similar mark appears on complementary
`
`goods, then there may be a strong likelihood that buyers will think that there is some connection
`
`between the sources of such goods.” McCarthy, The Law of Trademark and Unfair Competition,
`
`§ 24:26. See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1812, 1815 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (“[A]pp1icant’s
`
`‘restaurant services’ and registrant’s ‘wine’ clearly are complementary goods and services which
`
`may be encountered together by the same purchasers
`
`[as] is evident in the well-known
`
`expression ‘wine and dine’... .”); Octocom Systems, Inc. v. Houston Computer Services, Inc.,
`
`918 F.2d 937, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding OCTOCOM as used on modems
`
`confusingly similar to OCTACOMM as used on computer programs in part because programs
`
`and modems are commonly used together); In re Compagnie Internationale Pour
`
`L 'Informatique-CII Honeywell Bull, 223 U.S.P.Q. 363 (T.T.A.B. 1984)(QUESTAR for
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-12-
`
`

`
`
`
`computer hardware is confusingly similar to QUESTAN for computer software). The XPOD
`
`p product is designed solelyfor use with Apple’s IPOD product. The likelihood of confusion
`
`between these complementary products is clear.
`
`In this case, the IPOD mark is registered for “portable and handheld digital electronic
`
`devices for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating, and reviewing audio files;
`
`computer software for use in organizing, transmitting, manipulating, and reviewing audio files
`
`on portable and handheld digital electronic devices.” The challenged application covers
`
`“software for cross-platforrn sharing of files on portable digital electronic devices; software for
`
`cross—platform representation and manipulation of multimedia files; sofiware for sharing of files
`
`on portable digital electronic devices; sofiware for representation and manipulation of
`
`multimedia files.” Simply on the face of the XPOD application as compared with the IPOD
`
`registration, the goods offered by each party are highly related if not identical. For example,
`
`both cover software that are used in connection with manipulation and transmission, or
`
`“sharing,” of files for use on portable digital electronic devices. Also, the registration covers
`
`“portable and handheld digital electronic devices,” and the challenged application covers
`
`software for use with “portable digital electronic devices.” The parties’ goods are essentially
`
`identical and complementary.
`
`Further, as Applicant admits, the XPOD software would only be used in connection with
`
`Apple’s IPOD media player for the sole purpose of allowing IPOD player owners the ability to
`
`use their IPOD player on a Windows based computer. If one does not own an IPOD player, the
`
`XPOD software would provide no benefit to the purchaser of Applicant’s goods. Further, the
`
`XPlay software, which would have been branded with the XPOD mark, requires one to own an
`
`IPOD player to be able to use the sofiware. As a result, Apple’s and Applicant’s goods are more
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-13-
`
`

`
`
`
`than just “similar in use and fiinction,” rather they are highly related, complementary,
`
`compatible, and identical goods. As such, consideration of this factor clearly supports the
`
`conclusion that a likelihood of confusion exists.
`
`3.
`
`Apple and Applicant Offer Goods in Exactly the Same Channels of
`Commerce
`
`Overlapping or complementary marketing channels increase the likelihood of confusion.
`
`AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808 (9th Cir. 1979). As noted,
`
`Apple’s registration and Applicant’s application cover the same goods -- computer software used
`
`in connection with Apple’s IPOD media player -- as well as highly related, complementary
`
`goods. Further, Applicant has not limited its marketing channels in its application. Thus, if
`
`Applicant receives a registration, Applicant’s goods may be sold and advertised in any and all
`
`marketing channels used for computer soflware. As a matter of law, therefore, the Board must
`
`assume that allowing Applicant’s XPOD mark to register would result in Applicant’s computer
`
`software and Apple’s digital electronic devices and software being sold in the same marketing
`
`channels, thus tending to increase the likelihood of COI1filSlOI1. International Paper Co. v. Valley
`
`Paper Co., 175 U.S.P.Q. 704, 705 (C.C.P.A 1972).
`
`However, Applicant admits that it is likely that its XPOD product will travel in “normal
`
`and typical Windows PC sofiware charmels” through “in normal and typical Windows PC
`
`software manners of distribution.” Further, Applicant currently sells its XPlay product on its
`
`website and at retailers such as CompUSA, CDW, Outpost.com, J&R Computerworld,
`
`Amazon.com, Micro Center, and Fry’s Electronics. Apple has its own online store on its
`
`website, on which the IPOD product is sold. Thus, both parties would use the Internet as a
`
`charmel of trade. Further, Apple sells IPOD products in CompUSA, CDW, Outpost.com, J&R
`
`Computerworld, Amazon.com, Micro Center, and Fry’s Electronics, among other retailers.
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-14-
`
`

`
`
`
`Thus, the channels of trade for the parties’ respective products are likely to be identical. Hence,
`
`consideration of this factor favors a finding of a likelihood of confilsion.
`
`4.
`
`Applicant’s Low-Priced Goods are Subject to Impulse Purchase
`
`It is well settled that consumers pay less attention when buying on impulse, or when
`
`purchasing inexpensive items. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp.
`
`457, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1579, 1584 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Purchases made on impulse increase the
`
`likelihood of confusion as to the source of the products. Id.; see also Helene Curtis Indusz‘., Inc.
`
`v. Suave Shoe Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1618 (T.T.A.B. 1989). As Applicant does not yet sell its
`
`product, it is not clear as to whether it will be an inexpensive product subject to impulse
`
`purchase. But if review of the XPlay product and Applicant’s discovery responses are any guide,
`
`then likely confusion seems evident. Applicant’s XPlay product sells for about $30 and even
`
`uses a photo of Apple’s IPOD player on the packaging. Thus, someone in a retail store seeing
`
`the XPlay software box on a shelf showing a photo of the Apple product and selling for a
`
`relatively low price could easily purchase the software believing it to be made by Apple. If the
`
`same facts are true for the XPOD product, then confusion would be likely in that situation as
`
`well. Hence, this factor favors a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists.
`
`5.
`
`Apple’s IPOD Mark is Strong and Famous
`
`“[T]he strength of a mark depends ultimately on its distinctiveness, or its ‘origin-
`
`indicating’ quality, in the eyes of the purchasing public.” McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle
`
`Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 202 U.S.P.Q. 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1979). The more distinctive the mark, the
`
`more likely confusion will result from its infringement. Daddy ’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big
`
`Daddy ’s Family Music Ctr., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1997). Further, the fame of a
`
`mark is a dominant factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis, “independent of the
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-15-
`
`

`
`
`
`consideration of the relatedness of the goods.” Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54
`
`U.S.P.Q.2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Thus, the fame ofApple’s mark is an important factor
`
`and one that weighs strongly in Apple’s favor.
`
`Apple’s IPOD mark is strong and famous. First, the term “IPOD” is an inherently
`
`distinctive and fanciful term. Second, by virtue of its registration, the IPOD mark is entitled to a
`
`presumption of validity and exclusivity that prohibits the use of a confusingly similar mark.
`
`Third, and most importantly, over the past three years, Apple’s IPOD mark has achieved such
`
`recognition and distinction amongst the consuming public due to the product’s originality,
`
`popularity, and massive promotion that it has become a famous mark, entitled to broad
`
`protection.
`
`The IPOD player is one of the most popular portable digital media players in the world.
`
`Within two months of launching the product, Apple sold over 125,000 IPOD players. As of
`
`September 2004, Apple has sold approximately 5.7 million IPOD players, 4.4 million of which
`
`were sold in 2004. Apple has aggressively marketed the IPOD player on television, in print
`
`advertising, outdoor advertising such as billboards and posters, and on the Internet. The IPOD
`
`mark has truly become a household name within just three years and has achieved distinction as
`
`a famous mark.
`
`“Famous or strong marks enjoy a wide latitude of legal protection.” Kenner Parker Toys
`
`Inc. v. Rose Art Indust., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert.
`
`denied, 506 U.S. 862 (1992). As a strong mark, IPOD “casts a long shadow which competitors
`
`must avoid.” Id. Hence, this factor favors a finding that Applicant’s adoption and use of the
`
`XPOD mark will create a likelihood of confusion.
`
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`-16-
`
`

`
`
`
`6.
`
`There are No Similar Marks on Similar Goods
`
`There is no evidence of record that other parties use or have used IPOD for portable and
`
`handheld electronic music devices and related software. Further, the statutory presumption of
`
`exclusivity afforded Apple pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 11 l5(a) has not and cannot be rebutted. This
`
`factor undeniably favors a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
`
`7.
`
`Apple Uses its IPOD Mark on a Variety of Goods
`
`Apple uses its IPOD mark not only on its popular media player but also on software for
`
`that player, which is the subject of Apple’s IPOD registration. Thus, the scope of Apple’s rights
`
`in the IPOD mark is broad, and exclusive, for a wide range of goods relating to digital media
`
`players and related software. Applicant’s use of XPOD will infringe these broad rights, and thus
`
`this factor favors a likelih

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket